130 Mo. App. 695 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1908
Action on special taxbills belonging to a series issued by the city of St. Joseph in payment of the cost of paving Messanie street from the east line of Tenth street to the west line of Fifteenth street. A jury was waived by consent of the parties, judgment was entered for plaintiffs for the full amount demanded, and defendants appealed.
The bills issued. April 13, 1904, are claimed to be invalid on the ground that the meeting of the common council, at which the ordinance providing for the improvement was passed, was not convened in a manner authorized by law. St. Joseph is a city of the second class andr at the time of the passage of the ordinance, was operating under an Act passed by the Legislature p. 68, et seq.). The legislative body of the city was in 1903, relating to cities of that class (Laws of 1903, composed of thirteen councilman and a president who was not entitled to vote except in case of a tie. The statutes provide (Laws 1903, p. 70) : “Such common council shall hold a meeting on the third (3rd) Monday in April in each year and thereafter on the first (1st) Monday of each and every month in the year,
“St. Joseph, Mo., Aug. 18, 1903.
“The common council met pursuant to adjournment, there being present Councilmen Andriano, Barkley, Barrett, Crandell, Fullerton, Hicks, Horn, Klos, Reeves, Sack, Thayer — 11; absent Councilmen Bruce, Cannon, Imel — 3. President Sack in the chair. On motion of Councilman Barkley the reading of the minutes of the last meeting was dispensed with.
“Councilman Crandell was excused by the chair. Councilmen Thayer, Klos, Andriano and Hicks were excused by the chair.
*700 “4899. B'ecause of the lack of a quorum tbe Council adjourned, on motion of Councilman Fullerton, to Thursday, August 20, 1903, at 10 o’clock a. m.”
At the meeting held on August 20tk, another adjournment was had.to Monday, August 24th, at 8 o’clock p. m. The adjourned meeting held on the last-named date was the one at which the ordinance in question was passed. Counsel for defendants argue that “a valid ordinance can be passed only when the city council is assembled and acting as an organized body at a meeting held according, to law,” and that the special meeting at which the ordinance was passed was not held according to law for the reason that the motion to adjourn adopted at the intermediate meeting held on August 18th, was not passed in accordance with the requirements of the statute since its object was to adjourn to a day preceding the next regular meeting'day and it received only six votes — a less number than two-thirds of the members elect, though the meeting was organized with a quorum present. *
In the absence of statutory restrictions, the legislative body of a municipality when lawfully in session with a quorum present has the inherent power to adjourn by majority vote to a future date. [McQuillin on Munic. Ord., section I'll; Dillon on Munic. Corp., section 269 (4 Ed.) ; 1 Beach on Public Corp., section 268], but where as in the present case, the time for the holding of regular meetings and the method to j?e followed for the holding of special meetings are made the subject of express statutory enactment, such regulations must be strictly followed and the failure to comply with them in adjourning to a special time will invalidate the adjourned meeting and its proceedings will be regarded as coram non judicc and void. The statutes relating to cities of the second class define the charter powers of the city of St. Joseph. They stand as the embodiment of the constitution and their restrictions command abso
For a further defense, defendants rely on the conditions of a certain deed executed and delivered, by the owner of the land against which the bills in controversy were issued, to the city, under which it is claimed that the property was to be exempt from special assessments for the improvement of Messanie street. It appears that in 1871, Frederick W. Smith, who then owned the land, deeded to the city a strip thirty feet wide for the purpose of widening the street on the express consideration that the city would pave, gutter and curb the street and “keep the same in repair.’-' It is well-settled law in this State that a municipal corporation has no power to grant exemption from taxes either general or special and a contract which undertakes to do so is void, nor can municipalities discriminate in favor of any property. The charter of the city of St. Joseph in force at the time it received the deed from Mr. Smith contained no provision authorizing the city to contract for the exemption of any property from special assessments and the grant must be held to have been made by the grantor with full knowledge of the fact that he could not by any contract With the city relieve his property of its proportional share of future special assessments levied for street improvements. The opinion in the case of Vrana v. St. Louis, 164 Mo. 146, where the subject is exhaustively treated, decides the question under consideration adversely to the contention of defendants and may be consulted for a full exposition of the principle we are applying.
Objection is made to the inclusion in the taxbills of the cost of the curbs and gutters. Section 5681, Revised Statutes 1899, provides that “the costs of repairing
The judgment is affirmed.