Shuttering a military base is a difficult task. Whatever the long-term benefit to national security and the fisc, the economy of the area near a closed base suffers. Members of the congressional delegation rally to their constituents’ support. Because keeping any one base going imposes very little cost (per person) on the rest of the populace, this support may be effective. Everyone favors closing bases in other districts while protecting their own bases, but that outcome is not feasible. The upshot may be-that all bases remain open, even though everyone could gain by a process that spreads the hurt widely to achieve a long-term gain for the nation as a whole.
After a series of ill-fated attempts to rationalize the cross-state allocation of military resources, Congress enacted the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1808, note following 10 U.S.C. § 2687. The Act creates a Commission charged with recommending changes that save money and improve national security. Both the President and the Congress may approve or reject the Commission’s proposal, but they cannot amend it. The Commission dissolves when it delivers its report to the President. If either the President or Congress rejects the proposal, the process ends; but if both approve (more precisely, if the President transmits the proposal to Congress and the legislature does not cancel the plan by joint resolution), then the Secretary of Defense must implement the changes. This design mitigates the local-interest problems that had so often derailed sensible policy. The Commission must recommend a package in which the national gains outweigh local losses. The reason for banning amendments is obvious, and the provision disbanding the Commission once it delivers a recommendation reinforces the bar against amendments. (A “nay” by President or Congress would function as an amendatory power if the Commission could make alternative proposals.) In short, Congress designed the Act to force the President and its own membership into an all-or-none decision.
Base consolidations under the Act have occurred in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. In this most recent round, the Commission recommended closing 22 bases and realigning another 33, saving $35 billion over 20 years. 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report. The President transmitted the Plan, and Congress let it go into force. One of the Plan’s changes is the subject of this suit: the Secretary of Defense must move fif *653 teen F-16 jets from a base in Springfield, Illinois — where they were assigned to a wing of the Illinois Air National Guard — to a base in Fort Wayne, Indiana. According to the Commission, this change reflects “a resource-constrained determination by the Department of Defense that the aircraft concerned will better support national security requirements” in Fort Wayne.
In 2005 Illinois’ Governor brought this suit, asking the district court to enjoin the Commission from transmitting its proposals to the President. He contended that 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) prohibits redeployment without gubernatorial consent, which was not given. Section 104(c) allows the President to “designate” the National Guard units in a state “by branch of the Army or organization of the Air Force”, with the proviso that any “change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit” requires approval from the affected state’s governor. The Governor contends that the F-16s are an “allotment of a unit” and that redistribution is a “change”, making the Plan illegal to the extent it requires moving the jets. (The Governor also relied on 10 U.S.C. § 18238, but that statute is no longer in issue.)
The district court denied the Governor’s request for immediate relief, and we declined to issue an injunction pending appeal. We observed that § 104(c) does not prohibit the Commission (or anyone else) from making recommendations to the President. If the Governor’s understanding of § 104(c) is correct, the proper remedy is an order maintaining the planes in Illinois. The district court then dismissed the suit for want of standing, holding that moving the F-16s would not injure the Governor.
For a third time, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs in
Specter
(including the eponymous Senator) asked for an injunction to prevent the Secretary from closing the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, as the 1991 Plan required. They argued that the Secretary and Commission failed to observe all of the Act’s procedures, and that the President thus should not have approved their recommendation. All nine Justices voted to deny relief. The majority held (1) that the Commission’s recommendation to
*654
the President is not final agency action renewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, for unless the President and Congress approve the Commission’s plan nothing happens, and (2) that the President and Congress are not agencies whose decisions are reviewable under the APA. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Black-mun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, preferred to decide on a different ground: that the Realignment Act grants the President “unfettered discretion to accept the Commission’s base-closing report or to reject it, for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason”.
The Secretary’s order to move the F-16s to Indiana is final agency action, and the Department of Defense is an APA “agency”. Invoking Justice Souter’s opinion, the Secretary supports the district court’s conclusion that the federal judiciary lacks jurisdiction to review even final action implementing a base closure. But Justice Souter did not say this; his position is that the Act requires decisions to be implemented en bloc, not that judges are powerless to enforce the Act’s terms.
Nothing in the Act modifies the many statutes that confer jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes. Suppose the President failed to accept or reject the Commission’s proposal as a package — a requirement under the Act— but instead deleted two closures and ordered the Secretary to close a base that the Commission proposed to keep open. Execution of that order would be incompatible with the Act and could be enjoined. Or suppose the Commission proposed to save money by quartering the soldiers of a given base in the homes of local citizens. The third amendment would prohibit that — and given the Act’s all-or-none rule the entire plan might be enjoined. The Realignment Act does not limit recourse to the courts on such matters; the point of Justice Souter’s opinion was only that judges must not usurp the President’s policy-making function and must respect the Act’s all-or-none feature.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the authority to resolve the parties’ dispute.
Collins v. United States,
In several recent decisions the Supreme Court has observed with regret that the term “jurisdictional” is often loosely used, even in some of its own opinions, to signify any mandatory rule of decision.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
District courts have jurisdiction to hear civil actions against the United States and its agencies arising under federal law, when the plaintiff seeks relief other than money. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). This is such a case. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 5 U.S.C. § 702 (permitting “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action” to sue for injunctive relief). So our 2008 opinion said.
The question squarely presented is whether the Realignment Act supersedes whatever limits § 104(c) puts on the President’s power to redeploy federal equipment assigned to a unit of the National Guard. An affirmative answer does not mean that the Realignment Act “implicitly repeals” § 104(c); the statutes can coexist. Cf.
National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
The Governor says that the base-closing power under that Act is subject to all other limits on presidential authority. This argument rests on the premise that implied repeals are disfavored. See, e.g.,
Home Builders; Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
Is there any reason why the most recent statute should not govern? The Governor wheels out the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Section 2905(c)(1) of the Realignment Act permits the President to approve a plan without preparing an environmental-impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Realignment Act is silent about § 104(c). Because the Act mentions one statute it displaces, the argument goes, all others must be unaffected.
We read the Realignment Act’s treatment of NEPA as an argument against the *656 Governor rather than in his favor. The subsection immediately following the exemption we describe says: “The provisions of [NEPA] shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned”. § 2905(c)(2)(A). In tandem, subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)(A) say that NEPA remains effective to the extent that environmental analysis would not disrupt or delay the process of selecting bases for closure and realignment. The Realignment Act had to address NEPA in order to draw this distinction and preserve its application in part.
One might invert the Governor’s argument and say that statutory rules predating 1990 are superseded unless the Realignment Act expressly notes their applicability. But neither “all older statutes apply unless mentioned in the Realignment Act” nor “no older statute applies unless ...” captures Justice Souter’s point. What he concluded — and what we, too, conclude — is that the Realignment Act supersedes any statute that is incompatible with the Act’s all- or-none feature. The Act is designed to ensure that “action on a base-closing package be quick and final”.
Specter,
Affirmed.
