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Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc.
970 P.2d 277
Utah Ct. App.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 сontinuing necessary, by is liable for benefits. See id. longer virtue of repeal, as no Thus, glance a 35-1-70 and its separate status. As 34A-2^416. section its section show, had, have, Legis- the and continue to notes will recodifications the annotation statutory repeatedly despite tinkered with section in scheme the lature has the on, 35-1-68, that, from 1973 which made unmindful 1973 amendments extended 35-1-70, wholly changes payments dependent benefit those rendered section death legislative persons attention particular which no automatic. paid for over seven to have been

seems CONCLUSION decades, unnecessary. quite Comm’n, Hales v. Industrial applicable We hold that the time (Utah Ct.App.1993). n. 7 case, language plain of sections 35- ambiguous and unclear 1-68 and 35-1-70 was argue that our observa Petitioners application. light legislative in of thе its section 35-1-70’s tion Hales underscores history undisputed Leg intent their situation because the applicability to liability islature to shift for death benefit have little or no provision would otherwise beyond period payments the initial 312-week effect, yet good 35-1- remains law. Section employer/carrier, from the ERF to the we not, however, 70 has become obsolete. uphold the Board’s determination that Liber efficacy provision has some not inconsis still responsible ongoing for the death-bene the intent the 1973 and subse tent with payments fit to Ms. Moore. quent amendments to section 35-1-68. The of section 35-1-70 reads as current version The Board’s determination is affirmed. follows: 1) judge may An administrative law ex- BILLINGS, GREENWOOD, Judge, and indefinitely received tend benefits Judge, concur. chap- wholly dependent person under this ... if at the termination of the benе- ter

fits:

(a) wholly dependent person is still condition; dependent

(b) under all reasonable circumstances the

wholly dependent person be enti- should

tled to additional benefits. RACKLEY, Plaintiff L. Cathleen (1997). If Ann. 34A-2-416 Utah Code Appellee, (1), are extended under subsection benefits employer/carrier will not be liable payments; will fall extended that burden CENTERS, INC., FAIRVIEW CARE appear upon the ERF. See id. There corporation, Defendant a Utah circumstances which benefits are not auto- Appellant. ‍‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍in- matically bе extended extended First, definitely by the ALJ: in the case of No. 971213-CA. children, marriage, when attainment of Appeals of Utah. Court dependen- age years, or termination of cy of the minor child does not alter Dec. wholly individu- dependent child’s as a status second, al; remarriage when divorce or spouse does not alter wholly dependent indi-

his or her status as one of

vidual. See id. 34A-2-415. When coupled

the above circumstances is circum- when “under all reasonable

situation wholly person dependent

stances benefits[,]” to additional the ERF

be entitled *2 Danny Quintana, Danny Quintana

C. & Associates, P.C., City, Appel- Salt Lake lant. Isaacson,

Peter C. Collins and Tara L. Bugden Morton, City, & Collins Salt Lake Appellee. ' DAVIS, P.J., WILKINS, Before P.J., GREENWOOD, Associate J. arrival, upon she took it her- informed of its OPINION Muriel, to also call self to not tell DAVIS, Presiding Judge: ex- at her Sharon Centers, Inc. Fairview Care Defendant impropriety about the press her “concerns” (Fairview) appeals the trial court’s Muriel. keeping the information from *3 Rackley. We L. plaintiff in favоr of Cathleen Rackley not take the initiative to tell did ‍‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍reverse.1 Peterson, any did she contact outside nor attempt in an to have the situa-

authorities investigated.3 FACTS tion that, despite nursing upset was her instruc- family-owned care Sharon is a Fairview tions, Rackley decision had made a unilateral consisting of two care facilities. operation to tell Muiiel about the check.4 Sharon “West” facili- Rackley managed the Fairview him February sequently Peterson and told what through called from November Fairview, happened. Peterson then met Rack- had During her tenure 1994. Maroney, Rackley, Merkley, and Joseph Sallie ley suggestions numerous made “East” Peterson, manager manager of the Fairview general and an owner Both'Maroney Merkley received a writ- Fairview, and regarding compliance Fairview’s failing аbout reprimand ten for to tell Muriel state law and other work- with federal and a new the check. Peterson also instituted not all of related issues. While in- policy requiring that be favorably official residents suggested changes were received funds, regardless of Peterson, formed of all by many implemented were none- assisting them with their financial who is theless. affairs. 1994, Rackley that February In discovered Rackley reрrimanded manager re- Peterson also Merkley, the Fairview

Karleen apologize for the instructed told her to call Sharon sponsible for resident had thought, incident. after further not to tell Muriel the Fairview staff resident Rackley to terminate the Veterans Peterson decided that a cheek from Mellen $720 meeting. the testimo- Merkley called her into a While had arrived. herself Administration Mellen, ny conflicting as tо Peterson had by Muriel’s is whether was so instructed Sharon keep changed and decided to Rack- managing Mu- his mind daughter-in-law who had been administrator, the ley Fairview “West” many years since as the riel’s financial affairs did, fact, that Peterson Although trial court found death of Muriel’s husband.2 Rackley. cheek into fire deposited had Muriel’s Sharon account, she wanted Muriel’s bank claiming wrong- Rackley filed she was suit of its arrival personally tell Muriel by in violation of fully discharged Fairview Muriel, convincing an Alzheimers hopes of trial, the trial public policy. After a bench resident, money spent be “[djefendant’s termi- that said court ruled her. purchase of a wheelchair for employment implicated a plaintiffs nation of policy, to wit: Rackley check clear and substantial discovered Muriel’s When of defendant’s Salt yet of the residents thаt Muriel had not been and the fact legal was marked funds.” "Fairview Care Center” that facts and "[t]he 1. We have determined penned arguments adequately presented in briefs was in. Sharon Mellen’s name out and process the decisional would not and record and argument.” significantly oral aided Depart- Rackley eventually contacted the Utah 3. 29(a)(3). R.App. P. Safety Office of the ment of Health Ombudsman, after her but not until fact, that Muriel had executed document separation from Fairview. hereby provided: I "To whom it concernid certify has authorization to that Sharon Mellen conflicting testimony as to the tone of 4. The managing my personal allow- needs assist me Rackley and Sharon. between the conversation was a modified funds.” The document ance Rackley that insinuated Shar- insists that certify Sharon originally herеby read: "I form that money, denies while on had stolen assist Center has authorization to Fairview Care charge. my personal managing needs allowance me in City facility (including Lake west side resi- ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Mellen) Muriel dent informed of the argues fact that resident ar- monies had by concluding erred that a clear substan facility.”5 at the rived The trial court fur- nursing exists that a home ther determined that “[defendant violated immediately resident must be notified public policy by, in terminating plain- facility employee ar funds employment, punishing plaintiff tiffs for en- riving nursing facility.10 at the Whether gaging in furthering policy.”6 sup exists The trial court then concluded that porting wrongful discharge claim based on unlawfully Defendant terminated the em- an employer’s violation of that is a ployment plaintiff in violation of the question of questions law. We review of law *4 Utah, public policy of the of State includ- correctness, giving no deference to the ing but not limited to the clear and sub- legal trial Ryan court’s conclusion. See public policy stantial Stores, Inc., considerations set Rep. Dan’s Food 350 Utah Adv. following: forth 3, 3, 395, (Utah 1998); 972 P.2d 399-400 Communications, v. AT & T 844 Retherford I, Article 1 of Section the Utah Constitu- (Utah 1992). 958 tion!;;] I, Article Section 27 of the Utah Consti- ANALYSIS tution!;;] It well is established Utah law that (5)[;] §§ 42 3058g(a)(3) U.S.C. employment relationship an prеsumptively is 62A-3-201, Ann. seq.[;] et at-will. See 350 Utah Adv. at 400-02; 972 P.2d at Fox v. MCI Communi 1396[r(c)(6)7;] § 42 U.S.C. (Utah Corp., 1997); cations 931 P.2d R432-150-4[; § Utah Admin. Code and] Retherford, 958; generally see Centre, Ltd., Berube v. Fashion 771 P.2d 483.10[8] 42 C.F.R. 1033, 1041 presump The atwill appeals legal the trial court’s employer tion “allows both the and the em public clusion that a clear and ployee substantial employment any terminate the supporting Rackley’s wrongful exists employer reason and allows the to do so discharge claim.9 extending any without procedural safeguards Although 5. the trial court characterized this de- public policies vene the clear and substantial of fact, finding termination as a of Browning, determination Utah." Peterson v. 832 P.2d (Utah 1992) added). of what amounts (emphasis to a clear and substantial legal is a conclusion. argues 9. Fairview also if this court con- suggests 6. The evidence that Fairview fired Rack- ruling cludes court did not err in that a little, ley having anything, for reasons if exists, to do then conduct for However, public policy. with the furtherance of which she was terminated was not in furtherance challenge because Fairview does not the trial policy. disposi- the established Based on our fact, findings accept court’s this court tion, however, we need not address issue. them as entered. important It alleged tо note that the 10. 1396(i)(6). 7. The trial court cites to 42 U.S.C. by very found the trial court is narrow. Fairview, as noted this section does suggestion There is no that the funds were im parties agree not exist. The seem to that the properly dealt with or that failure to inform ‍‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍appropriate 1396r(c)(6). citation is to 42 U.S.C. component any attempt by any Muriel was a accordingly We use that section of the United improperly one to deal with the funds. Such analysis. States Code in our may implicate circumstances presumption. which would overcome the at-will law, 8. As trial court's reliance on federal See Fox Corp., v. MCI Communications 931 P.2d (Utah 1997) ("We Supreme we note the Utah Court has acknowledged held that have public policy exception "the employ- to Utah’s that the enforcement of a state’s criminal code encompаsses ment-at-will doctrine violations public poli constitutes a clear and substantial [only] cy.’’). federal law ... if those violations contra- policies”). important public stantial law.” except as employee, to an narrowly ... will Additionally, court “[t]his Fox, P.2d at 859. public policies on which construe the is not conclu presumption The at-will may be based.” wrongful termination action sive, however. Peterson, A narrow inter- 832 P.2d 1282. at- th[e overcome An at-will unreasonably “avoid eliminat- pretation will by demonstrating that presumption will] employer discharging em- discretion (1) agree- express implied or there is Rep. at Ryan, 350 Utah Adv. ployees.” termi- be employment ment 972 P.2d 405. upon satisfaction of only for cause or nated every employment termination “[N]ot (2) condition; a stat- agreed-upon another violating effect of sоme has the right of an regulation restricts the ute or Fox, is actionable.” employee under employer to terminate widely principles which are those “[E]ven (3) conditions; the termination certain justify may not sufficient to held values of a a violation constitutes Berube, recovery.” wrongful termination policy. Furthermore, this court “will P.2d at 1043. (footnotes omitted). Here, Rackley ar- Id. principles [public policy] appl[y] those that, telling Mu- by discharging her for gues and fundamental which are so substantial check, *5 the Veterans Administration riel about question to virtually no as that there can be in of a clear and fired her violation public promotion of the importance their public policy. substantial good.” Id. wrongful discharge To succeed on public policy, a a violation of claim based on only if public policy “A is ‘clear’ satisfy four-prong test. The party must enactments, by legislative plainly defined (i) employer that his “employee must show: standards, judicial deci constitutional (ii) him; a clear and substan terminated Rep. at 972 Ryan, 350 Utah Adv. sions.” (iii) existed; the em policy public tial at 405. Whether P.2d play; brought policy the into ployee’s conduct “by ‘examining] is determined substantial (iv) discharge the conduct and well as the strength policy the causally policy play into are bringing the public the as a to which it affects extent Rep. at Ryan, 350 Utah Adv. connected.” would determining whether we whole’ and omitted). (footnote pur For 404 972 P.2d at nullify to employer allow appeal, Fairview concedes poses of this by express agreement.” Id. the Thus, on we move Rackley was terminated. P.2d Retherford, 844 (quoting P.2d at 406 was a prong, whether there to the secоnd n. at 966 policy that nurs public right residents have the home poli public on a “Legitimate reliance arriving at personal monies the informed of requires an at-will rule cy exception to the facility. identify sources of attempt the to which under principles and the public repeatedly has under- supreme court Our Berube, Public 771 P.2d at 1042-43. lie it.” “only fact that clear and substan- scored the legslative in enact found policies claim of support will public policies tial ments, judicial pronouncements, or the con poli- discharge public wrongful in violation Adv. Id.; 350 Utah Browning, 832 stitution. See cy.” accord Peterson 405; Berube, 1992) (“[W]e 771 P.2d at 1043. P.2d at hold that Here, following relied on the in exception applies this the that a clear and its conclusion expressing support in statutory language the state when I, “Article policy existed: and when the substantial public conscience is clear Constitution[;] Article 1 of the Utah society are substan- Section affected interests Constitution[;] 42 (“We I, Berube, 27 of Utah tial.”); also Section 771 P.2d at 1043 (5)[;] Code 3058g(a)(3) §§ Utah wrongful termination U.S.C. that actions for stress 62A-3-201, seq.[;] 42 et U.S.C. sub- Ann. exception involve based on 1396[r(c)(6);] § § “overarching importance Utah Admin. Code R432- public,” Reth 4[; § 42 C.F.R. erford, and] 483.10.” n. is found in both 150 — 483.10(c) 432-150-9(8) § 42 C.F.R. and Rule closely scrutinizing After the constitution- of the Utah Administrative The Code. Code (both al, statutory state), federal and Regulations provides of Federal that “[t]he “policies” administrative cited right manage resident has the to his or her conclusion, support court in of its we fail to affairs, financial facility may and the not a clear and see substantial require deposit residents to their facility employees required to tell funds with facility.” 42 C.F.R. arriving the residents of monies 483.10(с). 432-150-9(8) Rule provides, pro- two state constitutional “The right resident has the to maintain his way any type visions no mention of finan- facility ‍‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍financial affairs and the not re rights nursing cial home residents. The quire deposit a resident to his funds parallel trial court also cites to ombudsman facility.” with the Utah Admin. provisions both the United States Code R432-150-9(8) (Supp.1997). Taken con Utah Code. does text, however, provisions both of ombudsman, these mere not claim that she was an nor ly nursing mandate that provisions do these home right address the of a require cannot nursing deposit personal resident to home resident to be told of facility, funds with that funds. but must instead allow the manage residents to their fi own Lastly, 1396r(c)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. Construing language narrowly, nances. 483.10, C.F.R. and Rule 432-150-9 of the do, as we are to we decline to generally parallel Administrative Code interpret providing it as a clear and substan each other and nursing address the of a overarching importance manage home resident to or her his own requiring as a whole care facili opposed being required depos- *6 ty employees personal to tell a resident about it facility. the funds with the These three most, notify funds. At failure to facility’s sections then address the responsi- Muriel of the arrival of funds in this context bility managed by where funds arе the facili- implicated moral, personal, perhaps obli ty apply and would case at bar if gation to Muriel. given Muriel had Fairview written authoriza- manage tion to her financial affairs. This

clearly Furthermore, was not the ease. CONCLUSION these three simply require sections most review, After careful we conclude that that nursing facility when a charged has been constitutional, none of the legislative, or ad- managing with personal the resident’s ministrative upon by enactments relied provide the resident with an express trial court a clear and substantial accounting only requested when by the resi- public policy requiring a facility employ- 1396r(e)(6)(B)(ii) dent. See U.S.C.A. ee to personal tell resident about funds that (West Supp.1998); Health Financing Care have arrived at the We thus hold Administration, 483.10(c)(4)(ii) C.F.R. Rackley’s that wrongful discharge claim (1996); Utah Admin. Cоde R432-150- premised upon the violation thereof fails. 9(8)(c)(ii) (Supp. Oct. These sec- judgment The trial court’s in favor of Rack- tions do not an duty upon affirmative ley is reversed and the case is remanded to facility employees to tell per- residents when entry in favor arrived, sonal funds have particularly where of Fairview. the resident had party authorized a third to “assist in managing [her] [her] WILKINS, P.J., Associate concurs. neеds allowance funds” and those funds were deposited in the resident’s account. GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result): only language

The in these sections that remotely suggest even policy I concur in by my the result reached col- arrival, notification of fund let leagues, alone one of respectfully but disagree with their deposit funds majority requiring from a resident to achieving that result. The means satisfy Rackley it, to prohibition that failed prefaces concludes with the Ryan, that “a clear and sub- requirement of statement, right “A to main- resident has policy Ryan v. existed.” stantial financial Admin. tain her affairs.” Utah Stores, Inc., Rep. 350 Utah Adv. Dan’s Food R4.400. 1998) (citations (Utah P.2d my opinion, Legislature has In the Utah omitted). Although I believe the court important public policy enunciated correctly important public policy held that an long-term issue, elderly рersons in care facilities agree I do was at not play,” into brought right “the deprived not be of their required by Ryan. Id. manage their financial informed about lack absent a determination of affairs Centre, Ltd., In v. Fashion Berube court, in competency. The trial its oral (Utah 1989), 1042-43 the Utah “the precise ruling, identified the Supreme that “a defi- Court observed virtually impos- proper- what their nition of of residents to know sible[,]” usually grounded legislation is, otherwise, but is whether it’s financial or judicial decisions. order determination, say happens have a what exception to at-will em- provide property.” agree. I to that ployment, it must be both “substantial believe, however, I do not origi- important.” (emphasis Id. at 1043 showing employ- “that met her burden of nal). brought play.” ee’s conduct into poli- examining the sources of After Adv. 350 Utah court, majority con- cy cited the trial this case are somewhat 405. The facts of cludes that there is not “a clear and substan- There, Ryan in the case. similar to those facility employees that care aggressive question- pharmacist was fired for to tell the residents of seeking prescriptions. fill of customers facility.” arriving monies at the I read upheld pharmacist’s supreme court differently. Title least two of those sоurces termination, prohibiting a because the law Code, 62A, Aging chapter 3 of the Utah titled im- pharmacist “knowingly filling an from Services, and Adult creates the Division require the proper prescription,” did not Aging Adult Code. Ann. Services *7 (1997)), investigate. pharmacist question and establishes a Id. 62A-3-102 Long-Term ‍‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍Program. Id. Care Ombudsman at 406. The court stated that the (1997 Supp.1998). to -208 & 62A-3-201 firing pharmacist would be action- intended to The ombudsman is address repоrting upon if was able it based relating long-term ag- care for “problems activity authorities or criminal citizens, require- fulfill federal and to questioning prescriptions as The statute fur- ments.” Id. 62A-3-201. 972 P.2d at 409. law. See id. ther states: case, Rackley responded to what In this Legislature finds and declares improper practices perceived she aging citizens of this state should resident, Muriel, and Mu- tacting both the asserting civil and human assistеd in their residents, daughter-in-law, She did not riel’s Sharon. and clients of

rights patients, facility and it speak created to serve the owners of the long-term facilities specialized problems; their needs that she not until after she was fired was health, safety, and welfare of that for the responsible the state ombudsman contacted citizens, appro- these the state should take investigating acting on such matters. through аdequate legal priate action agreed apparently Interestingly, the owners framework to address their difficulties. that residents should with her and clarified Id. deposits of all to their accounts. be informed Therefore, I would conclude policy, with this the Utah Ad-

Consistent public policy in did not further the prohibits a care ministrative Code appropriate manner and I would reverse court’s on that basis. Utah, in the Interest of STATE M.W. S.W., persons eighteen under

years age.

L.A.W., Appellant, Utah, Appellee.

State of

No. 951412-CA. Appeals

Court of of Utah.

Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Utah
Date Published: Dec 17, 1998
Citation: 970 P.2d 277
Docket Number: 971213-CA
Court Abbreviation: Utah Ct. App.
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