After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of several crimes attributable to a robbery at the intersection of Connecticut Avenue and K Street, N.W.
I.
Roth explained that after the robbery her head was “throbbing,” “sore” and “very tender to the touch.” She stated that she had swelling from “my right eye to [ ] behind my right ear.” The throbbing lasted for “a week and a half.” Roth’s hand was also injured, and some of her fingers “stayed swollen for about three weeks.” The injury to her index finger lasted the longest — -it was “almost unusable for about two months” and “was in a lot of pain.” Roth also reported “some bruising on my legs.”
On the night of the robbery, after the police arrived at Roth’s location, “an ambulance arrived as well.” Roth explained
II.
“In reviewing appellants’ claims, we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give deference to the right of the jury to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw all justifiable inferences of fact, making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.”
The District’s felony assault statute
This statute was enacted to “fill the gap between aggravated assault and simple assault,”
This court has decided one case interpreting “significant bodily injury” in the felony assault statute. In R.S.,
So what kind of injury requires “hospitalization or immediate medical attention” — the defining words for a bodily injury that is “significant”? Adopting a formulation crafted initially by Judge Byrd of the Superior Court in an earlier case, this court held in R.S. that “medical attention” means the “treatment” that is “necessary to preserve the health and wellbeing of the individual, e.g„ to prevent long-term physical damage, possible disability, disfigurement, or severe pain.”
In sum, our understanding of injuries that “require[ ] hospitalization or immediate medical attention” — meaning “significant bodily injuries” — excludes those which, although seemingly significant enough to invite medical assistance, do not actually “require” it, meaning the victim would not suffer additional harm by failing to receive professional diagnosis and treatment.
III.
After applying the objective test from R.S. (“in the ordinary course of events”) and the definitional language we have adopted from R.P. (“treatment ... necessary to ... prevent long-term physical damage, possible disability, disfigurement, or severe pain”), we must conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found that Roth’s bodily injuries were “significant.” First, no medical treatment was provided in this case, only cold compresses; and Roth reported no long-term effects beyond “a week and a half’ of headaches, swollen fingers “for about three weeks,” and two months of an “almost unusable” index finger.
Second, Roth’s subjective opinion that she was capable of treating her injuries without further attention from medical personnel may not indicate that, objectively, medical attention was not required— especially because her decision not to seek further examination of her injuries was motivated, to an appreciable extent, by her lack of medical insurance. On the other hand, Roth’s opinion about her injuries was corroborated, to a meaningful extent, by her testimony repeating the statements of the EMTs, who told her that she probably did not have a concussion or a broken finger.
In this case, the evidence, objectively viewed, revealed that Roth received no
So ordered.
. Appellant was convicted of robbery, D.C.Code § 22-2801 (2001); misdemeanor receipt of stolen property (RSP), D.C.Code § 22-3232(a), -3232(c)(2) (2001); misdemeanor receipt of stolen property as a lesser included offense of felony RSP, D.C.Code § 22-3232(a), -3232(c)(1) (2001); and felony assault with significant bodily injury, D.C.Code § 22-404(a)(2) (2012 Supp.). Accounting for concurrent sentences for the robbery and assault, to be served consecutive to consecutive sentences for the RSP convictions, appellant received prison time of approximately seven years, coupled with three years of supervised release thereafter and payment of $300 under the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996.
. See supra note 1.
. Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1992).
. In re L.L., 974 A.2d 859, 866 (D.C.2009)(quoting Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.2001))(internal quotation marks omitted).
. Lewis, supra note 4, 767 A.2d at 222.
. See supra note 1.
. Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 986-87 (D.C.2008)(internal quotation marks omitted).
. D.C.Code § 22-404(a)(l)(2012 Supp.).
. D.C.Code § 22-404.1 (2001). In Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 149-150 (D.C. 1999), this court, in the absence of a definition in the aggravated assault statute, borrowed for that statute the definition of "serious bodily injury” from the statute that provides sentencing enhancements for sex offenses, namely: "bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.”
. Colter v. United States, 37 A.3d 282, 285 (D.C.2012).
. In re R.S., 6 A.3d 854, 858 (D.C.2010) (citation omitted).
. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
. See supra note 11.
. In re R.S., supra note 11, 6 A.3d at 859; see supra note 9 (quoting definition of "serious bodily injury” in aggravated assault case).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.; D.C.Code § 22-404(a)(2) (2012 Supp.). In R.S., we focused briefly on why the definition of "significant bodily injury” includes both "hospitalization” and "immediate medical treatment.” It is "not easy,” we said, "to envision a situation in which injury might require hospitalization and yet not also require immediate medical attention.” In re R.S., supra note 11, 6 A.3d at 859 n. 3. We surmised, however, that this statutory distinction may be explainable by situations in which "an injury is only latent and manifests itself a considerable time after the fact; e.g., an unrecognized internal injury or concussion,” id., that may require eventual hospitalization if not the perceived need for immediate medical attention. On the other hand, we would add, there is no provision in the statute for latent injuries that do not require hospitalization, even if they do ultimately require medical attention. It follows that, for injuries not requiring "immediate” medical attention, the injury will not be "significant” unless it does eventually require hospitalization.
.Id. (quoting In re R.P., 136 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 549, 552 (2008)(Byrd, J.))(internal quotation marks omitted). We approved the following language from R.P. equating "attention” with "treatment”: An individual suffers significant bodily injury when the injury "necessitates the individual being taken to the hospital or receiving medical treatment shortly after the injury was inflicted. Hospitalization or medical treatment is required where it is necessary to preserve the health and well-being of the individual....” Id. (emphasis added).
. These injuries are not comparable to the "laceration” in R.S. that "required four to six stitches” in the victim's ear, which had been "tom in two,” eventually leaving "a scar"; or to the “fractured nose with a deep gash and profuse bleeding” in R.P. See In re R.S., supra note 11, 6 A.3d at 857, 858. More recently, we sustained a conviction for felony assault against a contention that the trial court plainly erred in crafting a supplemental jury instruction that defined "reckless” action under the statute. See Flores v. United States, 37 A.3d 866, 867 (D.C.2011)(conviction on evidence that victim received “eight to ten stitches and a tetanus shot” at a hospital "in treatment for his stab wound”).
. See supra note 8.