61 S.E. 185 | N.C. | 1908
A jury trial having been formally waived by the parties, the court heard the testimony and found the facts as follows:
1. The plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of North Carolina.
2. The defendant is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of North Carolina.
3. On 1 September, 1904, the plaintiff made, duly executed, and delivered a lease to the Howland improvement Company. A copy of said lease is hereto annexed and made a part of these findings of fact. *276
4. The defendant succeeded to the rights and liabilities of the said Howland Improvement Company under said lease.
5. Previous to the execution of said lease the plaintiff used in its locomotives for the transportation of freight and passengers over its railroad wood as fuel, and for the purpose of supplying itself with a sufficient quantity of wood the plaintiff had purchased timber lands and standing timber and had entered into contracts with several persons for cutting timber, among others one B. W. Ives, for the cutting and delivery to plaintiff of 15,000 cords of wood; and in pursuance of said contract the said Ives, prior to the date of said lease, had cut and delivered large quantities of said wood to plaintiff, and at the time of the execution of said lease the contract between plaintiff and Ives was in regular course of performance by both parties thereto.
6. When the defendant took over the property of the plaintiff under the said lease all of the locomotives which it received were what (371) are known as "wood burners," and it was necessary to have an adequate supply of wood as fuel for said locomotives, and the defendant used in its railroad operations only those locomotives for several months, and used up large quantities of wood as fuel, including a portion of the wood cut and delivered to plaintiff by said Ives under said contract.
7. Some months after defendant had been in the operation of said railroad under the said lease it changed the locomotives from "wood burners" to "coal burners."
8. After the lease the defendant refused to carry out the wood contract with Ives or to take any wood from him under and in pursuance of said contract between the plaintiff and said Ives; thereupon the said Ives demanded of the plaintiff that it carry out said contract, and upon the failure of the plaintiff to perform said contract the said Ives, on 28 December, 1904, brought suit against the plaintiff for the breach of said contract,
9. Upon the institution of said suit the plaintiff notified the defendant to come in and defend the same, which the defendant declined to do, and the plaintiff undertook the defense of said suit and did defend it to the best of its ability and at considerable expense and cost, but judgment was finally awarded, both in the Superior and Supreme Courts, against the plaintiff and in favor of said Ives for the sum of $8,106.90, with interest and costs. In addition to said amount, the plaintiff was forced to pay the following amounts: Interest on said amount, $216.16; cost, Superior Court, $104.60; cost, Supreme Court, $23.55; attorney's fee, $700; amounting in all at the time of said payment to the sum of $9,147.21.
10. The defendant knew of the existence of said contract at the time *277 of the said lease, as shown by the paper-writing itself and the testimony of Rowland, Davidson, and Bryan.
11. Said contract was assignable and was duly assigned by the plaintiff to the defendant and was broken by the defendant.
12. Said contract between the plaintiff and B. W. Ives was not (372) in writing, nor was there any writing concerning same at the time of the making of the lease to the defendant.
13. The referee held that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the amount set out in paragraph 9 above, and that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant accordingly.
The portions of the lease referred to in the third finding of fact, pertinent to this inquiry, are as follows:
"Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the several sums of money, rents, covenants, agreements, and stipulations hereinafter specified and agreed to be paid, kept, and performed by the Rowland Improvement Company, the said lessor, namely, The Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad Company, has demised, let, hired, farmed out, and delivered, and by these presents doth demise, let, hire, farm out, and deliver to the said lessee, namely, The Howland Improvement Company, the entire railroad of the lessor, with all its franchises, privileges, rights of transportation, works, property, including among other things its superstructure, roadbed, and rights of way incident thereto, situated in the State of North Carolina and extending from Morehead City, in the county of Carteret, to the city of Goldsboro, in the county of Wayne, in the said State; and also all depots, houses, shops, piers, wharves, water fronts, water privileges, buildings, fixtures, engines, cars, and railroad equipment, and all franchises, rights and privileges and other things, if any, of whatsoever kind and nature, to the said lessor belonging and necessary, incident, and appurtenant to the free, easy, and convenient operation of the said railroad leased hereby and now or heretofore used in that behalf; and also including the property situated in the said Morehead City known as the Atlantic Hotel, with all its rights, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances, and the furniture, fixtures, equipments, and appliances now therein or used therewith, and also all lands and interests in lands, timber, timber rights, and contracts now owned by the lessor, for the full term of ninety-one (91) years (373) and four (4) months from and after the first day of September, 1904, and to be fully ended, commencing the first day of September, 1904."
And, further, a covenant of indemnity as follows:
"And the lessee further covenants to and with the lessor, its successors and assigns, to indemnify and save harmless the said lessor against and *278 from any and all damages which may be recovered from or against it, according to law, by reason of any failure of the said lessee, its agents, employees, successors or assigns to perform in all things, or its or their violation of their duties and obligations, whereby the lessor may become liable to any party injured or sustaining injury in his or her person, reputation, or property; and the lessor on its part covenants to and with the lessee that whenever any suit or action shall be instituted against it, the said lessor, for any causes of action for which the lessee would be liable to the lessor under the terms of this lease, the lessor will immediately give due notice and tender defense of such suit or action to the lessee, such notice to be given to the resident agent of the lessee at either of the following named places, to wit, Morehead City, New Bern, Kinston or Goldsboro, all in the State of North Carolina."
And further: "It is further agreed between the parties that all cash on hand and all bills and accounts receivable, due and payable to the lessor, at the date this lease goes into effect shall not pass by this conveyance, nor shall the lessee be liable for any debts of the said lessor at said date."
On the findings of fact and conclusions of law there was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepted and appealed.
(374) After stating the case: The contract by reason of which this recovery was had and its effect and binding force as between the original parties were construed and determined in Ives v. R. R.,
Such recovery is resisted on the grounds chiefly (1) that the contract in question was not assignable; (2) that as a matter of fact it was not assigned. But we are of opinion that neither position can be sustained.
While at common law the rights and benefits of a contract, except in the case of the law merchant and in cases where the crown had an interest, could not be transferred by assignment, a doctrine which Lord *279 Coke attributes to the "wisdom and policy of the founders of our law in, discouraging maintenance and litigation, but which Sir Frederick Pollock tells us is better explained as a logical consequence of the archaic view of a contract as creating a strictly personal obligation between the debtor and creditor," the rule in its strictness was soon modified in practical application by the common-law courts themselves and more extensively by the decisions of the courts of equity; and the principles established by these cases have been sanctioned and extended by legislation until now it may be stated as a general rule that, unless expressly prohibited by statute or in contravention of some principle of public policy, all ordinary business contracts are assignable, and that actions for breach of same can be maintained by the assignee in his own name.
The general doctrine as to the assignability of rights is very well (375) stated in 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., sec. 1275, as follows:
What Things in Action Are or Are Not Assignable. — it becomes important, then, in fixing the scope of the equity jurisdiction, to determine what things in action may thus be legally assigned. The following criterion is universally adopted: All things in action which survive and pass to the personal representatives of a decedent creditor as assets, or continue as liabilities against the representatives of a decedent debtor, are in general thus assignable; all which do not thus survive, but which die with the person of the creditor or of the debtor, are not assignable. The first of these classes, according to the doctrine prevailing throughout the United States, includes all claims arising from contract, express or implied, with certain well defined exceptions; and those arising from torts to real or personal property and from frauds, deceits, and other wrongs whereby an estate, real or personal, is injured, diminished, or damaged. The second class embraces all torts to the person or character, where the injury and damage are confined to the body and the feelings; and also those contracts, often implied, the breach of which produces only direct injury and damage, bodily or mental, to the person, such as promises to marry, injuries done by the want of skill of a medical practitioner contrary to his implied undertaking, and the like; and also those contracts, so long asthey are executory, which stipulate solely for the special personal services, skill, or knowledge of a contracting party."
And an interesting and well considered article by Prof. Frederick C. Woodard on the assignability of contracts will be found in 18 Harvard Law Review, 23. There is an exception, as indicated in the last part of this citation from Pomeroy, to the effect that executory contracts for personal services involving a personal relation or confidence between the parties cannot be assigned. Lawson on Contracts, sec. 355. And another, equally well established and well-nigh as broad as the rule itself, *280
(376) is that executory contracts imposing liabilities or duties which in express terms or by fair intendment from the nature of the liabilities themselves import reliance on the character, skill, business standing or capacity of the parties cannot be assigned by one without the assent of the other. This last exception and the reason upon which it rests are stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion in Delaware v. Diebold,
In Devlin v. New York, supra, the general principle we are discussing is stated and applied as follows:
"1. Where an executory contract is not necessarily personal in its character, and can, consistent with the rights and interests of the adverse *281 party, we fairly and sufficiently executed as well by an assignee as by the original contractor, and where the latter has not disqualified himself from a performance of the contract, it is assignable.
"2. The assignment by the contractor with a municipal corporation for work is not against public policy so long as the corporation retains the personal obligation of the original contractor and his sureties; and in the absence of anything in the statute which authorized the work prohibiting it, such an assignment is valid. It does not terminate the contract or authorize the corporation to repudiate it.
"3. Accordingly held that an assignee of a contract for street cleaning, made between the corporation of the city of New York and another under authority of the act entitled `An act to enable the supervisors of the county of New York to raise money by tax for city purposes and to regulate the expenditure thereof,' etc. (ch. 509, Laws 1860), could maintain an action against the city for money due thereon and for damages resulting from a repudiation of the contract and an interference on the part of the city authorities, preventing a further performance." (378)
In Wagon Co. v. Lea, supra, Chief Justice Cockburn, delivering the opinion, discusses the principle as follows: "We entirely concur in the principle on which the decision in Robson v. Drummond (1) rests, namely, that where a person contracts with another to do work or perform service, and it can be inferred that the person employed has been selected with reference to his individual skill, competency, or other personal qualification, the inability or unwillingness of the party so employed to execute the work or perform the service is a sufficient answer to any demand by a stranger to the original contract of the performance of it by the other party, and entitles the latter to treat the contract as at an end, notwithstanding that the person tendered to take the place of the contracting party may be equally well qualified to do the service. Personal performance is in such a case of the essence of the contract, which consequently cannot in its absence be enforced against an unwilling party. But this principle appears to us inapplicable in the present instance, inasmuch as we cannot suppose that in stipulating for the repair of these wagons by the company — a rough description of work which ordinary workmen conversant with the business would be perfectly able to execute — the defendants attached any importance to whether the repairs were done by the company or by any one with whom the company might enter into a subsidiary contract to do the work. All that the hirers, the defendants, cared for in this stipulation was that the wagons should be kept in repair; it was indifferent to them by whom the repairs should be done. Thus, if without going into liquidation or assigning these contracts the company had entered into a contract with *282 any competent party to do the repairs, and so had procured them to be done, we cannot think that this would have been a departure from the terms of the contract to keep the wagons in repair. While fully acquiescing in the general principle just referred to, we must take care (379) not to push it beyond reasonable limits. And we cannot but think that in applying the principle the Court of Queen's Bench, in Robsonv. Drummond (1), went to the utmost length to which it can be carried, as it is difficult to see how in repairing a carriage when necessary, or painting it once a year, preference would be given to one coach-maker over another. Much work is contracted for which it is known can only be executed by means of subcontracts; much is contracted for as to which it is indifferent to the party for whom it is to be done whether it is done by the immediate party to the contract or by some one on his behalf. In all these cases the maxim, Qui fact per aliumfacit per se, applies."
It will be noted here that while the case of Robson v. Drummond, frequently cited in support of the position that contracts imposing liabilities cannot be assigned, is not overruled, there is decided intimation that it has gone too far in the application of this principle, and there is doubt if Ice Co. v. Potter,
This, ordinarily, is all the books mean when they state the proposition in general terms that a contract imposing liability cannot be assigned; that the assignment of such a contract does not, as a rule, relieve the assignor from responsibility. It may be well to note that we are speaking of the assignment of the contract and not of the transfer of the property about which parties may have contracted. In the last case it is a generally accepted doctrine that, in the absence of an agreement, express or implied, a party who buys property from a vendee, to whom the owner has contracted to sell it, does not, as a rule, come under personal obligation to the owner to pay the purchase price. Adams v. Wadhams, 40 Bar., 225; Comstockv. Hitt,
The contract in question here, being for the delivery of so much cordwood on defendant's right of way, may be classed with a contract of sale of a given quantity of staple goods having a known market value, and, under the principle established by the authorities referred to, we hold that it was assignable, so as to impose on defendant the (381) obligation to pay for the wood when delivered according to its terms.
And we are also of the opinion that by the terms of the lease the contract was, and was intended to be, assigned. The operative words of the lease are that the parties of the "first part do demise, let, hire, farm out, and deliver to the said lessee, etc., the franchise, property, etc., of the lessor for the full term of ninety-one years and four months from and after the first day of September, 1904." And the descriptive words as to the property passed included the franchise, works, property, right of way, etc., appertaining to the railroad; also the Atlantic Hotel property, with all its rights, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances, and the furniture, etc., used therewith; and, in reference to the matter now before us, "also all lands and interests in lands, timber, timber rights and contracts now owned by the lessor," etc. There was testimony to the effect, and it was found as a fact by the trial judge:
"5. That previous to the execution of said lease the plaintiff used in its locomotives for the transportation of freight and passengers over its railroad wood as fuel, and for the purpose of supplying itself with a sufficient quantity of wood the plaintiff had purchased timber lands and standing timber and had entered into contracts with several persons for cutting timber, and among others one B. W. Ives, for the cutting and delivering to plaintiff of 15,000 cords of wood; and in pursuance of said *284 contract the said Ives, prior to the date of said lease, had cut and delivered large quantities of said wood to plaintiff, and at the time of the execution of said lease the contract between plaintiff and Ives was in regular course of performance by both parties thereto.
"6. That when the defendant took over the property of the plaintiff under the said lease all of the locomotives which it received were what are known as `wood burners,' and it was necessary to have an adequate supply of wood as fuel for said locomotives; and that the defendant used in its railroad operations only those locomotives for several (382) months and used large quantities of wood as fuel, including a portion of the wood cut and delivered to plaintiff by said Ives under said contract.
"7. That some months after defendant had been in the operation of said railroad under the said lease it changed the locomotives from `wood burners' to `coal burners.'"
It is well recognized that the object of all rules of interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract, and that in written contracts which permit of construction this intent is to be gathered from a perusal of the entire instrument. In Paige on Contracts, sec. 1112, we find it stated: "Since the object of construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties, the contract must be considered as an entirety. The problem is not what the separate parts mean, but what the contract means when considered as a whole." And while in arriving at this intent words are prima facie to be given their ordinary meaning, this rule does not obtain when the "context or admissible evidence shows that another meaning was intended." Paige, sec. 1105. And further, in section 1106 it is said that the context and subject-matter may affect the meaning of the words of a contract, especially if in connection with the subject-matter the ordinary meaning of the term would give an absurd result. Again, as said by Woods, J., in Merriam v. United States,
And so, as to the words "timber," ordinarily this term applies to timber fitted for structural purposes, hut it would be entirely improper to give it that significance when the testimony shows that the entire purpose of these holdings and contracts concerning them was to supply (384) cordwood for the operating purposes of the railroad. And we think it a fair surmise, permissible in view of the facts and attendant circumstances, that if the lessee had not decided to change its engines from wood to coal burners this litigation would never have arisen.
If we are correct in our position that the contract was assignable, and that as a matter of fact it was assigned, then we are of opinion that plaintiff has the undoubted right to recover of the defendant the amount of the judgment, together with the cost and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in resisting the suit instituted by Ives. Though the lessee may have repudiated any and all obligations to Ives by reason of this contract, the lessor was not thereby relieved of the obligation to do what was reasonably required to resist recovery. Tillinghast v. Cotton Mills, *286
When the defendant bought and took an assignment of this contract for the delivery of so much cordwood on its right of way, and thus acquired the right to enforce performance by Ives or recover damages for its breach, it assumed the liability to pay for it when delivered. It could not take over the benefits of the contract without bearing its burdens. Defendant took the contract cum onere (R. R. v. Bank,
In the citation from Keener, supra, it is said: "It may be stated as a general proposition that a plaintiff can recover against a defendant as for money paid to his use to the extent that the claim paid by the plaintiff should have been paid by the defendant." This primary liability of the assignee is well brought out in the case of Cutting Pocking Co. v. Packers'Exchange,
The assignment of the Ives contract having established as between the parties a primary liability on the part of the defendant lessee, the obligations of that contract would not by any fair or correct interpretation be included under the later stipulation of the lease, "that defendant shall not be liable for any debt of the lessor at that date." This obligation, by the force and effect of the lease and assignment, had become the debt primarily of the lessee. And for the same reason the doctrine stated in general terms by Mr. Elliott in his valuable work on railroads (section 461), to which we were referred by counsel, (387) "that a lessee, under an authorized lease, is not liable on the contracts of the lessor in the absence of a stipulation to that effect," does not apply here. This is true when the lessee takes over the franchise and ordinary property of the lessor, without more; but in the case before us the lessee has taken the contract, thereby imposing on itself the obligation as a primary liability. And this distinguishes the present case *288
from that of Pennsylvania Co. v. R. R.,
The objection to the testimony of one who had been of counsel for Howland, the original lessee, as to the fact that the Ives contract was mentioned and referred to at the time of taking the lease, is (388) without merit. This was a fact necessarily known to both parties, brought out during their negotiation concerning the lease, and could in no sense be considered a confidential communication. Weeks on Attorneys, 289; Wigmore Evidence, 2311, 2312; 23 A. E., 67;Elliott v. Elliott, 92 N.W. 1008, citing with approval Hills v. State,
After giving the case most careful consideration, we find no error in the record, and the judgment below must be
Affirmed.
Cited: Younce v. Lumber Co.,