OPINION
Wе granted review to consider whether the dispute resolution provisions of the rules adopted by the State Board of Education prescribing school district procurement practices violаte due process. We find that we need not reach that issue because the rules fail to comply with the enabling legislation.
I. Introduction
The Governing Board of the Peoria Unified School District No. 11, as owner, entered into an American Institute of Architects standard form of agreement with R.L. Augustine Construction Company, as contractor, to build an administration center in Glendale. A dispute arose over delays, аnd each party blamed the other. The Governing Board imposed liquidated damages on Augustine and denied its request for additional payment. Through counsel, the parties exchanged letters in an effort to settle the dispute, ultimately culminating in an agreement that those letters would satisfy the first tier of the contract claim mechanism under Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R7-2-1155-1159 of the Board of Education’s procurеment rules (submission of claim to the district representative). The parties then went to stage two, under which Augustine appealed to the Governing Board under A.A.C. R7-2-1158. The Governing Board, again acting through the samе counsel, advised Augustine that it would appoint a hearing officer under A.A.C. R7-2-1181. At the hearing, Augustine made a record of its claim that there was no difference between the district representative, the hеaring officer, and the Governing Board. Augustine argued that it was inherently unfair to have one of the parties to the contract act as both litigant and judge. Nevertheless, the hearing proceedеd, and the hearing officer submitted his recommendation to the Governing Board under A.A.C. R7-21181(F). The decision of the Governing Board under A.A.C. R7-2-1181(G) followed, for the most part, the recommendation of the hearing officеr.
Augustine then filed an action in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County seeking judicial review of an administrative decision under A.R.S. § 12-905 of the Administrative Review Act, and also seeking a declaratiоn that the Board of Education’s procurement rules were unconstitutional because one of the parties to the contract, the Governing Board, as owner, also acted as the final аgency decision maker. On motion of the Governing Board, the superior court dismissed the complaint because Augustine failed to seek rehearing under A.A.C. R7-21182.
Augustine appealed to the court of аppeals which held that the Board of Education’s procurement rules were unconstitutional and that the Administrative Review Act did not apply to school districts. It thus reversed.
R.L. Augustine Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. No. 11,
II. The Board’s Rules for Administrative Review
Although we granted review on the constitutionality of the Board of Eduсation’s procurement rules, amici Arizona General Contractors Association,
et al.,
suggested that the court need not reach the constitutional question to decide the case. We will not reach a constitutional question if a case can be fairly decided on nonconstitutional grounds.
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair,
A.R.S. § 15-213(A) provides in relevant part that “[t]he state board of education shall adopt rules prescribing procurement practicеs for all school districts in this state ... consistent with the procurement practices prescribed in title 41, chapter 23 [A.R.S. § 41-2501 et seq.l” A.R.S. § 41-2611(A) requires administrative review of all contract claims under the Procurement Codе “before the purchasing agency and through an appeal heard before the director in accordance with chapter 6 of this title [A.R.S. § 41-1001 et seq.V’ Under A.R.S. § 41-2503(18), “‘Purchasing agency 1 means any state governmental unit which is authorized by this сhapter or its implementing regulations, or by way of delegation from the director, to enter into contracts.” Under A.R.S. § 41-2503(10), “ ‘Director’ means the director of the department of administration.” Under A.R.S. § 41-2611(B), the direсtor may appoint a hearing officer to submit a recommendation but the ultimate decision is the director’s to make.
Thus, under the Procurement Code, there is a two-tiered administrative procеss. The first is with the unit of government that procures the goods or services. 1 The second is with the director of the department of administration. The rules adopted by the director under A.R.S. § 41-2611(A) are consistent with this dual еntity scheme. See A.A.C. R2-7-916-919.
In contrast, the rules adopted by the Board of Education, while structured as a two-tiered process in form, in substance provide a one-tier process in which the purchasing body constitutes both the first and second tier. Under A.A.C. R7-2-1155-1156, the Governing Board’s district representative is the first administrative decision maker. Under A.A.C. R7-2-1155, 1158, and 1181, second-tier administrative review is by a hearing officer appointed by the Governing Board or by the Governing Board itself, with final decision making in the Governing Board. Thus, unlike the Procurement Code in which the purchasing agency and the director are separate entities, under the rules adopted by the Board of Education, the purchasing agency is both the first-tier reviewer and the second-tier final decision maker. In effect, as Augustine has argued here, the interested party is the adjudicator of contract obligations. A scheme that would have been consistent with the Procurement Code might have first-tier review by a school district representative, or the Governing Board of the sсhool district, and second-tier review and decision making by the Board of Education. The Board of Education, unlike the Governing Board of the school district, would not be a party to the contract undеr review.
We are thus of the view that the contract claim mechanisms set forth in A.A.C. R7-21155, 1158, and 1181 are not substantially consistent with the mechanisms under A.R.S. § 41-2611(A) and the rules adopted by the director of the department of аdministration under the statute. They are thus void under A.R.S. § 15-213 which defines the scope of
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the Board of Education’s authority to adopt rules.
Canon Sch. Dist. v. W.E.S. Constr. Co.,
III. Judicial Review
The court of appeals held that there was no right to judicial review under the Administrative Review Act because the school district, as a political subdivision of the state, is excluded under A.R.S. § 12-901(1) and § 12-902(A). If true, this is another instance of an inconsistency between the Procurement Code and the Board’s procurement rules.
Under the Prоcurement Code, A.R.S. § 41-2614, any final decision of the director of the department of administration is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. In contrast, the Board of Education’s procuremеnt rules have no provision for judicial review. The Governing Board argues that A.A.C. R7-2-1159 provides for judicial review because it provides that hearings on appeals of contract claims shall be conducted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, A.R.S. § 41-1001 et seq. It further argues that proceedings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. § 12-902(A). While A.R.S. § 12-902(A) provides for judicial review of a final decision of an “administrative agency,” A.R.S. § 12-901(1) expressly excludes political subdivisions from the definition of “administrative agency.” It thus appears that the Board’s prоcurement rules do not provide for judicial review. This is not compatible with the consistency requirement of A.R.S. § 15-213(A).
Without a judicial review provision, the administrative mechanisms created by the Board of Education are without effect. At the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, an aggrieved party would have to bring a de novo action in the superior court on the contract, thus rendering useless thе entire administrative proceeding. We do not believe the legislature would have required the Board of Education to adopt rules for the administrative review of contract disputes unless they had some meaning, i.e., were subject to judicial review and did not require a de novo contract action in every instance. See A.R.S. § 12-910. Had the Board adopted a rule for judicial review, the Administrative Review Act would have applied even though the school district is not an administrative agency within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-901(1), because A.R.S. § 15-213(A) confers power on the Board to adopt rules consistent with the Procurement Code, which itself provides for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Act. See A.R.S. § 41-2614. We note also that had the Board of Education adopted rules that provided that it, rather than the Governing Board, would be the final administrative decision maker, then the Board of Education, as an administrative agency, would сome within the express scope of A.R.S. § 12-902(A).
IV. Conclusion
The rules of procurement adopted by the Board of Education are not consistent with the Procurement Code in at least two respects: (1) the purchasing agency is also the final agency decision maker, and (2) there is no judicial review. To this extent, the rules are violative of A.R.S. § 15-213(A). We therefore reverse the judgment of the superi- or court which dismissed Augustine’s complaint, vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, and remand to the superior court for a trial de novo on the respective claims of Augustine and the Governing Board.
CORCORAN, J. (Retired) did not participate in the determination of this matter. ROBERT D. MYERS, Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, was designated to sit in his stead pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. VI, § 3.
Notes
. We do not address the setting in which the department of administration is itself the purchasing agency in fact.