33 Wis. 505 | Wis. | 1873
The complaint fails to state, facts showing that the title of the land is not held by purchase, within the rule laid down, and according to the construction given the statute, in Farrington v. Wilson, 29 Wis., 383. It fails, therefore, to show that the land is exempt from taxation, and so states no cause of action. The allegation that the lahd is “ by the laws of the state of Wisconsin exempt from taxation,” is the statement of a mere conclusion of law, which, being unsupported by the proper averments of fact, goes for nothing. Eor aught that is alleged in the complaint, the land may have been held by John W. Quinney, the ancestor of the plaintiff, “ by purchase,” according to the definition given those words and the interpretation put upon the statute in the case above referred to, which would make the land taxable; John W. Quinney, or the person from whom he acquired, may have held “ by purchase ” in the ordinary and popular acceptation, that is, for a valuable consideration paid for the land; and if such was the nature of his tenure or the manner in which his title was acquired or had its origin, then the land was taxable against him, even though he was a person of Indian blood, which the complaint does not state ; and being so taxable, the taxable quality was not lost or destroyed by the descent to the plaintiff. The
Another objection, to the complaint, as not stating a cause of action, is, that the object of the action, appears to be to restrain the collection of taxes by distress and sale of personal property. The complaint charges the seizure of certain personal property belonging to the plaintiffs, by the treasurer, under and by virtue of the warrant for the collection of the taxes, and asks an injunction to prevent the. treasurer from selling the same. It is well settled, in this court at least, that the writ of injunction will not be granted for such a purpose, and that the illegal seizure and threat of the officer to sell the goods and chattels of the plaintiff constitute no ground for equitable interference. Van Cott v. Board of Supervisors of Milwaukee Co.,
The order granting the temporary injunction was improperly made in the first place, and should have been vacated, and the injunction dissolved, on the motion of the defendants.
By the Court. — The order denying the motion to dissolve is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions that the same be allowed.
I take this opportunity to say that I did not concur in the decision of the court in Farrington v. Wilson. I dis^ sented in that case, but the published report does not show this. I deemed it unnecessary then, and do now, to state the grounds of my dissent. I wished merely that the fact should appear in the subsequent reports.