2006 Ohio 4238 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} Appellee's husband was hooked up by a respitory therapist to oxygen tubing that ran from the wall of the rehabilitation area. Shortly thereafter, appellee started into the bathroom, which was attached to the rehabilitation room, to put her cardiac monitors on and to get weighed prior to her rehabilitation session, as was customary. On her way into the bathroom, appellee tripped over an oxygen hose and fell, hitting her head.
{¶ 4} On October 4, 2004, appellee filed a complaint against appellant, alleging that it was negligent in failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Subsequently, on November 29, 2005, appellee filed a Motion to Compel appellant to provide a copy of any and all incident reports. Appellee, in her motion, alleged that she had requested the same in Requests for Production of Documents propounded on appellant, but that appellant had failed to provide the reports. In response, appellant, on December 9, 2005, filed a Motion for a Protective Order, arguing that the incident reports were not discoverable pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} As memorialized in an Order filed on December 13, 2005, the trial court granted appellant's Motion for a Protective Order. Thereafter, appellee, on December 23, 2005, filed a motion requesting, in part, that the trial court reconsider and vacate its December 13, 2005, order. Appellee, in her motion, argued, in part, that the incident report was discoverable because it did not involve an injury as a result of patient care provided by appellant . Appellee further argued that appellant had provided the trial court with no evidence that the incident report was prepared by, or for the use of, the peer review committee of a health care entity.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on December 30, 2005, the trial court ordered an in camera review of "any incident report or risk management report prepared by defendant in connection with plaintiff's alleged fall on defendant's premises." The trial court, in its entry, indicated that its inquiry "will not be limited to determining whether the report is privileged pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 7} It is from the trial court's January 25, 2006, Judgment Entry that appellant now appeals raising the following assignment of error:
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING PRODUCTION OF THE INCIDENT REPORT PREPARED REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S FALL WHILE SHE WAS A PATIENT RECEIVING CARE AT MEDCENTRAL HEALTH SYSTEM, AS THE REPORT WAS CLEARLY NOT SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO THE DICTATE OF R.C. 2305.253."
{¶ 9} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App. R. 11.1, which governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part:
{¶ 10} "(E) Determination and judgment on appeal. The appeal will be determined as provided by App. R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form. The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be published in any form."
{¶ 11} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned rule.
{¶ 13} Our standard of reviewing discovery orders is generally the abuse of discretion standard. See Arnold v.American National Red Cross (1994),
{¶ 14} R.C.
{¶ 15} "(A) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of section
{¶ 16} R.C.
{¶ 17} In turn, R.C.
{¶ 18} "(a) Conducts professional credentialing or quality review activities involving the competence of, professional conduct of, or quality of care provided by health care providers, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care;
{¶ 19} "(b) Conducts any other attendant hearing process initiated as a result of a peer review committee's recommendations or actions."
{¶ 20} The recent case of Rinaldi v. City View Nursing Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 85867,
{¶ 21} In Rinaldi, the administrator of the decedent's estate brought suit for negligence, fraud, wrongful death, and other actions. During the course of discovery, the administrator requested a privilege log listing all the documents the nursing center had withheld from discovery. The nursing center submitted the privilege log and disputed documents to the trial court for an in camera inspection along with a history of the discovery dispute regarding the documents. The trial court later ordered the nursing center to produce all of the documents identified in the discovery log.
{¶ 22} On appeal, the nursing center argued that some of the documents which were ordered to be produced were incident reports that were protected by R.C.
{¶ 23} "Furthermore, City View presented no evidence to the trial court that it even had a peer review committee that performed any of the functions identified in R.C.
{¶ 24} "A party asserting the privilege set forth in R.C. 2905.253 [sic] has the burden of establishing that the privilege is applicable. See, e.g., Waldmann v. Waldmann (1976),
{¶ 25} In the case sub judice, we find that the report prepared by appellant involved injury to appellee, a patient, as a result of patient care provided by health care providers. At the time she was injured, appellee was at appellant's medical facility for cardiac rehabilitation. As is stated above, she was injured after she fell while on her way to put her cardiac monitors on and get weighed in prior to her rehabilitation session. We concur with appellant that the report concerning the circumstances of appellee's fall "necessarily regards `injury or potential injury to a patient as a result of patient care provided by health care providers.'"
{¶ 26} Moreover, in contrast to Rinaldi, supra., there was evidence provided by appellant that the report in this case was an incident report prepared for use by a peer review committee. In the case sub judice, Marsha Hoover, R.N., in an affidavit attached to appellant's Motion for a Protective Order, stated, in relevant part, as follows:
{¶ 27} "Marsha Hoover, R.N., being first duly sworn, says that she has personal knowledge of all the facts contained in this Affidavit and the that she is competent to testify to the matters stated herein, and states as follows:
{¶ 28} "1. That I, Marsha Hoover, am a Registered Nurse licensed to practice in the State of Ohio.
{¶ 29} "2. That I am Risk Management Coordinator for MedCentral Health System.
{¶ 30} "3. That I have personal and professional knowledge of any/all aspects of the reporting and/or investigation performed pertaining to Louella Quinton's fall in the Pulmonary Rehabilitation Center at MedCentral Health System on October 3, 2002.
{¶ 31} "4. That I have personal and professional knowledge regarding all aspects of.
{¶ 32} "5. A purpose of risk management/incident reports is to establish a method whereby actual and potential risk management events are reported within the MedCentral Health System.
{¶ 33} "6. Another purpose of risk management/incident reports is to allow for the improvement of the quality of patient care and the environment of care in the MedCentral Health System.
{¶ 34} "7. Risk management/incident reports and all related documents and investigative information at MedCentral Health System, are intended by MedCentral Health System as Peer Review and Legal Work Product documents as defined by Ohio law.
{¶ 35} "8. Any/all risk management/incident reports, including, but not limited to, investigative information pertaining to Louella Quinton's fall at MedCentral during her pulmonary rehabilitation class on October 3, 2002, was prepared and/or performed within the scope of the function of the Risk Management and Quality Assurance Committees at MedCentral Health System.
{¶ 36} "Further affiant sayeth naught."
{¶ 37} Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant has produced evidence that the incident report in this case was prepared by or for the use of a peer review committee and that the report was within the scope of the functions of that committee. In short, we find that appellant has established that the incident report was privileged under R.C.
{¶ 38} Appellant's sole assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
{¶ 39} Accordingly, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Edwards, J.; Wise, P.J., and Gwin, concur separately.
Concurrence Opinion
{¶ 40} Although I concur in the majority's conclusion to reverse the decision of the trial court, I do so for a different reason. The majority reversed the trial court's decision on the basis that the incident report was privileged under R.C.
{¶ 41} I would not address the issue of whether the report is privileged under the statute because I find the trial court abused its discretion when it conducted an in camera inspection to determine whether the incident report was privileged information. In reaching this conclusion, I refer to our recent decision in Huntsman v. Aultman Hosp., Stark App. Nos. 2004CA00124, 2004CA00142. The Huntsman case addressed the issue of whether the revised version of the statute, renumbered R.C.
{¶ 42} "Further, in this particular situation, the change to the statute is clearly procedural. The change in the statute that is relevant in this case pertains to the Ohio legislature's apparent decision to foreclose a party from obtaining any information, documents, or records from the peer review committee's records. Previously, courts had interpreted the prior version of the statute (R.C.
{¶ 43} Because the current version of the statute does not permit an in camera inspection, I would find the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered an in camera inspection on December 30, 2005.
{¶ 44} Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.
Concurrence Opinion
{¶ 45} I agree with the result the majority reaches.
{¶ 46} R.C.
{¶ 47} I would find Nurse Hoover's affidavit establishes all the statutory elements, and further analysis is unnecessary.
{¶ 48} The parties both devote a large portion of their briefs to arguments regarding the applicable statute of limitations. The assignment of error does not encompass these arguments, and the majority does not mention it at all. I would find this issue is not properly before this court. The overruling of the motion to dismiss on statute of limitation grounds is not final, and would be premature.
