14 Ga. App. 382 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1914
(After stating the foregoing facts.) Two controlling questions which arise in this case are: (1) whether Rountree could purchase at his own sale under the power of attorney contained in the security deed, and (2) whether he can maintain an action for breach of warranty, there being no covenant of warranty in the paper just referred to. As we have already held in Pressley v. McLanahan, ante, 366 (80 S. E. 902), there was
We grant, as argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error, that if Eountree’s suit for breach of warranty depended upon his security deed, he would not be a purchaser; but the allegations of the petition show that under the power of sale in the security deed a valid sale was held, and Eountree became at that sale a “purchaser.” If the sale of Eountree, as agent for Monroe, to himself in his individual capacity was for any reason void, of course Eountree would not be a “purchaser.” If the sale is valid, he is a purchaser and entitled to the rights conferred by section 4193, supra. The intervening contract between the .Quitman Furniture and Hardware Company and Monroe, in which the company agreed to reimburse
The demurrers to the petition were properly overruled. And since the evidence authorized the verdict, there was no error in refusing a new trial. Judgment affirmed.