QUINTON v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket No. 100787
Michigan Supreme Court
Decided July 30, 1996
Rehearing denied post, 1205
453 MICH 63
Argued April 10, 1996 (Calendar No. 1)
Thereafter,
After the United States Supreme Court affirmed Romein, 503 US 181 (1992), the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the stay and
In separate opinions, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff‘s benefits should not be coordinated.
Justice LEVIN stated that
The doctrine of separation of powers stands for the proposition that the Legislature may not frustrate the decisions of the judiciary by subjecting it to revision, suspension, modification, or other review by the executive or legislative branches. The doctrine precludes the Legislature from reversing or setting aside a judgment entered by a court. Nor may the Legislature declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to a particular case was something other than what the courts said it was.
Because the WCAB is not a court, but an administrative tribunal, there is no separation of powers issue with respect to those workers whose cases were pending before it when Franks was decided and whose cases were dismissed or resolved on the initiative of the WCAB on the basis of Franks. Simply because an administrative tribunal cites a rule of law or other precedent established by a court does not convert its order into an order of the court. Following Franks, however, orders were entered in Quinton and thirty-nine other cases, remanding them to the WCAB for entry of a judgment consistent with Franks. Although the operative order reducing benefits was entered by the WCAB, rather than by a court, the WCAB acted at the express direction of the Supreme Court, and, for separation of powers analysis, those orders should be deemed to be orders entered by a court.
Worker‘s compensation provides a system of income maintenance, and, partially in recognition of this, it has been held to be subject to modification both prospectively and retrospectively in response to changes in law and fact. Unlike awards in other areas of the law, an award of worker‘s compensation is never final, and cannot be accorded the conclusive effect of res judicata. Such an award may be retroactively increased, decreased, or modified legislatively with respect to coordination or otherwise at any time, but, because it is always subject to change, it cannot be a final judgment for separation of powers purposes.
A change in an award is distinguishable from a change in a determination of eligibility or work-relatedness. The effect of
A properly enacted statute is binding law except to the extent that it violates the United States or the Michigan Constitution. As an equal branch of government, the judiciary must enforce the enactments of the Legislature to the extent permitted by the constitution. In this case, Quinton, having suffered a disabling injury before 1982, was among the class of applicants that the Legislature, through
Justice BOYLE, joined by Justice MALLETT, concurring, stated that the equities in this case compel awarding uncoordinated benefits.
While, under the doctrine of res judicata, claims that were or could have been reduced to final judgment are barred from being brought a second time, in some cases, there may be matters of public policy so extraordinary as to justify a departure from res judicata principles. Although the doctrine of res judicata is applicable in worker‘s compensation proceedings, it is not always a bar to modifications of worker‘s compensation awards where there had been a subsequent change in the law. The doctrine applies to rulings regarding both eligibility and the amount of benefits.
The Supreme Court has the authority to remedy the inequitable results in this case by declining to enforce the judge-made rule of res judicata under these extraordinary circumstances. On the merits of plaintiff‘s renewed claim, separation of powers is not violated by this result.
Justice CAVANAGH, concurring, stated that the 1986 order of the WCAB was final with respect to accrued benefits subject to the order. Prospective benefits, accruing after the 1986 order, however, would not be final because there are no vested rights in the amount of liability established at the time of an injury. Thus, this employer had a vested right to coordinate benefits for that period subject to the remand order and should be allowed to do so for that period. Nevertheless, the equitable considerations justify setting aside the orders and precluding coordination. It would be unfair to penalize employees who vigorously pursued their rights, while rewarding those similarly situated employees who did not. Coordination of benefits for employees injured before March 31, 1982, should be precluded.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice RILEY, joined by Chief Justice BRICKLEY, dissenting, stated that although Romein clearly held that workers have no vested rights in the finality of coordinated benefits paid, implicit in the Court‘s holding is that rights do vest for purposes of due process when judgments are entered by the WCAB at the direction of an appellate court pursuant to former law. Such a judgment exception protects the vested rights that form in reliance on an award at the moment it is reduced to a final judgment. The employer has a greater expectation of finality after litigation and decision by the appellate courts. A decision of the WCAB is less immune to a change in the law than the appellate courts. Accordingly, this forms the basis on which the constitutionality of
Justice WEAVER took no part in the decision of this case.
Levine, Benjamin, Tushman, Bratt, Jerris & Stein, P.C., and Sachs, Waldman, O‘Hare, Helveston, Bogas & McIntosh, P.C. (by Theodore Sachs and Granner S. Ries), for the plaintiffs.
Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C. (by Martin L. Critchell), for the defendants.
Amici Curiae:
Jordan Rossen, Ralph O. Jones, and Charles M. Gayney for International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America-UAW.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Morrison Zack, Assistant Attorney General, for Bureau of Worker‘s Disability Compensation.
OPINION
LEVIN, J. Following this Court‘s decision in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 649-658; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), the Worker‘s Compensation Appeal Board in 1986 ruled, pursuant to Franks, that the weekly benefits owed to plaintiffs’ decedent were subject to coordination pursuant to § 354 of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act,1 commencing March 31, 1982.
The question presented is whether the doctrine of separation of powers precludes, with respect to workers whose weekly benefits were held to be subject to coordination in, or pursuant to, Franks, application of the 1987 legislation providing that Franks was erroneously decided and that the legislative intention was not to coordinate respecting personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. A majority holds that the 1987 legislation is applicable to the weekly benefits of all workers injured before March 31, 1982, without regard to whether there was a prior adjudication in, or pursuant to, Franks.
I
Harry L. Quinton was born in 1915. He worked for General Motors Corporation until July, 1974. After his last day of work at General Motors, he filed a petition for hearing, alleging that his employment had caused disabling silicosis and emphysema. A 1976 decision of a hearing referee provided an open award of benefits, requiring General Motors to pay weekly benefits until further order of the Bureau of Worker‘s Disability Compensation. The referee‘s decision was not appealed.
In April, 1982, and again in July, 1982, General Motors notified Quinton that his benefits would be reduced under § 354, reflecting a coordination of his after-tax pension benefit.3
Quinton filed a May, 1982, petition for hearing, and General Motors filed a July, 1982, notice of dispute. The referee‘s decision directed General Motors to restore Quinton‘s full weekly benefits, saying that § 354 “may not be applied retroactively.”
The WCAB affirmed in 1983.4 The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. This Court held this case in abeyance pending a decision in Franks.5
Franks was decided in October, 1985. This Court held that § 354 was intended to apply retroactively, and thus “an employer may reduce the amount of workers’ compensation benefits payable after March 31, 1982, for periods of disability after that date, by deducting other employer-financed benefits as provided in § 354 . . . .”6
This Court then reversed the judgment of the WCAB in this case, and remanded to the WCAB “for entry of a judgment consistent with our decision in [Franks].”7
On remand, a two-member panel of the WCAB ruled in May, 1986, that Quinton‘s benefits were subject to coordination under § 354 “effective March 31, 1982, and thereafter,” pursuant to Franks.8
Subsections 354(17)-(20) were challenged in this Court, but the legislation was found to be constitutional. Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 555 (1990).11
Because Romein was being appealed to the United States Supreme Court, this Court stayed enforcement of subsections 354(17)-(20).12 After the United States Supreme Court affirmed Romein in March, 1992, this Court vacated the stay and directed that the statute be enforced.13
A lawyer representing Quinton wrote, in April, 1992, to General Motors, seeking repayment of all coordinated benefits, plus interest. When the money was not paid, the lawyer requested a hearing. A magistrate ordered General Motors to “repay with interest all past coordinated benefits,” and directed that General Motors “shall not coordinate any future weekly Workers’ Compensation benefits.” The magistrate said that he was bound by the Legislature‘s action, and by
General Motors again appealed. In January, 1994, the Worker‘s Compensation Appellate Commission reversed the decision of the magistrate. It noted this Court‘s statement in Romein that § 354 “may validly be applied to all compensation liabilities within its terms except those which have been reduced to final judgment before its enactment.”14 The WCAC referenced this Court‘s further explanation:
We hold, therefore, that
1987 PA 28 is constitutional even though it applies to benefits due and payable for a period before the effective date of the statute. We hold further that only judgments entered under former law are immune from this legislative modification. This limitation protects the vested rights that form in reliance on an award at the moment it is reduced to a final judgment. [436 Mich 533.]
The WCAC said that this “clear and unequivocal” holding of Romein meant that
The Court of Appeals, in denying leave to appeal, stated:
The Court orders that the application for leave to appeal is denied for lack of merit in the grounds presented in light of the final judgment entered by the Worker‘s Compensation Appeal Board on May 28, 1986, pursuant to the
Supreme Court‘s direction in Quinton v General Motors Corp, 424 Mich 884 (1986).
The plaintiffs applied to this Court for leave to appeal.16
II
In Romein, this Court held that
This Court said, however, in Romein that the provisions of subsections 354(17)-(20) do not apply where the rights of the parties were reduced to final judgment before the effective date of
The employers’ right to coordinate benefits as provided by statute in 1982 was repealed by
1987 PA 28 through a constitutional exercise of legislative authority to regulate social and economic life. We hold that1987 PA 28 does not violate the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions, the Contract Clause of the federal constitution, or the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution, so long as it is not applied to impair coordination rights that were reduced to final judgment before its effective date. [436 Mich 539-540 (emphasis added).]
It is well settled that issues neither briefed nor argued cannot be definitively decided, and that the Court‘s pronouncements, especially dicta, without briefing and argument, are not stare decisis.17 I therefore turn to the Michigan and United States Constitutions to consider what potential barriers to recovery Quinton‘s claim presents that were absent in Romein.
III
As most know from their early American history lessons, this country‘s founders and the authors of the Constitution of the United States of America established a tripartite system of government. The three branches, executive, judiciary, and legislative, are to remain separate and independent.
Of particular relevance to this case, the doctrine of separation of powers has been said by text writers to stand for the proposition that the Legislature may not frustrate the decisions of the judiciary by subjecting
It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.[19]
The doctrine of separation of powers is expressly set forth in the Michigan Constitution:
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution. [
Const 1963, art 3, § 2 .]
As in the federal system, this doctrine has been said to preclude the Legislature from reversing20 or setting aside21 a judgment entered by a court. Wylie v Grand Rapids City Comm, 293 Mich 571, 582-583; 292 NW 668 (1940).
While the accuracy of the foregoing statements concerning the power of a legislature to overrule a decision of a court, as expressed by this one Court of justice or the United States Supreme Court continues to go unchallenged in its most general sense, it has been noted by more than one constitutional scholar
A
In Plaut, purchasers of stock shares of a corporation brought an action against the corporation and other defendants, alleging violations of subsection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.23 At the time, because subsection 10(b) did not contain an express provision concerning the length of the applicable period of limitation, there were questions concerning what limitation period would be accorded Plaut and other plaintiffs who filed similar actions.
The issue was settled finally by the United States Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501 US 350; 111 S Ct 2773; 115 L Ed 2d 321 (1991). The Court ruled that a uniform statute of limitations was to apply, which mandated that actions be brought within three years from the time the event constituting the violation took place or within one year after the discovery of the violation. As a result of Lampf, Plaut‘s complaint was dismissed as untimely by a United States district court. Plaut did not appeal the dismissal.
In response to Lampf, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act by adding § 27A.24
Although this Court is not bound by Justice Scalia‘s analysis for the Court in Plaut, where, as here, state separation of powers concerns are implicated, we acknowledge the weight a decision of the highest court in the land carries. Because I find Justice Scalia‘s reasoning historically compelling, logically persuasive, and consistent with Michigan separation of powers jurisprudence, I adopt his analysis to the extent it is applicable to the facts in this case.
The Plaut majority stated that “Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.”26 It also implicitly recognized, however, the flexibility of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court distinguished earlier cases in which separation of powers concerns were present, yet not invasive enough to render the legislation unacceptable.
B
The majority in Plaut observed that legislative action had been upheld as valid in cases where the tribunal issuing the judgment was not an article III court, Sampeyreac v United States, 32 US (7 Pet) 222; 8 L Ed 665 (1833);27 where the judgment came from an administrative agency, Paramino Lumber Co v Marshall, 309 US 370; 60 S Ct 600; 84 L Ed 814 (1940);28 where the government had waived its right
to have the judgment accorded conclusive res judicata effect, United States v Sioux Nation, 448 US 371; 100 S Ct 2716; 65 L Ed 2d 844 (1980), Cherokee Nation v United States, 270 US 476; 46 S Ct 428; 70 L Ed 694 (1926);29 and where the Congress acted to validate public, rather than private, rights; Pennsylvania v Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co, 59 US (18 How) 421; 15 L Ed 435 (1855).30
An analysis of subgroups in which workers injured before March 31, 1982, fall indicates that resolution of the separation of powers issue, in accordance with Plaut, clearly entitles most workers affected to a full, unreduced, and uncoordinated benefit, either because no case was ever pending before the WCAB or because their cases were dismissed by the WCAB, an administrative tribunal and not a court, on its own initiative, and not pursuant to a directive from this Court or the Court of Appeals.
A
Because the doctrine of separation of powers bars the Legislature from reopening and setting aside orders entered by a court, workers injured before March 31, 1982, should be divided into two groups: those who accepted coordination and thus a reduced weekly benefit from and after March 31, 1982, without filing a petition seeking a hearing, and those who objected and sought a hearing resulting in an administrative or judicial determination. Those who objected and sought a hearing may be further divided into two groups: those whose cases were pending before the WCAB when Franks was decided, and those whose cases had been decided by the WCAB and were pending in the judicial appellate pipeline before the Court of Appeals or this Court.
B
No administrative or court order was entered concerning those who did not object, and who accepted a reduced benefit, and thus no separation of powers issue can arise respecting the 1987 retroactive legisla-
An administrative tribunal is not a court—it is not part of the judicial branch of government. Because the WCAB is not a court, but an administrative tribunal, arguably there is no separation of powers issue with respect to those workers whose cases were pending before the WCAB when Franks was decided, and whose cases were dismissed or resolved on the initiative of the WCAB on the basis of Franks by entry of an order on the authority of Franks. Paramino Lumber Co v Marshall31 was distinguished in Plaut on that basis.32 Simply because an administrative tribunal cites a rule of law or other precedent established by a court does not convert the order of an administrative tribunal into an order of a court.
C
Following this Court‘s decision in Franks, orders were entered by this Court in Quinton and in at least thirty-nine other cases, remanding them to the WCAB “for entry of a judgment consistent with Franks . . . .”33 Although the operative order reducing Quinton‘s benefits was entered by the WCAB, rather than by a court, under the circumstance that the WCAB acted at the express direction of this Court in entering a judgment consistent with this Court‘s decision in Franks, it is, I think, clear that those orders should
We are not informed concerning the nature of the orders entered by the Court of Appeals in the cases pending before it when Franks was decided, whether they, too, directed the WCAB to enter a judgment consistent with this Court‘s decision in Franks, or whether they simply remanded for reconsideration in light of Franks, nor are we informed how many such orders were entered by the Court of Appeals. Although not necessary to decision, since I conclude that because there is no reopening or setting aside of an order or judgment, the doctrine of separation of powers was not violated, I am inclined to treat an order entered by an administrative tribunal, pursuant to a court order directing reconsideration in light of a recently announced judicial decision, as an order implicating the doctrine of separation of powers.
V
In Plaut, subsection 27A(b) provided that certain actions that had been “dismissed as time barred” and “which would have been timely filed” under concepts identified in § 27A ”shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 1991.”34 (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court summarized its holding in the following statements:
By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this fundamental principle.[35]
A
The key words in the summarizing statements are “reopen” and “set aside.” The 1987 legislation amending
Pursuant to the 1986 WCAB order entered in Quinton, General Motors paid him a reduced coordinated weekly benefit of $18.79 until the effective date of the 1987 legislation.37 Thus, the order entered pursuant to this Court‘s directive remanding to the WCAB for entry of an order pursuant to Franks, was implemented—it was not reopened or set aside.
General Motors concedes that from and after the May 14, 1987, effective date of the 1987 legislation, the weekly benefit may not be reduced by coordination with Quinton‘s pension. Thus, General Motors does not claim that the doctrine of separation of pow
The issue then becomes whether the 1987 legislation violates the doctrine of separation of powers in requiring that Quinton and others be paid for the period between the March 31, 1982, effective date of the 1981 legislation and the May 14, 1987, effective date of the 1987 legislation, the weekly benefit, without reduction for coordination with a pension or other retirement benefits identified in the 1981 legislation.
Because the 1987 legislation does not, with regard to periods before the May 14, 1987, effective date of the 1987 legislation, require a reopening or setting aside of the 1986 WCAB orders, except possibly with respect to periods after the effective date of the 1987 legislation—which General Motors concedes does not involve any separation of powers issue—the 1987 legislation does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers concerning periods before its effective date.
To be sure, the 1987 legislation sought to modify the result of Franks, by barring coordination retroactively between March 31, 1982, and May 14, 1987, and by requiring repayment by General Motors to workers injured before March 31, 1982, of amounts deducted pursuant to Franks. But, Plaut does not preclude the Legislature from so modifying the operative effect of a prior judgment or order, if this can be accomplished without reopening or setting aside a judgment entered by a court.
The 1987 legislation operates independently of reopening or setting aside the 1986 WCAB orders. It
The 1987 legislation, requiring payment to each worker of the amount that was deducted, does not implicate the doctrine of separation of powers simply because it modifies the operative effect of the Franks decision retroactively. The Legislature can constitutionally accomplish its will without a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because this was accomplished independently of any reopening or setting aside of orders entered pursuant to Franks.
B
It might be urged that it elevates form over substance to hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude the Legislature from accomplishing indirectly by independent or separate legislation changes in the operative effect of a prior judgment that are in practical effect tantamount to reopening or setting aside a judgment.
It is, however, fundamental that the Legislature is empowered to overrule a judicial decision, and change the substantive law; that it may do so prospectively is indisputable. That it may even do so retroactively, at least insofar as worker‘s compensation benefits are concerned, is equally well established as
There is thus unavoidable tension between the power of the Legislature to legislate retroactively and the judicial power to enter final judgments. Where to draw the line is then the question—should it be drawn to bar only retroactive legislation that actually reopens or sets aside a judgment, or also to bar retroactive legislation that does not actually do so, but has the operative effect of doing so?
Text writers and others have written in broad terms regarding the scope of the doctrine of separation of powers. It is significant, however, that Plaut appears to be the first pertinent38 decision of the United States
In the three Michigan cases where the doctrine of separation of powers was adverted to, only Moser v White, 29 Mich 59 (1874),44 held the legislative act to be unconstitutional insofar as it would reopen a final judgment. In Wylie v Grand Rapids City Comm, supra, this Court found, after discussing in dicta the doctrine of separation of powers, that the act was not retroactive and, hence, did not apply to judgments entered before the legislation was enacted.45 In Butler v Saginaw Co Bd of Supervisors, 26 Mich 21, 27-28 (1872), this Court found, after first referring in dicta to the doctrine of separation of powers, that the curative act failed to overcome the deficiencies in the law and in the procedure followed, so that the application for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors to levy drain taxes must be denied. The Court observed with some delicacy: “The line which separates judicial from legislative authority is clear and
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Plaut is limited to a “reopening” or “setting aside” of a final judgment.46 The Court said that “the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified,” (emphasis in original) and spoke of the importance of “establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”47
Were this Court to expand the doctrine of separation of powers beyond the actual “reopening” or “setting aside” of a judgment to bar acts of the Legislature that do not actually reopen or set aside final judgments, but have the operative effect of doing so, it would become engaged in drawing vague rather than clear distinctions.
The doctrine of separation of powers operates somewhat arbitrarily. Of those who were injured before March 31, 1982, probably the greatest number48 are in the subgroup consisting of those who
Similarly, the subgroup consisting of those whose cases were still pending before the WCAB when Franks was decided, who arguably cannot be precluded under the doctrine of separation of powers, because the WCAB orders requiring coordination pursuant to Franks were entered on the WCAB‘s initiative without a directive from the Court of Appeals or this Court, also can be seen as benefiting by a somewhat arbitrary line.
Since the doctrine of separation of powers, as elucidated in Plaut, is a structural safeguard, a prophylactic device, rather than an immutable principle, there is no need to erect a wall higher than that established by the United States Supreme Court in Plaut, where the holding is limited to actually “opening” or “setting aside” a judgment.
VI
In Romein, this Court affirmed the power of the Legislature to enact a retroactive benefit, and the
A
A worker‘s compensation award is distinguishable from a judgment in an action in tort or for breach of contract. Worker‘s compensation provides a system of income maintenance. Franks, supra at 654. Partially in recognition of this, the Court has held that a worker‘s compensation award is subject to modification both prospectively and retrospectively, in response to changes in law and fact. See Goines v Kelsey Hayes Wheel Co, 294 Mich 156, 158; 292 NW 686 (1940); Romein, supra.
Because the circumstances affecting a worker‘s compensation award are subject to change, this Court has said that, unlike awards handed down in cases arising in other areas of law, “the amount of an employee‘s award [in a worker‘s compensation case]
This Court has also recognized that when an award granted pursuant to the worker‘s compensation act is to be paid “until further order,” as is the case here, it is not a “final determination” and it cannot be “accorded the conclusive effect of res judicata . . . .” Kosiel v Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 374, 381; 521 NW2d 531 (1994). See also White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 210; 89 NW2d 439 (1958) (decision from the WCAB “ordering payment of compensation until further order of the board . . . does not finally determine rights to compensation“).
More fundamentally, as this Court made clear in Romein, an award may be retroactively increased, decreased, or modified legislatively with respect to coordination or otherwise at any time. An employer has “no vested rights in the finality of the coordinated benefits paid.” Id. at 532.
The factual matrix in this case is thus distinguishable from that in Plaut. United States District Court decisions, following the holding in Lampf that no cause of action may lie, could not have been disturbed after the right to an appeal had run, absent exceptional circumstances not relevant. Unlike WCAB
B
Unlike Plaut, where “[t]o be sure, § 27A(b) reopens (or directs the reopening of) final judgments in a whole class of cases,”52 (emphasis added) the Legislature, by enacting 1987 PA 28, did not subject to reopening either the decision of this Court remanding Quinton‘s case in light of Franks or the WCAB‘s order on remand pursuant to Franks.
Further, 1987 PA 28 does not require the Court to “reopen” anything. The WCAC findings of fact are not affected, nor are any new findings required.53 No new evidentiary matters are considered. The initial hearing and determination remain intact and unaffected. The only consequence is that Quinton‘s recovery will be enlarged by an amount determined in a manner independent of all factors considered at the initial eligibility determination.
The effect of the Legislature‘s enactment of 1987 PA 28 is not to send the case back for a new order on the basis of the merits. Rather than modifying an existing order, the legislation may more properly be seen as providing a new benefit. As the branch of government responsible for promulgation of the state‘s laws, the Legislature may pursue by rational
VII
There is, indeed, an element of injustice to General Motors, Ford Motor Company,54 and any other employer who may have obtained orders from the WCAB on remand from this Court or the Court of Appeals directing that benefits be coordinated, in denying them any benefit from their victory in Franks. But there would also be an element of injustice in requiring coordination for five years until the May 14, 1987, effective date of the 1987 legislation, for pre-March 31, 1982, injured workers who contested the employer‘s claim that benefits should be coordinated55 and sought a hearing, while allowing injured workers, who sat on their rights and did not contest coordination, payment in full without coordination of their weekly benefits because no judgment of a court, or even an order of the WCAB, had been entered.56
If the WCAB‘s 1986 decision on remand ordering coordination in Quinton‘s case were insulated from
The United States Supreme Court recognized that similarly situated plaintiffs should be treated in like fashion in its review of this Court‘s decision in Romein. In dismissing General Motors’ due process argument, the Court commented that one of the legitimate objectives accomplished by the 1987 legislation was that it
equalized the payments made by employers who had gambled on [Franks] with those made by employers who had not. Cf. United States v Sperry Corp, 493 US 52, 64-65 [110 S Ct 387; 107 L Ed 2d 290] (1989) (legitimate to legislate retrospectively in order to ensure that similarly situated persons bear similar financial burdens of program).57
A commentator observed that “[t]he legitimacy of the judiciary depends, in large part, upon the treatment of like cases in a like manner.”58
The function of the doctrine of separation of powers is to protect the independence of the judiciary by insulating from legislative encroachment final judicial judgments, and is not to attempt to achieve real or abstract justice between private litigants. But in
VIII
A properly enacted statute is binding law except to the extent that it violates the United States Constitution or the
General Motors does not dispute that Quinton, having suffered his disabling injury before 1982, was among the class of applicants that the Legislature, through 1987 PA 28, intended would enjoy uncoordinated benefits. It is well settled that the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act is to be construed to accomplish its remedial purposes.59 Therefore,
The January, 1994, decision of the WCAC should be reversed, and the case remanded to the WCAC for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOYLE, J. (concurring). There is no serious argument that the decision of this Court in Chambers v General Motors Corp, a companion case to Franks v White Pine Copper Div,1 incorrectly interpreted the intent of the Legislature. In indicating that I would grant the motion for reconsideration, which was supported by, among others, former Governor William Milliken, I observed that, given the “harsh and unforeseen consequences” of the decision, inclinations to support the finality of litigation should yield to the question whether we had correctly determined the intent of the Legislature, 424 Mich 1202 (1985). Because we would compound the error committed by the denial of reconsideration and further penalize employees who pursued their rights, it would be unconscionable not to recognize a public-policy exception to res judicata in these circumstances.
The crucial issue in this case is whether the doctrine of res judicata as construed in Michigan applies to bar plaintiff from again litigating whether his worker‘s compensation award should be subjected to coordination with other sources. The doctrine of res judicata
applies not only to issues of fact and law which were actually litigated and decided, but also to any issue which might
have been litigated at that time. . . . Therefore, if during the adjudication of a dispute a pertinent issue of law or fact is raised and decided, or properly should have been raised, res judicata will bar the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent action. [Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589, 612-613; 433 NW2d 768 (1988) (BOYLE, J., dissenting).]
In other words, under the doctrine of res judicata, claims that were or could have been reduced to final judgment are barred from being brought a second time.
All members of the Court have recognized that res judicata is a judicially created doctrine. Riley v Northland Geriatric Center (After Remand), 431 Mich 632; 433 NW2d 787 (1988). In Pike, a majority of this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata, while applicable in worker‘s compensation proceedings, is not always a bar to modifications of worker‘s compensation awards where there has been a subsequent change in the law. 431 Mich 598-599 (opinion of GRIFFIN, J.); 431 Mich 608 (BRICKLEY, J., concurring).2 In my dissent in Pike, I advocated a stricter application of res judicata to worker‘s compensation proceedings and contended the doctrine applied both to rulings regarding eligibility and to rulings regarding the amount of benefits. 431 Mich 620. I also acknowledged, however, that, in some cases, “[t]here may be matters of public policy so extraordinary as to justify a departure from res judicata principles.”
1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, recognizes an exception to the general rule of claim preclusion in § 26(1)(d), p 234, when “[t]he judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme . . . .” In such a situation, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to extinguish the claim. Comment e to § 26, p 239, states that res judicata should not be applied where it would be inequitable to do so,
especially when there is a change of law after the initial decision. When such inequities involve important ongoing social or political relationships, a second action should be allowed even if the claim set forth is not viewed as different from that presented in the initial proceeding.
A rigid interpretation of res judicata would perpetuate the harsh consequences this Court declined to revisit in Chambers and hinder implementation of the Legislature‘s intent.
Given the importance of the principle that litigation should come to an end, exceptions should be employed sparingly. However, as Professor Moore has observed:
A good case can be made for the proposition that frank recognition of some limited power to temper rules along equitable lines results in their more faithful application. Justice is like a balloon full of water; squeeze it at one point and it bulges at another. [1B Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed), ¶ 0.405(12), p 111-77.]
Although I agree with the lead opinion to the extent that there are diminished reliance interests in worker‘s compensation determinations, ante at 90-91
On the merits of plaintiff‘s renewed claim, I agree with Justice LEVIN‘s lead opinion that separation of powers is not violated by this result. The Legislature may not constitutionally command this Court to reopen judgments, Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211; 115 S Ct 1447; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), and it has not done so. It is a different question whether the judiciary has that authority in extraordinary circumstances, id. at 236.3 I agree with Justice CAVANAGH that the equities in this case compel awarding uncoordinated benefits.
MALLETT, J., concurred with BOYLE, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). I agree with the lead opinion that the 1986 WCAB order that was entered at the express direction of this Court1 was, for all intents and purposes, this Court‘s order. LEVIN, J., ante at 81-82. However, I disagree with the conclusion of
Nevertheless, the equitable considerations presented by this employee and other similarly situated employees would justify this Court in setting aside the 1986 orders and precluding coordination.3 Pursuant to Romein, employees who were injured before March 31, 1982, but who quietly accepted coordination of their benefits after 1981 PA 203, are not sub
In sum, I concur with the disposition of this case, remanding to the WCAC for further proceedings. However, I would not reach the separation of powers issue addressed by the lead opinion. Instead, I would invoke our equitable power and grant equitable relief to Quinton.
RILEY, J. (dissenting). We granted leave to consider whether the order entered by the Worker‘s Compensation Appeal Board was a final “judgment” and therefore an exception to Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 555 (1990), aff‘d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed 2d 328 (1992), in which this Court upheld 1987 PA 28 prohibiting coordination of
I
In Chambers v General Motors Corp, decided with Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), this Court decided whether 1981 PA 203, providing for coordination of benefits under
The statute does not limit its application to cases where workers’ compensation payments are made to an employee for injuries incurred after its effective date, [i.e.,] for injuries incurred after March 31, 1982. Nor does it contain any language indicating that it should not be applied when payments are being made for injuries that occurred prior to March 31, 1982. The Legislature‘s failure to do so leaves the section generally applicable to payments made after its effective date. [Id. at 651 (emphasis in original).]
In response to Franks, the Legislature enacted 1987 PA 28, §§ (17) through (20), overruling this Court‘s interpretation of
Subsequently, in Romein, this Court decided the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28. Defendant General Motors contended that it relied on the
Consequently, there must be a distinction for purposes of finality between the situation in which the WCAB enters its own decision and the situation in the present case in which this Court, relying on its then-recent pronouncement of the law in Franks, remanded to the WCAB for entry of judgment. In order to read Romein and Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589; 433 NW2d 768 (1988), consistently, I would distinguish Pike. In Pike, the lead opinion held that “[b]ecause the amount of an employee‘s award is never final, res judicata principles do not apply to a change in the amount of benefits the claimant receives.” Id. at 602. However, the rule announced in that decision, striking the gender-based conclusive presumption of a wife‘s dependency, was applied without upsetting a previous judgment entered by the WCAB at the direction of this Court. This Court had not previously upheld the conclusive dependency provision with respect to the worker in Pike. That worker merely had a decision by a hearing referee because “there [had been] no appeal,” id. at 592, when this Court later changed the amount of his benefits to reflect the change in the law announced with that very decision. The lead opinion relies on this dis
As the Court stated in Romein, such a judgment exception “protects the vested rights that form in reliance on an award at the moment it is reduced to a final judgment.” Id. at 533. The employer has a greater expectation of finality after litigation and decision by the appellate courts of this jurisdiction. A decision of the WCAB is less immune to a change in the law than the appellate courts of this state. Accordingly, this language is not dicta, but forms the very basis on which the constitutionality of 1987 PA 28 was conditioned.8 The lead opinion essentially concedes this point:
Therefore, when this Court previously remanded Quinton “for entry of a judgment consistent with Franks,”9 General Motors obtained a final judgment within the purview of Romein and the award was then “immune from [subsequent] legislative modification.” Romein, supra at 533.10 Properly analyzed pursuant to this Court‘s decision in Romein, the decision of the WCAB allowing coordination of Quinton‘s benefits through the effective date of 1987 PA 28 should be upheld.
II
Although Romein is dispositive, the lead opinion engages in an irrelevant discussion of separation of powers. Asserting that it is not controlling, the lead opinion relies on Plaut, supra. Ante at 77-78. The lead opinion maintains that consistent with Plaut, the legislation now at issue did not “reopen” or “set aside” the 1986 WCAB orders. The lead opinion‘s characterization is a result-oriented application of those terms from Plaut. Once this Court accepts the premise that
To say that the 1987 legislation “simply requires payment to all in Quinton‘s class an uncoordinated benefit from and after March 31, 1982,” id. at 85, is the unquestionable equivalent of setting aside a previous determination by this Court. This Court allowed coordination of benefits for all injuries occurring before March 31, 1982, and the Legislature explicitly
III
The parties disagree whether the WCAB has the authority to enter a “judgment” and, if so, whether a judgment was entered. In doing so, the parties elevate form over substance. Irrespective of the language the Court used to establish the Romein exception and the language previously used in its remand order in the present case, it is clear that both refer to the same action of the WCAB (entering an order at the direction of an appellate court) that finally determined the rights of the parties with respect to coordinating benefits upon entry of a final judgment.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument that “judgment” in the context of Romein means judicial enforcement by a circuit court pursuant to
IV
This Court remanded Quinton‘s earlier petition for entry of a “judgment” consistent with Franks. The WCAB responded by entering a judgment that is properly understood as fulfilling the Supreme Court‘s remand order and falls squarely within the judgment exception established by Romein. Therefore, the decision of the WCAB should be affirmed.
BRICKLEY, C.J., concurred with RILEY, J.
WEAVER, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
Notes
This section provides that an employer may coordinate employee benefits, by applying against its workers’ compensation obligations payable for compensable periods after its effective date, that portion of certain other benefits, such as pensions and social security payments, also received by the employee and financed by the employer. [Id. at 647.]
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636 (1985), is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.
I would hold that the 1987 Legislature ran afoul of the separation of powers and the one court of justice articles of the Michigan Constitution when it gave retroactive effect to 1987 PA 28. [Id. at 564.]I concede, however, that the Court is bound by that decision, particularly the minimal protection carved out by the judgment exception.
“When a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.” [Detroit v Public Utilities Comm, 288 Mich 267, 299-300; 286 NW 368 (1939), citing Chase v American Cartage Co, Inc, 176 Wis 235, 238; 186 NW 598 (1922) (emphasis in original).]
424 Mich 884 (1986) (emphasis added).(17) The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 Mich 636 (1985) is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.
(18) This section applies only to payments resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring on or after March 31, 1982. Any payments made to an employee resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for a personal injury occurring before March 31, 1982 that have not been coordinated under this section as of the effective date of this subsection shall not be coordinated, shall not be considered to have created an overpayment of compensation benefits, and shall not be subject to reimbursement to the employer or carrier.
(19) Notwithstanding any other section of this act, any payments made to an employee resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for a personal injury occurring before March 31, 1982 that have been coordinated before the effective date of this subsection shall be considered to be an underpayment of compensation benefits, and the amounts withheld pursuant to coordination shall be reimbursed with interest, within 60 days of the effective date of this subsection, to the employee by the employer or carrier.
(20) Notwithstanding any other section of this act, any employee who has paid an employer or carrier money alleged by the employer or carrier to be owed the employer or carrier because that employee‘s benefits had not been coordinated under this section and whose date of personal injury was before March 31, 1982 shall be reimbursed with interest, within 60 days of the effective date of this subsection, that money by the employer or carrier. [
MCL 418.354(17)-(20) ;MSA 17.237(354)(17)-(20) , as amended by1987 PA 28 (emphasis added).]
This cause having come before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court . . . for entry of a judgment consistent with Chambers [supra] . . . . [Emphasis added.]
It is necessary to have an equally powerful judicial branch of government in order to ensure that the balance of power is not weighted in favor of the Legislature, and to ensure that individual rights are not circumvented by the will of the majority. Therefore, in order for this Court to maintain its equal position with our tripartite system of government, we must secure our constitutionally granted authority.
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991—
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 1991.
Our decisions to date have identified two types of legislation that require federal courts to exercise the judicial power in a manner that Article III forbids. The first appears in United States v Klein [80 US (13 Wall) 128; 20 L Ed 519 (1871)], where we refused to give effect to a statute that was said “[t]o prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.” Id. at 146. Whatever the precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress “amend[s] applicable law.” Robertson v Seattle Audubon Society, 503 US 429, 441 [112 S Ct 1407; 118 L Ed 2d 73] (1992). Section 27A(b) indisputably does set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that sense changes the law (even if solely retroactively). The second type of unconstitutional restriction upon the exercise of judicial power identified by past cases is exemplified by Hayburn‘s Case [n 19 supra], which stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc v Waterman SS Corp, 333 US 103 [68 S Ct 431; 92 L Ed 568] (1948). Yet under any application of § 27A(b) only courts are involved; no officials of other departments sit in direct review of their decisions. Section 27A(b) therefore offends neither of these previously established prohibitions. [514 US 218.]
The statute in this case meets that standard. The purpose of the 1987 statute was to correct the unexpected results of the Michigan Supreme Court‘s Chambers opinion. The retroactive repayment provision of the 1987 statute was a rational means of meeting this legitimate objective: It preserved the delicate legislative compromise that had been struck by the 1980 and 1981 laws—giving workers injured before 1982 their full benefits without coordination, but not the greater increases given to subsequently injured workers. Also, it equalized the payments made by employers who had gambled on the Chambers decision with those made by employers who had not. [Note 11 supra, 503 US 191 (emphasis added).]
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 422 Mich 636 (1985) is declared to have been erroneously rendered insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 for personal injuries occurring before March 31, 1982. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose. [
MCL 418.354(17) ; MSA 17.237(354)(17) (emphasis supplied).]