51 Misc. 83 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1906
This is a motion to- set aside a judgment entered upon the decision of a referee. The action was originally brought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The lien was discharged upon a bond being given by the City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Company of Philadelphia, which' company, as surety on the bond, was joined as a defendant in tiie action. George M. Boynton, Esq., was appointed
This motion to set aside the judgment is made upon two grounds. First, the insanity of the referee, and second, the alleged dissolution of the corporation defendant prior to the entry of the judgment. These grounds will be considered in the order stated.
A referee is an officer required to exercise judicial functions, and there can be no doubt that where a referee is incapable by reason of a mental disease of properly discharging his judicial duties such mental incapacity would be ground for the vacation of a judgment directed by him. Shelford’a Law of Lunatics (page 618) declares that “ a non compos ought not to sit as a judge; it is nevertheless said, that should such a case occur, the fines, judgments and other records taken before him would be good; but it is otherwise of mat
Upon a motion of this character the question which must be determined is whether the referee lacked mental capacity to properly discharge his duty. If he did, his decision and the judgement entered upon it should be set aside. If he did not, no reason exists for disturbing the judgment entered upon his decision. The question is one of fact, and its solution must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, rather than upon the application of artificial •legal definitions as to what constitutes insanity. Ho useful purpose can be served by reviewing the attempts of the early cases to define insanity or by examining the hairsplitting distinctions which these decisions and those based
In Hew York the Statutory Construction Law provides that “ the terms lunatic and lunacy include every kind of unsoundness of mind except idiocy” (§7). In regard to determining criminal liability, testamentary capacity or the ability to contract, the rules of law provide varying standards not in harmony with one another. In his work on Lunacy, Mr. Pope (p. 428) says: “It need only be remembered that the criterion of lunacy varies for different purposes, to show that the establishment of lunacy in one case, and for one purpose, need not necessarily conclude the fact in other cases, and for other purposes.” In determining the question of sanity or insanity, when it is involved as a principal issue, the standard prescribed by law as applicable to the particular class within which the case comes must be applied no matter* how artificial it may be or how inconsistent it may be' with the opinion of medical experts or with the rules prescribed in other cases. People v. Silverman, 181 N. Y. 235, 240. But when the issue of insanity arises collaterally these artificial rules are not necessarily applicable; and in such cases, as Mr. Buswell (p. 24) says, “the question is whether, by reason of mental disease, the party was unable to comprehend the nature of the act, its relations, effects and legal consequences.”
Such is the test which must be applied in this case in determining whether-the judgment entered upon the decision of the referee should be set aside. The mere fact that he may have entertained a delusion upon a particular sxxbjeet, if he was otherwise competent to discharge the duties of his office, would not render his acts in relation to such duties void. Sane men have undoubtedly entertained delusions, and Mr. Wharton has collected interesting instances of what has been called the “ insanity of sane men,” and cites as examples the names of several famous English and American jxxdges. See Whart. & Stille Mental Unsoundness & Psychological Law,
In Mew York the rule has been established that after inquisition found any contract made by a lunatic is absolutely void, and the inquisition is conclusive so long as the adjudication of incapacity remains in force. L’Amoreux v.
In determining vzhether Mr. Boynton was unable to comprehend the nature of his act, its relations, effects and legal consequences, the decision itself and the character of his acts should be given great weight. Mr. Pope says that “ in civil matters it may .be taken that the rationality of the act itself and of the manner of doing it, though not conclusive as to the sanity of the doer, is very strong evidence of it, even where he has generally been regarded as insane, and may be under confinement on that account at the time.” Law of Lunacy, 413.
The uncontradicted proof upon this motion shows that prior to and on December 15, 1905, Mr. Boynton attended to his professional duties properly and well. The opinion in this case was written by him three, weeks before he was adjudged insane, and is a clear and intelligent discussion of the legal questions involved. It shows a careful consideration of the testimony taken upon the hearing, a perfectly clear appreciation of.the questions involved, and the conclusion at which he arrived seems to have been fair and just. If, therefore, the rationality of the act is to be regarded as “ very strong evidence ” of sanity, then the conduct of Mr. Boynton throughout this case, the opinion which he wrote, the findings which he carefully corrected, and the •decision which he signed all attest, very strongly, mental capacity to discharge the duty which he performed. In addition to the rational character of the act itself, the evidence of several members of the bar and business men, with whom he conducted professional matters on the day or immediately prior to the day when he was 'adjudged a lunatic, is presented to show that in his relations with them and in regard to the discharge of his professional duties, Mr. Boynton conducted himself as a rational person. The counsel for
Giving full force and effect to the legal presumption arising from the inquisition it must, nevertheless, be conceded that its force is very much weakened by the character of the evidence upon which it was found, and the circumstances under which notice of the proceedings to Hr. Boynton was dispensed with. Bearing in mind in this connection the rationality of Hr. Boynton’s acts in relation to this case, and the testimony of his associates and others with whom he came in contact, I think that any presumption of mental incapacity arising from the inquisition is entirely overcome in relation to this case, where the question of lunacy is collaterally involved. The question to be determined is one of fact, and must be solved with due regard to all the attendant circumstances, rather than by according any undue weight to presumptions arising merely from the inquisition. The defendants in this case secured the appointment of the referee, many hearings v^ere had, what seems to be in all respects a fair and impartial decision was made,- and under the circumstances the judgment entered upon it should not be set aside merely because of the inquisition found against the referee.
The defendants seek to set aside the judgment upon the ground that one of^the defendants, the City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Company of Philadelphia, was dissolved on the 24th day of June, 1905, pending the hearing of the case before the referee and prior to the entry of the judg
Motion denied. Ho costs.