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Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler
506 F.3d 688
9th Cir.
2007
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*1 2K2.1(a)(2) by sentencing by under U.S.S.G. found court a prepon offense level history points See, criminal under and his derance e.g., evidence. 4A1.1(a). disagree. We “Dou Pirani, U.S.S.G. 543, States v. 551 & n. 4 permissible if the Sentenc counting (8th Cir.) ble (en banc), denied, cert. 546 U.S. that intended result and ing Commission 909, (2005). 266, 126 S.Ct. 163 L.Ed.2d 239 conceptually sepa concerns each section proposed When the enhancement is based relating sentencing.” to rate notions Unit upon an offense for which there was no Rohwedder, 423, ed conviction, case, prior gov as this “the Cir.2001). The in effect Guidelines prove (by ernment must at sentencing this offense ex Phillips when committed evidence) preponderance of the that “[p]rior felony provided con pressly defendant committed it.” United States v. viction(s) resulting in an increased base (8th Cir.2007). 675, Raglin, 500 F.3d 2K2.1(a)(2) level under are [§ ] offense Here, Phillips challenge does not the dis purposes determining also counted for finding trict court’s that he committed the history pursuant points Chap criminal prior question. Accordingly, offense in (Criminal Four, A History).” ter Part proper. enhancement was comment, (n.15) (Nov. 2K2.1, U.S.S.G. The judgment of the district court is 2003), 2K2.1, comment. now U.S.S.G. affirmed. (n.10). These base offense level and crimi history provisions conceptually nal address sentencing

separate notions. One ad gravity particular

dresses the of The addresses the

fense. other need to activity criminal

deter future this de Wyckoff,

fendant. See United States v. (11th Cir.1990). Thus, engage court did not in imper district QUINTERO- Alberto Rene counting. missible double SALAZAR, Petitioner, Second, Phillips argues that the

district court violated the Sixth Amend ment as construed United States v. KEISLER,* Acting Attorney Peter D.

Booker, 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. General, Respondent. (2005), in Apprendi L.Ed.2d 621 No. 04-73128. Jersey, New 530 U.S. (2000), L.Ed.2d 435 imposing a Appeals, United States Court of

four-level enhancement for use of a fire Ninth Circuit. arm in felony connection with another of submitting fense without that issue to the Argued and Submitted Nov. 2006. 2K2.1(b)(5) (Nov. jury. See U.S.S.G. Filed Oct. 2003), 2K2.1(b)(6). now U.S.S.G. This contention is without merit. Because the

sentencing guidelines advisory are under

Booker, enhancements advisory

guidelines range may be based upon facts

* States, predeces- Peter D. Keisler is substituted for his pursuant General of the United to Fed. sor, 43(c)(2). Acting Attorney R. R.App. Alberto P.

Zachary Nightingale, Hout, Van Der Brigagliano Francisco, & Nightingale, San CA, argued the cause petitioner; for the Hout, Marc Hout, Van Der Van Der Bri- gagliano Nightingale, Francisco, San & CA, was on the brief. Molina, Jr.,

Ernesto H. Litigation Senior Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Division, Civil Department United States Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the respondent; cause for the Peter D. Keis- States citizens. dren are all United General, David Attorney ler, Assistant repair runs a home Director, Divi- Civil Bernal, Assistant Y. employs he Justice, business at which maintenance Department sion, States citizens. several United D.C., on the brief. were Washington, 1998, Quintero-Salazar pleaded nolo In to the delin- contributing contendere of CaLPenal quency of a minor violation engaging in intercourse with KLEINFELD ANDREW J. Before: years younger than the minor who is three THOMAS, Circuit R. and SIDNEY in violation of CaLPenal Code perpetrator LEIGHTON,** B. Judges, and RONALD *4 261.5(c), intercourse engaging and in Judge. District years age is under 16 of a minor who with years age is 21 of perpetrator when the THOMAS; Dissent by Judge Opinion Code in violation of CaLPenal older KLEINFELD. judge 261.5(d). to eleven He was sentenced at- and ordered to imprisonment months THOMAS, Judge: Circuit rehabilitation counseling and other tend of question the presents This case probation offi- as directed his programs is cate- CaLPenal whether cer.1 turpitude crime a gorically U.S.C. meaning of the within 2, 2002, Quintero-Salazar was April On 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), alien making thus an from visit returning to the United States not, and that it is conclude removable. We he was detained family in Mexico when ing from the con- for review grant petition the Naturalization Immigration and by the Immigration of of the Board trary decision (“INS”) in seeking admission upon Service (“BIA”). Appeals 12, 2002, the April Francisco. On San began appear to and filed a notice INS I Quintero-Sa proceedings against removal being an inadmis lazar, him with charging is a citi- Quintero-Salazar Alberto Rene 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) under INA alien who entered sible of Mexico zen and national a crime in convicted of having been his for obtained States the United January turpitude.2 On volving moral and became conditional residence application an Quintero-Salazar filed in 1994. Resident a Lawful Permanent excludability on grounds of of for waiver wife, step-chil- and two three children His ** Quintero involved he is have learned how Leighton, I B. The Honorable Ronald will be for Judge District and how hard it for the Western his children District with States by designation. Washington, sitting She apart from their father.” to be them very caring and "is Quintero-Salazar he "is a father” thereafter, adds that began Shortly family only but also responsible about his Program, not which is participating in the SAFER Quintero-Salazar’s probation relapse-prevention program for therapy workers.” a and his Quintero-Salazar’s therapist in reported as that he "has ex-offenders. also adds officer responsi- very basis, program that he "is the writes regular counsel- attended directed on treatment,” and, already after about his ble full.” and fees in ing paid all fines ... requirement of one a SAFER complying with attend- therapy, has started year individual the appear relied on 2. The notice deepen aware- therapy "to his ing additional (d) 261.5(c) and not the §§ convictions Quintero-Salazar’s therapist also of- ness.” § 272 conviction. Mr. time I have known “[i]n fers it hardship would cause his tude within meaning

the basis of of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). pursuant and children U.S. citizen wife “To determine 212(h). INA whether a specific crime falls within a par category ticular of grounds for removabili removability with can charged ap- Aliens ty, we apply categorical and modified ply a waiver if their removal would for categorical approaches set forth in Taylor hardship result in extreme to a United States, v. United 495 U.S. spouse citizen or children. See 8 (1990).” 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 Cuevas- 1182(h)(1)(B). U.S.C. of remov- Waiver Gaspar ability eligible of those is at the discretion (9th Cir.2005). Attorney General. Id. Waiver not available, however, person seeking if the A categorical analysis requires an aggravated has been convicted of felo- compare us to the elements of the statute Thus, ny. question Id. before the IJ of conviction with a federal definition of (1) was twofold: whether the crime to determine whether conduct committing was for removable crime of proscribed by the statute is broader than (2) so, if whether his generic federal definition. In doing Id. an aggravated felony, constituted so, we “cannot underlying examine the *5 making him ineligible for waiver of remov- offense, facts of prior the but ‘look to ability. the fact of conviction and statutory the 7, 2003, February immigration On ” definition prior offense.’ United (“IJ”) judge decision, ordering issued her Corona-Sanchez, States v. 1201, 291 F.3d Quintero-Salazar removed to Mexico. (9th 1203, Cir.2002) (en banc) 1212-13 Analogizing to a 1966 BIA decision inter- (quoting Taylor, 602, 495 at U.S. statute,3 preting a Wisconsin the IJ found 2143). If the statute of conviction crimi categori- California 261.5 convictions nalizes conduct that satisfy would not cally involving to be crimes moral turpi- issue, federal definition of the crime at tude. then The IJ found then the qualify conviction does not as a ineligible for waiver because she found predicate offense categorical ap under the 261.5(d) “aggravated that is also an felo- proach. short, Id. at 1203. In under the 101(a)(43)(A). ny” under INA The BIA categorical approach, the issue is whether affirmed summarily pursuant to 8 C.F.R. the full range of encompassed conduct 1003.1(e)(4). the statute constitutes a crime of moral timely petition This for review fol turpitude. See United States v. Castillo- lowed. We review de novo question of Rivera, (9th 1020, Cir.2001). 244 F.3d 1022 statutory whether a state crime constitutes satisfy categorical test, “[T]o even the involving turpitude. crime moral Carty egregious least conduct ... qualify.” must 1081, (9th v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1083 Cir. United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 2005) Rodriguez-Herrera INS, (citing v. (9th 1201, Cir.2006). 1206 (9th Cir.1995)). 52 F.3d 240 n. 4 For a conviction to be a “crime of

II moral turpitude” immigration law, under it (1) The BIA erred in holding that a vile, “must be a crime that is base or 261.5(d) (2) violation of Cal.Penal Code depraved is violates societal moral categorically a crime turpi- moral Gonzales, standards.” Navarro-Lopez v. (BIA 3. Dingena, 1966). See Matter 11 I & N Dec. 723

693 (9th Cir.2007) (en continued monogamously without inter F.3d 1072 503 years banc). course for two to three willfully” or before It “must be done also face, offending On its event. such behav v. “evil intent.” Fernandez-Ruiz with (9th may ior and socially unaccepta be unwise 1159, 1165-66 Cir. base, to it many, “inherently ble but is not INS, 2006); also see Michel vile, INS, or depraved,” Hamdan v. 98 (“it (2d Cir.2000) in the is intent (5th Cir.1996), accompa F.3d or way inheres .... turpitude that moral one aby mind,” nied “vicious motive or corrupt a crime whether involves to determine Michel, at 263. Nor is it “so far act whether the is ac contrary “give to the moral law” rise corrupt motive or companied vicious to moral outrage.” Navarro-Lopez, at mind”). only statutorily Where an act is short, In the conduct does discussed inherently wrong, rather than prohibited, not meet the first Fernandez-Ruiz re not involve moral generally the act will quirement being an “act of baseness INS, Beltran-Tirado turpitude. contrary depravity accepted moral standards.” Cir.2000) (noting dif F.3d ndez-Ruiz, Ferna F.3d at prohibitum, an ference between malum 1165-66. only statutorily prohibited, act 13599 and 261.5(d) Indeed, proscribes con some se, inherently wrong). an act malum duct that prohibitum. is malum We know turpitude, there to “the For be it is prohibitum malum not malum in of depravi involve some level [must] un se because some conduct criminalized contrary ty or baseness ‘so far to the legal der if would be the adult rise to gives moral law' moral out married. minor were CahPenal See at 1071 rage.” Navarro-Lopez, (quoting 261.5(a) (defining “unlawful sexual n. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. Jordan *6 261.5(d) purposes for as intercourse” of (1951) 703, (Jackson, 95 71 L.Ed. 886 S.Ct. involving a person intercourse “with who is J., dissenting)). perpetrator, not the of the if the spouse The statute at issue here is Cal.Penal minor”); § is person a Cal. Fam.Code 302 261.5(d), provides: § Code which (permitting marry a minor with written 21 Any person years age of or older who order). a parent consent of a and court in an act of unlawful engages sexual prohibitum also know it is malum We minor who is under intercourse with a 261.5(d) is because some conduct under of of a years age guilty 16 either in Ann. legal other states. See Ark.Code felony, misdemeanor or a and shall be (2006) 5-14-125(a)(3) in (criminalizing by county in a punished imprisonment minors who or tercourse with are fourteen year, jail exceeding by not one or im- (2006) under); §Ann. 16-3-655 S.C.Code two, prisonment prison state the for (same). Finally, purpose California’s three, years. or four reveals that it was not passing the law words, among range the con- moral, In other of pragmatic-they so much as were 261.5(d), criminalized by duct would be teenage attempting pregnancies. to reduce a 21-year- consensual intercourse between Superior See Michael M. Court Sono of sophomore) 464, a a (possibly college old and ma 450 U.S. County, (1981) (“the years, (possibly who is 15 months justifica minor 11 67 L.Ed.2d 437 State, junior). relationship school That high a tion for offered the the statute very Supreme the of may begun accepted well have when the older Court California, legislature sought a the high of the two was school senior and the is that teenage younger high prevent illegitimate pregnancies”). a freshman have school 694 261.5(d) categorical approach, “judicially that is if defines conduct modified

Because cases, in at some facts would allow prohibitum, least noticeable the defendant malum an than categorically be a crime moral to be convicted of offense other it cannot 261.5(d) offense,” Moreover, a it qualifying because that defined as turpitude. used liability strict crime that does not cannot be as a basis for removal. Id. is a scienter, Casarez-Bravo, any showing (quoting lacks United States v. require (9th Cir.1999)). or evil requisite element of willfulness 181 F.3d 1077 “As required by repeatedly, government as Fernandez-Ruiz.4 we have noted intent clearly has the to establish burden reasons, these we conclude that For the conviction on unequivocally was based 261.5(d) criminalizes Cal-Penal predi qualifying all of the elements of a that contem- that is broader than conduct cate offense.” United States v. Navidad- 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). plated under 8 U.S.C. Cir.2004) (9th Marcos, F.3d Therefore, categorically is not Velasco-Medina, (citing United States v. within the Cir.2002); 305 F.3d United meaning immigration of the statutes. Pimentel-Flores, States v. (9th Cir.2003); Corona-Sanchez, Ill 1211). F.3d at If the crime of conviction does categorically predicate of qualify not as a Here, evidence that the statute, it may under a federal still fense government tendered was the fact of con analysis. under a qualify categorical modified Therefore, any judi viction. absent other ona-Sanchez, at Cor facts, cially application noticeable approach categorical Under modified categorical modified not al approach does “ judicially we examine ‘documentation analysis. ter our clearly noticeable facts that establish ” predicate conviction is a conviction’ IV purposes. (quoting for removal Id. Rivera-Sanchez, States v. Because crime of conviction not does (9th Cir.2001) (en banc)). Under the qualify crime involving turpi- *7 government Nagle, having v. aggravated 4. The cites Bendel 17 count of committed an fel (9th Cir.1927), eighty- ony. ques F.2d 720 but that Because we need not reach that tion, year-old does Maryland analysis. case involved a statute dif not control our Afridi preced the one at ferent from issue here Likewise, our in court’s recent decision Unit categorical ed both the of the establishment Gomez-Mendez, v. ed States 486 F.3d 599 analysis prior Taylor of crimes in and the (9th Cir.2007) also does not whether address intervening precedents other Ninth Circuit 261.5(d) § under conviction a constitutes government cited herein. The also relies on Rather, involving turpitude. crime moral Gonzales, (9th v. 442 F.3d 1212 Cir. 261.5(d) Afridi dealt with whether Gomez-Mendez However, 2006). does not address the was a of Afridi "crime violence” under the Federal question of whether conviction under Sentencing Guidelines. It in the answered 261.5(d) involving constitutes a crime mor guidelines explicitly affirmative because those Rather, turpitude. al dealt with wheth including defined "crime of violence” as Afridi er conviction under constitutes an rape.” "statutory guid Because we are not Thus, “aggravated felony.” would definition, statutory clear ed as and be Afridi play Quinte- into come were we that to hold task cause our is to determine is a what involving ro-S alazar did commit a crime moral not a removable, turpitude, violence,” moral was we were is "crime of our decision con eligible forced consider whether he was for trolled and Navarro-Lo Fernandez-Ruiz ineligible waiver or pez, whether he was on ac- and not Gomez-Mendez.

695 “manifestly involves moral years” of 15 meaning of 8 U.S.C. tude within said, dicta, in 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), have that turpitude.”2 the BIA and IJ erred We turpi- a “crime moral “statutory rape” was re- is of Quintero-Salazar that finding in 3 not removable he was tude.” Because movable. tur- a crime of moral having committed “consistently ... Our court has also held question of not reach the we need pitude, statutory rape prohibiting laws sexual that of for a waiver eligible he was whether proscribe contact with a minor under 16 hardship excludability on the basis of min constituting sexual abuse of a conduct and chil- citizen wife cause his U.S. would or,”4 felony.5 have aggravated an We 212(h). INA pursuant to dren Quintero-Salazar’s crime is even said that PETITION GRANTED. precedents a “crime of violence.”6 These view, room, my leave no for us to con KLEINFELD, Judge, Circuit that the crime is not one of moral clude dissenting: aggravated felony. an turpitude or is not conclude, as the BIA I would therefore dissent. respectfully

I concluded, ineli was the con- compels me to reach Precedent gible for a waiver.7 Quintero- that the crime of which clusion majority opinion of the argument a crime of The convicted is indeed was Salazar language statutory strong. Under some The crime is turpitude. moral in Fernandez by a our circuit’s recent decision intercourse specifically sexual rape, might there be real under 16.1 -Ruiz v. person 21 with a person over Quintero-Salazar’s having question as whether that “the crime of have held We But turpitude.8 age crime is one of of a ... child of the knowledge carnal Gomez-Mendez, 261.5(d). 6. United States v. See also United 1. Cal.Penal Code Gomez-Mendez, (9th Cir.2007). 601 (9th Cir.2007) range (concluding that the "full proscribed by Cal.Penal Code conduct 1182(h)(1)(B) ("No waiver 7. See 8 U.S.C. 261.5(d)” "statutory meets the definition granted case of an alien be ... in the shall rape”). previously to the Unit- been admitted who has lawfully admitted for ed States as an alien (9th Nagle, 17 F.2d Cir. 2. Bendel v. date of permanent if ... since the residence INS, 1927); Rodriguez-Herrera v. also see been convicted admission the alien has such (9th Cir.1995) ("[W]e have F.3d ....”). aggravated felony of an knowledge having of a that ... carnal found turpi year ... involve[s] old female Gonzales, 468 F.3d 8. See Fernandez-Ruiz tude.”). Cir.2006) ("[WJhile (9th spous 1165-66 INS, act,” 3. Gonzalez-Alvarado may depraved al abuse be a “base 1994). ("Typically, crimes of moral Cir. sufficient for a crime that factor alone is not *8 However, we have turpitude fraud. involve turpitude: the act must moral to constitute ... category acts ... such as included in this Indeed, willfully.... this cir also be done turpitude statutory rape, which involve generally requires 'willful precedent cuit's nature.”) (internal quotation very their to be order for a crime ness' or 'evil intent’ in omitted). marks turpi as one classified emphasize similarly Other circuits tude .... Lopez-Solis, 4. United States to a moral willfulness is critical Cir.2006). 1205-06 INS, generally Michel determination. See (2d Cir.2000) ('[Cjorrupt ("The 1101(43) 'aggra- term 5. See 8 U.S.C. turpi of moral murder, is the touchstone scienter rape, felony' ... or sex- vated means tude.').”). ”). a minor.... ual abuse of was about domestic ass Fernandez-Ruiz implications think that the

ault.9 I do not language in a domestic assault case specific holdings

can our overcome specifically more

strong speaking dicta

Quintero-Salazar’s precedent crime. Our (as opposed

on the crime at issue to the language have

implications of we written crimes) me

about other leaves unable to

join majority. GUGLIELMINO;

Carlo Briant Chun-

Hoon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, CORPORATION,

McKEE FOODS Corporation,

a Tennessee Defendant-Appellee. Zusman, Francisco, CA, Edward S. San argued the cause and filed briefs for the

No. 05-16144. plaintiffs-appellants. Kevin K. Eng, San Appeals, United States Court of Francisco, CA, was also on the briefs. Ninth Circuit. TN, Pickering, William H. Chattanooga, argued Argued Aug. and Submitted the cause and 2007. filed brief for the defendant-appellee. Anthony Jackson, A. Filed Oct. TN, Chattanooga, Dixon, R. Brian San

Francisco, CA, Hoffman, and Michael San Francisco, CA, were also on the briefs. Before: DIARMUID F. O’SCANNLAIN, MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, and KIM McLANE WARDLAW, Judges. Circuit Opinion by Judge O’SCANNLAIN; *9 Concurrence Judge O’SCANNLAIN. Id. at 1161.

Case Details

Case Name: Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 9, 2007
Citation: 506 F.3d 688
Docket Number: 04-73128
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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