MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Laurence H. Rabé worked as a flight attendant for Defendant United Airlines, Inc. (“United”) from 1993 until 2008, when she was terminated after an investigation revealed she had violated United’s rules governing the use of employee travel tickets. Plaintiff claims that United terminated her employment based on her age, national origin, sexual orientation, and in retaliation for complaints about employee discrimination. Rabé seeks to recover under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”); and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (“IHRA”). United moved for summary judgment on all counts. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [110] is granted.
Plaintiff, born on April 5, 1967, is a French citizen and a lesbian. (PL’s Rule 56.1(B)(3) Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts [146], hereinafter “PL’s 56.1,” ¶ 2.) United initially hired Plaintiff in November 1993 to work as an international flight attendant based at the Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris. (Id. ¶ 4.) In 1997, she voluntarily transferred to work as an international flight attendant from United’s Hong Kong base. (Id.) Plaintiff took a voluntary furlough from her employment with United in May 2002, and remained on furlough until she was recalled by United in early August 2005. (Id. ¶ 6.) After her return to United in August 2005, Plaintiffs supervisors in Hong Kong were Josephine Lau and Alwin Fernandes; the Hong Kong base managers were Lisa de la Fleur and Jennifer Wissig. Though she had returned from furlough, Plaintiff worked only three round-trip flights, all based from the Hong Kong base, from August 2005 to September 2007, when Fernandes prohibited Plaintiff from working pending an investigation of her travel (discussed below). (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff worked only three trips during that two-year period, because, as permitted by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between United and the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”), she allowed others to fly her assigned flights. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.)
I. United’s BP-3 Travel Policies
United routinely provides its flight attendants with “non-revenue positive space business passes,” or tickets, for specific purposes. (Id. ¶ 8.) One such type of ticket, a BP-3 pass, guarantees an attendant a free seat that is removed from inventory, that cannot be bumped due to customer demands or flight attendant seniority, and for which the service fee and/or taxes are paid by United. (Id. ¶ 9.)
A round-trip Annual BP-3 pass is granted to each flight attendant who voluntarily transfers to an international domicile, as Plaintiff did, to enable the attendant to conduct personal business at the location of his or her former residence once a year. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendant asserts that a flight attendant’s former place of residence is determined by her place of residence at the time she transferred. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 17.) A letter written by Frank Colosi, Director of Labor Relations, to United’s “Managers Onboard Service”
United provides all flight attendants with a Flight Attendant Operations Manual (“FAOM”) containing rules, policies, and procedures. (Id. ¶ 19.) The FAOM specifies that, absent mitigating factors, a flight attendant will be terminated for abuse or misuse of travel benefits. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff admits that it was her responsibility to seek clarification regarding United’s travel policies if she did not understand them or needed clarification. (Rabé Dep.,
In November 1999, when Plaintiff was working from the Hong Kong base, United distributed the November edition of Peak Times, the Hong Kong domicile’s newsletter, to all Hong Kong flight attendants’ mail boxes. That publication contained an article detailing rules for Annual BP-3 passes substantially as set forth in Colosi’s April 1999 letter.
II. Plaintiffs BP-3 Travel
Plaintiff listed a permanent address in France when she transferred from France to Hong Kong in 1997. (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 32.) Before her voluntary furlough period between 2002 and 2005, Plaintiff had always obtained Annual BP-3 passes to fly round-trip from Hong Kong, her domicile, to France. While Plaintiff was domiciled in Hong Kong, she had two addresses in United’s system — one in France and one in Hong Kong. In 2000, Plaintiff filed an application for domestic partner benefits with United, this time listing her address in Los Angeles as her primary residence. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 44.) The benefits application identified both Plaintiff and her partner as female, and Lau signed the application as Plaintiffs supervisor. (Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, Ex. H to Tab A, PL’s App. of Evidentiary Materials in Supp. of PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [147], hereinafter “PL’s App.”) The next year, Lau instructed Plaintiff to change her primary residence back to France, because Plaintiff is not a United States citizen. (PL’s Opp. at 2.)
On December 15, 2005, Plaintiff changed her primary address in United’s system from France to Hong Kong and then inquired about obtaining an Annual BP-3 pass to return to France. Plaintiff was notified that she was not eligible for an Annual BP-3 pass because France was no longer her primary address. She then changed her primary address back to France on January 3, 2006. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 35.)
On August 6, 2006, Plaintiff obtained a round-trip Purser BP-3 ticket from Paris to attend a Purser meeting in Hong Kong. The trip authorized her to travel a route from (1) Paris to Washington, D.C.; (2) Washington, D.C. to Los Angeles; (3) Los Angeles to San Francisco; (4) San Francisco to Hong Kong; (5) Hong Kong to Chicago; and (6) Chicago to Paris. (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 37.) After the training in Hong Kong, Plaintiff traveled on her BP-3 pass
On October 30, 2006, Plaintiff once again changed her primary address, switching from an address in France to one in Hong Kong. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 36.) Two days later, Plaintiff inquired about using her Annual BP-3 pass to travel from Hong Kong to France to conduct personal business, and requested that her return trip from France to Hong Kong be routed through Los Angeles. United denied that request because it was not the most direct routing. Instead, on November 28, 2006, United issued Plaintiff an Annual BP-3 pass on a route from (1) Hong Kong to Chicago; (3) Chicago to Paris; (3) Paris to Chicago; and (4) Chicago to Hong Kong. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 39-40.) Before boarding the first leg of this trip on November 30, 2006, Plaintiff booked a space-available ticket from Chicago to Los Angeles for later that day. After flying from Hong Kong to Chicago, Plaintiff abandoned the remaining three legs of the trip without cancelling them or informing anyone that she would not be using the subsequent flights. Rather than continuing on her authorized route, Plaintiff she flew on a space-available basis from Chicago to Los Angeles to be with her domestic partner. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff later changed her permanent address back to one in France on January 11, 2007. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 36.)
In August 2007, Plaintiff asked Lau to issue her a BP-3 ticket to travel from her home in France
III. Investigation into Plaintiffs Travel
As part of United’s investigation, Fer-nandes met with Plaintiff six times between September 11, 2007 and December 80, 2007. Plaintiff was permitted to have a witness at each of those meetings, and a witness did join her at every meeting after the first one. (N either party has identified any of Plaintiffs witnesses.) (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 50.) During those conversations, Fernandes never directly asked Plaintiff about her sexual orientation. Plaintiff asserts, however, that Fernandes asked her about why she had parking permits in Los Angeles “with a grin on his face” during a September 2007 meeting. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff later informed Wissig
On November 12, 2007, while the investigation into her travel records was ongoing, Plaintiff wrote an e-mail message to AFA union president Jake Kande, claiming that she was being “persecuted” by Fernandes because of his Indian heritage. (Id. ¶ 68.) Kande responded that he did not believe Plaintiffs comment about Fernandes was appropriate, but that she should provide any evidence she had of alleged harassment or discrimination and the union would pursue the issue. (Id.) Four days later, Plaintiff sent Kande a second e-mail message, asking for help from the union in making a harassment and discrimination case against Fernandes. Plaintiff attached an article about India’s alleged prejudice against homosexuality to substantiate her claim that Fernandes, an Indian man, was “harassing]” her. (Id. ¶ 64; Tab H, Ex. 43 to Def.’s App.) Plaintiff did not provide the union with any other information to support her claim against Fernandes. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 64.)
On December 8, 2007, Plaintiff wrote Wissig an e-mail again stating that she felt she was being harassed and potentially discriminated against by Fernandes. Wis-sig arranged a meeting with Plaintiff for December 30, 2007 — the next day that Plaintiff was scheduled to be in Hong Kong. (Id. ¶ 65.) During that meeting, Plaintiff stated she felt she was being mistreated based on her sexual orientation and national origin. She cited Fernandes’ Indian cultural background; a comment Fernandes made in 1997 about homosexuality being illegal in India; and his questioning her, as described earlier, about why she had a Los Angeles parking pass during the September 2007 investigatory meeting. (Id. ¶ 66.) Plaintiff nevertheless declined to complete a ‘Written Statement of Complainant” form at that time. (Id.)
During the investigation into her travel, Plaintiff admitted she had not flown on ticketed legs of her BP-3 authorized travel
The same day that Plaintiff met with Wissig to discuss her discrimination concerns — December 30, 2007 — Fernandes issued a “Letter of Charge,” citing Plaintiff for violation of United’s Articles of Conduct by using her BP-3 tickets to commute in August and November 2006 to visit her partner in Los Angeles, failing to complete authorized routing of BP-3 tickets, and failing to cancel the unused portions of her BP-3 routings. Specifically, the Letter of Charge alleged that Plaintiff violated (1) Article 5 by failing to complete the authorized routing and (2) Article 35 by failing to cancel segments of her BP-3 tickets. (Letter of Charge, Ex. 4 to Tab D, Def.’s App.) Article 5 prohibits the “[a]buse or misuse of any travel benefits,” while Article 35 prohibits “any conduct detrimental to the company or which has the potential to adversely affect the company’s relationship with customers, suppliers, employees or the public.” (United’s Articles of Conduct, Tab H to Ex. 12, Def.’s App.) Pursuant to Section 26.A. 1 of the CBA, the Letter of Charge also set a date (January 9, 2008) for a hearing on the allegations, to be held in Hong Kong. (Id. ¶ 56.)
Plaintiff again wrote to Wissig on February 7, 2008, asking Wissig to “finalize the [internal harassment complaint] procedure started on December 30th [2007].” (Pi’s. 56.1 ¶ 67.) Wissig asked Rabé to provide any documentation she had to support her discrimination and harassment claims and informed her that if her complaint were substantiated, it could affect the Letter of Charge hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff never completed her complaint and never provided additional information or documentation to United or the AFA; Defendant nevertheless proceeded to conduct a thorough investigation into her allegations, interviewing a number of employees, including Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 68-69.) Wissig informed Plaintiff on March 10, 2008 that United’s investigation had found no violation of the airline’s Harassment or Discrimination Policy. (Id. ¶ 69.) Wissig’s letter “strongly encouraged” Rabé to come forward if she felt she was subjected to retaliation, but Plaintiff never informed Wissig or anyone at United that she believed she was subject to retaliation. (Id.)
Pursuant to the CBA, United held a hearing on the Letter of Charge on March 22, 2008. Jacobsen acted as the hearing officer. On April 5, 2008, Jacobsen issued a Letter of Decision terminating Plaintiffs employment. Plaintiff appealed her termination through her union (the AFA), which held an arbitration hearing in September 2009 and March 2010. In a December 1, 2010 decision, the System Board of Adjustment panel upheld Plaintiffs termination, finding that she had knowingly violated United’s Articles of Conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 56-60.)
IV. Administrative proceedings
Subsequent to her termination, Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. (Id. ¶ 70.) The EEOC charge — filed on July 30, 2008— alleges retaliation and discrimination based on age and national origin, while the state claim — filed on September 27, 2008— alleges retaliation and discrimination based on age, sexual orientation, national origin, and citizenship status. (Id.) Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 75.) Though she did not receive the corresponding letter authorizing suit from the Department, Plaintiff argues that she exhausted her administrative remedies by proceeding through to a dismissal of that charge with the Illinois Human Rights Commission on June 13, 2012. (PL’s Opp. at 15.) Plaintiff filed two requests for review with the Commission; one in December 2009 and one in January 2011. (Ex. A to Def.’s Reply Mem. of L. in Support of Its Mot. for Summ. J. [151], hereinafter “Def.’s Reply,” at 6.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” such that “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although intent and credibility are often critical issues in employment discrimination cases, no special summary judgment standard applies to such cases. Majors v. GE Elec. Co.,
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the IHRA
Plaintiff alleges that United subjected her to harassment and discrimination based on her sexual orientation in violation of the IHRA. Before reaching the merits of Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court must first address whether Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies under the IHRA. See Hankins v. Best Buy Co., 10 CV 4508,
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not receive a right-to-sue letter from the Department and, therefore, may not pursue a civil action under the IHRA. (Def.’s Mem. in Support of Its Mot. for Summ. J. [110], hereinafter “Def.’s Mem.,” at 7.) Plaintiff does not deny that she never received a right-to-sue letter from the Department, but contends that she has exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the Commission, which ultimately sustained the Department’s dismissal of her discrimination claim on June 13, 2012. (Pl.’s Opp. at 15.)
Notably, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the present suit was filed properly in this court under the procedures of the IHRA. The IHRA allows complainants to commence civil actions in state court within 90 days of either the issuance of the Department’s report or, if the Department fails to issue a report within a year, within 90 days of the conclusion of that one-year period. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(D), (G)(2). These limitations apply with equal force in federal court. See Ayala v. Advocate Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 11 C 4019,
As Rabé filed this suit just weeks after filing a claim with the Department, the procedural scheme of the IHRA would be satisfied only if the Department had dis
III.Retaliation Claim Under Title VII
Plaintiff alleges that United terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under Title VII. Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs retaliation claim under Title VII. (Def.’s Mem. at 12-13.) United further claims that Rabé has waived her arguments in support of her retaliation claim by failing to raise them in her response to United’s motion for summary judgment, and that therefore Count III has been abandoned. (Def.’s Reply at 5.)
In addressing United’s argument, the court is guided by the ‘“well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered.’ ” Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ.,
IV. Harassment Claim Under IHRA
Plaintiff claims she was harassed by United based on her sexual orientation in violation of the IHRA, and defendant has moved for summary judgment. (Def.’s Mem. at 13-15.) As discussed above, the court need not assess the merits of Plaintiffs IHRA claims, as Rabé has not properly exhausted her administrative remedies under the Act’s procedural scheme. But Plaintiffs harassment allegation also cannot survive summary judgment, because — as with her retaliation claim — she has failed to develop any arguments to refute United’s position that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the foregoing reasons, United is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim of harassment under the IHRA.
V. Discrimination Claims Under IHRA, Title VII, and ADEA
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United discriminated against her by terminating
In analyzing discrimination claims under the IHRA, Illinois courts have adopted the framework used by federal ' courts in addressing discrimination claims under Title VII or the ADEA. Zaderaka v. Ill. Human Rights Com’n,
A. Direct Method
Under the direct method, plaintiffs may survive summary judgment by presenting direct or circumstantial sufficient to establish or to create an inference of intentional discrimination. Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
In this case, Plaintiffs only apparent attempt to develop claims under the direct method rests on the cat’s paw doctrine, and relates to her sexual orientation discrimination claim. (PL’s Opp. at 12 n. 16.) Rabé implies that Fernandes, a United supervisor and former flight attendant, intentionally guided and influenced Defendant’s investigation against the Plaintiff due to his bias against her based on her sexual orientation. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiffs only evidence of Fernandes’ animus toward her, however, comes from comments he allegedly made in 1997 about homosexuality in general and its status in India. (Id. at 2.) There is no evidence that, at that time, Fernandes was aware of Plaintiffs sexual orientation. Nor has Rabé presented any basis for a conclusion that Fernandes’ views controlled or even influenced Jacobsen, the actual decisionmaker. Even
B. Indirect Method
Under the indirect method, Plaintiff may avert summary judgment by first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas formula, which requires her to show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she met United’s legitimate employment expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were treated more favorably. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
The “similarly situated” test is a flexible inquiry whose requirements vary from case to case, but in each instance its purpose is to determine whether there are enough common factors between a plaintiff and a comparator — and few enough confounding ones — to allow for a meaningful comparison in order to divine whether discrimination was at play. See Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc.,
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defendant may identify a legitimate, non-diseriminatory justification for the adverse action. Stockwell v. City of Harvey,
1. Prima Facie Case
The parties agree that Rabé has satisfied the first and third prongs of the prima facie case: she is a member of multiple protected classes (she is over forty years of age, she is a lesbian, and she is a French national) and her termination constitutes an adverse employment action. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 2; Def.’s Mem. at 8-10.)
Plaintiff acknowledges that Articles 5 and 35 encompass a broad swath of activity. For instance, Plaintiff refers to two flight attendants who also violated Article 35 of United’s Articles of Conduct and were investigated by Jacobsen: Jose Silva in 2010 and Joyce Noland in 2007.
Plaintiff does refer to two additional potential comparators by name: Nancy Johnson and Jennifer Wissig. (Id. at 10-11.) Johnson, a flight attendant with United since 1972, received a 30-day suspension in 2004 for allegedly violating Article 5 by failing to complete scheduled travel on a BP-3 pass. (Decl. of Stephen Stoute, Ex. J to PL’s Opp.) Rabé and Johnson were not, however, similarly situated, as Johnson did not deviate from the BP-3 pass’s assigned routing, did not fail to cancel any portions of her BP-3 travel, did not hold a positive space seat out of inventory, and only misused the BP-3 policy on a single occasion. (Id.) Further, Rabé offers no evidence as to Johnson’s age, national origin, or sexual orientation.
Jennifer Wissig, Plaintiffs former base manager in Hong Kong, was neither suspended nor terminated for allegedly violating United’s business travel policies in July 2008. (J.W. Termination Letter, Ex. 4 to Tab J, Defl’s Mem.) When she violated the policy again in November 2008, however, United terminated Wissig. (Id.) While it is true — as Plaintiff argues — that job titles and rank alone are not dispositive of the “similarly situated” issue, the record here does not support Plaintiffs contention that Wissig and Rabé were, in fact, substantially similar. Most significantly, Wissig and Plaintiff shared neither the same supervisor nor the same decisionmaker. Both of Wissig’s alleged violations were investigated by Greg Orth (Id.), while Rabé was investigated by Jacobsen. Moreover, it is not clear that Wissig and Rabé were treated disparately: both were terminated for violating travel United’s policy twice.
Plaintiff urges that whether a comparator is similarly situated is a fact-specific inquiry and inappropriate for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Opp. at 9.) Yet the record is wholly deficient to support the notion that Rabé and any of the individuals she offers as comparators were, in fact, alike in all material respects. Plaintiff believes she was fired for discriminatory reasons, and she may indeed have been used as an “example” — but she offers no evidence that United’s Hong Kong management was aware of and deliberately ignored similar misconduct by others. Thus, Rabé cannot show that there is a similarly situated person who was treated more favorably than her by United; and she has failed to establish a basis from which the court can draw an inference of discrimination.
United is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, and the IHRA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [110] is granted.
Notes
. United also asserts that BP-3 passes guarantee a business or first-class seat and that they cannot be sold. Plaintiff disputes these propositions (PL's 56.1 ¶ 9), but they are not material to this motion.
. A “purser” is a lead flight attendant on a flight. (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 15.)
. In her Rule 56.1 statement, Plaintiff uses an alternative title in reference to the recipients of Colosi’s letter: "Managers in Onboard Service.” The parties did not provide a definition for either term. Lau testified, however, that her title at the time of her deposition was "manager, inflight service” or "in-flight manager.” (Lau Dep. at 4:15-24.) Previously, she served as a "supervisor of in-flight service.” (Id.) Based on this context, the court assumes that (1) “Managers Onboard Service” refers to flight attendants with certain managerial responsibilities during flights, and (2) that Colosi's letter was distributed to those individuals.
. Plaintiff argues that the Colosi letter of April 1999 was received by Ms. Lau "more than a year before Plaintiff transferred to Hong Kong.” (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 18.) This assertion, however, directly contradicts Plaintiff's acknowl-edgement that she worked out of United's Hong Kong base from 1997-2002. (Id. ¶ 6; Pl.'s Opp. at 2.)
. The Peak Times article explained that: (1) the pass is intended to permit a flight attendant to return to his/her permanent residence to conduct personal business such as renewal of a driver's license or passport, monitoring real estate, or filing tax returns; (2) the pass is not intended for pleasure, commuting, or vacation travel; (3) the pass may only be written for travel from the new domicile location to either the location of the former residence (as determined by the primary permanent address the flight attendant had at the time of her transfer) or to the prior domicile location, if it is different; (4) the pass should take the most direct route; (5) once a destination is identified, all subsequent passes must be to the same location for the entire duration of the transfer; (6) the pass may not be altered; and (7) altering or abusing the pass could result in disciplinary action up to and including discharge. (Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 29.)
. Neither party explains how or when Plaintiff returned to France from her November 2006 visit to Los Angeles.
. Plaintiff does not identify when or in what manner she and Wissig had this conversation.
. It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her IHRA claim with the Department on September 27, 2008. (Pi's. 56.1 ¶ 70.) Neither party has provided a copy of the Department's initial report dismissing her IHRA claim.
. In fact, the only evidence Rabé has offered to support her assertion that she has exhausted her administrative remedies belies the notion that she satisfied the procedural requirements of the IHRA. Plaintiff offered a record of the Commission’s review of her appeal from the Department's initial report, which shows that Rabé’s appeal was due to the Commission on December 10, 2009. The IHRA generally requires any appeal to the Commission be brought within 90 days of the Department's dismissal. Ninety days prior to December 10, 2009 was September 11, 2009, which was nearly 11 months after Plaintiff commenced the present suit. The court concludes that Rabé’s claim could not have been dismissed prior to her filing this civil suit against United.
. Plaintiff argues in her reply brief that summary judgment is inappropriate where the court is required to address whether the plaintiff and a comparator are "similarly situated.” Yet, as United points out, in the case on which Rabé relies for this point, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the "similarly situated” issue. Srail v. Village of Lisle,
. Discovery in this case was protracted. Plaintiff raised numerous concerns regarding United's compliance, and the court took care to ensure Plaintiff had access to all available documents likely to lead to relevant evidence, granting several motions to compel: November 13, 2013, (Minute Entry [127], Nov. 13, 2013), December, 6, 2012, (Motion Hearing [132], Dec. 6, 2012), and February 1, 2013. (Minute Entry [144], Feb. 1, 2013.)
. Plaintiff also refers to two lists she received from United: (1) fifteen flight attendants that violated Article 5, ten of whom were not terminated; (2) eleven flight attendants who violated Article 35, none of whom were terminated. (PL’s Opp at 10-11.) Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence to support these numbers, and the court could not find the lists in the record.
. Notably, in Plaintiff's own case, the investigation of her BP-3 use began in response to her request for parking reimbursement in Los Angeles.
. Although Plaintiff suggests that Jacobsen was the hearing officer for Noland’s investigation, the evidence she cites to for that proposition, a Letter of Charge from Supervisor Jimmy Chiang, does not mention Jacobsen. (PL’s Opp. at 11 n.14; Letter from Chiang to No-land of 10/3/07, Ex. I to PL’s App.)