Quimbo Appo v. . the PeopleQuimbo Appo v. . the People
The Oyer and Terminer in the several counties is a permanent and continuous court. Its successive sessions are terms of the same, and not distinct tribunals.
The Oyer and Terminer has no power to order a new trial upon the merits, after a conviction for felony.
WRIT of error to the Supreme Court. Quimbo Appo was tried and convicted of murder, and sentenced to be executed therefor, by a Court of Oyer and Terminer held in and for the city and county of New York, in April, 1859. The court adjourned sine die on the 16th of June following.
On the first Monday of October, in the same year, a Court of Oyer and Terminer was held in and for the same city and county, before Mr. Justice ROOSEVELT, and on the 17th of
The district attorney denied the power of the court to entertain or grant such a motion and declined to answer it on the merits. The court affirmed its power and announced its intention to grant the motion. The district attorney thereupon sued out an alternative writ of prohibition, addressed to Appo and the court, forbidding the exercise of this jurisdiction. The writ was returnable at the general term of the Supreme Court on the first Monday of December, 1859. On the return day the court, on argument, rendered judgment, awarding a prohibition absolute, from which judgment Appo brought error to this court.
David Dudley Field, for the plaintiff in error.
I. The writ of prohibition is a remedy, nearly obsolete, never demandable as a matter of right, and when granted is confined to those cases in which there is no other remedy. If, therefore, it were clear that the Oyer and Terminer had no power to grant Appo a new trial, and that the Supreme Court had the power to interfere, it should nevertheless not revive against human life this almost forgotten writ: but in favor of mercy and of life, should leave the district attorney to his remedy by writ of error. If Appo should hereafter have judgment in his favor, for any cause other than an acquittal by a jury, the People may bring error under the act of 1852 (ch. 82), and review the order for a new trial; and if such order be a nullity, the appellate court will render judgment against the prisoner upon the original conviction. (Ex parte Braudlacht, 2 Hill, 367.)
II. The Supreme Court has not the power to interfere by prohibition with the granting of a new trial, in a criminal action, over which the Oyer and Terminer had general juris-
III. The Supreme Court has not the jurisdiction in any case to issue a prohibition to the Oyer and Terminer any more than the Queen‘s Bench in England has jurisdiction to issue a prohibition to the Common Pleas or the Exchequer. The Court of Oyer and Terminer is the highest court of criminal jurisdiction in the State. It may issue its process into any county (2 R. S., 247, § 43). Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the legislature in cities. (
IV. If, however, it were conceded that the Supreme Court could issue a prohibition to the Oyer and Terminer, and by such prohibition could prevent its making an order for a new trial in a case over which it had full jurisdiction, still it could not issue its prohibition in this case, because the Oyer and Terminer had the power to grant the new trial as it has done. The only question is one of power. The propriety of its exercise cannot here be examined. If, for any cause whatever, a Court of Oyer and Terminer, after judgment, and at a subsequent term, can grant a new trial, the present attempt to control it must fail. The power then may be tested by supposing an extreme case: Let us suppose that upon an indictment for murder the jury has just returned a verdict of guilty, and that while the jury is yet in the box, the counsel at the bar, and the prisoner in the dock, the person supposed to be murdered should enter the court, and the witnesses should confess that the accusation, trial and conviction were the fruits of a conspiracy to take life under the forms of law, would the court be bound by the law of the land to proceed, nevertheless, and
V. The power to grant new trials is an incident of every court of superior jurisdiction. The first reported case is in Style, 466—since which time the power has been fully established. (See Lord MANSFIELD in 1 Burr., 394; and the cases and comments in Graham and Waterman on New Trials, Introduction, 2, 3, and vols. 2 and 3.)
VI. The Court of Oyer and Terminer is a court of superior jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction over every crime. Because it is limited in territorial extent that does not make it a court of inferior jurisdiction, any more than the territorial limits of the circuit and district courts of the United States make them courts of inferior jurisdiction. The Constitution of the State does not class the Court of Oyer and Terminer among the inferior courts. (1 Va. Cas., 172; Com. v. Crump., 2 Park., C. R. 653; 3 id., 518; McCormick v. Sullivan, 10 Wheat., 192.)
VII. The power of criminal courts of general jurisdiction to grant new trials in cases of felony has been decided so often in this country that it is not now a debatable question. (Whart. C. L., 981-1019; U. S. Dig. Crim. Law, 561-592.)
VIII. The power of our Courts of Oyer and Terminer to grant new trials in cases of felony is also settled by authority. No doubt ever existed on the subject till the case of The People v. Comstock (8 Wend., 549), and to this day that case and
IX. The objection that the granting of new trials in criminal trials would lead to frequent applications proves nothing. The possibility of abuse of power is no evidence that the power does not exist, nor any reason why it ought not to exist. There is probably at this moment no civilized country on the globe, which does not allow the review of trials and judgments in criminal cases. In England the old rule has long been condemned by her wisest lawyers and judges, and is now abandoned. (2 Denison‘s Crown Cases, 286; Queen v. Scaife, 6 Brit. Crown Cases, 286; See the 8th Report of the English Comrs., 18-33, 159, 264, 221; Report of N. Y. Comrs., 256; Livingston‘s Code of Criminal Pro., ch. 12; Act erecting the Superior Court of Buffalo, 1854, ch. 96, § 35.)
X. It, the Oyer and Terminer, has the power to grant a new trial at the same term, and before judgment; it has also the power to grant it at a subsequent term. The court is a continuing one; its several sittings are terms. All such process, if issued when the said Court of Oyer and Terminer and Jail Delivery is not in session, may be tested on any day in the last
XI. It has also the power to grant the new trial after the sentence. This power has been long exercised in civil actions, and there seems to be no reason why the same should not exist in criminal actions. New trials in criminal cases depend upon the same principles which have been established in civil cases. (Whart. Crim. Law, 983; 5 T. R., 436; King v. Holt, see remarks of GROSE, Justice, 446; King v. Gough, Doug., 798; State v. Price, 3 Halsted, 358.) The power to open judgments has long been exercised in civil cases. (Soulden v. Cook, 4 Wend., 217; Com. v. Peck, 1 Met., 428; People v. Cancemi, note, 16 N. Y., 501.) This power is examined and asserted in Miller v. Finkle (1 Park. C. R., 374).
This shows that the sentence is no bar to a new trial.
John T. Doyle, for The People, defendants in error.
I. The writ of prohibition is the proper remedy. 1. It lies whenever an inferior court, tribunal or officer exceeds its jurisdiction; and even where the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and is proceeding in the exercise of that jurisdiction, to determine incidentally a question over which it has no authority. (F. N. B., 39 H., 40 K., &c.; Jac. Law Dict., verb Prohibition; Byerley v. Windus et al., 5 B. and C., 1; Darby v. Cosens, 1 T. R., 552.) 2. The October Court of Oyer and Terminer, before which this motion was made, had not jurisdiction of the subject matter. There was no lis pendens before it—a previous Court of Oyer and Terminer had tried the traverse, rendered judgment, and passed sentence. The whole case was res judicata. No court but one of appellate jurisdiction could disturb the judgment. (2 R. S., 205, § 29.) 3. There is no other adequate remedy.
II. As to the power of the Court of Oyer and Terminer in the present case. 1. A Court of Oyer and Terminer has no power in any case to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial. If a conviction should be had on testimony unsatisfactory to the court, or if evidence newly discovered should cast a reasonable doubt on the prisoner‘s guilt, the Executive alone can interfere. It was for the purpose of correcting such errors that the power of pardon was confided to the Governor. It is not proposed to discuss this question at length, as its determination is not necessary in the present case. The arguments pro and con will be found in the conflicting cases of The People v. Morrison (1 Park. C. R., 625), People v. Judges of Dutchess Oyer and Terminer (2 Barb. S. C. R., 282); People v. Stone (5 Wend., 39); People v. Comstock (8 Wend., 549); 2 R. S., 739, et seq., and Rev‘rs Notes. 2. But supposing such power to
III. Conclusive as the argument on the law as written appears, that drawn from the reason of the law—the argumentum ab inconvenienti—is equally forcible. 1. It is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to enact a system of laws for organization of criminal courts, which of necessity would be utterly inadequate to the punishment of crime. The power contended for here, if it exists, would be destructive of all government. There is no convict who cannot make out a plausible case for a new trial, and their incarceration would fully excuse any amount of laches in the application. The public is provided with no means of resisting such applications. The witnesses on whose testimony convictions have been had, are scattered to the four quarters of the globe; the means of perpetuating their testimony, or of preserving any authentic memorial of the evidence given on the former trials, has not been provided by law, and does not exist in fact. If the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, convened for the purpose of trying prisoners now under accusation of crimes, have power to go back and review the action of their predecessors, the result is easily divined. 2. The fact that there is no law or rule of court requiring any minute to be kept of the evidence on which the prisoner was convicted; no provision for the making or settling of a case embodying the evidence; none as to the time within which such a motion shall be made; no power on the part of the prosecution to detain witnesses after a verdict, or to compel affidavits in opposition to such a motion; no provision, either by statute or rule of court, having any reference whatever to such a proceeding; and no precedent for such a motion in the whole judicial history of the State, should of themselves be conclusive against the existence of the power
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SELDEN, J. The first question to be considered is, whether the writ of prohibition was a proper remedy, assuming that the Court of Oyer and Terminer had no authority to grant a new trial upon the merits after conviction and sentence for the crime of murder.
The office of this writ is, to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals of every kind from exceeding their jurisdiction. It is an ancient and valuable writ, and one the
But it is said, that when the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the action, or of the subject matter before it, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction can neither be corrected nor prevented by a writ of prohibition.
It is true that the most frequent occasions for the use of the writ are where a subordinate tribunal assumes to entertain some cause or proceeding over which it has no control. But the necessity for the writ is the same where, in a matter of which such tribunal has jurisdiction, it goes beyond its legitimate powers; and the authorities show that the writ is equally applicable to such a case. Mr. Jacob, in treating of this writ, after saying that it may issue to inferior courts of every description, whether ecclesiastical, temporal, military or maritime, whenever they attempt to take cognizance of causes over which they have no jurisdiction, adds: or if, in handling of matters clearly within their cognizance, they transgress the bounds prescribed to them by the laws of England, as where they require two witnesses to prove the payment of a legacy. (Jac. Law Dic., title Prohibition.)
In the case of Darby v. Cosens (1 Term R., 552), the defendant, who was vicar of the parish of Long Burton, had sued Darby in an Ecclesiastical Court for tithes, that being an action appropriate to the jurisdiction of that court; but the defendant having set up a modus by way of defence, an issue was presented which the Ecclesiastical Court had no authority to try—still, as it assumed to proceed with the case, upon application to the Court of King‘s Bench a writ of prohibition was issued.
The precise objection made here was taken in the case of Leman v. Goulty (3 Term R., 3), where certain church wardens were cited in the Bishops’ Court to exhibit on oath an account of the moneys received and paid by them. Objections being
These cases prove that the writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power, in a cause or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than when the entire cause is without its jurisdiction. The broad remedial nature of this writ is shown by the brief statement of a case by Fitzherbert. In stating the various cases in which the writ will lie, he says: And if a man be sued in the Spiritual Court, and the judges there will not grant unto the defendant the copy of the libel, then he shall have a prohibition, directed unto them for a surcease, &c., until they have delivered the copy of the libel, according to the statute made Anno 2 H., 5. (F. N. B., title Prohibition.)
This shows that the writ was never governed by any narrow technical rules, but was resorted to as a convenient mode of exercising a wholesome control over inferior tribunals. The scope of this remedy ought not, I think, to be abridged, as it is far better to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power than to be driven to the necessity of correcting the error after it is committed. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that this was a proper case for the use of the writ, if the
Had, then, the Court of Oyer and Terminer authority to make the order granting to the defendant, Quimbo Appo, a new trial? One position taken by the counsel for The People upon this question is, that the power, conceding it to exist, before judgment, cannot be exercised after judgment has been pronounced and the prisoner sentenced. I have not, however, been able to discover any solid basis for this distinction. There is no general principle upon which it can rest—nor am I aware of any analogies to support it. If the ends of justice require that this power should be vested in Courts of Oyer and Terminer, that demand is just as imperious where judgment happens to have been pronounced before the grounds for the interposition of the court are made known as in other cases. If the judgment stands in the way, it may be vacated. The court does not become, as claimed by the counsel, functus officio as to the particular case whenever sentence is pronounced. Suppose, for instance, the court through inadvertence should sentence the prisoner without inquiring of him whether he had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced. If the position is sound, this error, although immediately discovered, could not be corrected by the court which committed it. It would be not only unsupported by authority, but unsafe, I think, to hold, as we must if we sustain the doctrine contended for, that a Court of Oyer and Terminer loses all control over the cases before it as soon as the judgment is recorded.
Another position of the counsel is, that if it be admitted that the court before which the prisoner was tried could grant a new trial, yet another Court of Oyer and Terminer subsequently organized, being a distinct court, had no jurisdiction of the case, and could not exercise that power.
This involves an inquiry into the nature of Courts of Oyer and Terminer in this State, and how far they resemble the English courts of that name. In England, although Courts of Oyer and Terminer are annually held in every county of
Hence, as they must inquire before they can hear and determine, they can try no indictments except such as are found at the same court. This difficulty, however, is overcome by a second commission of Gaol Delivery, as it is called, which authorizes them to deliver the gaol of all prisoners found therein upon their arrival at the place where the court is held, and by virtue of this power they try all indictments, whatever the offence or wherever found.
This commission may be to different persons, but for convenience is usually to the same persons who compose the Court of Oyer and Terminer. Besides these more general commissions, special commissions may be issued by the King at any time to try either specific offences, or the individuals named. Of course, upon the final adjournment of any of these courts in any county its powers are ended. It no longer has any existence so far as that county is concerned, and there is no longer any Court of Oyer and Terminer or of Gaol Delivery, as the case may be, in and for such county, until a new commission issues.
Hence it is plain that no subsequent Court of Oyer and Terminer, as such, could interfere in any way with any case commenced at a previous court, because it must first inquire, then hear and determine. How far its powers as a Court of Gaol Delivery might extend, I am not prepared to say; but no court in England has, I think, ever assumed to take cognizance under this power of a motion for a new trial, even for irregularity, in a case tried at a previous court. It has been held there that the
If, therefore, no substantial difference were found to exist between our Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery and those of England, I should think it a sufficient objection to the order granting a new trial in the present case, that it was not made by the same court in which the case was tried.
But our Courts of Oyer and Terminer, although they have the same name and a similar jurisdiction with those of England, are nevertheless in some respects differently organized. I do not think it necessary to inquire whether the act to settle Courts of Justice, published in the appendix to volume 2 of the Revised Laws of 1813, and bearing date in 1683, was ever in force in this State or not. It will sufficiently exhibit the present structure of the court to refer to a few of the more modern enactments on the subject.
Section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1821, provides as follows: The Clerk of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Sessions of the Peace, in and for the city and county of New York, shall be appointed by the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in said city, and hold his office during the pleasure of the said court. This language necessarily implies that the Court of Oyer and Terminer was regarded as a permanent and continuing court. Under the English system there was no Court of Oyer and Terminer in existence, except while a particular set of commissioners were in session. There could be no clerk of such a court during the interval between the expiration of one commission and the issuing of another, nor could the definite article the be appropriately used in such a connection as in the clause quoted, except in reference to some particular session of the court.
By section 40 of the title of the Revised Statutes concerning Circuit Courts and Courts of Oyer and Terminer (2 R. S., 207), it is declared that the seals previously adopted by the several Courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery shall continue to be the seals of these courts respectively; and section 42 of the same act provides that process issued out of a Court of Oyer and Terminer when such court is not in session may be tested on any day in the last preceding term of the said court. This section treats the court as in existence, although not in session, and as having a succession of terms.
Again, the Code enacts, section 20, that there must be two terms of the Circuit Court and Court of Oyer and Terminer held annually in each of the counties of this State, and as many more terms thereof, and as many special terms, as the judges of each judicial district shall appoint therein.
These provisions leave no doubt that the English Court of Oyer and Terminer has been so far modified under our judicial system as to become a permanent and continuous court in each of the counties of the State, so that each session of such a
It becomes necessary, therefore, to pass upon the question whether Courts of Oyer and Terminer in this State have authority to grant a new trial upon the merits, after conviction in a capital case. This question has been somewhat agitated in our courts, and there are conflicting decisions upon it, the result of which it will be well in the outset to ascertain; because, however it might have been originally, if the question has been settled by the courts of this State, we should not feel at liberty to disturb it.
In referring to the cases I will begin with the more recent. There are, then, two decisions of our present Supreme Court upon the subject: One made at the general term in the second district in the case of The People v. The Dutchess Oyer and Terminer (2 Barb. S. C. R., 282), the other at the general term in the third district in the case of The People v. Morrison (1 Park. C. R., 625). In the first of these cases the power, after an elaborate examination, was denied; and in the last, after an examination equally elaborate, it was affirmed. As these were coördinate courts of equal jurisdiction and grade, they may properly be considered as balancing each other. I speak of their weight as decisions merely, irrespective of the reasoning in the two cases. The fact that one was a few years later than the other, considering the nature of the question and the position of the courts, does not materially affect their relative force. The question, therefore, may fairly be considered as standing, so far as authority is concerned, substantially where it was left by the previous cases.
We have next two decisions of the former Supreme Court similarly situated: First, that in the case of The People v. Stone (5 Wend., 39), where the power was asserted: and next, that in The People v. Comstock (8 Wend., 549), in which it was denied. It is suggested in The People v. Morrison that the remarks of SUTHERLAND, J., in the last of these cases, were made through mere inadvertence, without reflecting that the same court had, two years before, decided the other way. I find it difficult to adopt this explanation. It supposes that Judge SUTHERLAND and Judge SAVAGE had both entirely forgotten the case of The People v. Stone, and not only so, but that Mr. Wendell also, who had but just reported the former decision, neglected to call the attention of the judges to the obvious discrepancy. The point was one calculated to awaken attention, especially when elaborately discussed, as it was by MARCY, J., in his opinion; and the case of The People v. Comstock could hardly, I think, have found its way into the books if the pointed and emphatic remarks of SUTHERLAND, J., in that case had been inadvertently made. From the tone of those remarks I think it much more likely that the latter justice, although not entirely satisfied with the opinion of MARCY, J., in The People v. Stone, had not chosen to dissent, and that he availed himself of the case of The People v. Comstock—MARCY, J., having in the meantime left the bench and NELSON, J., having taken his place—to express his own views upon the question, the latter justice probably concurring with him.
The case of The People v. Comstock may therefore fairly be considered as a counterpoise to that of The People v. Stone, because, although the precise point was not involved in the last of the two cases, yet what was then said must, I think, have been said upon full consideration of the reasoning in the previous case. Taking the two cases together, therefore, and construing them by such light as we have, they show the opinions of SAVAGE, Ch. J., and MARCY, J., in favor of, and of SUTHERLAND and NELSON, Js., against the power.
Besides the cases already referred to, there are two of an older date to which I will briefly advert. The first is the case of The People v. Townsend (1 Johns. Ca., 104), where the prisoner having been convicted at the Oyer and Terminer for
The other case referred to is that of The People v. The Justices of Chenango (1 Johns. Ca., 179). The Supreme Court in that case denied the right of a Court of General Sessions to grant new trials upon the merits, and issued a mandamus to compel them to proceed to judgment in a case where they had exercised that power, after conviction for a felony. This case has ever been considered as settling the question as to the power of Courts of General Sessions in this State to grant new trials; and much of its reasoning applies as well to Courts of Oyer and Terminer as to Courts of General Sessions, if the former are to be regarded as inferior courts.
The term inferior, as applied to courts, has no very definite meaning. It is used in different senses. In the sense of being courts of very narrow and restricted jurisdiction, Courts of Oyer and Terminer are not inferior; but in the sense of being subordinate to the Supreme Court, and subject in common with all other minor tribunals to its supervisory control, they certainly are. Courts which are subject to be put in motion by mandamus or restrained by prohibition, and to have their causes taken away before judgment by certiorari, are subordinate courts; and this is all that is necessary to give to the reasoning of the court in the case of The People v. The Justices of Chenango, its full force when applied to Courts of Oyer and Terminer. The court in that case, speaking of the Courts of General Sessions, say: Writs of error, certiorari, mandamus, and attachment issue to it from this court. Those writs con-
From this brief review of the cases in this State, it is difficult to say in what direction, when the authorities are fairly weighed, the scales would incline. I assume that they are evenly balanced; but whether this assumption is just, or whether the preponderance should be considered as in favor of the power, does not in the least affect my view of the present case; for it cannot be contended that there exists that clear and settled course of decision which should preclude any further examination of the subject.
It is to be looked at, then, substantially as an original question, and as if it had now arisen for the first time. It is not controlled by any statute, and hence what we are called upon to decide is whether, by the common law, Courts of Oyer and Terminer have the power to grant new trials upon the merits, after conviction in a capital case.
This court and the Supreme Court have the power, if not the right, to legislate and to amend the common law, and no doubt their legislation would be as wise as much that proceeds from more legitimate sources; but the better opinion I think is, that each department of the government should confine itself to the exercise of its appropriate functions, and not encroach upon those of any other. It is shown in the case of The People v. Morrison that in most of the States of the Union the courts have assumed the powers contended for here, and this is urged as authority by which our courts should be governed. But it is the common law of England, and not that of Pennsylvania or Alabama, which we have adopted. Upon all questions upon which there is any doubt, we pay high respect to the decisions of the courts of other States, but when the law is known and conceded, the fact that other States have confessedly disregarded and departed from it, is entitled to very little weight.
Judge MARCY, in The People v. Stone, devotes most of his argument to proving that Courts of Oyer and Terminer in this
But it matters not, in my view, how strong may be the reasons given in the cases of The People v. Stone and The People v. Morrison for a change in the law. The question we are called upon to consider is not whether the admitted rule of the common law was, or is, wrong, and ought to be changed, but whether that change should be wrought by the courts or left to the action of the Legislature.
The whole course of judicial as well as legislative action in this State, until the decision in The People v. Stone, indicates very clearly, I think, a general understanding that Courts of Oyer and Terminer could not grant new trials in such cases. In the case of The People v. McKay (18 John., 212), where it became necessary to move in arrest of judgment, on the ground that no venire had been issued, the cause was removed into the Supreme Court by certiorari, and the prisoner brought up by habeas corpus in order that the motion might be made there. In the case of Douglass (4 Cow., 26), convicted of murder in the county of Steuben, where a motion was made to set aside the verdict for certain irregularities on the part of the jury, the same course was taken; and in the case of The People v. Ransom (7 Wend., 417), who was found guilty of murder in the city of New York, judgment was suspended in order that the question of regularity might be presented to the Supreme Court.
The bearing of the proceedings in these cases will be seen, when it is considered that even the subordinate and inferior common law courts in England have power to set aside ver-
The Legislature also, in providing for the correction of errors in law by means of bills of exception, and making no provision as to new trials for mistakes in regard to matters of fact, has, I think, indicated its opinion not only that new trials could not be granted in cases of that kind, but that they had better be left, as by the common law they are left, to the action of the pardoning power.
It is by no means certain that such would not be the better course, even if we had power to determine the question upon grounds of expediency alone. Certainly it would, I think, unless at the same time some rules could be adopted by which the exercise of the power should be in some degree regulated.
The Legislature, in permitting motions for new trials to be made upon the minutes of the judge in civil cases, has imperatively required that they should be made at the same term at which the cause is tried. (
The suffering of such motions to be made before another judge at a subsequent term, without any provision as to the manner in which he should become possessed of the facts of the case, would, I apprehend, be attended with very serious inconvenience. There is great danger, too, that the privilege, if allowed without being subjected to some precautionary restrictions, will be used to delay and embarrass the administration of criminal justice, already sufficiently difficult.
The subject, taken as a whole, can only be adequately dealt with by the Legislature, to which it appropriately belongs, and I am entirely opposed to so obvious a stretch of judicial power as would be involved in holding that our Courts of Oyer and Terminer, without the aid of any statute, possess a control over
The judgment should, I think, be affirmed.
CLERKE, J. The question which seems to have been debated in this case is, whether a Court of Oyer and Terminer, held at a term subsequent to that in which a person has been convicted and sentenced, can grant him a new trial. It does not appear to have been asserted in the argument, either here or in the Supreme Court, that for offences greater than a misdemeanor, a new trial cannot be granted by any court on the merits. Certainly, however, this is the rule of the common law. It has been always tenaciously maintained in England down to the present day, that where the defendant has been convicted on an indictment for felony, there can be no new trial, except for irregularity, or some other extrinsic cause. Has this well-established and, I think, salutary rule been changed in this State?
The cases in our reports on this subject are not numerous, and are far from being unanimous. The first which I find is that of The People v. Townsend (1 J. C., 104), where it was held by the Supreme Court, in April, 1799, that a Court of Oyer and Terminer may award a new trial; but the crime for which the defendant was indicted was perjury, at that time considered in this State—as at common law—to be merely a misdemeanor. It was made felony only by the Revised Statutes. In The People v. The Sessions of Chenango (2 Caines’ Cases in Error, 319), the court decided, to be sure, only that the Court of Sessions being an inferior court, could not grant a new trial; but KENT, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says, “The Sessions cannot grant a new trial upon the merits. It is a power not exercised by this (the Supreme) Court, after verdict in cases of felony; and, perhaps, it is expedient it should not be.” In The People v. Stone (5 Wend., 39), the court, indeed, held that Courts of Oyer and Terminer had authority to grant new trials on the merits in all cases, and entirely ignored the rule of the common law. But this decision was expressly overruled by the same court in The People v. Comstock, where it is declared
It is stated, in the points of the plaintiff in error, that in England the old rule has been condemned by her wisest lawyers and judges, and is now abandoned. This is a mistake. It is only about three weeks ago, during the present session of Parliament, that Mr. McMahon introduced a bill in the House of Commons to allow new trials to be granted in all criminal
The right to a new trial in cases of felony would work still greater detriment in this State. The witnesses on whose testimony defendants are convicted, are apt to be more migratory than in England; and the law has provided no means of perpetuating their testimony, or of preserving any authentic memorial of their evidence. In every case there would be repeated applications for a new trial; so that in the city of New York, where the district attorney is unable, from the multitude of cases, to bring all to trial, a fearful obstruction to the administration of justice would be the consequence.
The only judicious and practicable remedy for erroneous verdicts in criminal cases, is that of the pardoning power. No stigma, as has been supposed, necessarily adheres to a defendant who has been unjustly found guilty of a crime, when he receives the pardon on the express ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of evidence. I place my opinion, therefore, on the ground not merely that a Court of Oyer and Terminer has no power to grant a new trial, where the verdict has been rendered at a previous Oyer and Terminer, but that no court has power, in cases of felony, to grant a new trial on the merits, under any circumstances.
The power to issue a writ of prohibition clearly still resides in the Supreme Court; it is expressly recognized in the
The order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
BACON, J. (Dissenting.) Anticipating that I shall disagree with a majority of my brethren, and very reluctantly dissenting from the judgment which is about to be pronounced, I only desire in a very few words to express the grounds of that dissent.
The only question, then, in this case is, whether a Court of Oyer and Terminer, at a term subsequent to that at which a prisoner has been tried and convicted, and judgment rendered upon the conviction, has power to grant a new trial. The question is an important one, and if it were wholly res integra, and for the first time to be discussed and passed upon, I should esteem it one of no small difficulty. At any rate it falls within that category where much may be said, and pertinently and plausibly said, too, upon both sides. I do not go into the question of the original constitution of Courts of Oyer and Terminer in England, nor the various modifications and enlargements of their powers by statutes enacted from time to time. On this
Without, then, going into the argument, I consider the power of Courts of Oyer and Terminer to grant new trials as established by a most controlling weight of authority, and that this power may be exercised at a term subsequent to that at which a conviction has taken place and judgment rendered. In the case of The People v. Townsend (1 John. Ca., 104), the defendant had been convicted of perjury, but before sentence was pronounced he absconded. He afterwards surrendered himself, and the presiding justice reported to the Supreme Court that the verdict was against evidence. The opinion of the Supreme Court was asked, and they answered that there should be a new trial, and directed that opinion to be communicated to the judges at the next Oyer and Terminer to be held in the county where the trial took place. The case, in effect, is an adjudication of the Supreme Court, given by way of advice, that the Oyer and Terminer had power to grant a new trial where the verdict was against evidence, and in that case the application and a decision thereon would necessarily be made at a subsequent session of the court. In the case of The People v. Stone (5 Wend., 39) the same question arose. The defendant had been convicted in Rensselaer county, and an application was made to that court for a new trial, whether at the same or a subsequent term does not appear from the statement of the case. The court, doubting its power, suspended sen-
It is true that in the case of The People v. Comstock (8 Wend., 549), Judge SUTHERLAND was, probably by an inadvertence, betrayed into the expression of an opinion that in a case of felony no new trial could be granted, whether the defendant was acquitted or convicted. He seems to have lost sight of the case of The People v. Stone, in the decision of which he took part, and of the fact that Comstock having been acquitted, he was secured by the constitutional immunity from the jeopardy of another trial. The case has never been considered as an authority in denial of the power of the court to grant a new trial in a proper case.
The case of The People v. Stone has been followed by several subsequent cases. In The People v. Morrison (1 Park. C. R., 625), in a very able and elaborate opinion, Judge HARRIS vindicates the power of a Court of Oyer and Terminer to grant a new trial, and places it, in my judgment, on impregnable grounds, both of principle and authority. He takes occasion to show, also, that this power is in full exercise in at least eighteen of the States of the Union, and that the English rule which denies new trials in criminal cases, but turns over the subject to the royal clemency, has never been adopted or recognized by the courts of this county.
In the case of The People v. The Court of Sessions of Wayne County (1 Park. C. R., 369), at general term in the seventh district, a decided opinion was expressed that the power resides in Courts of Oyer and Terminer, although its existence in Courts of Sessions, which are of limited and inferior jurisdiction, was denied. “Courts of Oyer and Terminer,” says Mr. Justice JOHNSON, “have full criminal jurisdiction, and are the only courts in the State having such powers.”
The power, then, to grant new trials, I think, beyond question, exists in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, and for reasons that make that authority plenary for all the purposes of a
It is said by the counsel of The People, in opposition to the assertion and exercise of this power in the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, that the scheme of our government and the distribution of powers under the Constitution are at war with the right thus claimed. It is insisted that the pardoning power was conferred upon the Executive for the very purpose of correcting any errors of fact that might occur in the prosecution and conviction of a supposed culprit, and that pardon does not imply guilt. I do not coincide in this view. On the contrary I think with us, in the administration of the criminal law and in dealing with offenders who have been subjected to its action, the normal and necessary association with the word pardon is the idea of guilt. The office of the Governor is not to reverse unjust or illegal decisions, but to remit the punishment due to the guilty. If innocence is claimed, or an improper conviction has been obtained, then justice requires a new trial. The mercy which is thus invoked is but a poor palliative for the injury that may have been inflicted. I agree with Judge MARCY that “it is
The case made in the court below was one appealing very strongly to the reason of that tribunal to grant a new trial. It was certainly from no fault of the court before which the defendant was tried that the trial resulted in a conviction. A number of unfortunate circumstances concurred in presenting him before the jury substantially without defence, and yet standing thus unaided and unshielded before them, there was evident hesitation with the jury in convicting him of the crime of murder. There is every reason to believe that on another trial the crime laid to his charge will, if not excused, be greatly mitigated. I think it is eminently due to this comparative stranger to us and our institutions—this “waif,” as he has been appropriately called, cast upon our shores from “the central flowery kingdom“—that he should have one more opportunity to show the extenuations of his offence, even if he cannot succeed in wholly purging himself of crime.
I think the order of the general term granting the writ of prohibition should be reversed, and the order of the Oyer and Terminer granting a new trial affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.