Carl David Fischer (“Fischer”) appeals from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County in a dissolution of marriage action. The only issue before this court is the division of property. Fischer argues that the trial court erred in considering the oral testimony of his former wife Melissa Quilty (“Quilty”) as to the existence and value of certain “shop tools” that were awarded to Fischer. Fischer further contends that the trial court erred in that the division of property was not an equal division. We affirm.
Factual Background
The parties were married in 2006. On August 15, 2011, Quilty filed an action for dissolution of marriage from Fischer. In its judgment, the trial court dissolved the marriage and divided the marital property. As part of the division of marital property, the court ordered Fischer to pay an equalization payment to Quilty in the amount of $28,000. The court based this payment on evidence that (1) the total value of the marital estate was $90,000, (2) Fischer was receiving $73,500 in net assets, and (3) Quilty was receiving $16,500 in net assets. In its order, the court noted that “a payment is necessary to make an equitable, if not perfectly equal, division of the marital property.”
The size of the equalization payment was primarily attributable to a $50,000 value placed on certain “shop tools” that were categorized as marital property and awarded to Fischer. Quilty was provided with Fischer’s discovery responses only a few days before trial, and that is when she discovered the shop tools were missing from his list of assets.
Fischer raises two issues on appeal. First, Fischer contends that the trial court erred when it included $50,000 in shop tools in the division of marital property. He asserts that the finding of the existence of $50,000 in shop tools and their classification as marital property were against the weight of the evidence. Second, Fischer argues that when dividing the marital property, the trial court erred in not considering his Exhibit 52, a properly admitted list of marital property.
Further facts are set forth as necessary in the analysis below.
Standard of Review
When reviewing a judgment of dissolution of marriage, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Green v. Green,
All evidence and permissible inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and we disregard all evidence to the contrary, even if the evidence could support a different conclusion. Sweet v. Sweet,
We review the trial court’s division of property for abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is only found where the award is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration ...” Id. (quoting Sweet,
Analysis
I.
In his first point, Fischer contends that the trial court erred when it included “$50,000 in shop tools” in the division of marital property. Specifically, Fischer argues that the finding of the existence of $50,000 in shop tools and then- classification as marital property were against the weight of the evidence. Although he made no objection to Quilty’s testimony or the admission of Quilty’s Exhibit 5 into evidence, Fischer claims on appeal that the “shop tools” in question do not exist and that Quilty’s testimony and the inclusion of the tools on her Exhibit 5 were insufficient evidence to prove their existence, value, or classification as marital property.
The trial court has broad discretion in the valuation and classification of property as marital or non-marital. Foster v. Foster,
Evidence of the existence of the shop tools and their valuation at $50,000 is listed in Quilty’s Exhibit 5 and from her testimony:
Q. And he has a significant amount of shop tools; is that correct?
A. Yes
Q. You believe the value of those shop tools to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $50,000?
A. Yes
On cross-examination Quilty was only asked: “A lot of his tools he had before the marriage?” Quilty’s response was “he had some.” As noted above, Fischer did not testify or offer any evidence regarding the tools. He never contested the existence or value of the tools. In short, he made no mention of the shop tools at all.
Because the trial court is always free to accept or reject, all, part, or none of the witnesses’ testimony, there was no error on the part of the trial court in believing Quilty’s uncontroverted and unobjected to testimony and the exhibit as to the existence, status as marital property and value of the shop tools. See Tadych v. Horner,
Next, Fischer suggests that in the absence of pictures or an itemized list of the shop tools, there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to have valued the tools. The trial court accepted Quilty’s valuation of the tools at $50,000, as she testified to and as her Exhibit 5 listed. While it is true that a trial court may not enter a valuation of marital property not supported by evidence at trial, the court nonetheless enjoys broad discretion in valuing marital property. Foster,
Finally, Fischer argues that there was insufficient evidence to classify the tools as marital property. When determining whether property is marital or non-marital, courts consider whether the property was acquired before or after the marriage. Glenn v. Glenn,
Having examined the record before us, we have concluded that there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could have determined the existence, value, and classification of the property disposed of in the judgment. There was no error, plain or otherwise.
This point is denied.
II.
In his second point, Fischer contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider his Exhibit 52, a list of marital property that was admitted into evidence. He argues that in disregarding his list of marital property — which only listed items he claimed were in Quilty’s possession— the court created an inequitable distribution that produced a $2,000 to $3,000 swing in the overall distribution of the marital assets. However, in his one-paragraph argument, Fischer points to nothing in the record indicating that the trial court did not consider all of the evidence presented. Instead, without support, Fischer complains that a failure to include the property listed in his Exhibit 52 in the trial court’s worksheet produced an inequitable distribution.
Fischer’s argument in his second point is deficient in two respects. First, Fischer failed to include any reference to the standard of appellate review as required by Rule 84.04(e). The rule states that “[t]he argument shall also include a concise statement of the applicable standard of review for each claim of error.” While it is easy enough for this Court to determine the applicable standard of review, this Court should not be burdened with the duty of supplementing a deficient brief with its own research. Waller v. Shippey,
Were we to address the question presented on the merits ex gratia, Fischer would still not be entitled to relief. Because the trial court is always free to accept or reject, all, part, or none of the witnesses’ testimony, there was no error on the part of the trial court in believing or not believing Fischer’s testimony and exhibit as to the existence, status and value of the property listed in his Exhibit 52. Tadych v. Horner,
This point is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Ail concur.
Notes
. The record establishes that Fischer was delinquent in providing discovery responses, which resulted in the trial court having to issue an order to enforce discovery.
. All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2012) unless otherwise indicated.