215 Pa. Super. 83 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1969
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
These are appeals from the decisions and orders of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, which granted benefits under the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law to Harold S. Schmuck, whose claim was filed in his own behalf and as the representative of eleven other employes, and which denied benefits to John Leo Conroy, whose claim
These claims arose when the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 1666 (IBEW), with approximately 3,950 members, struck the Lancaster, Pennsylvania, plant of RCA from June 4, 1967, through July 6,1967. The IBEW agreement with RCA ended at midnight on June 1, 1967; and after the RCA and IBEW were unable to come to an agreement on a new contract, IBEW stopped working and established picket lines at the Lancaster plant, commencing at approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 4, 1967, and ending on July 6, 1967. Harold S. Schmuck was employed by RCA as a member of the Teamsters’ Union, which had a collective bargaining agreement in effect with RCA during the strike. John Leo Conroy was a member of the International Association of Machinists, Local No. 1984 (IAM), which also had a collective bargaining agreement with RCA in force during the strike. Neither Schmuck nor Conroy was on strike.
In the Schmuck case, the Board found that there was work available for him and his fellow claimants, that he was willing to continue working, but that he was prevented from working because management ad
In the Conroy case the Board found, inter alia, that during the strike there was work available for him and Ms fellow claimants, that there was a work stoppage at the plant commencing June 4, 1967, at 10:30 p.m., that three members of Conroy’s union were serving on IBEW’s picket line on June 5, 1967, at 11:30 p.m., and that Conroy during the strike made no sincere effort to cross the picket line, which was peaceful and without evidence of violence. From these facts the Board drew the legal conclusion that Conroy’s “. . . unemployment was actually voluntary on his part and the result of the work stoppage within the meaning of . . . Section 402(d) of the Law,” and denied compensation under Section 402(d), which reads: “Section 402. An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week ... (d) In which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed: Provided, That this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (1) he is not participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (2) he is not a member of an organization which is participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (3) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage oc
Since in both cases the Board found that work was available for all claimants during the strike, Section 402(d) of the Act is inapplicable under the facts. In Pennsylvania “work stoppage” in this section means plant stoppage and not the individual employe’s work. Pulver Unemployment Compensation Case, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 112, 215 A. 2d 269 (1965).
Under the facts of these cases the applicable provision of the Act is Section 402(b), which reads, “An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . (b)(1) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . And provided further, That the provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the event of a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute within the meaning of subsection (d).” In the Schmuck case, the Board acknowledged this to be true when it stated in its opinion, “There are two other questions that arise in this case, to wit: (1) Was continued employment available to the claimant during the work stoppage? (2) Was claimant’s unemployment, during the work stoppage, in fact due to lack of work brought about by the employer’s failure to call the claimant to work because of the employer’s concern for the safety of the claimant and its equipment?” Both questions were answered in the affirmative by the Board.
By such findings the Board recognized that there was risk of harm to nonstriking employes if they attempted to cross the picket line, which is inconsistent with its other finding that the picketing was peaceful and without violence. A further inconsistency arises when it refused to recognize that there was a risk of bodily harm to Conroy and his associates if they at
In Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Company, Johnson Motors Division v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 610 (1949), compensation was allowed to office workers who refused to cross picket lines during a strike, where no passes were issued to them to pass through the picket line, and where all the doors to the plant were locked. There it was held that it was not any act or omission of the employe but the omission
Therefore, the issue in the Conroy case is the same as that in the Schmuck case. It is whether these claimants voluntarily left their work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature under Section 402(b) (1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. We have held that if a picket line is maintained within the limits permitted by law and there is no physical compulsion exerted to prevent employes from passing the picket line, nonstrikers are unemployed solely by their own choice. Franke Unemployment Compensation Case, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 251, 70 A. 2d 461 (1950). However, we have also recognized the right of an employe to refuse to cross a picket line when there is present a reasonable fear of danger from doing so. Urbach Unemployment Compensation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 83 A. 2d 392 (1951). But in Franke Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, at page 257, this Court also stated, “If an employe is prevented from working through no act of his own, as where he is forcibly barred from working, he would be entitled to compensation.”
Where the decision of the Board is against the party having the burden of proof, the question before the appellate court is whether the Board’s findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law and its order, and can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the competent evidence. Johnson Unemployment Compensation Case, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, 193 A. 2d 615 (1963). Since we find in the Conroy case that the Board’s findings
Decision and order affirmed in Radio Corporation of America v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. 389 October Term, 1968.
Decision and order reversed in John Leo Conroy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. 2 March Term, 1969, and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
If three of Conroy’s associates personaUy participated in the picket line, this should not affect the rights of all members of the same union if no union action sanctioned their participation.
Concurrence in Part
Opinion by
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:
I agree that the decision of the Board of Review should be affirmed in the Schmuck case because the employer advised Schmuck and his fellow claimants, members of Local 771 I.B.T., that they should not attempt to enter the plant. I would also affirm the decision of the Board of Review in the Conroy case because members of the union to which he and his fellow claimants belonged, Local No. 1984 I.A.M., were actively participating in the strike.
