313 Ky. 816 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1950
Affirming.
This appeal is from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in a case submitted upon an agreed statement of facts pursuant to Section 637 of the Civil Code of Practice. The question presented is whether four ordinances of the City of Louisville have been legally advertised so as to authorize the appellant, James P. Queenan, Jefferson County Clerk, to place certain bond issue questions on the ballot to be used by the voters of the City of Louisville in the general election to be held on November 7, 1950. The Circuit Court answered the question in the affirmative.
The Board of Aldermen of the City of Louisville duly enacted Ordinances Nos. 231, 232, 233 and 234,
Each of the ordinances contains a provision which reads: “The Mayor is hereby authorized and directed to give public notice of the time, place and purpose of the election upon said question or proposition for at least two (2) weeks prior to the time of the election in one (1) daily newspaper published in the City of Louisville, in which notice this ordinance shall be reproduced in full.”
The agreed facts in the present case are that the first paid advertisement of the ordinances appeared in the Louisville Times on Friday, October 27, 1950, just twelve days, including Sundays, before the election. Widespread publicity in the press and public forums of the City has been given to the ordinances over a period of months, including many articles in the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times, both daily newspapers of general circulation in the City. In addition to the newspaper publicity, the ordinances have been publicly endorsed by numerous organizations having many thousands of members in the City, and has been opposed by a resolution of the Louisville Federation of Labor having approximately 114 local unions with a total membership in excess of 40,000. The ordinances have been debated on the radio in round-table discussions or otherwise over one of the local radio stations and on numerous newscasts and telecasts over all the
It is appellant’s contention that in elections involving bond issues where 'there is a statute requiring advertising of the ordinance for a certain minimum time before the election, the provisions of the statute are mandatory in such respect and any advertising which appears in the newspapers for a shorter time than the minimum time prescribed cannot be considered substantial compliance with the statute. Appellant cites a number of cases in support of this contention, but he relies principally upon Hatfield v. City of Covington, 177 Ky. 124, 197 S. W. 535; Pendley v. Butler County Fiscal Court, 229 Ky. 45, 16 S. W. 2d 500, and Douthitt
In Collar v. City of Louisville, 187 Ky. 448, 219 S. W. 421, 422, the validity of an authorized issue of $2,000,000 of bonds was attacked because there had been no advertisement as required by the ordinance calling the election. There was no statute requiring publication of the ordinance, but the ordinance directed the mayor to advertise the election for at least ten days (exclusive of Sundays) prior to the day of election in each of the daily papers published in the City and to embody the ordinance in the notice. The ordinance in its entirety was never published, but the election and the proposal to be voted on received a large amount of publicity in various ways. Without deciding whether the provisions of the ordinance as to giving notice of the election were mandatory or directory, the court held that there had
“It is difficult to see how much greater publicity could have been given to th'e matter, and it would seem almost impossible, with these matters so constantly and continuously before them, that many citizens of Louisville could have failed to know and understand the nature, the object, the need, and the purpose of the bond issue. True, the ordinance in its entirety was not embodied in any of the articles of advertisements, but the main points were featured time and again. The object sought by publication is to bring the ordinance to the attention of the people, that they might be thoroughly posted and advised of its import, and. thus enabled to vote intelligently upon the measure.
“The authorization of a bond issue of such magnitude and the assumption of the indebtedness created thereby are matters of vital moment and consequence to the voters and taxpayers. Before entering into such an undertaking and shouldering such a burden the matter should be explained or brought out in such a manner as that those who read may understand. This was done and thanks to the newspapers and co-operating agencies, in a far more effective, forceful, and readable way than could or would have been accomplished through the publication of the ordinance alone. Few people read or pay any attention to official advertising, while the plan adopted put the bond issue so prominently, constantly, and interestedly before the public that they were practically bound to know about it. There was in deed and in truth a substantial compliance with the ordinance.”
The most recent expression on the subject by this court was in Hall v. Sturgill, 305 Ky. 445, 204 S. W. 2d 496, where the question of the time of advertising a special election under the local option statute was involved. KRS 242.040, after requiring publication in a newspaper of the order calling the election, provides that “the sheriff shall also advertise the order by written or printed handbills posted at not less than five conspicuous places in each precinct of the county for two weeks before the election.” September 16th was the last day for the posting of the notices. There were 54 precincts in the county, and the notices required by the statute were posted in strict conformity therewith in
After referring to the Pendley, Douthitt and dollar cases and other authorities, the question posed earlier in the opinion was answered as follows: “We have concluded that KRS 242.040 is mandatory as to the publication and posting of the notices of an election, but that the provision concerning the time of such posting and publication is directory only, and that a substantial compliance therewith is sufficient.”
It was held that there was a substantial compliance with the statute, and that the election was valid.
We think the rule announced in the Hall case is sound, and in the light of the agreed statement of facts we are constrained to hold that this case falls squarely within that rule. It cannot be said with any show of reason that any elector of the City of Louisville will be denied the privilege of voting at the election for want of sufficient notice.
Judgment is affirmed.