R. Anthony J. SMITH v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant
No. 2563 C.D. 2015
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
September 6, 2016
Submitted on Briefs July 15, 2016
OPINION BY JUDGE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER
In its opinion, the trial court framed this issue as implicating the court‘s authority to “reasonably control the mode and order of examining witness[es] and the presentation of evidence.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/14, at 18, citing
In his brief, Wilson frames the issue as one of discovery and cites
(a) In all court cases, ... if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant‘s attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable:
...
(iv) any other evidence specifically identified by the defendant, provided the defendant can additionally establish that its disclosure would be in the interests of justice.
Questions involving discovery in criminal cases lie within the discretion of the trial court and that court‘s decision will not be reversed unless such discretion was abused. Commonwealth v. Rucci, 543 Pa. 261, 670 A.2d 1129, 1140 (1996).
Here, we can discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to allow Wilson to access Jackson‘s medical records. The record is devoid of any evidence that Jackson ever suffered from a drug or alcohol problem, and Wilson points to none in his brief. Wilson‘s requests appear to have been based on nothing more than mere speculation and suspicion of the Commonwealth. Moreover, defense counsel was free to cross-examine Jackson regarding any factor that may have impacted his ability to testify truthfully or recall the events in question. Accordingly, Wilson is entitled to no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Bryan L. Heulitt, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from the November 12, 2015, Order of the
Mr. Smith‘s vehicle was impounded by the Philadelphia Parking Authority (Parking Authority) on April 28, 2015 after being “live stopped.”3 (Common pleas Op. (Op.) at 1.) Mr. Smith appeared before a BAA hearing officer later that day. (Id.) The City was not represented at this “hearing.” According to the transcript,4 the hearing officer informed Mr. Smith that
Mr. Smith met with a different hearing officer (Hearing Officer), again without the presence of representatives of the City, the following day. (Id. at 21a.) The transcript shows that Mr. Smith once again argued that he was a victim of identity theft and that the parking tickets and penalties did not belong to him.5 Mr. Smith presented Hearing Officer with documentation from the State Police and the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court showing that he was the victim of identity theft in 1991. (R.R. at 23a.) After taking a short break to consult with a supervisor, Hearing Officer told Mr. Smith:
The only thing we can do at this point in order to get your car out, you would have to pay the fees and that would be $335.00 and these red light tickets which would be $350.00. You would need $685.00 and we would put you on a payment plan for the rest of the tickets.
(Id. at 24a.) Mr. Smith asked Hearing Officer how, if he paid the $685.00 and accepted a payment plan, he could still appeal the fees assessed against him because the cars that were ticketed were not his. The Hearing Officer responded: “You don‘t have too much of a choice here.” (Id.) The “hearing” ended, and Mr. Smith was provided with notice that he was not eligible for a hearing to determine whether he was responsible for the 31 outstanding violations because the violations entered into default more than one year before the hearing. (Id. at 51a.)
Mr. Smith filed a statutory appeal with common pleas. Common pleas issued a scheduling order on June 23, 2015, that set a due date of September 8, 2015, for Mr. Smith‘s brief. (Id. at 10a.) Mr. Smith did not file a brief in support of his appeal. (Op. at 3.) The City filed a Motion to Quash Appeal, alleging that Mr. Smith‘s appeal should be quashed pursuant to Rule 2188 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure6 because he violated common pleas’ scheduling order and the City was unable to prepare a defense. (R.R. at 54a-55a.) Common pleas denied the City‘s Motion to Quash Appeal and proceeded to hear oral argument.
At oral argument, Mr. Smith, appearing pro se,7 argued that he is the victim of
The City filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and common pleas ordered the City to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement) pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.9 (Order, November 23, 2015, C.R. at Item 10.) In its Concise Statement, the City argued that common pleas erred: (1) “when it denied the City‘s Motion to Quash Appeal and allowed [Mr. Smith] to participate in oral argument despite never filing a brief“; (2) “when it concluded that it had jurisdiction to make a determination of liability for the outstanding [31] parking citations“; and (3) “by ignoring the standard of review in an appeal from an administrative agency.” (R.R. at 87a-88a.)
Common pleas issued an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure10 responding to the City‘s arguments in its Concise Statement. Therein, common pleas responded to the City‘s argument that the Motion to Quash Appeal should have been granted and that Mr. Smith should not have been permitted to participate in oral argument by reasoning:
[T]he trial court‘s decision as to whether to grant or deny a Motion to Quash for failure to file a brief is within the court‘s discretion. King v. City of Philadelphia, 102 A.3d 1073, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In the instant case, [Mr. Smith] averred he was unrepresented and did not know that he needed to file a brief.
[The City] did not plead nor prove that it suffered any prejudice in [Mr. Smith]‘s failure to file a brief. ... Consequently, this court exercised its discretion in denying [the City]‘s Motion to
Quash and allow[ed] [Mr. Smith] to participate in oral argument.
(Op. at 6.)
With regard to the City‘s argument that it ignored the standard of review in an agency appeal, common pleas reasoned as follows.
As there were no findings of fact and conclusions of law provided to this court, it was impossible for this court to determine whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. [The City] provided a certified record containing only E-tims reports11 and hearing dates. [The City] argued that [Mr. Smith] could not contest any tickets older than one year, despite [Mr. Smith]‘s arguments that the tickets were not accrued by him and that the car registrations linked to those violations were not his cars, and despite the fact that the car was impounded due to said unpaid violations, of which [Mr. Smith] testified he had no notice. This court found [Mr. Smith]‘s oral argument persuasive and credible, and consequently exercised its equitable powers to resolve [Mr. Smith]‘s tickets.
(Op. at 5.)
Finally, common pleas responded to the City‘s argument that common pleas lacked authority to rule on Mr. Smith‘s liability for the parking violations. Common pleas held that the “procedure before the [BAA] was perfunctory,” and that Mr. Smith‘s due process rights were violated by being “effectively denied the ability to contest the tickets, to fully understand the charges against him, or provide a meaningful defense in any way” “despite having no knowledge of [the parking tickets].” (Op. at 6-7.) Common pleas concluded that in light of this due process violation, the court has equitable powers to resolve the outstanding tickets. (Op. at 7.)
On appeal to this Court, the City makes the same arguments it raised in its Concise Statement, and it argues that common pleas erred by concluding that Mr. Smith‘s due process rights were violated.12
Motion to Quash Appeal
First, the City argues that common pleas erred by denying its Motion to Quash Appeal pursuant to Rule 2188 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to a court of common pleas providing appellate review of a local agency decision under the Local Agency Law unless the court has specifi-
The Supervising Judge shall publish a standing case management order for each agency whose determinations are appealed on a regular basis (“agency-specific orders“). For agencies whose determinations are seldom appealed, the Supervising Judge shall publish a stand-ing order of a generic nature. The [Prothonotary] shall provide appellant(s) with an agency-specific (or generic) standing order whenever a notice of appeal is filed.
Every appeal (and matter ancillary thereto) shall be governed by the aforesaid standing order and any supplemental order, which may be issued by the Supervising Judge.
Phila. Civ. R. 320(c).
Here, common pleas issued the relevant scheduling order on June 23, 2015. Neither the Philadelphia County Rules of Civil Procedure nor the scheduling order provide for consequences for not complying with the briefing timeline. While common pleas had the discretion to grant the Motion to Quash Appeal, see King, 102 A.3d at 1077 (affirming common pleas’ decision to “exercise[] its sound discretion” and grant of a motion to quash for failure to file a brief), the law does not require it to do so. Further, we do not agree that the City was unduly prejudiced by common pleas’ decision to allow Mr. Smith to participate in oral argument. Mr. Smith raised the exact issues in oral argument as he did in the two BAA hearings; ergo, the City had notice of Mr. Smith‘s arguments and was able to prepare a defense. Accordingly, we observe no error or abuse of discretion in common pleas’ decision to deny the City‘s Motion to Quash Appeal.
Standard of Review and Determining Liability
Next, the City argues that common pleas erred and abused its discretion when it concluded that Mr. Smith was not liable for the 31 parking violations and penalties because Mr. Smith‘s liability was beyond its scope and standard of review.
This action is governed by the Local Agency Law. Kovler v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 1067 n. 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); see Section 2.02 of the City of Philadelphia, Office of Director of Finance, Regulations of the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication13 (stating that BAA “shall, consistent with the Local Agency Law,
A “full and complete record” is defined as “a complete and accurate record of the testimony taken so that the appellant is given a base upon which he may appeal and, also, that the appellate court is given a sufficient record upon which to rule on the questions presented.” City of Philadelphia v. Board of License and Inspection Review, 139 Pa. Cmwlth. 240, 590 A.2d 79, 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (quoting Springfield School District v. Shellem, 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 306, 328 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974)), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 540 (Pa. 1991). In the event a full and complete record of the proceedings before the local agency was not made, the court may hear the appeal de novo, or may remand the proceedings to the agency for the purpose of making a full and complete record or for further disposition in accordance with the order of the court.
In re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659, 668 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
The City argues that because the record was full and complete, the only issues under review by common pleas were whether BAA‘s determination that Mr. Smith was not entitled to a hearing to consider his allegations that he should not be liable for the parking violations (1) violated Mr. Smith‘s constitutional rights, (2) was an error of law, (3) was determined in a procedure that was contrary to statute, and (4) whether the finding that Mr. Smith‘s violations were in default for more than a year was not supported by substantial evidence. The City misidentifies the issues involved. Mr. Smith argued before the BAA and common pleas that the tickets do not belong to him due to alleged identity theft. After assessing the evidence and hearing argument, common pleas identified a constitutional infirmity in the process that had to be addressed.
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
[T]he basic tenets of due process apply with equal force in administrative proceedings as they do in judicial proceedings. See Kowenhoven v. County of Allegheny, 587 Pa. 545, 901 A.2d 1003 (Pa. 2006) (“Due process principles apply to quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings ....“). Moreover, it is fundamental that the key principles underpinning due process include the requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Pa. Bankers Ass‘n v. Pa. Dep‘t of Banking, 598 Pa. 313, 956 A.2d 956, 965 (2008) (emphasis added). “The key factor in determining whether procedural due process is denied is whether the party asserting the denial of due process suffered demonstrable prejudice.” City of Phila. v. Urban Mkt. Dev., Inc., 48 A.3d 520, 522 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Due process not only requires an opportunity to be heard, but also that the opportunity is provided “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The constitutional requirements of due process are mirrored in
Pursuant to the Traffic Code, the “parking ticket and the information from a state department of motor vehicles identifying the owner of the vehicle” serves as “prima facie evidence that the registered owner of the vehicle was the person who committed the parking violation.” Section 12-2807(2) of the Traffic Code, Phila. Code § 12-2807(2). We understand that the Traffic Code and associated regulations provide the BAA with broad adjudicative authority to consider a challenge to the City‘s prima facie case and an appellant with the right to a hearing to rebut the prima facie case if he or she submits a “written application setting forth (i) a sufficient defense to the charge, and (ii) excusable neglect as to the respondent‘s failure to timely submit testimony and evidence or attend the hearing” within one year after the ticket is entered. Phila. Code § 12-2807(4). The Traffic Code also limits the ability of registered owners to raise the lack of notice of a parking ticket on appeal. According to Section 12-2807(4) of the Traffic Code:
If a notice of violation was mailed to the registered owner at the address appearing on the registry of a state department of motor vehicles, the failure to receive such notice shall not be considered a defense unless the owner can prove that a state department of motor vehicles was advised of the owner‘s change of address prior to the date of the parking violation.
Id. (emphasis added).
However, these provisions are necessarily premised on the fact that the “registered owner,” to whom the notice of violation was sent, is the person appearing before the BAA. Any interpretation of these provisions that does not permit the person against whom liability is charged to challenge whether the governmental entity is proceeding against the correct person is not a lawful interpretation. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 536, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the United States Supreme Court assessed Georgia‘s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Act), Ga. Code Ann. §§ 92A-601-92A-605 (1958), which operated to suspend motor vehicle operating privileges for uninsured licensees who were in accidents until the licensee posted security to cover the damages caused by the accident. The procedures under the Act did not afford uninsured licensees with the right to a hearing to challenge whether he or she was liable for the accident. The Court noted that while “[a] procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case,” a hearing was required in that instance to address the limited issue of whether there was a reasonable possibility that judgments may be made against the licensee. Id. at 540. The Court held that because:
the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State‘s determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing. The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be ‘meaningful‘, and ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’ It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses
of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.
Id. at 541-42 (citations omitted).
Like in Bell, the question of whether Mr. Smith owns the cars in question is a central factor to the deprivation of his property. Accordingly, a meaningful hearing on this question is required. Common pleas therefore correctly determined that Mr. Smith should be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present his defense.
However, common pleas did not correctly provide Mr. Smith with that opportunity. Common pleas noted in its opinion that its review was hampered by BAA‘s decision to not provide common pleas with findings of fact or conclusions of law. (Op. at 5); see
Common pleas relied on its equitable power citing
(a) General rule.--A party who proceeded before a local agency under the terms of a particular statute, home rule charter, or local ordinance or resolution shall not be precluded from questioning the validity of the statute, home rule charter or local ordinance or resolution in the appeal, but if a full and complete record of the proceedings before the agency was made such party may not raise upon appeal any other question not raised before the agency (notwithstanding the fact that the agency may not be competent to resolve such question) unless allowed by the court upon due cause shown.
(b) Equitable relief.--The remedy at law provided by subsection (a) shall not in any manner impair the right to equitable relief heretofore existing, and such right to equitable relief is hereby continued, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a).
We, therefore, must remand to allow Mr. Smith the opportunity to present evidence to a neutral fact finder on whether Mr. Smith was provided notice of the violations and failed to act, and whether the violations at issue belong to Mr. Smith. See Burger v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of McGuffey Sch. Dist., 576 Pa. 574, 839 A.2d 1055, 1062 (2003) (noting that “due process is a flexible concept and, thus, requires procedural protections as each particular situation demands“); City of Phila., Bd. of License & Inspection Review v. 2600 Lewis, Inc., 661 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (concluding that because a licensee was denied due process due to defective proceedings, remand was necessary “to ensure the integrity of the administrative process“). We leave the decision on whether the fact-finding necessitated by our disposition should be conducted by common pleas or BAA up to the sound discretion of common pleas. Pursuant to
ORDER
NOW, September 6, 2016, the November 12, 2015 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas), entered in the above-captioned matter, is VACATED. The matter is REMANDED to common pleas for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER
Judge
Notes
If an appellant fails to file his designation of reproduced record, brief or any required reproduced record within the time prescribed by these rules, or within the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of the matter. If an appellee fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by these rules, or within the time as extended, he will not be heard at oral argument except by permission of the court.
Id.(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court.--If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (“judge“) desires clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement“).
Id.(1) General rule.--Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.
Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immu-