R.W.B. v. T.V.R.W.B. v. T.V.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2024
Appearances:
T.V., pro se.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant T.V. appeals from the trial court‘s decision granting a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO“) in favor of petitioner-appellee R.W.B. After a review of the record and pertinent law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the CSPO pursuant to
{¶ 2} R.W.B. and T.V. are next door neighbors with a long history of animosity dating back to 2015 due to their dispute relating to a flooding issue and later over the property line. They have accused each other of trespassing, and both have called the police on numerous occasions. On May 11, 2022, R.W.B. filed the instant CSPO against T.V. based on multiple incidents in April and May 2022. During this time period, T.V. had a CSPO in place against R.W.B.
{¶ 3} On September 28, 2022, the magistrate held a full hearing on R.W.B.‘s petition. R.W.B. represented himself and testified at great length at the hearing; he also presented testimony from his wife. T.V. was represented by counsel; he did not present testimony on his behalf, but R.W.B. and his wife were fully cross-examined by his counsel.
{¶ 4} R.W.B. testified that, in June of 2021, T.V. installed several cameras pointing at R.W.B.‘s residence, including a front bedroom window. R.W.B. alleged thе cameras were installed “to stalk and cause mental stress” to him and his wife. He testified that a buzzer emitting the sound of “whoo-hoo, whoo-hoo” would go off whenever he was out in his yard. He specifically testified to an incident on May 5, 2022, where he was planting grass in his front yard. The buzzer was emitting the sound the entire time he was in his yard, and at some point, T.V. returned home and started yelling at R.W.B. and calling him vulgar names in an attempt to provoke him and engage him in an altercatiоn. R.W.B. testified that “I‘m hysterically scared of this guy” and that he called the police that day. R.W.B. also recounted incidents on
{¶ 5} On cross-examination, when R.W.B. was asked if it was possible that the sounds coming from T.V.‘s security cameras wеre triggered by motion, he answered in the negative, explaining that the buzzer did not always go off when he was near the cameras, nor did it go off when T.V. or his wife were in their yard, which indicated the sounds were not motion-triggered but rather intentionally set off by T.V. or his wife when they observed his presence in the cameras.
{¶ 6} R.W.B.‘s wife testified that she has lived at their home for 22 years and, after T.V. and his wife moved in, she would not go outside anymore because she did not want to deal with the conflict. T.V. constantly yelled profanities at her husband. On one occasion, she was looking out the window when her husband was working on the yard, T.V. saw her, and he “popped [her] the finger.” On another occasion, T.V. filmed her husband when he was dоing yard work, trying to agitate him and get a reaction from him. She testified she “feels threatened” when she is out in the yard.
{¶ 8} After T.V.‘s counsel presented his closing argument, R.W.B. again asked the court to play the video he referenced earlier. The court allоwed R.W.B. to reopen his evidentiary presentation and play the video, over T.V.‘s counsel‘s objection.1
{¶ 9} After the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision granting the CSPO, finding that the petitioner proved by a preponderance of evidence that the
Appeal
{¶ 10} On appeal, T.V., pro se, does not present assignments of error as required by
{¶ 11} Except for “Issue 3,” T.V. fails to cite any relevant legal authority to support his argument for the “issues” he raises. As such, we decline to address them.
Mental Distress
{¶ 12} The third “issue” raised by T.V. concerns the element of mental distress in the menacing-by-stalking statute,
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} The menacing-by-stalking statute,
{¶ 15} There is a “pattern of conduct” when there are “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.”
{¶ 16} On appeal, T.V.‘s clаim relates solely to the element of “mental distress.” “Mental distress” means any of the following:
(a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity;
(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require рsychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or received
psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mentаl health services.
{¶ 17} To obtain a CSPO, a petitioner is required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent, by engaging in a pattern of conduct, “caused the petitioner to believе he or she would cause [the] petitioner mental distress or physical harm, not that the respondent did in fact cause physical harm or mental distress.” J.A.C. v. A.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110999, 2022-Ohio-2275, ¶ 12, quoting L.J. v. M.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109403, 2021-Ohio-312, ¶ 7. See also M.D. v. M.D., 2018-Ohio-4218, 121 N.E.3d 819, ¶ 98-99 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554, and State v. Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 48. Nothing in
{¶ 18} The magistrate here found the testimony showed that several cameras installed by T.V. made loud and constant noises whenever R.W.B. was
{¶ 19} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner R.W.B. has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the element of mental stress required in the menacing-by-stalking statute. Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating, and actual treatment by a professional is not required to prove mental distress. The trial court here was permitted to rely on its knowledge and experience in determining whether mental distress has been caused. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s decision granting the CSPO in favor оf the petitioner.
{¶ 20} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandatе issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR