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Qwest Corporation v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review
829 N.W.2d 550
Iowa
2013
Check Treatment

*1 CORPORATION, QWEST Appellee, TAX BOARD OF

IOWA STATE

REVIEW, Appellant.

No. 11-1543. of Iowa.

Supreme Court

April Miller, General, Attorney

Thomas J. Jr., Special Stanley, Donald D. Assistant Miller, General, D. Attorney and James General, appellant. Attorney Assistant Goode, Nyemaster Bruce W. Baker of P.C., Moines, Richard Des G. Smith LLP, & Hawley Hawley Ennis Troxell Denver, Idaho, Adkins, Boise, A. Roy Colorado, appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice. proceeding review This administrative imposing whether requires us decide *2 Corporation. of S provid- tax on the Iowa-based U West thereafter carriers, exchange telephone incumbent local but not ed local landline service in four- states, competitive long including on that of distance and teen Iowa and the rest of providers, wireless service violates article former Northwestern territory. Bell I, section 6 of Iowa Constitution. We Although the divestiture was the death conclude it does not. The differential tax knell for a single telephone company’s pre- enterprises rationally treatment of these country, dominance in this did leave in in legitimate related to state interests en- place system where local phone service new couraging development compet- was generally provided by monopoly carri- infrastructure, itive telecommunications ers that existing had the infrastructure to raising providers while revenue from those offices, switches, do so (e.g., central and historically regulated monopoly had a lines). phone customer To address this enjoy advantages and continue to some situation, Congress and the states enacted monopoly. Accordingly, reverse legislation in the mid-1990s. Telecom- of the court judgment district (Telecom Act) munications Act re- uphold the Iowa State Board of Tax Re- quired exchange incumbent local carriers Qwest Corporation. view’s assessment on (ILECs) like U S West provide inter- connection to their networks to offer Background

I. Facts and Proceed- elements, their network such as the hard- ings. homes, phone wired lines that entered an “unbundled” basis largely The facts in this case are undis- to other carriers (CLECs) puted. sought to enter the generation ago, A the American market- (AT&T) place and Telephone Telegraph Company compete & them. See Tele- position nationally had a communications Act of Pub.L. dominant both 104- (codified local 110 Stat. long-distance telephone service. scattered U.S.C.) Iowa, In sections of 47 it did business under the name Northwestern Bell. Most Iowans obtained Complementing Telecom Act was long-distance their local and phone service passed House which File had been through company Northwestern Bell. The general assembly year our before. See owned and maintained ran lines that from (current 1995 Iowa ch. Acts version at Iowa residences and businesses into cen- (2013)). §§ Iowa Code 476.95-.101 Like offices, switching tral equipment where Act, required Telecom House File 518 phone was used to route toward their calls provide ILEC to “interconnection” ultimate Iowans destination. Those who and to make available the “unbundled es- phone did not get service from sential facilities its network.” See id. Bell primarily Northwestern relied on an- (current § 12 version at Iowa Code monopoly, other local such GTE. as 476.101(4)(a)(l)). § The section entitled “Findings expressly of policy,” case, of a lengthy As the result antitrust —statement act, purposes sets forth certain a consent decree entered follows: industry ended AT&T’s national 1. Communications services should effect in dominance. The decree took throughout just, be available the state at its local required AT&T to divest tele- reasonable, rates from and affordable phone businesses. This led to forma- variety providers. independent regional tion of Bell seven operating rendering one which was decisions with re- companies, U West, Inc., predecessor spect S of telecommunica- regulation con- were reasonable. company’s the board shall costs companies,

tions 518, however, File gave id. House its on See effects of decisions sider the phone companies option exiting local mar- competition telecommunications *3 regulation by submitting from this form of and, to extent reasonable kets that, plan” if “price regulation approved, a lawful, develop- to further the shall act price set for “basic com- forth competition in those markets. ment of to subject permitted munications services” encourage competition In order to 3. Acts ch. adjustments. See Iowa services, the for all telecommunications (current § version at Iowa Code relating to address issues board should 476.97). opted § U West for S toward cost and prices the movement of and, voluntary price regulation plan a existing in the removal subsidies no consequently, longer subject to the incumbent local price structure of regulation. rate-base/rate-of-return exchange carrier. The Telecom Act and its Iowa counter- flexibility appro- Regulatory 4. in an increased part resulted CLEC priate provides cus- competition when to for presence in Iowa. From 2000 with choices in the competitive tomers in- example, CLEC access lines Iowa variety, quality, pricing of commu- 193,000 260,000. But, creased from services, and when consistent nications meantime, competitors other for local protection with consumer and other service residential and business entered public interests. relevant telephony, voice marketplace —cable respond 5. The board should (VOIP), protocol over internet and wire- flexibility to in the speed changes record less service. While the here does industry. communications by not detail the actual inroads made development can be fos- 6. Economic competitors each these traditional by the of advanced com- tered existence service, it is that a landline clear number munications networks. swapped of Iowans have ser- ILEC Thus, legislature’s § Iowa Code 476.95. vice for one of these three alternatives. inter- purposes the act can be stated From 2000 to ILEC access lines preted availability of af- enhancing 1,759,000 1,422,000 declined from —a through- fordable communication services corresponding than greater decline state, encouraging competition out increase in CLEC lines. services, all and foster- telecommunication As Iowans know from their ing development. economic experience, industry has wireless Prior ILECs in Iowa like significantly years. From grown recent S West had been Northwestern Bell/U the number of wireless ser- subject regula- to rate-base/rate-of-return vice Iowa increased from subscriptions 286, § tion. Acts Iowa ch. 975,000 1,821,000. phone A wireless (current § 476.8 version at Code essentially two-way radio. Wireless (2013)). system regulation, Under this signals communication is based on radio essentially the incumbent carrier received it travels from the handset to the cell (or versa). guarantee plus costs a reason- its reaching tower vice After tower, by able be signal by high-speed rate of return would covered cell travels customers, long paid switching tariffs so data circuit1 to mobile office generally providers do not own CLECs. Wireless lines them ILECs or these data but lease from (MSO). provider’s The wireless MSO uses certain enterprises. other See Iowa Code calls; switches, 427A.l(l)(fe) (2013) switches to route those § (indicating that however, may contain additional function- “[property assessed the department of ality that an do ILEC’s switches not need pursuant revenue to sections 428.24 to MSO, to have. From the the communica- 428.29, 433, 434, chapters 437, 437A, or may travel on the ILEC’s network— 438” shall be assessed as real property). definitely person and will do so if the being Bell, GTE, Northwestern and other tele- spoken to is an ILEC customer. phone companies continued to have to pay Historically, (i.e., Iowa has centrally switches, tax on their computers, *4 level) the state property assessed for tax and other equipment personal and proper- purposes both the real and the personal ty Nonetheless, in Iowa. Qwest’s coun- property telephone traditional compa- sel acknowledged at oral argument in this nies such as Northwestern Bell and its case, long so as the telephone company successors S Qwest. U West and This remained subject to rate-base/rate-of-re- system dates back approximately a centu- regulation, turn it was allowed to include ry and continues day. to this See Iowa obligations those tax and, in its rate base (1913) (“Said § Code 1380 assessment thus, ultimately pass to them along to shall property every include all kind and Iowa consumers. whatsoever, real, character personal, or House File 518 in provided 1995 that mixed, used said companies in the “competitive long telephone distance com- transaction of telegraph telephone and (CLDTCs) panies]” subject not be business....”); (2013) (con- § id. 433.4 to property this taxation scheme. See Thus, taining language). similar ILECs (current 1995 § Iowa Acts ch. ver- required pay are to property tax in Iowa 476.1D(10)(6)). sion at § Iowa Code In- switches, on the computers, and other stead, companies essentially would be equipment and personal property they use taxed on their property real only prop- for provide to local telephone service in Iowa. erty acquired after January 1996. Iowa Historically, this tax regime applied to 476.1D(10)(6). § Code A “competitive “[ejvery telegraph telephone company long telephone company” distance was de- operating a line this state.” See id. fined as one where “more than half of the (1913) (current § 1328 version at id. company’s revenues from its Iowa intra- (2013)). § 433.1 state telecommunications services and fa- As we in Heritage noted Cablevision v. cilities are received from services and facil- Manon County Board Supervisors, “In ities that the board has determined to be past times provided Iowa statutes for an subject competition.” to effective personal extensive property tax.” 476.1D(10)(a). § It undisputed that this (Iowa 1989). However: “In provision was intended to encourage so- general 1973 the assembly adopted a called competition,” “facilities-based that scheme personal under which most proper- is, deployment of additional equipment ty would longer no be taxed.” Heritage in Iowa Cablevision, by competitive carriers. Seven 37; 436 N.W.2d at see also (codified carriers have since qualified § Iowa Acts ch. CLDTC (1975)) status, MCI, AT&T, § Iowa including Code 427A.11 Sprint, (phasing out tax). personal McLeod, property Yet phaseout long-distance this affiliate of did not apply telephone to companies Qwest.2 476.1D(10) (like

2. A McLeod), CLDTC for purposes section can be a CLEC but it cannot thirty-five forty-five to property (perhaps been companies never Wireless acquired taxation scheme while percent) to the subject they are not consid- subject because was still for ILECs rate-base/rate-of-return telephone 3, 2006, com- “telegraph regulation. ered to be On November a line in this state.” See operating a no- pan[ies] Iowa of Revenue issued Department companies are as- § Wireless id. 438.1. a value placing tice of assessment (i.e., county) locally by the sessed operating on Iowa its towers, which a form are value of cell $1,028,480,000. Qwest challenge elected to 441.21; § id. property. real assembly’s previous decision general However, they r. 701-71.15. Admin. Code property of ILECs personal tax the property tax pay do not operat- providers or wireless CLDTCs or equipment and other switches Thus, ing Qwest responded Iowa. located in their may be by filing appeal- protest assessment however, undisputed, It MSOs. Iowa State ing the assessment only frequently have companies wireless Review. Board of Tax *5 than for entire state —rather one MSO the 11, Qwest amend- On filed an December per metropoli- of central offices a number agreement protest acknowledging ed an like an tan area ILEC. which reduced the to- parties between the service other Although both CLEC and Qwest’s property tal value of assessed telephone sig- have made of service forms $785,000,000, Qwest’s preserving while ILEC market nificant incursions into arguments. Qwest took constitutional share, Qwest large to have a continues treatment it position that the dissimilar tax of De- phone of local service. As share similarly comparison received in to other 780,166 access it still had cember companies telecommunications situated territory, Iowa. its service lines in Within discrimina- amounted to unconstitutional wireline seventy-eight percent it had that the Specifically, argued tion.3 connections; communities, in over tax taxed for scheme which ILECs ninety percent least wireline had but not personal property, value customers had customers. While some providers, wireless violated and CLDTCs cord” wireless for “cut the and substituted Qwest’s rights Equal under Protection service, that the record indicates wireline States Clauses of the and United region in the Midwest as whole this Constitutions. only about 15.8% of would have been half the second of 2007. households requested transfer of parties jointly and fac- demographic geographic Certain Department Inspections the case to the even suggested tors the number would be (DIA) for case Appeals and a contested lower Iowa. evidentiary Subsequently, an hearing. before DIA over a was held Qwest’s hearing taxable from June 23 to 26 five-day period includes a substantial amount of 476.1D(10)(b) stipulated parties § 3. The of this assess- an ILEC. Iowa Code that be ment, (or $220,049,395) telephone (stating long compa- repre- that a percent distance ny purposes "means an of the section purchased Janu- sents that were after assets entity provides telephone fa- that service and 1, 1995, ary exempt that have been exchanges, cilities between local but does purchased by a if CLDTC. exchange utility holding ... a include local 476.29, certificate issued under section sub- 12”). section 1, 2008. July The administrative law ties Iowa. H.F. 518 contained other (ALJ) judge forty-page designed issued a decision measures to promote competi- 5, 2010, May findings forth her setting exchange local market. Further, 476.[1]D(10) of fact and of law and rejecting conclusions subsection ex- Qwest’s equal protection emption applied Re- all challenge. acquired newly garding per- treatment equipment purchased differential by qualifying merely sonal equipment owned CLDTCs and CLDCs—not used to ILECs, provide long she observed: distance service. Thus exemption provided an incentive for legislature may concedes that the established long distance companies to

pass tax laws to stimulate de- economic move into the local exchange market. however, velopment. They argue, Finally, Qwest argues if a even provide the state incentives to [cannot] rational basis existed to the ex- support deny one them group to another emption newly acquired prop- CLDC group. applied here, they related As erty provision when the was enacted in legit- contend had no 1995, the growth competitive forces offering imate basis for within the industry telecommunications competitive long incentive distance between 1995 and 2006 has negated the companies excluding lo- incumbent provide need incentives to encourage exchange providers. cal However, competitors. es- record ample justification The record reveals *6 although Qwest tablishes that lost a has for the to make a distinction portion share, of its market re- Qwest telephone between ILECs and service mains the exchange dominant local car- providers, including long distance rier in the it markets serves. providers. and other had ILECs The rational test require does not providing exchange been local service narrowly classifications to be to tailored providers operating as sole for their particular serve a If end. the classifica- service areas monopo- under sanctioned has basis, some it reasonable does ly They status for decades. owned the not offend the constitution simply be- existing local telephone infrastructure cause classification is not made and, prior to the mid-1990s were “the nicety prac- mathematical or because in local phone company.” un- ILECs were tice it inequality. result[s] some The likely presence to reduce their in the fact that the legislature could have craft- expansion state or withhold in Iowa. exemption ed a broader or different tax importantly, More well- the ILECs were D(10) not does render section 476.1 un- positioned only compe- withstand constitutional. tition, competitors. but to impede (Internal quotation citations and marks omitted.) Qwest contends that the offer tax Turning to providers, the wireless

incentives to competitive long distance ALJ concluded: companies rationally was not related competition a desire to en- ample enhance The state also treat has reason to courage the differently construction the local wireless providers service exchange market. The state a le- than providers purposes had wireline gitimate definition, encouraging interest in de- By tax assessment. velopment and both providers telephone construction of wireless are not long exchange distance and local facili- do companies. They not own an inter- its state consti- Court, raising only and District infrastructure state-wide

connected hearing, After a centrally challenge. assessed tutional is not Al- ruling department of revenue. reversed the Board’s by the district court impact Qwest’s these found that Iowa constitutional though distinctions wire- wireline and question respect of whether violated with rights were situated, similarly are providers compared less it received treatment justifica- a rational they provide[ also wireless With re- providers. ] CLDTCs companies differ- taxing CLDTCs, tion for wireless district court to the spect telephone companies. ently than wireline found: service is a rel- communication

Wireless deciding that at the Assuming without industry. first commer- atively new there time File enacted [House 518] by the FCC cial license was issued legitimate gov- was a rational basis and inception From the legislation, for the purpose ernmental service, segment this wireless the evidence in the the Court concludes highly competitive. has been market no longer record such rationale shows wireless competition, Despite market exists.... It has been established rapidly throughout expanded service has segments of and wireless wireline state. industry the telecommunications are fre- providers ... Because wireless customers, competition for same [switching] only one mobile quently relevant market to look thus this is the (rather entire state than office for the picture of complete at. this more When each central offices within number of at, market is looked telephone the total area) it reasonable to con- service seems Qwest’s share of market served companies likely are that wireless clude ac- just forty percent of 2006 under less significantly own cording report by to a Board. “personal fall into the traditional Therefore, no longer it is clear *7 than ILECs own. property” categories market, as it fif- dominant in this was years ago operating when it was

teen type the providers status, do own Wireless monopoly under sanctioned common to of state-wide infrastructure for rejecting argu- reason this ALJ’s fully It is centrally businesses. assessed by support in the Qwest ment is without for the to allow reasonable record. providers personal the same

wireless avail- exemptions tax that are returns In the end the Court to locally owners of able to other assessed (here taxed or not taxed fact items property. commercial of- Qwest’s switches and related central Qwest timely appeal filed to the proper- equipment personal fice parties State Board of Tax Review. The by long after some ty purchased however, that the deci- stipulated, ALJ’s companies respec- telephone distance Board, sion treated as that of the would be nearly and are for tively) are identical Qwest’s judicial subject right seek activity primary main or the same Accordingly, Board thereon. review use.... 12, adopt- final order on October

issued a deciding without there was Assuming in full. ing the ALJ’s decision disparate tax basis for the rational D(10) Qwest peti- treatment of section 476.1 when brought On November enacted, County concludes that in the Polk was Court judicial tion for review time, legitimate governmen- rational basis and technology. and advancements in through tal interests been vitiated provisions in Iowa chapters Code in the changes underlying circum- 427A a tax establish stance[s], time, passage of and advance- allowing scheme a tax exemption for the Accordingly, in technology. ments personal property of [providers] wireless D(10) allowing section 476.1 Code but not for the substantially similar exemption ac- switching and central office equipment (the quired taxing after 1995 CLDCs property of only property similarly proper- situated “personal” above) relevant to this issue as detailed ty is an viola- unconstitutional are violation of Iowa’s equal protec- equal provision, tion Iowa’s protection provision, set forth in Article set forth Article section of Constitution, Iowa’s section 6 Iowa’s ap- as Constitution, applied Qwest. plied Qwest.

(Internal omitted.) citations timely The Board appealed to this Court.

Similarly, providers, concerning wireless the district court wrote: II. Standard Review. analysis long As distance generally above, We review a district

companies the Court will assume court’s on a petition judicial decision deciding a rational without there was agency review of action for correction of for the exemption basis for wireless XXI, errors at law. Timberland Partners when it companies was enacted. How- Revenue, LLP above, Dep’t v. Iowa ever, again must Court (Iowa 2008). However, 172, 174 conclude assumed no this, cases such as where constitutional longer exists. was a Wireless service raised, issues are our relatively review is de novo. industry new was not available in widely Iowa when the ex-

emption enacted. The record is Analysis. III. growth providers clear of wireless over exploded Equal and subscribers has A. Protection Under the Iowa years ten past point We now Qwest’s Constitution. address number of wireless subscribers in claim State’s property that the tax scheme *8 Iowa exceeded the number of wireline for telecommunications companies violates Accordingly, customers. the Court con- the Iowa equal protection clause of the any I, legitimate cludes rational basis of and Constitution.4 Article section 6 the governmental interests that once existed Iowa “All of a Constitution states: laws disparate general opera- for this tax treatment have shall have a nature uniform tion; through grant been vitiated in the changes Assembly the General shall not underlying circumstance[s], citizen, citizens, or passage privi- to class of I, consistency provision 4. For the sake of our more tion found in article 6 of section I, Constitution”); State, precedent, King recent we will refer article 818 the Iowa v. 1, (Iowa 2012); "equal protection 6 as the clause” 22 section N.W.2d n. 18 Judicial Ct., 569, the Iowa Constitution. Inc. 578 See L.F. Noll v. Branch v. Iowa Dist. 800 N.W.2d 391, (Iowa 2012) (Iowa 2011) Eviglo, (querying Equal 816 N.W.2d 392 whether "the (referring "equal protection to the clause" of Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution Constitution); violated”); Rojas Energy Ridge the Iowa NextEra Res. has been v. Pine Bd., 30, Farms, L.L.C., (Iowa 223, Iowa LLC v. Utils. 815 N.W.2d 44 779 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 2012) 2010) (same). (referring “equal protec- to the 558 immunities, which, per the the can be “far from upon same means and end or

leges long citi fect” “is not so equally belong relationship not all so terms shall counterpart, as to ar federal our attenuated render distinction zens.” Like its Varnum, 763 essentially bitrary “is or irrational.” equal protection clause (citation similarly at 879 & n. 7 and internal persons that all situated N.W.2d direction omitted); quotation King, marks see also alike.” Varnum v. should be treated (Iowa 2009) Brien, 818 at 28. N.W.2d 878 N.W.2d 763 (citation quotation internal marks have applied When we rational omitted); v. Branch accord Judicial laws, they generally test been 2011). (Iowa Ct., 569, 578 Dist. 800 N.W.2d difficulty. “The ra upheld without much easily is met in chal tional basis standard legislation, Social and economic v. lenges Corp. to tax statutes.” Hearst here, at issue is provisions the tax Fin., & N.W.2d Dep’t Revenue 461 reviewed the rational basis test. under (Iowa 1990); Heritage accord Ca 306 (Iowa State, 1, 27 King 818 N.W.2d v. (“It blevision, widely 436 at 38 is N.W.2d State, 2012); Sanchez v. 692 accord recognized basis standard (Iowa 2005). This “a N.W.2d 817 is easily challenges satisfied in to tax stat Varnum, very standard.” 763 deferential utes.”); Selden, 251 City Waterloo 879; King, N.W.2d at accord 818 N.W.2d 1977) (“An (Iowa iron N.W.2d 508-09 27; v. City at Rental Ass’n Prop. Ames rule equal taxation is neither attainable (Iowa 2007). Ames, N.W.2d 259 736 Hearst, necessary.”).5 nor we held that review, the statute “Under rational-basis equal it violated neither federal nor state only rationally legiti need related to be protection guarantees for the Sanchez, mate interest.” state not exempt newspapers magazines at N.W.2d 817-18. does “[T]he [s]tate from Iowa’s sales and use tax. evidence, only produce plau have to at noted “in tax N.W.2d 304-06. We justification required.” King, sible fields, even than in matters more other 28; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at see also legislature possesses greatest freedom challenging at party N.W.2d 879. Hearst, at classification.” 461 N.W.2d heavy showing “has the the stat burden of Among things, accepted 305. other negate every ute unconstitutional and must argument state’s that Iowa’s tax scheme upon reasonable basis classifica “enhancing served the state’s interest Varnum, may be sustained.” knowledge literacy of its general (citation quota N.W.2d at internal Id. at citizenry.” omitted); King, tion marks accord 28; subsidizing newspapers Sperfslage City By price v. Ames Bd. (Iowa Review, 1992) through “newspaper” exemption 480 N.W.2d of (“The ... makes upheld newspapers statute will be under State available *9 means; legis we find the of even moderate to low basis standard if those reasonably public lature conclude that the an action deemed to be in the could legitimate exemption, newspa- promote classification would interest. With this interest.”). pers inexpensive state fit between the will remain an source creating Supreme especially 5. The United States Court taken have broad latitude in has City a similar view. See v. India Armour stat- and distinctions in tax classifications of —, 2073, —, napolis, U.S. 132 S.Ct. (Citation quotation utes.” and marks internal (2012) (“[W]e 182 L.Ed.2d 1005 omitted.)). [[legislatures repeatedly pointed out that (Iowa 2002). people of public information most 352-53 We noted that will be city able to afford. “the had freedom in economic matters encourage one type property of usage saying exemp- Id. It went that the without over another differentiating the fees buy- tion applied regardless of whether the imposed usages” different and was person er of the was a of mod- newspaper “free encourage commercial develop- erate even apply to low means did not by relieving payment ment it from if magazine have been a similar- would Builders, parks fee.” Home 644 N.W.2d ly inexpensive public source of information at 352-53. We the City “may added that people for of to low moderate means. reasonably assume that commercial users Similarly, Sperfslage, upheld we generate of property need for park less regulation required state buildings all facilities than do developers.” residential living three or more units to be classi- Id. at 353. properties fied as commercial for Racing In Ass’n purposes allowing taxation while all build- Central Iowa v. Fitz of (RACI II), ings gerald following with one or units to two be classified remand from Court, Supreme residential even when used as a com- United States we con legislature’s mercial venture. 480 N.W.2d at 48-49. cluded that the decision to tax gross receipts We reiterated that rational basis test racetrack gambling at a rate easily “is to tax challenges thirty-six percent satisfied gross and riverboat statutes.” at 49. Sperfslage, N.W.2d gambling receipts at a rate of twenty per We regulation then found the constitution- I, cent violated article section 6 of the al “far likely because it was more that an Iowa Constitution. 675 N.W.2d 15-16 (Iowa 2004).6 owner occupier purchase one-unit or We our explained application two-unit rental than properties three-unit of the rational basis standard the follow as a use residence.” ing terms: Again, correspondence this rough between court [T]his must first determine wheth the asserted state interest and the classifi- er had a valid rea enough. cation was It did not matter son to treat differently racetracks from case, particular in a single or double- riverboats when taxing gambling pur- unit had a never residential revenue these businesses. See Fitz pose. Iowa, v. gerald [Racing Ass’n Cent. 103, 107, 2156, 2159, 539 U.S. 123 S.Ct. And in Home Builders Ass’n Greater (2003) Moines, L.Ed.2d City (requiring ] Des Moines v. West Des “ plausible policy ‘a rejected a chal- reason the classi federal constitutional ” (citation omitted)). fication’ lenge parks imposed to a this re fee on residential gard, “the statute serve a developers, legiti commercial based must on the size of with- geographic parcel, governmental mate interest.” Glowacki Exam’rs, out regard anticipated density v. State Bd. Med. 1993). (Iowa proposed subdivision. N.W.2d More- certiorari, granted RACI II was the last decision in series. Court then reversed our originally ruling We had struck down the tax differ- that the tax violated scheme federal violating equal ential in 2002 protection, both the Federal to us for remanded fur- Clauses, Equal proceedings. Protection Fitzgerald Racing without ther Ass’n *10 Iowa, 103, 110, performing separate analysis a under Cent. 539 123 S.Ct. U.S. of 2156, 2161, 97, (2003). Racing Iowa Constitution. Cent. Ass’n 156 L.Ed.2d 105 This of (RACI I), Fitzgerald Iowa v. 648 led to 2004 II under our decision in RACI (Iowa 2002). Supreme 562 The United States Iowa Constitution alone. 560 at in relevant

over, (defining “specious” interest must be 2187 the claimed state part right or su- “apparently proper: v. conceivable.” Miller “realistically fair, not so perficially just or correct but Hosp., 394 N.W.2d Cnty. [Boone 1986) added). (Iowa reality: appearing well first view: in at (emphasis ] 779 PLAUSIBLE”). Rather, rea- policy whether this court must then decide Our justifying classification Fitzger particular in See son a a basis fact. reason has be See id. ald, [107], generally should “credible.” at 123 S.Ct. at U.S. “capable of (defining at 532 “credible” as legis (requiring at L.Ed.2d worthy of being credited or believed: rationally upon lature could believe facts true). ...: belief entitled confidence: based are was classification TRUSTWORTHY”). Our court’s state- Finally, whether the we must consider classification, ment in Miller that the reason offered relationship between a “real- i.e., support of classification must be between racetracks differences boats, the latter istically conceivable” reflects purpose and the of and excursion understanding “plausible” a reason. of so weak that classification added). It (emphasis N.W.2d at 779 must viewed as arbi classification be “ rejects implicitly purely superficial a trary. (requiring that ‘the rela See id. analysis implies the court tionship goal the classification its of permitted “to if the probe as to render the determine so attenuated [not be] ” (cita ra- requirement constitutional of some arbitrary irrational’ distinction or omitted)); tionality in the nature of the class sin- Chicago tion accord Title Ins. (Iowa v. gled out has been met.” Greenwalt Huff, 256 N.W.2d Co. 1977) Corp., 71 P.3d Ram Restaurant (requiring relationship rational be validity legitimate (Wyo.2003) (considering a tween 730-31 classification interest). statutory governmental classification under purpose state or protection guarantees of the Unit- equal (footnotes II, 7-8 675 N.W.2d at RACI constitutions). Wyoming States and ed omitted). latter, we Concerning Id. at 7 n. 3. footnotes, In two we elaborated separate stated: phrases what meant “realis- we Although equal protec- this element tically “basis fact.” conceivable” and require analysis “proof’ tion does not former, we said: respect to the With sense, “ traditional it does indicate requirement plausible policy ‘a ” ex- the court will undertake some may reason for the classification’ be credibility the assert- amination aspect equal analysis protection challenged factual for the classi- ed basis susceptible differing most conclusions it simply accepting fication rather than generally Fitzgerald, application. face value. at [107], at at 123 S.Ct. 539 U.S. Thus, 8 n. 4. clear that made added) (cita- (emphasis L.Ed.2d at 103 justification asserted proof actual an omitted) (stating requirements not necessary, would not court Clause). The Equal dictio- Protection accept at face value and simply nary gives synonyms two the word it was examine it to determine whether “plausible”: “specious” and “credible.” opposed specious. credible New Webster’s Third International Dic- ed.2002). (unabr. bringing tionary party also reiterated that Certain- We ly “specious” challenge “negat[e] must pass reason should support might reasonable basis that generally every constitutional muster. See id. *11 8. Yet we reasonably the treatment.” Id. at could not disparate believed when “a involves taxing thirty-six added that classification racetracks at percent degrees of and un- rather than at the twenty-four extreme overinclusion percent particular by in relation rate recommended any derinclusion the committee reasonably impact cannot be said fur- would have on goal, competitive the (citation position the goal.” excursion boats vis-a-vis ther that Id. at 10 and omitted). quotation counterparts.” out-of-state Id. internal marks simply “There no rational connection [wa]s standards, Applying rejected these we between this conceivable legislative pur- justifications four III asserted RAC pose discriminatory and the tax im- rate disparate eco- promoting taxation — posed on the racetracks.” Id. communities, development nomic of river preceding mind, With the principles in protecting the reliance of river- interests we personal now turn to the property tax operators, aiding posi- boat the financial scheme in this at issue case. riverboats, maintaining tions of the in Iowa. riverboats Id. at 9-15. Concern- Application B. of Rational Ba interest, ing first asserted we state Qwest’s sis Review Claims. The State there noted that were river communities argues that vigorously “simi is not with racetracks nonriver communities larly situated” with the CLDTCs and wire Thus, jus- with riverboats. Id. at Therefore, less providers. ini the State “illogical.” was It involved tification Id. contends, tially we do not need to reach degrees “extreme and un- overinclusion question of whether the more favor Bierkamp derinclusion.” Id. (quoting tax able treatment CLDTC and wireless (Iowa 1980)). Rogers, N.W.2d provider has a rational rejected We then the asserted reliance Timberland, basis. See at 175 of riverboat operators interest because the (“If identify[ ... court is unable to a] nothing lines drawn taxation had do similarly class of situated who individuals time of with the investment. Id. 11. are treated allegedly differently under tax triggered by differential “[T]he statute, challenged plaintiff has not engaged gambling whether business first step equal protec satisfied the an prior implementation new tax analysis, the court need not ad rates, [by] whether gambling takes dress whether statute has a rational place floating at 12. casino.” Id. legitimate government to a in relationship (Citation quotation terest.” and internal We also concluded that the finan- aiding omitted.)). marks There is some risk of cial insuffi- position riverboats was an tautology to a if an succumbing we decide cient that were justification itself. If equal claim protection ground, on this so, “any differential tax constitu- would be Varnum, 763 however. N.W.2d at 882-83. tional because lower tax benefits always way, No are groups every two identical in the financial situation of the sub- taxpayer “nearly every equal protection claim ject lower Finally, to the rate.” Id. at 13. of a aground could be run onto the shoals not accept we could contention State’s analysis if the need groups threshold two thirty-six percent gam- that a on gross image mirror ed to be a of one another.” (much receipts bling higher of racetracks therefore, assume, will Id. at 883. We than the tax rate recommended similarly the groups are situated here. committee) study legislative designed Nonetheless, keep as an incentive to Iowa. agree riverboats with the Board’s it, As we put at 15. a rational exists for conclusion that “[T]he *12 562 Constitution, underly- in changes the to tax the legislature’s decision by 1995 investments find a

post-January ing can allow us to circumstances in this property in CLDTCs a longer rationally relates statute no way a for the state. This was reasonable legitimate government purpose.” State encourage deployment of legislature to 2007) Groves, (Iowa 90, 93 742 N.W.2d that would foster com- new infrastructure 581).7 Bierkamp, N.W.2d at (citing 293 in networks and result petitive wireline However, case, disagree in we this The prices legisla- for consumers. lower find conclusion. To the district court’s that the rationally ture could have believed dominant,” the longer that “is no competitive powerful ILECs had a built-in Qwest’s percent- district court considered facilities, advantage existing on their based total wireline and wireless connec- age of had underwritten development whose been tions. past century. over the But this that wireless ratepayers assumes substitutes, record wireline are when the court the sake district assumed most wire- before the Board showed that 476.1D(10)’s argument that section tax or (eighty-five percent less customers a rational exemption may pur- served during period the time covered more in but found that it does not do pose pay this for wire- proceeding) continue longer so now because “is no domi- Thus, ar- line one can plausibly service. that “when nant.” We have said before a demand gue that there remains distinct applying a rational basis test under them, Immediately stating exemp we went on to Neither cases a tax after 7. of these involved Groves, In a jurisprudence overturning tion. we considered substantive automobile discuss process challenge prohibiting due ato statute guest jurisdictions. at in Id. statutes other residing within thou sex offenders from two Thus, Bierkamp anything, if deci- 581-82. facility. feet care sand of a school or a child “changes underlying reference to in sion’s years 742 at 92. We noted that two evolving legal contemplates circumstances” before, Eighth court Circuit both our comparable no de- There have been trends. rejected challenges had similar constitutional proper- velopments of which we are aware in (cit residency Id. at to these restrictions. ty jurisprudence. ing Seering, State v. 701 N.W.2d 662-65 Notably, Eighth Circuit on which case Miller, (Iowa 2005), and Doe v. 405 F.3d poli- in we relied Grovesindicates that elected (8th Cir.2005)). Citing Bierkamp, we 709-16 cymakers are better suited reevaluate "changes underlying said circum Doe, legislation over time. See basis stances can allow us to find a statute no ("The institutionally legislature is F.3d at longer rationally legitimate gov relates to weigh equipped to benefits and burdens (citing purpose." Bierkamp, ernment Id. [legislation], and initial deci- to reconsider its 581). But N.W.2d at we noted Groves light experience and data accumu- sion present any had "failed to evidence that Still, time.”). States lated over United us to retreat from our decision in cause recognized Supreme Court Thus, Seering." rejected we his rational Id. constitutionally taxation scheme can become challenge. basis changes if it fails invalid to account for Bierkamp, we found no rational basis for Allegheny passage value due to time. guest Iowa’s automobile statute held Pittsburgh Cnty. Web- Coal Co. v. Comm'n un- could not withstand constitutional attack 336, 343-46, I, Cnty., 488 109 S.Ct. der article section 293 N.W.2d at 585. ster U.S. 6. review, (1989) 633, 637-39, At the of our outset rational 102 L.Ed.2d "changes underlying stated that circum- (striking prop- county’s down a assessment may stances vitiate basis” purchase erty primarily taxes basis of passage may "the of time call for less defer- time, price, adjustments with no over experimental ential standard of review as that new owners were assessed legislation trial less or nature of evident.” roughly the rate those who 8 to times However, Id. at unclear that we it is longer). had owned applied principles even these in that case. *13 therefore, and, a separate market for wire- situation more likely is to have unchecked service, still domi- monopoly power).8 line and that is See, e.g., nant in that market. Eastman the Turning to differential treatment of Servs., Inc., v. Image Kodak Co. Tech. personal property by owned ILECs and 2072, 469-82, 2083-90, U.S. S.Ct. wireless we providers, note at the first (1992) 265, 285-94 (finding 119 L.Ed.2d district court’s irrefutable observation: cross-elasticity existence of that the de- growth providers wireless “[T]he prevent not markets product mand does has exploded subscribers past over the ten being treated separate from anti- years point to the that 2006 the number purposes). pur- trust For rational basis of wireless subscribers in Iowa exceeded poses, “realistically justi- this conceivable” Yet, the number wireline customers.”9 fication, which does not involve “extreme helpful this observation is only in so far as degrees overinclusion and underinclu- goes. it To extent separate that wire- sion,” uphold is a sufficient basis to exist, less and wireline markets legisla- II, legislature’s line-drawing. RACI reasonably ture could conclude that at 10. N.W.2d is competitive, wireless market with four Additionally, to the there is a companies extent national scope doing business (AT&T, separate Verizon, market for wireline in in services Sprint T- power, Mobile), which the ILECs have a monopoly wireline market is legislature could reasonably competitive conclude that not. In a industry, pricing taxing personal cost, the ILECs’ is an property approaches marginal and there are no way to appropriate capture some monopoly government rents to extract. v. monopoly S.E.C., rent. See Beach FCC NetCoalition 615 F.3d Commc’ns, Inc., (D.C.Cir.2010) 307, 319-20, (“[I]n 508 U.S. 113 537 a competitive market, S.Ct. price L.Ed.2d of a product supposed (1993) (justifying a regulatory exemption cost, ie., its approach marginal sell- for satellite service covering commonly er’s cost of producing one additional unit.”). Thus, managed buildings, sepa- owned or legislature logi- might rately managed owned and buildings, cally that the conclude burdens of a tax on that an ground operator providers’ in the latter personal wireless incidence, i.e., argues issue here 8. The is one of tax legislature that when the whether tax would be borne consumers phased out most taxes on monopoly prof- or instead would come out of it businesses could not have been Defending a tax on its. this basis different intending industry, to stimulate the wireless defending produc- from based on "revenue which did not even exist. cannot But one pure or "the tion” fact that the market will ways. going require have it If we both are I, higher [a allow RACI tax].” See legislation pur- legitimate serve a current short, thing at 561-62. one it is pose, require we cannot end have government group for the assert that legislators actual been in the minds of when taxpayers heavily should be more so the taxed Otherwise, legislation was enacted. government money. can raise more As we saying would be that the has to I, pointed argu- out in RACI this is a circular periodically review the entire Iowa Code always justify can any ment that be used to regularly However, reenact laws that serve a differ- discrepancy in tax rates. it is an- original pur- thing purpose ent than the other to maintain intended that differential tax rationally enhancing rates are related to af- pose. fordability because the lower will ulti- rates mately higher benefit consumers while monopoly rates will come out of rents. exemption along to limits the CLDTC simply passed be would in Iowa while, prices, exemption a tax on was enact- higher purchased after the consumers Furthermore, not. monopolist prop- case ed. this concerns taxes, inter- erty an area where reliance from evidence contains The record significant. been viewed as ests have might conclude legislator *14 certainly sophisticated busi- operate in a companies the wireless that Owners— compa- like telecommunications nesses Qwest does market and still competitive tax declining property consider the con- have been nies—often Wireless rates not. Mean- dramatically per they a minute basis. before sequences purchases on of their while, single line flat-rat- Qwest increased make It is reasonable for State them. monthly from service rates residential ed by those reliance interests con- preserve to 1, 2005, to August on to $14.12 $12.80 it has tinuing property to tax as been 1, 2006, to on August on $15.56 $16.60 purchase its taxed from date Thus, justification August 2007.10 Hahn, Nordlinger owner. 505 U.S. “specious”; is not for differential treatment 2326, 2333, 13-14, 112 S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d II, at 8 it RACI 675 N.W.2d is “credible.” (1992) (upholding limits California’s n. 8. adjustments value of on to assessed this compare useful to and contrast It is until is resold and acknowl- A key II weakness of case with RACI serving to edging pro- that “classifications in II was it was position that State’s RACI legitimate tect and reliance in- expectation (at tax part) justify in to trying least protection deny equal terests not do way promote to simply a differential laws”). favorably by that were treated companies Qwest’s personal to Iowa’s challenge that We do not hold here the differential. only not tax scheme is simply justify State can the different challenge brought nationally. that has been treatment of in section 433.4 tax ILECs Hopewell Jersey New Inc. v. way promote group companies a to one Verizon Rather, the a New Borough, objected it hasn’t. an to Jer- over another —and ILEC that plausible showing has a sey imposed personal property State made law a that vestiges their the ILECs retain some exchange telephone on “local com- tax ap- status that make it monopoly former as “a pany,” which law defined tele- proper- for the State to tax their propriate providing dial tone communications carrier ty potential relieving developers while a fifty-one percent to local access from competing infrastructure a similar telephone exchange.” 26 N.J.Tax burden. (2012). the statute as The court construed requiring an annual determination

Also, interest we dismissed the reliance whether the still had 51% wire- ILEC laws nothing II because in those RACI service, personal case the line the investment had been turned on when 476.1D(10) Verizon, contrast, By property tax would continue. section made. Qwest's Yet, ability price has not been driven into annual tion. institute eight percent suggests increases of ten not claim that its wire- bankruptcy does competition so "robust” as unprofitable. Nor line business be, legislature could claims it or at least the Qwest demonstrated, as has the racetracks Qwest analogizes conclude. its situation so RACI, jeopard- question did in that the tax Blockbuster, thriving in- which used to have I, ability profit. RACI 648 izes to make its into store rental business but has been driven N.W.2d at 561. bankruptcy competi- by other forms of video N.J.Tax at 418. The New Jersey court “its property must receive the same tax then held that the statute so construed did benefits as similar property used cable equal protection not violate the clause of companies provide telephone services”), Jersey the New Constitution: granted, 11SC669, cert. No. 2012 WL (Colo.2012); North, The court concludes that there was a GTE Inc. v. Zaino, impose continue to 96 Ohio St.3d 770 N.E.2d (2002) personal property only (rejecting those local an ILEC’s constitutional telephone had, companies challenge to an Ohio many law that provided for years, enjoyed a monopoly higher over the much pro- rate of assessment on cer vision of local tain telephone service in of ILECs and not ing franchise areas. The Legislature “enjoy ILECs the advantage could ... *15 reasonably being assume provider that three the default of intraLATA enjoyed ILECs call substantial service for competitive customers who fail to take advantage as a result of affirmative their former action to choose another pro vider”); monopolies; they Sw. Combs, continued to be Bell Tel. Co. v. 270 249, the dominant users of S.W.3d public rights of 272-73 (Tex.App.2008)(finding facilities; way that, no federal or state equal protection transi- viola measure, tional tion in it was reasonable imposing to con- franchise taxes on local impose tinue to only exchange the tax on carriers those but not long-distance carriers).11 companies until they such time as no longer enjoyed a competitive advantage, C. Alternative to the Rational Basis as evidenced they the fact that were alternative, Test. In the Qwest urges us longer no providing 51% the dial tone not to follow our established rational basis and access exchange. to an jurisprudence, but instead to up take Id. at 428. The court added dictum that lead of certain other states expressly the tax would fail the rational basis test if require uniformity in taxation. companies that originally had met the fif points out that a few other jurisdictions ty-one percent would “perpetually be sub have concluded that “constitutional unifor- ject to tax” regardless of happened what mity sufficiently important that no ra- competitive position. Notably, justify tionalization can differences in taxa- though, Jersey New employs a balancing tion.” See Citizens Telecomms. Co. of test in rational basis cases that differs White Mountains v. Dep’t Ariz. Reve- analytically nue, from 33, the federal rational 123, 206 Ariz. 75 P.3d 129-30 event, test. Id. at 425. In any the New (Ct.App.2003) (holding that under the Ari- Jersey court found that the ILECs’ reten zona constitution functionally equivalent tion of a majority of the same); wireline business property must be taxed the Idaho was a Baird, sufficient justification constitutional Tel. Co. v. 91 Idaho 423 P.2d for continuing (1967) differently, treat them 346-47 (finding it unconstitu- the same conclusion we are reaching here. tional under Idaho’s uniformity clause to See also Corp. v. Prop. Colo. Div. assess certain at a higher ratio of — Taxation, —, 10CA1320, P.3d value), No. full cash overruled Simmons v. 2011 (Colo.App.2011) Comm’n, WL 8832876 (reject Idaho St. Tax 111 Idaho 723 ing Qwest’s arguments (1986); constitutional that P.2d 892-93 Inter Island Tel. Qwest's argues it, 11. The State greater also imposing personal property tax on but not government use of services because of its on providers. the CLDTCs and wireless We larger justifies much infrastructure in Iowa argument. need not reach that justices except All concur Co., County, 125 Wash.2d Juan v. San (1994) WATERMAN, J., specially (holding it who concurs P.2d 1382-83 APPEL, J., phone a local who part. assess takes no unconstitutional rate than other higher a much company at WATERMAN, (concurring spe- Justice property taxpayers). utilities cially). easily distinguishable, These cases are at however, constitutions the state because majority’s I in the well-reasoned concur language requiring specific contained issue respects one. The ma- decision in all Telephone Idaho uniformity in taxation. opportunity expressly jority misses the VII, in article section language relied Iowa v. Racing overrule Ass’n Central stating, “All tax of the Idaho Constitution (Iowa II), (RACI Fitzgerald 675 N.W.2d same uniform class upon es shall be 2004). my expressly call to I reiterate limits, of the within the territorial subjects II as erroneous for plainly overrule RACI ” 423 levying tax.... P.2d authority concur- my special set forth in reasons event, has that Idaho decision 340. In State, 1, 43 n. King rence in Simmons, P.2d been overruled. See 2012) (Iowa J., (Waterman, concurring). *16 Washington The Arizona at 892-93. relied similar state constitu courts also mandating apparently provisions

tional Tele taxation. See Citizens

uniform Co., (“According at 129

comms. P.3d Uniformity of the Arizona Con Clause

stitution, ‘all taxes Article Section the same class of upon

shall be uniform WATSON, Appellant, Brandon Dean Island, ”); Inter P.2d property.’ (“All upon taxes uniform shall be class of within territori same levying authority

al limits DEPARTMENT OF TRANS- IOWA ” Const, 1)). 7, § art. (quoting .... Wash. PORTATION MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellee. the Iowa Constitution say, Needless And, not contain a clause. such does No. 12-0344. to our prece- a test would be antithetical them above. dents as we have described Court of Iowa. Supreme Bd., City Coralville v. Utils. Cf. April (Iowa 2008) n. 3 750 N.W.2d (declining interpret Constitu- requiring “all Iowa laws be

tion as uniform”).

geographically

IV. Conclusion. reasons, we foregoing reverse

For judgment the district court further proceed- to that court for

remand opinion. not inconsistent with this

ings RE- JUDGMENT

DISTRICT COURT AND REMANDED. CASE

VERSED

Case Details

Case Name: Qwest Corporation v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Apr 12, 2013
Citation: 829 N.W.2d 550
Docket Number: 11–1543
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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