R. Anthony Marrese, M.D. And Michael R. Treister, M.D. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons

ERISA, аllegedly which was caused Fund, scheme to bilk by a fraudulent Anthony MARRESE, R. M.D. and Allegations instant action. crux Treister, M.D., Michael R. part per only plain- of fraud se are Plaintiffs-Appellees, conspiracy alleging tiffs’ claim. In a con- spiracy facilitate the fraudulent diver- AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHO sion Fund’s insurance premiums, SURGEONS, PAEDIC set forth in sufficient detail Defendant-Appellant. necessary facts to state a claim upon which No. 81-2671. may granted.43 relief be United Appeals, States Seventh Circuit. IV. CONCLUSION The order granting summary judgment Argued Feb. 1982. Welch, in favor Morgan of Kleindienst and Decided Nov. 1982. & Kleindienst is reversed. The order dis- Rehearing En Banc Granted Opinion missing the amended complaint second Vacated Jan. 1983. 14, 1980, as to July defendants American, and Klekamp, Evans and the order striking Welch, names of Kleindienst and Mor-

gan and Kleindienst from the second complaint

amended are reversed.44 The

case is remanded to the district court for proceedings

further inconsistent with opinion.45 Thus, fraud. These claims are 9(b) not stated with inap- we ade 43. do hold that Rule quate specificity, nor are plicable there sufficient to this case because even facts claims of a developed in fiduciary subject the record for us consider breach of 9(b). are to Rule duties appellants’ Caster, arguments Moreover, intelligently. See Robinson it applied; Cir.1966). is not clear which note that the in- state’s law should be We also present- pleadings and this issue was stant ing detailed not briefed to us. Thus, underlying alleged presumably ap open remains circumstances pellants, subject fiduciary proper fraudulent actions and breach of exercise of dis duties, court, distinguishable develop cretion the district Robinson where remand, 9(b) upon upheld although claims under Rule dismissal would cau they complaint containing preempted by ERISA, tion that of a “bare assertions 1144(a). conspiracy Dependahl of a U.S.C. § defraud.” See v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., denied, (8th Cir.), cert. 454 U.S. 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d however, uphold, de- district court’s 44. We (1981). a claim state cision that cannot under the Racketeer these defendants investigate 45. The district court should also Corrupt Organizations Act Influenced and possibility consolidating the instant case (RICO), (1976). 18 U.S.C. See Order of § currently pending with others before the court 24, 1980, portions plain- at 3. Nov. Those also arise out Hauser’s de- efforts to , complaint July filed on tiffs’ second amended fraud the Fund. should be un- Consolidation containing properly RICO count were practical dertаken it is to do so in order to sjricken. any prejudice avoid named defendants rule on the do not substance We this case who are also defendants in other pendent appellants’ law claims based on state related actions.

1085 Griffith, argued, Kendall M. D. Thomas Crisham, Nord, Hollis, Robert E. Pamela S. brief, Culbertson, Hinshaw, Moel-

on the mann, Fuller, 111., Chicago, Hoban & for defendant-appellant. Foss, Michael T. Sawyier, Schuman & Drake, Chicago, 111., John J. Casey, for plaintiffs-appellees. PELL, STEWART, Before Judge, Circuit POSNER,* (Retired), Justice and Circuit Judge. POSNER, Judge. Circuit appeal This criminal brings contempt cata, up judi- to us issues of res 26(c) pretrial discovery under Rules (d) and dure, of the Rules of Federal Civil Proce- the application and of the Sherman Act’s “Rule of Reason” to denial mem- bership professional in a association. The defendant-appellant in this case is the American Academy Orthopaedic Sur- geons, private association to which most surgeons orthopaedic in the United States belong. plaintiffs The are two orthopaedic surgeons practice Evansville, who Indi- ana, and Chicago, respectively, and were denied membership Academy withоut hearing or a reasons. statement of Mem- bership alleged certain to confer profes- advantages, sional it is not a prerequi- site either to being practice certified to orthopaedic an surgeon obtaining or to hos- pital privileges. staff Each of the practice is certified to orthopaedic surgery and has staff privileges hospitals. at several * Judge Sprecher originally pertinent portions was the third member briefs and of the record and panel, untimely prevented recording tape but his death the oral has listened participation argument. his in the decision of this case. Judge place has read Posner took his and being membership After denial plaintiffs’ refused application for plaintiffs brought the Academy membership and to all other denials of state They in an Illinois court. claimed a membership applications between 1970 and right under Illinois a hearing law to Academy persisted 1980. The It refused. application their and to reasonable stan in its refusal even after the district court membership. dards for The Appel Illinois limiting protective issued a order acсess to late Court held that the complaint failed to the discovered materials to the state a claim because counsel, and even after not an Academy is “economic necessity.” Academy produce ordered the the re Treister of Ortho v. American quested The court held the documents. paedic Ill.App.3d 755-56, Surgeons, of its Academy in criminal order 501, 508, 396 N.E.2d $10,000. Ill.Dec. 1232 and fined it The Academy appeals (1979). Having lost in plain state court the from that judgment. tiffs the Academy then sued in federal dis asks us to hold that injunctive trict relief damages court for discovery order was an abuse of the district Act, 1 of under section the Sherman 15 court’s 26(c) discretion under Rule 1, charging illegal boycott. U.S.C. § Procedure., Federal Rules Civil complaint alleged the Academy is out that plaintiffs point is not a final field, “a monopoly possessed of sub that we argue cannot review it stantial power to control the market because the court has not district certified services,” orthopaedic surgical and that the appeal it for an immediate under 28 U.S.C. though fully plaintiffs, qualified for mem 1292(b). the contempt But judgment is § the bership under announсed criteria of the order, us; final re viewable by a party Academy, were excluded for “extraneous” willing who is to pay price the of being reasons, Dr. which the case of Treister punished for contempt (or suffering an (no Dr. particulars given Marrese) were for equivalent sanction such as dismissal of the “(a) his supposed willingness included complaint) validity if the of the order he expert testimony against offer other ortho disobeyed ultimately upheld is may by paedic malpractice surgeons in medical get that means immediate review of the cases; (b) willingness known to consult his order. cases Many See, e.g., hold this. surgical relatively on a out-patients high- Ryan, 530, 532-33, United v. 402 States U.S. basis; (c) volume his nonconformity of 1580, 1581-82, 91 29 85 (1971); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d personality personal attitudes with Revenue, Ryan v. Commissioner Internal those most orthopaedic established sur 13, 19-20 (7th 517 F.2d Cir.1975); Hanley v. particular geons and in those who were McHugh (7th 419 Constr. F.2d 957 already members of academy.” the The Cir.1969); Serv., National Util. Inc. v. alleged that complaint the Academy had Serv., Inc., Northwestern & Wire Steel 426

refused and that explain its actions the Cir.1970); F.2d 222 Hastings North actions compe effect of those was “to limit Dist, Indepеndent East School 615 F.2d and enforce with conformity tition current (5th Cir.1980). 631 But these cases practices” injure plain and to business with uneasily coexist another line of cases practice profession. tiffs in the of their which holds where as in this case the Academy moved to

The dismiss the com judgment is for criminal than rather civil grounds: judgment plaint contempt, validity on two dis underlying missing the plaintiffs’ questioned state court action appeal not be on may order proceeding; was res contempt judgment. ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍See, e.g., federal United a claim complaint America, failed to state Mine v. United Workers of States denied, 291-94, 677, 694-96, was Sherman Act. The motion 330 U.S. 67 S.Ct. (N.D.Ill.1980), (1947); Community 496 236 and dis ITT F.Supp. 91 L.Ed. 884 Devel Barton, 1351, 1356 covery asked the began. opment The. F.2d Corp. v. Yet Academy correspon (5th Cir.1978). Hanley, all of its our decision produce relating example, contempt. dence and other documents involved both for criminal must compare hardship two lines of can be rec to the party cases 957; against sought, at if onciled, Hanley, supra, discovery whom dis- see supra, allowed, hardship at Ryan, covery United States 4; Wright, seeking discovery discovery at 1582 n. is de- party n. Pro magnitude Federal Practice and nied. Not hard- Cooper, Miller & pp. (1975), nature, 340-41 ship, not its must be considered. cedure § ing Purely private given that in cases where should be validity interests less weight has been held not to be than interests that are considered to underlying order special from the appeal reviewable on have social value. contempt, appeal the order could been argues that First discovery ed directly, while orders cannot immunizes from discovery Amendment be, through discretionary or ex other than correspondence and other documents relat such traordinary procedures, as section ing applications to denials of for member proceedings. and mandamus 1292(b) appeals saying ship. way This is a right discovery to have order re have a more asserting than interests judg a contempt appeal viewed the Academy purely private value. it is disobeying thus one ment for recent far, too this court’s decision goes final-judgment rule, safety valves McHenry for Hospital Cty. v. in Memorial discovery im A U.S.C. 1291. § Shadur, (7th Cir.1981) pose on a heavy and irrecoverable costs curiam), rejected a claim of (per priv discovery make party; yet appeal- orders hospital’s for a records of ilege disciplinary right able as of would lead to intolerable against physicians, staff makes proceedings litigation. in federal delays Confining if the were engaged clear. Even right review of appellate or views, advocating controversial and the the party ders to cases where whom against publication of its internal files would ex cared enough order was directed views, pose members to retaliation for those is a crude but incur sanction it would an absolute privilege not have identifying really serviceable method discovery, though orders, and waiving burdensome would then heavy showing have a burden the rule for them. finality The validi sought the information was vital to

ty discovery of the order that the case by and means unobtainable less disobeyed is therefore properly before us. likely discourage advocacy. such See 26(c) Rule of the Hastings Federal Rules of Independent North East School the empowers 632; Dist., Civil Procedure district court at In re supra, 615 F.2d Petrole justice any requires to “make order which um Prods. Litigation, Antitrust F.2d party person or protect annoy (2d Cir.1982). embarrassment, ance, oppression, or undue say Yet we cannot that there is not expense, including burden or .. . that dis case if not a lurking First Amend ” not be had .... covery The effective right ment at least a First Amendment litigation management complex of requires interest, sought by the discovery the judge be the district allowed a broad and which impair differen plaintiffs would guiding the discovery process, discretion the usual tiates this case from antitrust exercising and un powers therefore in his sought is invoices discovery where 26(c). Corp. Chrysler der Rule v. Fedders the minutes or of a reports or salesmen’s (6th Cir.1981). Corp., of directors. Acad corporation’s board But his discretion is not unlimited and if he may engaged in a emy conspiracy be it he commits abuses reversible error. Silk laws, it is also violate antitrust Corp., wood v. Kerr-McGee exchange of information engaged in an (10th Cir.1977). related mat surgical techniques about This ruling exchange In on a great motion under Rule interest. public ters of discovery, 26(c) to limit if the has to may district court be inhibited files, membership party even under a it seеking disclose leverage to extort a settle- order; protective order is the protective ment, by enabling impose him to on his arrangement lawyers’ laymen kind of opponent costs induce a may settle- distrust. If the instinctively Academy com- despite ment offer the lack of merit of the with the plies discovery order its members Predatory discovery case. is serious prob- may be reluctant offer candid evalua- lem litigation today, in federal and Rule future, applicants tions 26(c) is one of district court’s too' little atmosphere mutual confidence that en- weapons against used is it. This not to say courages exchange a free of ideas may be 26(c) that a Rule movant demand a eroded. on trial of merits spot. suppose It is also necessary to consider the pleadings, that after the and the evidence probable impact order, discovery if it obtained all from the discovery other upheld, purely private on the interests of interpreted in are the most favorable Academy and its members. One does light party seeking discovery the ghosts to raise of Aristotle and order, every aftеr assumption favorable Tocqueville to be de reminded that volun respect to that party what tary important associations are to many might up requested turn way of in particular, Americans people, and that indulged, additional evidence is it seems voluntary professional are associations im highly unlikely that the party’s claim or professionals (the to American portant last defense, may be, as the case has any possi- very proposition premise plain is the ble merit. A motion for summary judg- suit, tiffs’ as it was their Illi might premature ment be because discovery suit). nois Confidentiality deliberations yet complete. was not But if the discovery membership essential to the voluntary requested burdensome, would be proba- character of an association. Without it ble lack of merit the underlying claim or are evaluations of appli there no candid defense is not irrelevant to the district cants, such and without evaluations the court’s of its exercise discretion under Rule character of association as a group 26(c). associating by free people compro choice point This is not new. “The court has therefore, mised. First Apart, to order discretion whether or not dis considerations, Amendment which we have however, hardly and would covery, indirectly implicated are only said order, the to refuse involuntary abuse of when disclosure discretion files of voluntary appears asso the claim or defense baseless and private (but ciation is inimical hardship wor discovery would work a on the objectives association, thy) even party.” other 4 Moore’s Federal Practice protective order is when issued. This is 26.56[1], pp. 26-125, ¶ 26-124 to n. 20 such say may not to that disclosure not be (Moore 1982). eds. & Lucas Doe v. See New ordered; but it involves a significant hard Services, York City Dept, Social ship, in be every which must balanced 134, (2d Cir,1981); 147 Spier v. Home Ins. against its benefits. 896, 404 F.2d 899-900 Cir.1968); Springfield Comm., Dionne v. School 340 On the benefit of the ledger side 334, (D.Mass.1972) F.Supp. 335 (Wyzanski, 26(c) analysis a Rule in usual emphasis J.) (“Federal stage courts do not academic other, is on whether there are ly less bur merely Quixotes tournaments for Don to of getting means the information densome practice knighthood”). In a clear re seeking the party that needs to discovery requеst consideration, to this deny his ease. But fusal prove another (burdensome ground request support in of a emphasized legit but no less frequently less imate, claim) be an any possible probably is whether his case baseless could abuse has discretion; not, we “value” of of must decide whether this only merit. If it does give to will requested discovery be is such a case. legislative sev no basis in the or language has advanced histo- laws; believing this anti grounds for that the federal antitrust and the ry eral merit, that, see, whatev suit conceivable as we are about state trust has no fact files adjudicate defenses based on federal correspondence er the courts plaintiffs trying may law, are preclusive that obtain effect under antitrust in refusing about its motives to admit in estoppel show the doctrine of collateral applicants suit, other mem plaintiffs shows subsequent federal bership. competent One is that suit is barred tribunals to courts are that state judicata questions because earlier federal antitrust adjudicate —and in against their state court so in plaintiffs brought, not be cases why should this True, Academy. defended, action under federal antitrust as well as include an antitrust count plaintiffs did not law? But res action. bars not that question is an But however party that a only actually claims made swered, plain doubted that the it cannot be first but also the claims he could under the joined have claim tiffs could made on the basis' of have the facts that he Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, Act, ch. Antitrust Illinois alleged plaintiff that suit. A not suit; 60, 38, in their state § split by bringing his cause action a suit would close a substitute it must consider how lost, then, on one he has theory and after for their Act claim. have been Sherman again different trying theory. on a Feder act is identical to Illinois language Department Moitie, ated Stores 452 U.S. Act. 1 of the of the Sherman Section that 394, 2424, (1981); 69 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. conspiracies and other Act forbids Sherman Plastics, Inc. v. Harper Amoco Chemicals 3(2) trade. agreements restrain Section (7th Cir.1981). Corp., Act, which, with an Illinois Antitrust simply “Cause of in this context action” opinion, in this is the later exception noted right the set that establishes facts boycott be would under which section any theory that the plaintiff relief see Bar Committee Comments— challenged, in his suit. Here could have asserted first p. Ill.Ann.Stat. Smith-Hurd’s ch. comprises thаt set of the circumstanc facts (1977), conspiracies forbids and other consequences Academy’s es and re trade restrain “unreasona agreements to admit Drs. Marrese

fusal and Treister to Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, 60-3(2). ch. bly.” § membership, and it is irrelevant that language persuaded The difference allege chose not the antitrust Illinois Appellate boycott that a implications facts in their state of those 3(2) never challenged under section could court action. se; illegal per have to pronounced point the plaintiffs they But out that the Rule be evaluated under of Reason. Serv., Act H.F. joined Group Multiple Listing could Sherman Blake v. they 730, 743, that were Ill.App.3d claim to the other claims N.E.2d court. in state Blumenstock prosecuting (1976). that is of no moment in the Co., 252 v. Curtis Pub. case. see Agency only Bros. Adv. We shall present 385, 386-87, 440-41, 40 theory illegal of an boycott tenable the federal (1920), L.Ed. 649 held have is a Rule Reason jurisdiction over theory, per theory; courts have suits not a se far exclusive and so of the federal antitrust alleging boycotts violations are unlawful if unreason laws, holding repeated many concerned, and the able arе we can find no differ cases, modern such as Kurek v. Pleasure ence in between the substantive ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍standards Peoria, Driveway Ill., Blake, Park Dist. of supra, & 583 and federal acts. Illinois See 378, Cir.1978) curiam), 743, 25, (7th (per Ill.App.3d 739, in 345 at F.2d 379 36 N.E.2d proposition 28; Co., circuit. This ques People this has been v. Distrib. 53 cf. Crawford 648, Note, 332, 339, (1972), tioned. Exclusive Jurisdiction 291 652 See Ill.2d N.E.2d Actions, Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, 38, the Federal in Private eh. 60- interpreting Courts Civil § 509, 510 n. It has (1957). 70 Harv.L.Rev. 13 11.

1Q91 preme But there is a difference in the precedent remedies on which the court two acts. A prevailing plaintiff under the relied, Labs., Inc., Becher v. Contorne 279 ease boycott in a Act Sherman 388, 391-92, 356, 49 357, 73 L.Ed. federal in other antitrust case is enti- (1929) (per Holmes, J.); 752 preclu- and the trebling tled to an automatic of his dam- sive effect state court factfindings in ages. 3(2) 15. But section See U.S.C. § subsequent federal antitrust suits. subject act is to the following Illinois provision: “if it is shown viola- [the] point The last will bear some elabo willful, may, tion the court in its was discre- ration. The best reason for not giving pre tion, increase the amount recovered as dam- clusive effect to a judgment in an earlier ages up to a total 3 times the amount of state action be would a belief that Ill.Rеv.Stat.1981, damages.” 38, actual ch. competent were not adjudi state courts 60-7(2). § cate antitrust questions, federal even if the If it not for this were difference statute, Nash state had enacted enforceable of Co., County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore courts, tracking own course in its the feder 484, (4th Cir.1981), 487-93 F.2d be a al statutes. But this antitrust belief cannot holding precedent plain- direct that the be that state given maintained courts are tiffs’ federal antitrust claim is barred decide allowed to federal ques antitrust judicata. The Fourth thought Circuit it tions, preclusive with effect under the doc that a plaintiff intolerable should able to trine of collateral estoppel, in suits which in bring an antitrust in state court under a federal antitrust claim'is way raised a state statute identical to the Sherman Act defense. At least clear where the then, after suit, final in question Lyons is factual. Westing See v. bring same suit in federal court under Corp., house (2d Elec. 222 F.2d And, said, Act. Sherman as we have it Cir.1955); Fire Ins. Co. Calvert v. American made would have no difference in Nash if 1228, 1236 Mutual Reinsurance the first suit had brought been under an- (7th Cir.1979) (dictum). n. 18 But es theory other and the plaintiff had reserved sential issues in most federal antitrust theоry his antitrust for later in use federal market, eases —relevant power, market ef court in the event that he failed win in competition, fect on monopolistic intent, state court theory. other and so forth —are If factual. state courts decision; a frankly Nash is innovative competent to decide those are issues rejects contrary authority in three circuits. preclusive effect in any subsequent federal Corp., See Abramson Pennwood Inv. 392 suit, and the state’s antitrust law is identi (2d Cir.1968); F.2d v. Wat Clark law, cal to the do federal not see how an chie, (9th F.2d Cir.1975); object antitrust being claimant can re Hayes Solomon, quired, judicial economy, interest of (Our spoken Cir.1979). circuit never litigate his claim in state court question, although per the brief curiam under state law when he is in state already opinion Kurek Driveway v. Pleasure & court, choice, by his on another claim. That Ill., Peoria, supra, Park Disk of could be insight is the essential of Nash. imply, though it read to does not expressly speak directly But Nash does to a adopt, approach Nash.) inconsistent with case such as this where state antitrust Nash, cases predate and the statute not identical to federal. The decided them may courts that want to reex such a was question to do in what position the light amine their in' of the full Nash. F.2d at 492. convincing reserved discussion of the issue in Nash; given like the answer the academic authorities that a state court support court marshaled in which held position, Lyons, supra, of its Currie, e.g., Res Judicata: bar federal antitrust Neglected judgment would Defense, damages 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. treble could (1978); suit, 347-48 because part the enigmatic seemingly in the state suit. dispositive Su- obtained not have been at 189. tion of the Sherman Act and joining That case is distin-

See 222 one, this one though. For federal the state law guishable their claim claims had no tre- Lyons getting chance of to sue thing, they instead decided on in which court, damages in state whereas ble court would federal have court. state some and Treister would have had Marrese decide the state law jurisdiction had treble the getting damages under chance pendent juris- the doctrine claims under Act if un- they Antitrust had sued Illinois diction. they had two act. would have der that as choice was attractive to Neither jump that would not face them hurdles to made, as one plaintiffs they would They in a federal antitrust suit. try piecemeal, case litigating and was a violation prove have had to willful law claims in state court’s their state court and appeal to the trial have had would law in federal damages. to award treble their federal claim court with discretion is, of the Illinois in approach litigation act much as outcome in the first an adverse statute, criminal maxi- typical to set a having (they hoped) preclusive no effect on which the penalty “sentencing” mum procedure No for this second. reason impose only will in extreme presumably against its suggested. been And advan cases, penalty than a definite as un- rather plaintiffs to the must balanced the tages law. der federal defendant, and to the to the inconvenience judicial systems, federal state and allow another But there is and better distinc ing plaintiff stages a his case try this case Lyons. tion between Since stage having preclu decision at one no had sued Westinghouse Lyons in state court in subsequent stages effect (except sive contract Lyons for had inter breach factfindings actual made at one stage posed the defense that the contract was would, earlier, as noted have collateral-es Act, illegal question under Sherman subsequent stage). effect a toppel was a We whether in the state suit where, of this the balance preclusion on the merits defense would bar think favors Lyons Act maintaining a Sherman the relevant standard of as in this Westinghouse in court liability federal is the same state and federal . not, that it part The court held would as though the remedies are similar law and Lyons not have because could plaintiffs’ have said identical. alternatives damages (or for that matter obtained treble litigation were not so piecemeal paltry successfully asserting any damages) from courts should have to entertain such illegality his of antitrust to West defense litigation at a time when both the state and state law inghouse’s contract claim. If res judicial systems are staggering federal un applied, had would judicata Westinghouse magnitude. of unprecedented der caseloads succeeded in by suing in state court have We add even if the district giving choice of either

putting Lyons rejecting was judge correct Acade up damages to treble or abandon his claim he argument, should have my’s ing defense in the meritorious possibly piecemeal character considered of this Teamsters state New York suit. Cf. State part as of his litigation appraisal of the & Retirement Fund v. Pen Conf. Pension to the hardship complying with Corp., 953, 957 sion Benefit Guar. plaintiffs’ request. Because (D.C.Cir.1979). The put to unneces not face present painful did choice. legal expense by splitting their claim sary If a state could they they wanted forum did, they request their form of a state joined have antitrust count to their place special that would burden law counts then they other state should have opponent made though had a shot at damages, treble appeal judge’s equita a one as if district they brought so sure had weaker 26(c) discretion under Rule than if the federal suit. could have Alternatively, they ble first, litigating federal court had been their claims alleging sued in a viola- plaintiffs

1093 Academy in a parsimoni- more boycott case, found in a Board of Trade of ous manner. Chicago States, City of v. United 246 U.S. 231, 242, (1918). 62 683 38 S.Ct. L.Ed. There is an additional reason believ- legality of an internal case involved rule ing that the plaintiffs’ antitrust suit be exchange designed of a commodities to lim- groundless whatever the contested dis- it competition members, some of its covery might reveal. This reason as has we violation and a would rule have been see implications shall different for the dis- punishable by expulsion. A more accurate trict court’s exercise of its 26(c) pow- Rule generalization today be that boycotts would ers: not that it should have denied the per se illegal they are only are used to requested discovery altogether that it agreements enforce that are themselves il- should postponed have of legal per se—for example, price-fixing membership pending other, files bur- less agreements. See United States Trotting might quickly densome that have Chicago Ass’n, Ass’n v. 781, Downs 665 F.2d ground- shown suit was whether the indeed (en (7th Cir.1981) banc), 787-90 gen- for the less as a matter of law. principle, eral and Spray-Bite Serv. Corp. v. watershed great of that law is Co., 1226, 684 (7th Monsanto F.2d 1234-36 per the distinction between se illegality and Cir.1982), for the price-fixing exception. illegality under the Rule of Reаson. If a that is organized least the rule for asso- .At practice per is within se category, all having ciations some purposes; lawful we you prove have to establish a violation is need not consider a whether conspiracy or engaged that defendant practice; hoc “association,” other ad if anticompeti- you do not show that in fact the intent, tive in treated under a practice or has had will have an adverse harsher standard. on competition. effect But if practice a is not se per within the it category is —if It is true early cases, that some words, governed, in other the Rule of such as United States v. Terminal Railroad (the dichotomy Reason perfect, Louis, 383, Ass’n of St. U.S. mergers there practices, are some for exam 507, (1912), 56 L.Ed. 810 imply hold or ple, that governed by are another standard boycott has the effect totally altogether, refinement but this is irrelevant excluding competitor is, from a market case) must, to this the plaintiff —then alone, for that reason illegal; and this could prevail, show the defendant se species per be viewed as a illegality. engaged practiсe but also that by As is uncontested that American doing so the defendant was injuring compe Surgeons Orthopaedic no tition. of reason re “[A]ny analysis rule power prevent anyone practicing quires anticompetitive showing market cases are orthopaedic surgery, Co., Corp. effect.” Lektro-Vend Vendo here; ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍relevance so need not doubtful 255, (7th Cir.1981); 660 F.2d see Dos extent, their empha to what consider Santos Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical competitors welfare of sis on rather Center, (7th Cir.1982); (the consumers than railroad in excluded America, Havoco of Ltd. v. Shell Oil appears the Terminal Ass’n case to have Cir.1980). exclusion complaining been about its from a survive the plaintiffs’ cartel!), denial of the these cases can consum appli prevails cations for in the Academy, a view of antitrust er-oriented collective refusal the Academy’s See, mem e.g., Corp., Reiter v. Sonotone today. bers to on iden deal with 99 S.Ct.

tical they (1979). terms deal with each Reviewing on which L.Ed.2d 931 these cases other, It to be boycott. boycotts was a form used this court held that can recently per illegal said were se. on illegal per often that se the basis of boycotts not be deemed entirely competitors (rather But that true. The best was never than on impact known of the Rule Reason if there is no “direct consuming public) statement however, of, likely, What is far more supply or demand influence the effort to alleging boycott are Phil Tolkan for, product.” competitor’s illegal, only by is so virtue Datsun, that, Milwaukee Datsun if it is of Inc. v. Greater Reason; Ass’n, Inc., they and therefore of Advertising the Rule Dealers’ Cir.1982). alleged show, element of ille None is as an essential must are com- ef “anticompetitive Marrese market in Treister and some gality, this case. Corp. members and member- Academy boycott. Lektro-Vend petitors of from the fect” competing in with ship may be valuable at 268. To supra, 660 F.2d Vendo orthopae- and nonmember both member to they likely have done or are see whether dists, is no contention that there so, facts to do assume that all of the be able with the interfering directly Academy is (This is plaintiffs are true. alleged by customers, or suppliers to access plaintiffs’ assumption, for some of the generous too get hospital to staff by trying privi- as allegations were denied in an af plaintiffs’ alleged effect of denial leges revoked. plaintiffs did not counter that fidavit ability to membership plaintiffs’ on the of own.) of their Then the an affidavit with indirect, orthopaedic medicine practice were denied admission to plaintiffs lawyer membership trial just denying as a competi they because are fierce Academy Lawyers College of Trial in the American tors; also denied ad others like them are only an indirect effect on his would have reason; membership for this in mission speaking to obtain clients. We are ability great pro it Academy carries with such course, degree of but an “indi- of matters to advantages aspirants that most fessional effect, by falling which we mean one rect” membership orthopaedic surgeons all —and complete far short exclusion from are already aspir are not members who market, support per will not a se attack on (if fails) have an incen ants —will boycott. a in the kind of to avoid com engaging tive en behavior petitive Nor do the plaintiffs price- allege that cost them their chance of gaged in and among fixing conspiracy orthopaedic sur becoming members. to geons, conspiracy which the exclusion granted plain- even with all this membership from if, might showing come close to Academy ancillary. Even have not tiffs required effects in a taking competitive notice to (concept ’pleading kind of extreme, According to their we could tease such an case. its furthest Rule of Reason statements, majority of ortho- statement in the com the vast allegation out of the own who have been denying surgeons that one of the reasons plaint paedic (at three oral Academy years for at least Dr. Treister practicing plaintiffs’ sur counsel said willingness consult one of the argument was his “known suspect using he was relatively high-vol though gical percent, out-patients of the Acade- perhaps imply license) members “high ume volume” are poetic basis” — 10,000 members in all. The help plain ing price low it has my, and —it boycott restrictions sort price-fix places any is a form of no tiffs. If the concerned, got could have members. far as it is ing, plaintiffs probably on its So damages ferociously they as a as as like. right compete ten treble matter of can they nonmembers in a suit under the Illinois deal with grace They rather than are free to Act, practice in provides right Treister —to Antitrust such as Marrese and them, patients to refer damages price-fixing cases. treble See association meet- Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, 60-3(1), Academy’s 60- them, ch. forth. §§ and so as such Nash, correctly we consider to nonmembers 7(2). ings open a decision are Treister, though they object, decided, indistinguishable would then be Marrese and us, to having seems frivolously this case we would have no doubt badges. judica that the suit nonmember The freedom at all was barred wear deal with nonmembers con- ta. members point of orthopaedic surgeons firms earlier that this not a belong our who a “direct ef- where the association makes Academy is so that competition few among of, or supply fort to influence demand competition is not them — for, product.” Phil Tolkan competitor’s or alleged regulate to limit way —is Datsun, 672 F.2d at 1286. supra, insufficient to assure the consuming public of competition. the benefits they Unless circumstаnces it is In these clear that if they can show this will be unable to ask the members the Academy all of the were in trier of fact draw an all, inference the same market —if to say, were either the of an of one exclusion individual ortho- competitors another —the consumer paedist market, effective competition possible interest each or could not effect of seriously competitive be harmed the exclusion of that exclusion on the these and others like them of plaintiffs aspirants from behavior other membership, (not the market that such exclusion is in higher could result in a price quali- or lower cards: that concede the Acad- of ty orthopaedic surgery in these communi- power emy anyone has no to exclude from ties. practice of orthopaedic surgery). Ten The plaintiffs have made no effort thousand is a vast of competitors. number yet discovery proceedings as in this Unless they explicitly agreed not to com- anticompetitive case probable to show a ef pete, up agreement and backed their with say do they fect. We cannot make the machinery pre- elaborate enforcement showing; required but at stage of the vent members from cheating individual on only where the facts of record bearing agreement, consumer would be as- competitive on effect large are the number of in a buying competi- sured the benefits orthopaedists of who belong to the Acade While there is tive market. a sense in my and the fact that the Academy does not any competitor of re- the exclusion regulate way, their behavior in any it does duces the sense of competition, it is not very not seem to likely they us that will be is competition that relevant to antitrust law circumstances, to do In able so. these currently as conceived. Liability Products do not think the district court should have Ins. Inc. v. Agency, Crum & Forster Ins. discovery ordered of the Academy’s mem Cos., (7th Cir.1982). 663-64 bership any files discovery before there was competition The of policy designed is probable anticompetitive on the issue of benefit of the ultimate consumers rather power effect. A district court has the un individual competitors.

than of The con- 26(c) (d) der Rules and of the Federal Rules competitive guaranteed sumer is conditions Procedure, guaranteed, he he but is not has no of Civil and a clear case the in of, a preservation duty, discovery interest in the fixed num- to defer a burdensome re competitors ber of than the greater quest pending completion discovery far of on being required number assure his able to likely dispose an issue that is buy competitive Maybe in market. thereby request entire case make older case of view would survive in a naked Cooper, Wright, Miller & Fed moot. 8See resulting aggression in the total exclusion eral Practice and Procedure §§ market; from the competitor of a but that (1976). We are not here as we speaking (if would be a se case per anything) and this denial, of but only postpone were earlier is not. ment; appropri is sometimes the former ate, the latter more It is often so. should 10,000 members The do apparent court, been have district not, however, the same compete all in mar- us, the present likely it is to is case orthopaedic surgery ket. The market for the issue compe wash out over on effect compеtes local. with other Dr. Marrese or- tition. There would been no Evansville, conceiva thopaedists in Dr. Treister with hardship ble orthopaedists requiring other in Chicago. plain- them to tiffs will have the conduct discovery burden at trial of show- this is ing gaining these sue before access local markets the number to the member- STEWART, (Retired), Justice sequence discovery may dissenting. files.

ship to coerce intended the Acad- been well have In this case our mission is no more than settle, event the but in balance emy criminal citation for to review a enough to us make is clear hardships comply discovery order. refusing to conclude, judicata independently Nonetheless, majority opinion wrestles court, in issue, refusing to that the district concerning, first, questions with difficult files, the membership defer and, second, judicata, of res the doctrine its discretion. abused of the Sherman Act to a denial application are raised Other issues professional organiza- briefs, that we take of the on the view ground, new forges despite tion. It need discussed. only case one of them a factual absence of record in this decide us to asks desрite contrary precedent the existence of was abuse of I believe Because other Circuits. the district court’s discretion but also that questions properly neither of on the complaint basis refusal to dismiss the Court, for review this presented that the erroneous. We have judicata of res was concerning substance discussion the discovery decide whether jurisdiction to extremely doctrine of res dubi- discretion, an abuse of because it order was ous, the contempt and that citation was order, of that is the disobedience that the proper, respectfully I dissent. punished by judge the holding district Academy contempt. criminal But we litigating In course of an the to review jurisdiction have the dis would defendant-appellant the Ameri- judge’s trict refusal to dismiss the com Orthopaedic Surgeons, the Academy can only if he had certified interloc plaint plaintiffs-appellees Drs. Marrese and Treis- appeal utory order for an immediate discovery correspondence ter sought the not do 1292(b), he did so. He 28 U.S.C. and relating and other documents to the denial Academy point out that the could did for application membership of their its judicata argument make wished in organization previous as well as deni- to all contempt citation, appeal its the and als of since 1970. The Acade- right, the he was because merit of that produce to my refused documents. is, seen, argument germane as we have to protective then The Court issued District discovery the order was an abuse whether to the documents to limiting order access his, of discretion. But statement did not counsel, the ordered requirement satisfy 1292(b) of section produce Academy requested ma- if “of the judge, opinion district Academy’s refusal Following terial. interlocutory] or [nonappealable that such order, Judge District comply with his controlling question of law der involves a for Academy contempt and cited the im- ground to which there for is substantial $10,000 fine. posed Academy then opinion and that an difference immediate brought appeal. appeal may order materially ad termination majority opinion vance ultimate liti first addresses the writing shall state in such gation, whether, ... so appeal from a question criminal made, order.” no statement was Since such judgment comply failure contempt have jurisdiction ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍do not review order, validity discovery with a refusing district court’s order to dismiss the may be reviewed. underlying order Watkins, In re complaint, (5th 271 F.2d 771 that the opinion correctly validity concludes Cir.1959), and the appeal from that order discovery may order underlying of an jurisdiction dismissed for lack in this appeal from a reviewed on criminal con- judgment court. The re See United States v. tempt judgment. Costs in to the appellant. versed. this court 530, 532-3, Ryan, 402 U.S. 91 S.Ct. 1581-82, (1971). So 29 L.Ed.2d Ordered. discovery order, reviewing however, In Just disposition of plaintiffs’ claims ... by the appellate principle court is limited would impossible be rendered should they broad judges district have discretion in requested be denied access to the informa conducting pre-trial and in fram tion. Proof of the claimed group boycott A ing protective judge’s trial dis orders. require demonstration of the real covery invalidated order not be unless Academy’s reasons for denial of admission an abuse of represents discretion. candidates, information obtainable solely Lewis, (8th Voegeli Cir. through the materials seeks to 1977) (“[W]e unlikely to fault аre most [the protect.” American Marrese v. unless, in trial the totali court’s] No. 80 Orthopaedic Surgeons, C slip circumstances, ty [discovery] rul (E.D.Ill. op. 5,1981). at 6 Ruling Mar. ings abuse gross are seen to be a of discre Academy’s interest confidentiality tion unfairness in resulting in fundamental insubstantial,” was “not . .. the District case.”); Keyes the trial of the v. Lenoir protective Court drafted a order imposing (4th Rhyne Cir.), College, 552 F.2d restrictive which, conditions under denied, cert. Court, words of the District “the confiden (1977); L.Ed.2d 190 Swanner United tiality of Academy’s admissions process States, Cir.1969). (5th 406 F.2d 716 An largely preserved.” Id. at 5. In a [was] appellate may not decide whether “it opinion, later the District Court carefully would, instance, in the first permitted considered argument made on behalf of for.” discovery prayed Tiedman v. the Academy that the should be Pigment Corp., American required complete their discovery on the Cir.1958). question injury of antitrust before obtain ing access to the documents at issue. The turn, In in deciding whether to order rejected District argument, find impose protective whether ing that the possible prejudice to the Acad discovery, a trial judge restrictions on such emy did not justify requiring the plaintiffs of party must balance the interest the re- to undertake piecemeal discovery. App. at the sisting discovery against need of the 138. seeking for discovery the party requested present case, In the material. the District and analysis employed protective The the framing in its protective order Court care- order formulated in this case were virtually fully assessed the interests of both the identical to and analysis the order in a very Academy attempt- the two In and doctors. similar, recent antitrust case decided the ing discovery, the Academy resist had same District In Judge. previous the argued the production requested of physician sued of group physicians for infringe upon documents would the First excluding staff, him a hospital from and rights Academy Amendment members. thereby allegedly destroying his practice. interest, Academy’s however, The which the sought He from the discovery hospital of identified, Court is correctly District essen- relating to other physi- certain documents tially the preserving an interest in confiden- for applied cians who had admission to its process tiality application of its in order to hosрital resisted, medical staff. The even future evaluations. preserve the candor of after the District issued protective Court concludes, the majority opinion As in- order, asserting its need for confidentiality legitimate, protected but not terest prevent chilling the of the evaluation First the Amendment. process. sought The hospital issuance of a writ mandamus from this Court to Matched the com- Academy’s interest District to vacate its plaintiffs’ the Court dis- pel the need confidentiality was covery opinion order. In a Per Curiam The District requested for the material. need, mandamus, denying petition for Judge carefully noting: this this assessed explicitly recognize hospi- documents Drs. Court declined access to the “Without as effectively pre proceedings privileged tal disciplinary Marrese and Treister are in antitrust eases: litigation.... discovery vented continuing its text to an recognize hospital disciplinary pro- lengthy analysis of the merits “To regardless order, ceedings privileged, plaintiffs’ antitrust suit in sought, words, disclosure is purpose for which to determine “the benefit of dis- its committees, such grant party seeking would in to the it.” covery effect absolute participants and their members holding underly that the merit of the In prosecution immunity from for all state- is a fundamental consideration ing lawsuit and actions taken in con- ments made determining whether appellate for proceedings de- text of such .... [We] court abused its discretion in as a district interest public cline to do The so. benefit of sessing granting discovery, private of federal enforcement majority opinion disregards long-settled simply strong too law in this context procedure. of civil After principles pos- of relevant and permit the exclusion filed, complaint Academy was had by application evidence crucial- sibly grounds to dismiss the suit on the moved Hospital’s privilege.” was barred by action the doctrine that the Hospital McHenry County v. Memorial the complaint and that failed of res Shadur, (7th Cir.1981) a claim under the Act. In to state Sherman omitted). (footnote opinion, District Court de published motion. Marrese nied the v. American restricted The Court’s District. Surgeons, 496 Academy Orthopaedic case was both consistent with in this order (N.D.Ill.1980). to the needs of Since this order F.Supp. sensitive both precеdent and one, order, therefore, not a final could not way in no was parties. the denial of appeal an abuse of the motion to represented discretion. Based then conclusion, unless the District certified dismiss inquiry on this limited interlocutory order for appeal immediate analysis validity citation, 1292(b). my opinion, end under U.S.C. But the District should § so, declined to do and therefore the District Court’s should be affirmed. Court appellate could not seek review of however, majority opinion, embarks entry its case until after the the merits of lengthier course of analysis. opin- majority judgment. of a final correctly states that the ion District Court Academy, opinion today permits required compare the hardship was cases, in future parties similarly situated against whom party sought, immediate, appellate review of the secure allowed, discovery is with the need of the lawsuit, prior discovery, merits of a seeking discovery requested for the party trial, a judgment, simply by disobeying or correctly cites the opinion material. The subjecting order and themselves discovery the confi- Academy’s preserving interest violating the for order. imposed to the fine application process. In dentiality of the balance, evaluating majority opinion justify the other side the the seeks to its discovery, need for plaintiffs’ opinion approach by relying upon unprecedented correctly “emphasis notes that the the District then in which Court had denied cases [of usually relating is on whether there are inquiry] discovery this claims which were getting groundless. other, means See Doe probably less burdensome to be found seeking Services, party Dept. dis- of Social City information v. New York Cir.1981); 134, (2d Spier his case.” At that covery prove needs to 147 649 F.2d 896, however, majority opinion Co., in- F.2d 899-900 point, 404 Home Ins. single a sentence changes Cir.1968); Springfield Dionne v. cludes School 334, of the inquiry: Comm., F.Supp. (D.Mass.1972). focus “But another 335 entire 340 consideration, frequently emphasized ¶26.56[1], less Federal Practice 4 Moore’s Cf. 26-125, legitimate, (Moore is whether his & n. 20 no less & Lu pp. 26-124— Ante, 1982) the court (“Ordinarily, merit.” at 1089. will any possible cas eds. has sentence, theory whether majority opin- this determine Based on not whether, sound, proved, or to devote the rest of proceeds complaint then ion

1099 436, 440, 385, requested, 386, rul- 40 the relief S.Ct. 64 support L.Ed. 649 discovery (citing cases)) motion.” no ing (1920), on a federal antitrust claim could have But, the District present in the Court by the Illinois decided courts. been proba- the suit was did not determine that Because of the federal courts’ exclusive Rather, it denied the mo- groundless. bly claims, over federal antitrust jurisdiction dismiss and ordered discovery. tion to several Circuits have stated that doc Thus, guise in the granting the District does litiga trine not bar the judicata of res discretion consider the Court merits of a a antitrust claim between tion of federal determining suit whether participated in an earlier parties who have permissible, majority opinion actually involving the same set of state court trial narrows District Court’s discretion Solomon, 958, 984 facts. 597 F.2d Hayes v. party a permitting relitigate the merits denied, 1078, (5th Cir.1979), cert. 444 U.S. unsuccessful of an motion to dismiss in an 1028, (1980); 100 62 L.Ed.2d 761 S.Ct. Ku from criminal appeal Driveway rek v. Pleasure & Park District failing for with order. comply Peoria, 378, (7th Cir.1978), F.2d 379 583 will a result interfere the Dis- Such denied, 1090, 873, cert. 439 U.S. 99 59 S.Ct. Judge’s authority to control trict the dis- (1979); Watchie, L.Ed.2d Clark 57 513 encourage covery process filing of 994, (9th Cir.), denied, F.2d cert. interlocutory appeals in the heavily bur- (1975); U.S. L.Ed.2d 60 appellate federal courts. dened Abramson v. Pennwood Corp., Investment Because District Court denied the mo- also, (2nd Cir.1968); see certify not tion to dismiss and did order (Second) 61.2(1) of Judgments Restatement review, Court, immediate as the for c, 2 (1973) (“A. comment illustration Co. ante, ultimately majority acknowledges, brings an action B. Co. in a state to review jurisdiction lacks court under a state antitrust law and loses As to dismiss. the motion denying on the merits. It then an action commences majority in the result, the discussion facts, upon in a federal the same of the parties’ of the merits claims opinion charging violations federal antitrust is purely advisory. and defenses Undaunt- laws, federal courts have ex jurisdiction, this absence of ed the ma- jurisdiction. clusive The second action opinion jority completely formulates a un- barred.”). expansion the res precedented however, court, One carved out an doctrine, existing inconsistent with law in exception In prevailing rule. Nash Circuits, including previous several deci- County Education Bd. of v. Biltmore judicata bars the of this Court. Res sion denied, (4th Cir.), cert. in a relitigation subsequent between 102 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed.2d concerning single cause оf parties two (1981), Appeals the Fourth actually decided of all claims in the action plaintiff held that a who has main Circuit claims that could have first suit as well as in state an action court under a state tained raised, decided, but were been statute was identical Ante, at 1090. The litigation. earlier statute was barred from federal antitrust present case earlier sued subsequent federal antitrust instituting a claiming in an a Illinois distinguished expressly action. But Nash hearing a on right under law to Illinois state not the case in which the statute did application to reasonable stan- and recovery damages of treble in the authorize The Illinois court membership. dards for statute. Id. at as the federal or same manner did not have it a state federal before Illinois statute Moreover, because, antitrust 490. Because antitrust claim. laws in the federal antitrust precedents, differs from long-settled the federal courts mandatory provide not for the jurisdiction exclusive an- does over federal Nash, majority trebling damages, claims, Adv. of as titrust Bros. see Blumenstoek not ultimately concludes, “does opinion Publishing U.S. Agency v. Curtis Ante, directly this speak lating ... case.” at as to the effect of the defendant’s therefore, 1091. ante, today, Until no court on the plaintiffs, conduct and ever plaintiff litigating barred a a market, ante, Specu- at 1094-1095. on on federal antitrust facts claim similar replace analysis should not factual lation case, present those of and several deci- lawsuit; evaluating any the merits of it is a stated plaintiff may sions have that a not tool with particularly inappropriate be so barred. of Reason” antitrust to evaluate a “Rule justified majority opinion reaching claim. unprecedented by arguing result think the I order and subse- should have resolved their citation contempt represent did not quent dispute a by instituting federal antitrust abuse of the trial judge’s discretion. I litigating all of their state claims disagree majority’s with the decision to pendent claims in federal action. the merits the underlying reach lawsuit Ante, According at 1092. to the majority its expansion believe that the doc- therefore, opinion, the doctrine judi- of res judicata is dubious. highly trine res Ac- cata bars not that were actually claims cordingly, respectfully I dissent. decided or could have bеen decided suit, first also claim that any could have

been decided had the chosen to

bring their suit in completely different expansion

forum. of the doctrine of This fun- principle, contradicts ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍the system, legal to our that parties,

damental judges, choose the forum in which to BANK, Plaintiff, ROCK ISLAND resolve their differences and frame claims advanced in their More- pleadings. v. over, the majority opinion’s analysis is The AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY premise based on the errant merely COMPANY, Defendant, Third-Party suit, plaintiff instituting federal Plaintiff-Appellant, insist decide any federal court relat- ed pen- state claim under the doctrine of jurisdiction. jurisdiction dent KEARNEY, “[PJendent William J. Third-Party discretion, a doctrine of not of plaintiff’s Defendant-Appellee. right.” United Mine Workers of America No. 81-2205. Gibbs, 715, 726, (1966). 16 L.Ed.2d 218 United States Court Appeals, Circuit. Seventh majority’s analysis novel valid- ity citation also enables Argued Nov. 1981. “express to reach its view” on Decided Nov. 1982. question the merits at issue case, although, again, 15,1982. once the Court Dec. Rehearing Denied jurisdiction lacks to dismiss the suit based any such view. Because there has not

yet been or a trial in this majority opinion obligated “Rule of Reason” analysis

conduct a activities, though there

defendant’s

single in the record show the nature fact actions, the purposes defendant’s conduct, mar- geographic relevant

kets, con- or the effect of defendant’s

duct specu- It does these markets. so

Case Details

Case Name: R. Anthony Marrese, M.D. And Michael R. Treister, M.D. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Jan 25, 1983

Citation: 692 F.2d 1083

Docket Number: 81-2671

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.