Qun Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Qun Lin contends that the BIA arrived at an adverse credibility finding that was not supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition.
On June 14, 2005, Qun Lin applied for asylum and other relief alleging that he had been imprisoned and mistreated by Chinese authorities on account of his practice of Falun Gong, a meditative practice outlawed by the Chinese government in 1999.
He testified at his hearing that he began practicing Falun Gong to improve his health in November 1998, before the practice was banned. He worked in a garment factory, and he had suffered fainting spells on the job. He began to practice Falun Gong with his uncle, privately, in his uncle’s house or foyer. When Falun Gong was outlawed, he continued to practice until February 2003, when he was picked up and taken to a labor camp in Linjiang County. He said that he was sentenced to three months in the camp and that while he was there, he was interrogated and told to stop practicing Falun Gong. He said his captors slapped and punched him and that he was beaten over twenty times. He said that “when they beat me up there, I lost consciousness and they never taken me to the hospital.” After serving a three-month sentence, he was released. He said that when he was released, he “could barely walk,” and that it took about a month to recover from his injuries. He went to a traditional doctor for treatment.
In 2004, he contacted a smuggler, whom he paid 40,000 Chinese RMB to transport him to the United States. He left China using his own passport, then traveled through Hong Kong, Guatemala, and Mexico. He finally entered the United States *25 without inspection on or about October 4, 2004, at or near Hidalgo, Texas. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
The Immigration Judge hearing his case found that Qun Lin was not a credible witness, primarily because of inconsistencies in his testimony concerning the circumstances of his arrest and imprisonment. Qun Lin had initially testified that he last worked for the garment factory in February 2003 “right before I got arrested.” On cross-examination, he said he had stopped working before his arrest in February 2003 due to a workplace injury. On further questioning, Qun Lin testified that he did not stop working at the factory until May 13, 2003, which would have been after his arrest and release on May 7 of that year. The IJ observed that Qun Lin’s statements about when he stopped working were inconsistent and that his statement that he returned to work immediately after his release from the camp was inconsistent with his testimony that he was so injured during his imprisonment that he could hardly walk when he was released. The IJ found that Qun Lin “was never able to reconcile this discrepancy.”
The IJ further remarked on inconsistencies about Qun Lin’s current practice of Falun Gong in the United States. Qun Lin said he only practiced Falun Gong about twice a month here, but on questioning about why he did not practice more often, he said that his master had advised him that the best way to do Falun Gong was mentally. In response to the IJ’s questions, Qun Lin conceded that he could practice mental Falun Gong in China without anyone ever knowing. Based on this concession, the IJ found that Qun Lin did not have a reasonable basis to fear future persecution if he returned to China.
The IJ also relied on the fact that a Chinese passport was lawfully issued to Qun Lin during the time that he alleges that he was being harassed by the Chinese government. She also remarked that Qun Lin gave no details to support his claim of harassment after his release from the work camp.
Finally, the IJ remarked that in light of the weakness of Qun Lin’s own testimony, his claim would have been bolstered by corroborative documentation showing that he had in fact been treated for serious injuries in May 2003, but that Qun Lin did not produce any such corroboration. The IJ concluded that, having failed to establish his eligibility for asylum, Qun Lin also failed to substantiate his claims for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, both of which were based on the same testimony the IJ rejected as incredible.
Qun Lin appealed to the BIA, which issued a reasoned decision affirming on the ground that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous. See 8 C.F.R. § 10G3.1(d)(3)(i) (BIA reviews IJ’s findings for clear error).
Qun Lin petitions for review of the BIA decision. He contends that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence and that the IJ failed to take into account background evidence on country conditions that he introduced into the record.
We review the BIA’s findings of fact according to the administrative substantial evidence standard, under which the agency’s findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary of the finding.
Albathani v. INS,
Where the BIA does not adopt the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s decision rather than the IJ’s.
Georcely v. Ashcroft,
I.
Qun Lin argues that his testimony was not self-contradictory because he “consistently testified that his employment was terminated in February 2003 immediately before his arrest.” But he did not stick to this story. He also testified, “I stopped working in May after I got released.” When confronted with the inconsistency, he affirmed, “I stopped working in May,” then specified May 13. Later, on redirect he said he quit working at the factory in February “[bjecause I got arrested and detained by Chinese government for three months.” The record supports the finding that there were internal contradictions in Qun Lin’s testimony.
Qun Lin contends that these contradictions were too minor to support the adverse credibility determination.
2
Under our case law, an adverse credibility determination may not be predicated on inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony that do not go to the heart of the applicant’s claim.
Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS,
Credibility determination. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the de *27 meanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (emphasis added);
see also
8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(C)
&
1229a(c)(4)(C). The import of the highlighted language is to eliminate the “heart of the claim” rule.
3
See Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales,
II.
Qun Lin contends that the BIA did not take into account the background information that he offered regarding persecution of Falun Gong adherents. State Department country reports are relevant in assessing an asylum applicant’s credibility because they can corroborate his story.
Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft,
Finally, Qun Lin argues that the BIA erred in relying on the fact that he was able to leave China using his own passport, despite his assertion that he was being constantly harassed by Public Security officials because of his association with Falun Gong. An asylum applicant’s ability to leave the alleged country of persecution using his own identification documents may undermine a claim that the applicant was being pursued by the government.
See Journal v. Keisler,
Because the BIA did not err in rejecting Qun Lin’s testimony as incredible, it did not err in rejecting his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, all of which depended vitally on that testimony.
The petition for review is DENIED.
Notes
. The BIA adopted the clear error standard of review advisedly in a regulation that became effective on September 25, 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(f); Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 F.R. 54878, 54888-54891 (Aug. 26, 2002). Neither party addresses the somewhat metaphysical question of whether we should review the BIA's legal conclusion that the IPs findings were not clearly erroneous or the underlying findings of fact themselves. The distinction would not affect the result in this case, so we need not belabor it.
. The record reveals another apparent inconsistency that goes to the heart of Qun Lin’s claim, in that he testified at the hearing that he had been beaten more than twenty times while in the labor camp, but his asylum application seems to refer to only one beating ("In April, I was beaten up by the police at the facility while handcuffed. I eventually lost my consciousness.”). Because the BIA did not note this inconsistency, we may not rely on it.
See Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft,
. The early remarks
on
H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (2005),
reprinted at
151 Cong. Rec. H536-41 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005), reveal an intent by its proponents to overrule certain unspecified opinions of the Ninth Circuit that were thought to unduly restrain an IJ’s ability to judge credibility.
See, e.g.,
151 Cong. Rec. at H549-50 (Remarks of Mr. Sensenbrenner: bill "brings back sanity to the asylum laws by overturning these rogue precedents from the ninth circuit”);
id.
at H551 (Remarks of Mr. Hostettler: “These provisions merely overturn Ninth Circuit Court decisions saying that immigration judges cannot use inconsistencies in an alien’s statement to determine if he or she is being untruthful.”);
see generally Abovian v. INS,