102 Minn. 256 | Minn. | 1907
This action was commenced in the district court of the county of Meeker by Charlotte A. Quinn, as plaintiff, against the Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company, to determine adverse claims to real estate. After issue was joined, and before the trial of the action, the plaintiff died intestate, and the administrator of her estate, Owen Quinn, the present plaintiff, by order of the court made upon his motion, the defendant opposing, was substituted as plaintiff in this action in place of the original plaintiff and authorized to prosecute the action as such administrator. In his supplemental complaint the administrator alleged that he was in the exclusive possession of the land.
The cause was tried by the court without a jury, the plaintiff appearing and taking part therein, and thereupon the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect following: The original plaintiff, Charlotte A. Quinn, and John Quinn, were husband and wife, and on November 29, 1902, he owned the land in question, and they conveyed it by quitclaim deed to his sister, Rosa A. Johnson, who at the same time and as a part of the same transaction conveyed the land to Mrs. Quinn. Each of the conveyances were made without consideration and with the intent of all the parties thereto to hinder and defraud the defendant, who was then a creditor of John Quinn
The plaintiff here urges two general propositions: (a) That the trial court had no jurisdiction to substitute the appellant as plaintiff in place of his intestate, or to make findings of fact or order for judgment or grant the defendant affirmative relief, (b) The findings of fact are not sustained by the evidence.
Counsel for appellant, in discussing this question, attaches controling importance to the fact that the grantor, John Quinn, was solvent at the time the land was transferred to his wife. Whether he was then solvent or insolvent was an important item of evidence, for a solvent debtor is less likely to make a fraudulent disposition of his property than an insolvent one. Such evidence, however, is by no means conclusive. Walkow v. Kingsley, 45 Minn. 283, 47 N. W. 807.
The evidence fully sustains the conclusion that the deed of the land from John Quinn and wife to his sister and the deed from her to Mrs. Quinn were one transaction, the purpose of which was to transfer the title of the land from the husband to his wife. The plaintiff, as the representative of the wife, made no attempt at any time on the trial to show the bona fides of the transaction, but rested his case solely upon the deeds in question. The statute charged Mrs. Quinn with notice of her husband’s debts. G. S. 1894, § 5534; R. L. 1905, § 3609. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the deeds were without consideration and fraudulent. The plaintiff called John Quinn, the grantor, in rebuttal, and examined him with reference to his bank
Judgment affirmed.