23 Del. Ch. 289 | Del. | 1939
delivering the opinion of the
court:
This cause is before the court on an appeal from a decree of the late Chancellor enjoining a threatened cancellation of a license granted by RCA to a licensee to manufacture and sell radio apparatus, and by it assigned to PSB with the consent of the licensor; establishing, by interpretation of the license agreement as amended, a base for the computation of royalties; and, consequently, setting a formula for an accounting between the parties.
In the documents constituting the license agreement the terms, “receiver,” “complete radio receiver,” “complete set,” “licensed apparatus” and “complete apparatus,” were used, and it is with respect to the precise scope and meaning of those terms as related to a base for the calculation of royalties that the parties became at variance.
The disagreement between the parties was not of an immediate occurrence. For some time, PSB manufactured and sold a complete receiving set with cabinet packed in a carton for delivery to the public, and paid royalty thereon. But, as PSB sought, within the terms of the license agreement as interpreted by it, to narrow the royalty base and thereby to reduce its royalty obligations, disputes arose. PSB made certain royalty payments under protest to obviate the danger of cancellation of its license. PRT was a wholly owned subsidiary corporation through which its sales to the public were effected; and when PSB was reorganized, and PRT was created, as it was claimed, as a
Briefly, the parties differ as to what is the base on which royalties are calculable and payable. RCA contends that the base is the selling price of a radio receiving set complete with cabinet as offered to the public, and not a radio receiver in the trade or technical sense; and that PRT is a mere instrumentality or sales department of PSB, set up to enable PSB to escape its just obligations. PSB contends that it was licensed to manufacture and sell a complete radio receiver in the trade sense of the term, and under the amended license agreement it was authorizd, at its option, to manufacture and sell a unit comprising a complete receiver and a loud speaker only; that it sold all of its product to PRT, an entirely separate and independent corporation; and that it was liable for royalty on the selling price of the product sold by it to PRT.
The immediate question at issue, then, is what, under the license agreement, is the base for the calculation of royalties ?
Radio is essentially an electric science. Progress in the science has been very rapid, due largely to the enormous public interest in the subject, to keen competition, and to the ever widening circle of radio enthusiasts, both amateur and professional. Broadly speaking, radio reception means the reception of signals from a certain distant transmitter with a reasonable degree of loudness and a minimum interference from other sources of radio transmission. A radio receiver is a device comprising apparatus that converts radio waves into sound waves of the same character as those emitted from the speech or music broadcast. The ap
To reproduce the audio frequency signals so that they may be heard, some form of telephonic appliance is necessary. In the early days of the art, a head set was generally used. This device was followed by what is known as a loud speaker. There were, and are, loud speakers of many kinds and varying degrees of excellence. While essential for the reproduction of sound to the ear in the absence of a telephone head set, a loud speaker is no part of the receiver. A receiving set comprises a receiver and some form of telephonic device; and as the loud speaker is generally employed, it may be said with some approach to accuracy that a receiving set consists of a receiver and loud speaker.
The case or cabinet in which the receiver is housed is not a necessary component of a receiving set, although the cabinet may be so constructed as to improve the sound. A complete radio receiving set ready for immediate use by the purchasing public may be defined to be a combination of receiver, loud speaker, batteries or battery eliminator, tubes and other devices necessary or useful for satisfactory au
It is stated in the appellees brief that RCA, through its ownership or control of over upwards of 4000 patents, absolutely dominates the radio industry; that without license from it no one can manufacture a radio receiver; and that, through a subsidiary, it manufactured and sold radio receivers in active competition with its licensees. This statement is important only as evidencing freedom in the imposition of terms by RCA upon its licensees, and as giving some weight to the thought that as RCA must have a great investment, and as it is a profit corporation, it may be supposed that its grants to licensees are not so rigid and exacting as seriously to interfere with the popularization of the use of radio apparatus.
It may be readily accepted that RCA was, and is, careful to determine the character and extent of the licenses which it grants. The license agreement under consideration is in the language of RCA. It chose the words and terms, framed the sentences and ordered their arrangement. The language of the agreement is to be construed most strongly against it. 3 Williston Contr., § 609; 13 C. J. 554; 6 R.C.L. 854. Moreover, the grantor of the license, engaged as it was in a trade or business involving a particular science and art, may be supposed to have employed terms and expressions especially adapted to, and as understood in, the trade; and if technical words and terms are used, they are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the trade, unless it is clear that they were used in a different sense. 2 Elliott, Contr., § 1511; 12 Am. Jur. 237. Beyond question the court should consider the agreement as a whole, should put itself in the position of the parties, and should examine the circumstances in which the contract was made; and a construction should be sought that will give full force and effect to all of the provisions of the agree
There is little or no dispute with respect to the evidence of the case. In fact, the Chancellor regarded it as undisputed. In any event, this court will not disturb a finding of fact made by the Chancellor, unless, upon a careful review of the evidence, there is a conviction to a reasonable certainty that the finding was plainly unsupported by the evidence. Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Town of Seaford, ante p. 199, 2 A. 2d 265.
While at times, more especially with respect to other issues of the case, the appellant would seem to take issue with the Chancellor upon findings of fact, its dissent is not so much directed to basic facts as it is to inferences drawn therefrom. On the important question immediately in discussion involving questions of interpretation of words and terms contained in the documents comprising the agreement between the parties and the construction of the agreement
The original license agreement, .which was assigned by the licensee named therein to PSB, granted to the licensee a personal, indivisible, non-transferable and non-exclusive license to manufacture at a designated place and to sell only for radio amateur reception, radio experimental reception and radio broadcast reception throughout the United States and its territories or dependencies, “Tuned Radio Frequency Receivers” as defined in paragraph (d) of Article 2 of the agreement.
Paragraph (a) of Article 2, defined the term “amateur reception” as meaning reception by one not a professional
The grant of the license specifically, was not extended to the manufacture and sale of superheterodyne or super-regenerative receivers or parts thereof. The royalty was established at seven and one-half per cent of the licensee’s net selling price of the “apparatus” licensed and sold, except that no royalty was exacted nor royalty reports required with reference to sales of apparatus purchased from or through RCA. The right to manufacture, use or sell vacuum tubes, except to use and sell tubes purchased from RCA, was forbidden; and RCA agreed to sell and PSB agreed to buy the necessary number of tubes required to make initially operative the apparatus licensed.
As the object of the grant of the license to manufacture and sell radio receivers was the opportunity to supply the requirements of the public, it may reasonably be supposed that the definition of a tuned radio frequency receiver would be reconcilable with the several classes of reception so carefully particularized in the agreement. So, by paragraph (d) of Article 2, the term, Tuned Radio Frequency Receiver, was defined as, “a complete radio receiver advertised as such and salable to the using public as such, which may include a cabinet, head set, loud speaker,' battery eliminator, etc.”
It is of the first importance to determine what was meant by the definition of a tuned radio frequency receiver.
Unless the phrase, “advertised as such and salable to the using public as such,” was of such force and effect as to destroy the plain and natural meaning of what, for brevity, may be called the optional clause of the definition, it would seem clear enough that, by the term “Tuned Radio Frequency Receiver,” was not meant a rigid and unyielding thing, but a thing as to which the licensee was granted a measure of latitude and independence in manufacture and sale. Logically this is so, in view of the several classes of receptionists contemplated in the license agreement, and the optional or permissive language of the definition of a complete radio receiver. Practically this is so, for the reason that to have required the licensee to manufacture and market a radio set complete with cabinet and other accessories would tend to deprive the licensee of available mar
What was licensed to be manufactured and sold was a complete tuned radio frequency receiver. As we view the definitional language, the licensee was licensed to manufacture and sell a thing variable within certain limits: nothing less than a complete radio receiver, but, at the option of the licensee, the same thing in combination with other named and unnamed devices comprehended within the words, “cabinet, head set, loud speaker, battery eliminator, etc.” The language is permissive, and in no sense mandatory. It has, of course, a negative as well as an affirmative significance. The appellant attempts to draw a distinction between the meaning of the word “include,” and the words, “added to.” It argues that the contract says— not that certain things may or may not be added to the licensed receiver—but that the licensed receiver may include those articles; and that whatever any particular receiver may or may not include, it must be a complete radio receiver. The diorism is not substantial.
The court below, in commenting on the definitional language of the license agreement, said:'
“As stated before, the original license agreement authorized the manufacture and sale of Tuned Radio Frequency Receivers. But, for royalty purposes, the contract made an arbitrary addition to the strict scientific meaning of the term. It provided that it ‘may include a cabinet, head set, loud speaker, battery eliminator, etc.’ The ‘etc.’ is important. Thus, the thing licensed under the patents was one thing and the articles upon the selling price of which royalties were to be paid for the privilege of manufacturing and vending the patented apparatus, was the thing licensed and more.”
The appellant contends that it was at this point that the court below committed fundamental error in holding ■ that there was a difference between the article which was licensed, and the article upon which royalties were to be paid.
Such, we think, is the extent and effect of the definition as applied to the apparatus licensed to be manufactured and sold, unless impaired or destroyed by the phrase, “advertised as such and salable to the using public as such.” Upon this phrase the appellant founds its contention that the thing licensed to be manufactured and sold was a com
This controversial phrase immediately follows the word “receiver,” but in immediate sequence is the optional clause “which may include a cabinet * * *”. A common sense construction of the term “complete radio receiver” and its qualifying phrases, adding nothing and subtracting nothing is that the primary thing licensed was a radio receiver complete in all of its essentials and ready to function as such, advertised as a complete receiver and salable as a complete receiver to the using public, an instrument upon which the buyer might rely as complete with no necessity for the addition of any other essential. Reading the definition as a whole there is no requirement, or reasonable suggestion, that the thing licensed was a radio set complete with cabinet advertised as a radio set complete with cabinet and salable as such. The implied prohibition contained in the definition is against the manufacture and sale of an incomplete radio receiver, a thing lacking in some essential. The agreement does not require the licensee or anyone else to advertise. That a licensee might, and probably would, sell its product through distributors is easily recognizable. A distributor no doubt would, as did PRT, advertise the merchandise, and in such manner as to appeal most strongly to the public. But it is entirely unreasonable to suppose that the definition of the thing licensed, despite the careful language of the contract, should come in the end to depend, not upon the words and phrases chosen by the appellant itself, but upon advertising verbiage. The definition of a complete radio receiver is to be found in the agreement, not in advertising for which, peradventure, the licensee is not responsible. As the Chancellor aptly said, the problem of definitions cannot be transferred from the contract where it was specifically dealt with, to the uncertain and highly indefinite field of advertising material. Quite apart from this, radio receivers, at the time of the contract, and even
Apart from abstractions, and construing the language of the license agreement reasonably and practically, we are of opinion that the licensee was not required to manufacture and sell more than a complete radio receiver, consisting of a chasis and tubes; and that, upon its election so to do, the minimum royalty base was the net selling price of the apparatus as thus constituted. The appellant could have defined a tuned radio frequency receiver as a complete radio receiver housed in a cabinet. It did not do so. A construction, doubtful, at best, ought not to be indulged to its greater advantage and profit.
We come now to the letter of May 28, 1929, which is called the first cabinet allowance letter. By the terms of this letter royalty was to be paid on an amount determined by subtracting from the net selling price of each radio receiving set sold by the licensee, the net cost of the cabinet plus that portion of the licensee’s total profit fairly attributable to the cabinet, and then adding $2.00 in lieu of the deduction as the useful value of the cabinet. Manifestly, the letter does not purport to alter the definition of “receiver,” or to change in any manner the base for the calculation of royalty. PSB had been manufacturing and marketing a complete radio receiving set with cabinet packed in a cartoh ready for delivery to the ordinary purchaser, and had
This letter, as it appears, was not understood by several of RCA’s licensees, and it was followed by an explanatory letter of October 16, 1929. In this letter the term, “complete set” is used, and the term “cabinet” is defined as including only the case enclosing the radio set. Speaker units, motors, magnetic pickups, phonographic turn-tables and other things, were not to be included in the calculation of the cabinet allowance deduction. The appellant contends that this letter contains the only definition of what the parties meant by “cabinet,” and that it was the “complete set” which was again understood as being the same, thing as “complete radio receiver,” the total cost of which was to be computed. However true this statement may be in a case' where a complete radio receiver housed in a cabinet was the article manufactured and sold, it is impossible to conceive of the cabinet allowance letter with its explanation as destroying or impairing the optional right of the licensee to manufacture and sell something less than a complete radio
Moreover, as will be seen, the letter of May 28, 1929, was specifically cancelled by the amendatory letter of February 27, 1932, and, necessarily, the explanatory letter fell with the cancellation.
The origial license agreement was amended by the appellant’s letter of proposal, dated October 31, 1930, and. accepted by PSB. It was proposed that from and after the date of the letter the “said License Agreement” should be deemed to include licenses to manufacture and sell, “instead of only Tuned Radio Frequency Receivers,” the following apparatus; (a) All complete radio telephone broadcast receivers for amateur, experimental and broadcast reception; (b) all complete radio broadcast receivers of pictures (including television) for use in homes; and (c) all complete apparatus for use in homes for reproducing pictures and talking pictures. By the second article, “radio broadcast receivers” of sound or pictures, was stated to mean complete apparatus (but not separate parts thereof except for repair or replacement in apparatus licensed under the agreement) advertised as such and salable to the using public as such, which may include a cabinet, head set, loud speaker, battery eliminator, projector and screen, with the proviso that radio tubes might be omitted at the election of the licensee from such complete apparatus.
The three types of “reception” were not changed. The
The term, “complete apparatus” was used, and properly so, for the licensee was permitted to enter into a larger radio field. The term, “receiver,” or, “complete radio receiver,” would not suffice. The term, “complete apparatus,” would be adequate. Substituting, therefore, “complete apparatus” for the term, “complete radio receiver,” as used in the original agreement, no alteration of the definition of “receiver” was accomplished, for, in the same sequence as in the original agreement, were the words, “which may include a cabinet, head set, loud speaker, battery eliminator, projector and screen.” The devices, projector and screen, have nothing to do with a radio broadcast receiver. So, by the omission of the all embracing abbreviation, “etc.,” and the incusion of tubes in the optional class of things, the maximum royalty base was established as a combination of chassis (as that word is understood), tubes, cabinet, head set, loud speaker and battery eliminator; and as a minimum royalty base, the chassis alone was constituted.
Next in order is the second cabinet allowance letter of May 29, 1931. Effective as of April 1, 1931, the cabinet allowance plan was modified and extended to permit the licensee to base its royalty on the selling price of the complete receiver, including the cabinet, when the selling price of the cabinet as determined in accordance with the first cabinet allowance letter and the explanatory letter, was less than $2.00. The letter proceeded: “However, if you are
The appellant contends that a complete receiver is expressly defined as including a cabinet, rather than a bare aggregation of parts. What we have heretofore said with respect to the unreasonableness of looking to a cabinet allowance letter for a definition of the thing licensed to be manufactured and sold, and, consequently, for the determination of bases for the computation of royalties, need not be repeated. The first paragraph of the letter does not purport to define anything. There is nothing in it that defines a complete receiver as a receiver plus a cabinet. There is present the same idea that a cabinet may be in combination with a complete receiver and, in that sense, a part of it; and that, if marketed by the licensee as such, royalty is to be computed in accordance with the plan under which certain deductions with respect to a cabinet were to be permitted. The second paragraph of the letter makes entirely clear whatever may be equivocal in the first paragraph. It recognizes the freedom of the licensee to market a radio set, comprising a chassis and loud speaker, without the cabinet. Such combination is spoken of as “an incomplete set,” but by the most necessary inference the licensee’s right to manufacture and market such set is made manifest. The appellant’s argument finds this difficulty: if the term “complete receiver” always had meant a “complete receiving set,” the addition of the words, “including a cabinet” would be superfluous. On the other hand, if a “complete receiver” may or may not include a cabinet, as the licensee may elect, the additional words have a definite meaning, and are descriptive of the combination of receiver and cabinet the selling price of which combination was under consideration.
The final amendment to the original license agree
After proposing that the amount so deducted in each case should be such percentage of the net selling price of the complete apparatus as the licensee’s manufacturing cost or purchase price of cabinet, tubes and parts of automobile receivers, dependent on whether the licensee should purchase or manufacture them, should bear to the manufacturing cost of the complete apparatus, the proposal proceeded:
When the entire article is considered, it is clear that the term, “complete apparatus,” has a like variable meaning as the term, “complete radio receiver,” as used in the original agreement. The meaning of the term, in the sense of its comprehensiveness, is made dependent upon the “parts” sold with the apparatus. The phrase “the following deductions” can only refer to the “parts” enumerated in sub-paragraphs, (c), (d) and (e), to-wit, cabinet, tubes and automobile receiver devices; and, to remove any reasonable possibility of doubt, it is declared that the minimum of licensed apparatus shall be a chassis and loud speaker.
The amendment accomplished at least three things. It reduced the royalty rate. It broadened the minimum royalty base by shifting the loud speaker from the optional class of things to the mandatory class. And it allowed deductions, for royalty purposes, from the net selling price of the complete apparatus, a variable thing, by an amount corresponding to that portion thereof represented by cabinet or tubes, or cabinet and tubes, if and when sold in combination with the irreducible minimum, chassis and loud speaker.
By this amendment, the maxium base for the computation and payment of royalty was the net selling price of the combination, chassis, tubes, cabinet, and loud speaker; while, as a minimum base, the chassis and loud speaker were established.
If there is anything of ambiguity in the article, the fault lies with the licensor; and it is in no position, we repeat, to insist upon a construction most favorable to it. But, we think that there is nothing ambiguous or uncertain in the language of the supplemental agreement. It is entirely consistent with the general scheme (apart from spe
The argument of the appellant upon this phase of the controversy lacks substantial merit. It is highly artificial; and it is founded upon an emasculation of its own definitional terms.
The appellant contends that PSB, by its conduct and acts, and by its royalty reports and payments prior to 1932, gave a practical construction to the license agreement quite in accord with the appellant’s contention.
It is a familiar rule that when a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the courts. The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention. 2 Elliott, Contr., §
There are no elements of an estoppel; nor is the appellee’s conduct evidence of a modification of the license agreement. Whether PSB, with intention, exercised its option to manufacture and market a complete radio receiving set, or whether it was merely careless, or ignorant of the extent of its rights as a license of RCA, cannot serve to make less effective the express terms of the license agreement.
Article 8. of the amendment of October 31, 1930, contains a provision requiring ,the licensee, in the event that any apparatus licensed under the license agreement should be sold to a corporation, firm or association in which PSB or its stockholders owned a controlling interest by stock
Prior to July 30, 1934, PET was a wholly owned subsidiary of PSB. The reorganization of PSB’s business which was effected on or as of that date resulted in an entire divorcement of the two companies. PSB ceased to own a share of PRT’s stock. No officer or director of one company became an officer or director of the other. The two companies occupied the same plant, in the sense that the same roof covered both, but whatever space PET required was definitely allotted to it, and adequate rent was paid. The two companies were, it is true, closely bound by a contract under which PSB sold its output exclusively to PET, and to the same extent the latter bought and marketed PSB’s output.
The appellant contends that PSB by its practical and contractual control over PET may properly be said to own a controlling interest in PET otherwise than by stock ownership; that PSB has breached the license agreement by dividing or sharing the benefits of its license with PET; and that PET is but the alter ego of PSB, or a mere instrumentality.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon this aspect of the appellant’s case. The Chancellor, with the greatest care and thoroughness, examined the particulars of the appellant’s charge. He considered in minute detail the facts and circumstances of the reorganization of PSB, the creation of PET, and the contract entered into between them; and with like care, he weighed all of the evidence as it related to the appellant’s argument that PET came within the provisions of article 8 of the amendment of October 31, 1930. The greater part of the Chancellor’s opinion was devoted to a searching examination of the appellant’s contentions in this respect. His conclusions were that PET was neither agent,
These conclusions were the just and reasonable inferences drawn from basic facts. They may be properly regarded as findings of fact which this court ought not to disregard. In any event, we accept the Chancellor’s conclusions, and with him hold that PSB did not divide or share the benefits of the license with PRT; that PRT, was not an agent, instrumentality, alter ego or sales department of PSB; and that royalty under the terms of the contract is calculable and payable on PSB’s selling price to PRT, and not on the latter’s selling price to its distributors.
Finally, there are certain errors assigned with respect to the exclusion of evidence sought to be elicited both on cross-examination and on direct examination concerning what apparatus was covered by patents under which PSB is licensed by RCA.
In the cross-examination of one of PSB’s employees who gave evidence on its behalf, the witness was asked if a certain device, said to be one element of the cabinet, was patented. Objection was made that the inquiry was not within the scope of the examination in chief, and the objection was sustained. The same witness was shown a copy of a letter purporting to have been addressed to him by a patent attorney of RCA, and what appeared to be an original response of the witness thereto. The letters were said to be concerned with certain patented elements of the cabinet. Upon suggestion that the inquiries were not properly in cross-examination, but were a part of RCA’s case in chief, the witness was, then and there, taken as a witness in chief for RCA. Upon his identification of the letters, they
Notwithstanding, error is assigned. Since no exception was taken to the rulings on the evidence, the assignments of error relating thereto will not be considered. Stephenson v. Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 211; Dean v. State, 2 W. W. Harr. (32 Del.) 469, 125 A. 478.
By other assignments of error abuse of legal discretion by the Chancellor is predicated upon his refusal to re-open the case to permit the introduction of testimony to show the nature and character of certain patents as an aid to the interpretation of the license agreement. In his opinion denjring a re-hearing the Chancellor observed that the patent situation as an interpretive aid was not seriously advanced at any time by RCA; that the line of inquiry sought to be developed was referred to only twice and then in a casual way; and so foreign to the theory of RCA’s case was the subject matter of the inquiry that when he ruled against it no exception was taken. He also observed that RCA had ample opportunity at the trial to show what it subsequently desired to show in a re-opening of the case; and that the application did not appeal to him for the reason that the case having been tried on one theory and the court’s views thereon having been made known, the purpose of RCA was to re-open the case to see whether another theory might not be developed which supplementing the first theory, would not be more persuasive. (22 Del. Ch. 321).
The essence of judicial discretion is the exercise of judgment directed by conscience and reason, as opposed to capricious, or arbitrary action. Where a court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of all of the circumstances, and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice as to produce substantial injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused. 5 C. J. S. Appeal and Error,
Considered as a motion for a new trial on .the ground of after discovered evidence, the motion of course must have failed. In re Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., supra. As an attempt to retry the case on a different theory, the motion had no merit. The appellant insists that it did not press its offer of proof of patented articles at the trial, because it was content to rest upon the contract as it was written; but, the Chancellor, as it contends, having changed his mind with respect to the materiality of the evidence which he had excluded, proceeded to make assumptions as to the scope of the patents not only contrary to what the ev> dence would have shown, but also for which there was no basis in the record. In brief, the appellant contends that the Chancellor did not construe the contract as it was written.
The contention results in this: The Chancellor, having construed the contract contrary to the appellant’s contention, is said to have abused his judicial discretion in refusing the appellants an opportunity to introduce evidence upon which a different interpretation might be predicated.
We are satisfied that, in view of the issues of the case as presented to the Chancellor, he did not abuse his discretion in declining to re-open the case; and, consequently, the assignment of error in this respect must fail.
The decree of the court below is sustained.