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Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.
124 F.3d 430
3rd Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 respect to either delay with was excusable QUEEN PIZZA, INC.;

order. CITY Thomas C. Bolger; Pizza, Inc.; Baughans, Scale Here, the government the learned Inc.; Buck; Pizza, Inc.; F. F.M. Charles progress report issuing judge, for whom Bigelow; Robert S. Blue Earth Enter- purpose sealing for the prepared been had Bores; prises, Inc.; Kevin Davis Pizza tapes, was out of town and would be the Enterprises, Inc.; Davis; Diane A. Fish- Friday, tapes on Au- unavailable to seal Pizza, Inc.; Fisher, Jr.; er James B. 1991, day the gust extension SEPCO, Inc.; Corp.; Pizza L S & S G & Therefore, Wednesday, expire. August on Co.; Stephen Gallup; Lugent Pizza D. judge to request was made for a substitute Pizza, Inc.; Joseph Lugent; J. Billio’s appointed, Judge Kate Ford Elliot Pizza, Inc.; Murtha; Spring J. William Thursday, assigned was to the case. On Pizza, Inc; Walker; Garden Brad L. attorney August the assistant district Pizza, Inc.; Wood, JRW James R. Indi- spoke Judge requested Elliot and with vidually Representatives and as Class tapes Saturday, August on 10. seal Consisting All Class Present and Monday, August Judge Elliot told him that Certain Former Domino’s Franchisees adequate tapes, 12 would be seal States; in the United International Monday, August tapes were on Advisory Council, Inc., Franchise sealed. tapes were sealed We conclude “immediately” purpose for the of the statu- Queen PIZZA, INC.; City DOMINO’S Piz- tory sealing requirement. Under the hold- za, Inc.; Bolger; Pizza, Thomas C. Scale Carson, ing where the surveillance ends Inc.; Baughans, Inc.; Buck; Charles F. Friday tapes and the are sealed on the Pizza, Inc.; Bigelow; F.M. Robert S. following Monday, sealing is immediate Enterprises, Inc.; Earth Blue Kevin light intervening weekend. Fur- Bores; Inc.; Enterprises, Davis Pizza thermore, Monday if sealing even Davis; Pizza, Inc.; Diane A. Fisher immediate, not deemed to be the assistant Fisher, Jr.; SEPCO, Inc.; James B. &S attorney’s judge’s district reliance on the de- Pizza, Inc.; Pizza, Inc.; S G & L Ste- Monday certainly cision to wait until was phen Gallup; Pizza, Inc.; Lugent D. Jo- reasonable, consequently delay seph Lugent; Pizza, Inc.; J. Billio’s Wil- attorney excusable. The assistant district Murtha; Spring Pizza, liam J. Garden previously arranged had for a substitute Inc.; Walker; Inc.; Brad L. JRW 2518(8)(a)

judge comply in order to Wood; James R. and International judge’s and had deferred to that decision to Advisory Council, Inc., Appel- Franchise tapes following Monday. seal We lants. expect believe it would be unreasonable to No. 96-1638. attorney judge to seek out a third tapes Judge seal the after Elliot had told Appeals, United States Court waiting Monday him that until suf- would be Third Circuit. ficient. Argued Feb. Aug.

X. Decided above, explained For the reasons we affirm judgments against the defendants. *3 Brown,

Sheryl Snyder, (Argued), Todd G. Louisville, KY, Hayburn, Appellants. & Kolb, (Argued), Og- F. Thomas P. Daniel Davis, Wardwell, den, Polk & New York Shiekman, City, Pepper, Z. Hamil- Laurence PA, Appel- of a Scheetz, Philadelphia, The essence successful nationwide &ton product uniformity fast-food chain is con- lee. sistency. Uniformity benefits franchisees LAY,* SCIRICA, ALITO Before: purchase pizza because customers can Judges. Circuit pizza Domino’s store and be certain the exactly pizza will taste like the Domino’s SCIRICA, Judge. Circuit which are familiar. This means that up not build individual franchisees need THE OF COURT OPINION good Uniformity own will. also benefits the whether appeal, we must decide brand name franchisor. It ensures the will support a tying restrictions certain franchise customers, in- continue to attract and hold of federal antitrust laws. claim for violation *4 royalties.1 creasing franchise fees and Pizza stores of Domino’s Eleven franchisees Advisory the International Franchise reasons, For these section 12.2 of the Council, Piz- against Domino’s Inc. filed suit agree- Domino’s Pizza franchise standard za, Inc., anti- alleging violations of federal pizza ingredients, that all requires ment contract, laws, and tortious trust breach of beverages, packaging by materials used contract. The district interference with a Domino’s franchisee conform to the stan- claims under the antitrust court dismissed Pizza, dards set Domino’s Inc. Section 12(b)(6) for failure to state a Fed.R.Civ.P. Pizza, provides 12.2 also that Domino’s Inc. granted, be- which relief can be claim for require in in- “may our sole discretion allege a valid cause the failed supplies gredients, and materials used market. The district court declined preparation, packaging, delivery supplemental jurisdiction over the to exercise pizza exclusively from purchased us remaining common law claims. approved suppliers from or distributors.” Pizza, Pizza, Queen Domino’s City Inc. v. right im- Domino’s Pizza reserves the “to (E.D.Pa.1996). F.Supp. 1055 We on the pose reasonable limitations number will affirm. approved suppliers or distributors of rights, product.” To enforce these Domi- History and Procedural I. Facts Pizza, inspect no’s Inc. retains franchisee stores and to test materials and A. subject ingredients. 12.2 is to a Section Pizza, a Inc. is fast-food service Domino’s providing that Domi- reasonableness clause through company pizza a national sells Pizza, Inc. must “exercise reasonable no’s 4200 stores. Domino’s Pizza network of over respect judgment with to all determinations operates approximately 700 of owns and us under the terms of this to be made Independent franchisees own these stores. Agreement.” remaining Domino’s operate the Pizza, largest pizza compa- Inc. is the second agreement, franchise the standard Under States, ny in the with revenues United Pizza, approximately Inc. 90% sells Domino’s per year. excess of billion $1.8 ingredients sup- million $500 by Domino’s franchisees.2 These ples used joins system by

A franchisee the Domino’s sales, per year, million form worth some $450 executing agreement a standard Pizza, Inc.’s significant part of Domino’s Pizza, a fran- Inc. Under the with Domino’s only purchase Franchisees 10% profits. agreement, chise the franchisee receives ingredients and from outside supplies their pizza the “Domino’s”name right to sell under dough, return, exception of fresh sources. With Domino’s Pizza re- and format. Pizza, Inc. does not manufacture royalties. Domino’s ceives franchise fees and * Pizza, sup- Lay, Inc. sells States Cir- 2. Domino’s The Honorable Donald P. United Circuit, division, sitting Judge Eighth cuit Judicial plies through Domino’s Distri- its Pizza by designation. Division, formerly "DPDD.” DPDD bution Pizza, analysis franchising subsidiary 1. See the of the economics of of Domino’s Inc. Grimes, in Warren S. When Do Franchisors Have Power?, L.J. 107-110 Market Antitrust Instead, developing cooperative purchasing it sells to franchisees. products plan participating under which franchisees products approved purchases

it these could obtain at re- suppliers then resells them to the fran- suppliers cost from than duced Domi- markup. chisees at a Pizza, no’s Inc. Plaintiffs contend when Pizza, Inc. became aware of these B. efforts, intentionally ingredient issued plaintiffs in this case are eleven Domi- supply specifications vague potential so the International no’s franchisees and Fran- suppliers provide could not FPC with mean- Council, (“IFAC”), Advisory chise Inc. ingful price quotations. corporation Michigan consisting approxi- allege Plaintiffs also Domino’s Pizza en- mately 40% the franchisees dealing arrangements tered into exclusive States, promote the United formed to deny with several franchisees in order to interests.3 The common contend pool potential buyers FPC access to Pizza, monopoly that Domino’s Inc. has a sufficiently large pur- to make the alternative “the million aftermarket for sales of $500 chasing economically scheme feasible. In ad- supplies to Domino’s franchisees” and has dition, plaintiffs contend Domino’s monopoly unreasonably its used *5 anti-competitive predatory pric- commenced trade, competition, limit restrain and extract ing shut to FPC out of the market. For profits. supra-competitive point Plaintiffs to Pizza, example, they maintain that Domino’s Pizza, by actions Domino’s Inc. several to prices many ingredients Inc. lowered and support their claims. supplies competitive to a level with FPC’s First, Pizza, plaintiffs allege that Domino’s prices recouped profits by and then lost rais- ability purchase has restricted their Inc. to price ing dough, on fresh which FPC competitively priced dough. Most franchi- Further, supply. plaintiffs could contend purchase dough sees all of their fresh from Pizza, Domino’s Inc. entered into exclusive Pizza, attempt- Domino’s Inc. Plaintiffs here dealing arrangements only approved with the by making pizza ed to lower costs fresh suppliers ready-made deep dish crusts and They dough on site. contend that in re- agreements, suppli- sauce. Under these Pizza, sponse, pro- Domino’s Inc. increased obligated ers were to deliver their entire cessing quality fees and altered standards Pizza, output to Domino’s Inc. Plaintiffs al- inspection practices store-produced lege purpose agreements of these was to dough, potential which eliminated all savings prevent purchasing FPC from these critical and financial incentives to make their own pizza components for to resale franchisees. dough. allege Pizza, also Finally, plaintiffs Pizza, allege Domino’s prohibited produce Inc. stores that dough dough Inc. to sell refused fresh to franchi- franchisees, selling dough from to other purchased sees unless the franchisees though even dough-producing stores ingredients supplies from Domino’s Piz- willing dough price to sell at a 25% to za, Inc. As a alleged result of these and other Pizza, price. 40% below Domino’s Ine.’s practices, plaintiffs maintain that each fran- Next, plaintiff's object pays to efforts Domi- chisee store now between $3000 $10,000 Pizza, per year to IF more attempt no’s Inc. block AC’s to supplies competitive than it buy expensive ingredients less mar- supplies allege passed ket. Plaintiffs these costs are from other sources. In June IFAC on to consumers. purchasing agreement entered into a Purchasing Cooperative, Foodservice Inc. C. (FPC). agreement, ap- Under the FPC was pointed purchasing agent noted, for IFAC-mem- As eleven Domino’s franchisees and ber Domino’s charged franchisees. FPC was an complaint IFAC filed amended in United Pizza, argued apparently 3. Domino’s Inc. unnecessary before the district trict court found it to standing court that IFAC is without in this case. light dismissing address this issue in of its order Pizza, Pizza, Inc., City Queen Inc. v. Domino's the case for failure to state a claim. (E.D.Pa.1996). F.Supp. The dis- plaintiffs purchase ingredi- Eastern District to force to for the District Court States Pizza, supplies them ents and from stemmed “not Pennsylvania against Domino’s from nature of the compen- declaratory, injunctive, and seeking from its market share in the fast fran- food §§ 1 of the Sher- satory relief under and 2 business, agree- chise but Act, plaintiffs §§ 1 2. The man U.S.C. reason, plain- ment.” Id. at 1062. For that contract, sought damages for breach “implicate contract, principles tiffs’ claims good faith and implied covenants of breach of and are not the of the antitrust concern interference with dealing, fair and tortious plain- laws.” Id. The district court also held contractual relations.4 adequately allege tiffs failed harm to had Inc. moved to dismiss competition, premise “a bedrock of antitrust claim, claims for failure to state antitrust law.” Id. at 1063. Because failed allege contending failed cognizable to assert a antitrust claim and market,” pleading require- “relevant a basic diversity among par- there was neither § 2 ment for claims under both special nor justifying ties circumstances exer- They act. maintained Sherman supplemental jurisdiction, cise the court in the com- that the relevant defined prejudice plaintiffs’ dismissed com- without Domino’s-approved plaint “market” —the subject mon law claims for lack of matter by Domino’s used jurisdiction. Id. 1063-64. Pizza franchisees —was invalid as a matter granted plaintiffs The district court leave- law because boundaries complaint file an cure the amended defined contractual relevant market were jurisdictional pleading deficiencies then- agreement, contained in the franchise terms state claims. Plaintiffs decided not to law by cross-elasticity of de- not measured Instead, replead their state law claims. *6 product interchangeability. mand or sought complaint to amend their for a second mo- granted court defendant’s The district attempt time in an to state a valid federal prejudice plaintiffs’ fed- tion to dismiss with antitrust claim. The district court denied court ob- eral antitrust claims. The district motion, plain- noting though their Act that “in order to state Sherman served complaint tiffs’ second amended § § plaintiff 1 or claim under either plead would cure the failure to harm to com- identify product geo- relevant and must petition, the failure to it would not cure allege that graphic markets and the defen- allege a relevant market. The court valid power within those dant exercises market pur- stated: “Plaintiffs do not and cannot Pizza, Queen City Inc. v. Domi- markets.” supplies from chase alterna- Pizza, Inc., F.Supp. 922 1060 no’s suppliers Domino’s domi- tive because (E.D.Pa.1996). Noting that did supply ingredient nates the market or explicitly identify the relevant “not only sup- market’s because Defendant is the in amended geographic markets franchisee-plaintiffs plier, but because the complaint,” the court said that “it is clear contractually purchase only bound to context, in their from the and confirmed suppliers approved by It is Defendant. opposition memorandum in to the instant power resulting economic from the motion, the relevant therefore, that Plaintiffs consider power, agreement, and not market ingredi- for product market to be the market market’ Plaintiffs that defines the ‘relevant franchi- supplies among ents Domino’s allege support of their antitrust claims.” concept of Rejecting rejected plaintiffs’ argu- Id. at 1061. sees.” court The district market, “an- required the court held that was ment that a different result predicated upon Supreme a ‘relevant decision East- titrust claims under the Court’s Services, Image by the bounds of a franchise man Kodak Technical market’ defined Co. at 1063. 112 S.Ct. 119 agreement cognizable.” are not Id. 504 U.S. (1992). Pizza, appeal This followed. L.Ed.2d 265 The court that Domino’s Inc.’s noted complaint complaint aban- plaintiffs originally United States. amended 4. filed the Their The represent fran- purported claim to all Domino's and a class of all doned their behalf of themselves present chisees. Domino’s franchisees in the future 436 § and Standard of Review U.S.C. 2. This last claim was not

II. raised Jurisdiction before district court. jurisdiction district had noted, As we have the district court held counts under 15 over the antitrust U.S.C. that none of the antitrust claims §§ §§ 28 26 and U.S.C. 1331 and cognizable under federal law. We will supplemental It to exercise declined analyze each claim in turn. jurisdiction over the common law counts. jurisdiction § We have under U.S.C. A. court’s Our review of the district dismissal matter, plaintiffs As a threshold ar 12(b)(1) 12(b)(6) under Fed.R.Civ.P. gue that “relevant market determinations are (3d plenary. Stehney Perry, inherently intensive, fact and therefore are Cir.1996). inappropriate disposition on a Rule 12(b)(6) 16). (Appellant’s motion.” brief at

III. Discussion eases, It is that in proper true most only definition can be determined after a distinct Plaintiffs assert six inquiry factual into the commercial realities First, appeal. plaintiffs allege claims on faced consumers. See Eastman Kodak Pizza, monopolized Domino’s Inc. has Services, Inc., Image Co. v. Technical pizza supplies 451, 482, 2072, 2090, stores, in violation of use Domino’s err, however, L.Ed.2d 265 Act, § 2. support Sherman 15 U.S.C. they try general when to turn this rule into a contention, plaintiffs allege of this Domino’s prohibition per against se dismissal of anti Pizza, Inc. has sufficient market trust plead claims for failure to a relevant prices competition control and exclude 12(b)(6). market under Fed.R.Civ.P. Second, plaintiffs this market. contend Pizza, attempted mo- Plaintiffs have the burden of defin nopolize pizza sup- ing the market for Domino’s the relevant market. Pastore v. Bell plies § 2 ingredients, Telephone Pennsylvania, in violation of Co. 24 F.3d Third, (3d Cir.1994); plaintiffs allege Co., Act. the Sherman Tunis Bros. Inc. v. Co., (3d dealing Inc.’s exclusive ar- Ford Motor 952 F.2d Cir. 1991). rangements unreasonably have restrained “The outer boundaries of a *7 Act, § in violation of 1 of the by trade Sherman market are determined the reasonable Fourth, plaintiffs § allege interchangeability 15 U.S.C. 1. Domi- of or use the cross-elastici Pizza, imposed tying ty no’s Inc. an unlawful of product demand between the itself and by arrangement5 requiring U.S., franchisees to substitutes for it.” Brown Shoe Co. v. buy 294, 325, 1502, 1523, from them as a 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 8 obtaining dough, (1962); in Brothers, condition of fresh viola- 510 L.Ed.2d Tunis 952 1, (same). § § tion of Act 15 1. the Sherman U.S.C. F.2d at 722 plaintiff Where the fails Fifth, Pizza, plaintiffs allege Domino’s proposed Inc. to define its relevant market with imposed tying arrangement by an unlawful reference to the rule of reasonable inter buy requiring demand, franchisees to changeability cross-elasticity of supplies “as a of their alleges proposed condition continued or a relevant market enjoyment rights clearly of and services encompass interchangea under does not all Agreement,” Franchise products Standard violation ble substitute even when all factual Act, § § favor, 1 of the Sherman 15 granted U.S.C. inferences are Sixth, Pizza, plaintiffs allege Domino’s legally Inc. relevant market is insufficient a monopoly See, has in a relevant “market may granted. motion to dismiss e.g., be reasonably Network, interchangeable op- for TV Communications Inc. v. Tur franchisees,” Television, portunities facing prospective Inc., 1022, ner Network 964 F.2d (10th Cir.1992) Act, 2 violation of the Sherman 15 1025 (affirming district tying arrangement, product.” Allen-Myland, "In a the seller sells one known as the tied Inc. item, tying product, known as the the condi- v. Corp., International Business Machines 33 F.3d item, 194, Cir.1994). buyer (3d purchases tion that the another 200

437 585, 19,105 2847, Corp., 472 n. plead for failure U.S. 596 S.Ct. court’s dismissal claim market; (1985) 19, n. proposed (quoting a 2854 L.Ed.2d relevant 86 467 only specific consisting of one television Corp., United States v. Grinnell 384 U.S. Air, narrowly); 563, too Tower 570-71, 1698, 1703-04, channel defined S.Ct. 16 86 Exp. Corp., F.Supp. (1966)). 956 270 v. Federal Inc. Dairy L.Ed.2d 778 See also Ideal (E.D.N.Y.1996) (“Because a relevant market Farms, Labatt, Ltd., Inc. v. John 90 F.3d products reasonably in all that are (3d Cir.1996) includes 737, (same); Bonjomo 749 v. plaintiff’s terchangeable, failure define its Kaiser Corp., Aluminum & Chemical 752 by rule of reference to the reasonable market 802, (3d Cir.1984) (same). F.2d 808 alone, is, standing valid interchangeability dismissal.”); Optische grounds In for B.V. The district dismissed Inc., Hologic, De Oude v. 909 dustrie § 2 plead Delft claims for monopoly failure to (S.D.N.Y.1995) (dismissal F.Supp. 162 for valid market. suggest relevant Plaintiffs market; plead a relevant failure to valid materials, “ingredients, supplies, and distri plaintiffs failed to market terms of define operation bution services used and in the explain or interchangeability ra reasonable pizza stores” a rele constitutes underlying proposed tionale narrow market purposes. vant for antitrust dis market We Industries, definition); Re-Alco Inc. v. Nat’l agree. Inc., Educ., F.Supp. 812 Health Center for noted, As we have outer boundaries (S.D.N.Y.1993) (dismissal for failure to relevant are determined reason market; plead plaintiff a valid relevant failed interchangeability able Eastman Ko use. allege specific prod health education Services, Inc., Image dak Co. v. Technical explain why uct was 2072, 2090, S.Ct. for part larger health U.S., (1992); L.Ed.2d 265 Brown Co. Shoe materials); E. education & G. Gabriel 1502, 1523, 370 U.S. Bros., Gabriel No. 93 Civ. (1962); Co., L.Ed.2d Tunis Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1994)(dismissal Brothers fail WL 369147 (3d Co., v. Ford Motor market; plead ure to valid relevant Cir.1991). implies “Interchangeability legally insufficient because it roughly equivalent one to another no clearly contained varied items with cross- demand). put; for the to which it is while there use elasticity of degree preference some

B. other, one over either effec would work tively. person needing transportation to A allege accordingly buy work a Ford or could willfully acquired maintained a mo automobile, Chevrolet elect to ride could ingredients, sup nopoly the market for options bicycle, assuming horse or those plies, materials distribution services used *8 Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Inter feasible.” stores, operation in the of Domino’s in viola Corp., national Business Machines 33 F.3d Act, § 2 of the 15 tion of Sherman U.S.C. Cir.1994) (internal 194, (3d quotations 206 2 2. Section sanctions those “who shall omitted). assessing inter When reasonable monopolize, attempt monopolize, or or “[fjactors in changeability, to be considered conspire person or other or combine with use, price, Tunis qualities.” clude persons, monopolize any part the trade Brothers, 722. inter F.2d at Reasonable 952 states, or or among commerce the several by changeability is also “cross-elas indicated foreign “The offense mo with nations.” ticity product between the itself demand § 2 nopoly under has of the Sherman Act (1) it.” v. and substitutes for Brown Shoe Co. possession monopoly two elements: U.S., 1502, 1523, 294, 325, (2) 8 power in U.S. the relevant market explained in L.Ed.2d As we acquisition willful or maintenance of that Co., Co., v. distinguished Tunis Inc. Ford Motor growth or Brothers devel (3d Cir.1991), 715, “products in consequence superior 952 F.2d opment prod as a of a uct, acumen, by a [are] business or historic a relevant market characterized accident.” words, demand, Aspen Skiing Aspen Highlands Skiing cross-elasticity in other Co. price good mining product interchangeable, of a within a whether a in the rise put by but to the uses to which the product market would tend to create Thus, general. consumers in the relevant greater goods for other like a demand Brothers, inquiry here is not fran whether Domino’s 952 F.2d at 722.6 market.” Tunis may reasonably approved chisee both or use sauce, Here, dough, paper tomato non-approved products interchangeably with Pizza, Inc. cups that meet Domino’s stan- contract, triggering liability out for breach of by are used Domino’s stores are dards and pizza general might but whether makers dough, cups interchangeable with sauce and products interchangeably. Clearly, use such suppliers by available from other used adopt plaintiffs’ could. Were we to Indeed, companies. is the pizza other position that contractual restraints render availability interchangeable ingredients of products otherwise identical non-inter- suppliers, comparable quality from cehangeable purposes of relevant market cost, motivates lawsuit. lower definition, any dealing arrange exclusive Thus, market, the relevant which is defined ment, output contract, requirement or reasonably interchangeable all include tying agreement support franchise products, solely cannot be restricted to those Perhaps claim for violation of antitrust laws. by products currently approved Domino’s reason, for this no court has defined a rele by Domino’s for use franchisees. vant market with reference to the reason, reject plaintiffs’ For that we must particular plaint contractual restraints of the proposed relevant market. Indeed, only iff.7 cases we have found course, Domino’s-approved pizza involving rejected plaintiffs’ Of similar claims position differ from other as a matter of law. See United Ass’n, supplies in Agents available one cru Farmers Inc. v. Farmers Ins. (5th Cir.1996) (“Eco Only Domino’s-approved prod Exchange, cial manner. 89 F.3d 233 ucts be used franchisees nomic derived from contractual ar violating rangements without 12.2 of section such as franchises or in this case, agreement. Farmers’, agents’ standard contract with suggest nothing power, that this difference is sufficient do ultimate antitrust.”) (internal welfare, approved itself to create a relevant market in consumers’ omitted), products. disagree. quotation We The test for a rele citation and cert. de - nied, -, 960, reasonably vant market is not commodities U.S. 117 S.Ct. interchangeable by particular plaintiff, (1997); Ajir but Corp., L.Ed.2d v. Exxon No. (N.D.Ca.) reasonably interchangeable by 93-20830, “commodities C 1995 WL *3 (“Just purposes.” consumers for the same United because Exxon’s direct serve dealers Co., E.I. may contractually purchase States v. du Pont de Nemours & gasoline from only 76 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed. one source —Exxon—does not mean that (1956); Brothers, Tunis at 722. gasoline”; the relevant market is Exxon making A court a relevant market gasoline). determina correct relevant market is all See Jerrico, Inc., Seagood tion looks not to the contractual restraints Trading Corp. (11th Cir.1991) by particular plaintiff assumed when deter- 924 F.2d 1570 n. 39 Cross-elasticity is a measure of reasonable in- Co. v. North Mozart Amer- Mercedes-Benz of terchangeability. ica, (9th Cir.1987), As one treatise observes: "The 833 F.2d 1342 the Court of commonly economic tool most referred to in Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that mar- *9 determining what should be included in the mar- ket exists in three where circumstances: ket from which one then determines the defen- government granted patent a seller a or cross-elasticity dant's market share is of demand. monopoly, possesses similar where the seller a Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of the unique product, possesses where seller a substitutability products point of from the of view high market share. Id. at 1345-1346. The court buyers. technically, of More it measures the made no mention of contractual limitations as a responsiveness product of the demand for one price power. source of market changes product.” in the of a different E. Harrison, Jeffrey Thomas Sullivan and standing L. Under- Implications and its Economic Antitrust Kodak, rioting gue they that the dis- under fact that are (declining to reach issue but rejected plaintiffs’ pro- supports claim that “locked in” their that an “af- claim trict court Long supplies posed Domino’s-approved market for sales of termarket” for is purposes. was a relevant a for fast food stores antitrust John Silver’s purposes). plaintiffs for antitrust We believe misread Kodak. market Supreme argue that the Court’s Plaintiffs argued The Kodak that defendants defining relevant markets East- decision there was no relevant market in Kodak re- Services, Image Technical man Kodak Co. pair parts, they unique even if and non- U.S. 112 S.Ct. parts, interehangeable repair with other be- (1992) a requires different out- L.Ed.2d cross-elasticity cause of between demand disagree. come. We prices price parts copier If the and sales. parts high, too con- were raised defendants Kodak, Supreme In Court observed tended, copi- for it would decrease demand market is defined with reference to that a that ers.8 Court held whether there Kodak, interchangeability. reasonable parts cross-elasticity of demand between and 482, 112 at 2090. The Court case, was, copiers question in this a factual parts repair that the market for held that not be as a matter of could determined photo-copiers was a for Kodak valid services law. reached conclusion be- The Court parts repair market because relevant switching cause and information costs arise not services for Kodak machines inter- piece purchases expensive when an one parts used changeable with service copier. equipment like a In circum- some copiers. suggest to fix other Id. stances, might costs an econom- these create supports proposed Kodak its relevant that ic lock-in that could reduce or eliminate the it some market because indicates copiers cross-elasticity of demand between circumstances, single a of a brand repair parts copiers. and the for those may relevant service constitute a market. commodity This is correct where Kodak, believe, held that a we interchangeable not unique, and therefore proposed here, products. But it is uneon- with other non-interchangeable product or derivative aside, restraints tested contractual summary judg- service cannot be defeated on sauce, dough, products ingre- and other ment a defendant’s assertion approved dients use franchi- proposed is cross-elastic derivative market interchangeable with other items sees are market, if a reason- primary with the there is available on the market. possibility that the assertion able defendant’s cross-elasticity factually about incorrect. Plaintiffs contend that face informa- existence switching “lock in” But Kodak not hold that the tion and costs that them does alone, franchisees, position switching of information and costs as Domino’s by the franchi- impracticable such as faced making economically those sees,9 system an otherwise invalid relevant to abandon the Domino’s renders them repair parts They line of business. ar- valid.10 enter different case, considering exiting A one franchise typical franchisee assert that 8.In system information costs associated faces products or services in their rele- opportunities researching alternative investment interchangeable reasonably vant market are be- switching stemming loss of costs from the positive cross-elasticity they possess de- cause if it not be recovered invested funds price in the one in the mand: rise start-up costs abandons its current business market will increase demand for other items the new venture. associated with contrast, By in the market. in Kodak defen- argued copier parts, though dants that Kodak unique, parts repair been If Kodak had not reasonably copiers interchangeable with the rather, additional but could be obtained from themselves, were not a relevant because price, could not sources at a reasonable Kodak parts negative cross-elasticity between buy repair parts copier purchasers have forced would, parts copiers: price an increase if the true even Kodak. This *10 copiers they argued, using decrease demand copier purchasers faced and switch- information parts. those ing Kodak locked them into to use of costs that switching and copiers. fact indicates that This and service were and there was a designed and franchisee good maintain question cross-elasticity. Judg- about of fact will. These differences between the Kodak inap- ment as a matter of law was therefore transaction and franchise transactions are Here, propriate. it is uneontroverted that compelling.11 approved supplies ingredients Plaintiffs also contend that Virtual Main- fully interchangeable in are all relevant re- tenance, Computer, Inc. v. Prime spects pizza supplies with other outside the (6th Cir.1993), F.3d 660 supports their claim reason, proposed relevant market. For this that the may boundaries of a relevant market dismissal of the claim as a matter by be defined contract. In Virtual Mainte- appropriate. of law is nance, granted Ford Motor Co. Prime Com- distinguishable present Kodak is from the puter right an exclusive to market Ford de- appeal important in other respects. The Ko- signed software and software revisions that dak case arose out of concerns about unilat- design companies automobile must use to changes parts repairs eral Kodak’s design Computer ears for Ford. Prime sold policies. copiers sold, When the were first only package software revisions in a with purchasers Kodak relied to obtain service uncompetitive hardware maintenance ser- Later, independent providers. from service Appeals vices. The Court of for the Sixth it chose to use its over the market in Circuit held that Prime legally could not unique replacement parts squeeze the in- monopoly power exercise its over software dependent providers repair service out of the revisions to buy force customers to unwanted copier purchasers market and to force hardware maintenance contracts. Plaintiffs directly obtain service higher monopoly note that Prime’s de facto change policy cost. Because this was not over software stemmed from a contract with sale, buyers foreseen at the time of had no Ford, they argue which implies ability higher to calculate these costs at the boundaries of a market be defined purchase time incorporate them into contract. But Prime monopoly had a be- contrast, purchase plain- decision. possessed cause it unique product that no tiffs here knew that Domino’s Pizza retained one else sold. Since unique, was significant power ability pur- over their and not interchangeable prod- cheaper supplies chase from alternative ucts, it constituted its own relevant market authority sources because that spelled was contrast, purposes. By for antitrust Domi- out in detail section 12.2 of the standard no’s unique product does not sell a or service. agreement. franchise Unlike the buy Domino’s-approved Franchisees must Kodak, the Domino’s franchisees could assess supplies they not because potential costs and economic risks at the unique, are but they obligated by because they signed time agreement. the franchise contract to do so. The franchise transaction between Domino’s subjected accept to Were we to plaintiffs’ relevant mar- competition pre-contract stage. ket, at the virtually That all tying agreements franchise cannot challenged be said of the conduct requiring purchase inputs franchisee to Kodak because it was not authorized con- such from the tract terms origi- disclosed at the time of the franchisor would violate law. nal transaction. Kodak’s sale of its legal Courts and long commentators have involved no contractual framework for con- recognized that tying franchise contracts are tinuing purchaser. relations with the But a an important aspect essential and of the fran- agreement regulating supplies, in- organization chise form of business because spections, quality agency standards structures prevent reduce costs and fran- ongoing an relationship between franchisor chisees from freeriding offering products of — Silberman, information costs alone cannot create market Myths 11. See Alan Franchise Rather, power. competitive Power”, it is the lack of a "Market 65 Antitrust L.J. object purchased market stance, in the to be in- —for competitive parts— in Kodak gives company power.

441 availability of quality agreement insufficient to maintain the alternative sub-standard prod- opportunities. reputational value of the franchise franchise Plaintiffs need not the benefitting quality control If while from have become Domino’s franchisees. uct sys- in the franchise in efforts of actors contractual restrictions section 12.2 of the Ameri- Franchising is a bedrock of the general agreement tem.12 franchise were viewed economy. than one of all More third overly risky they can or burdensome the time retailing in in the spent transactions proposed, plaintiffs pur- dollars could have paid to franchise outlets.13 restaurant, States are United chased different form of not the antitrust laws were We do believe They made some alternative investment.15 to this designed to erect a serious barrier chose not to do in so. Unlike organization.14 form of business Kodak, plaintiffs purchase prod- must here ucts from Domino’s Pizza not of because the Sherman Act “is purpose The of prod- over a unique Domino’s market protect working from not to businesses uct, but because are bound contract market; protect public it is to If un- to do so. Inc. acted Spectrum Sports, market.” the failure reasonably when, agree- under the franchise 447, 458, McQuillan, 113 v. U.S. 506 ment, plaintiffs’ ability pur- it restricted (1993). 884, 891, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 S.Ct. sources, chase from other Here, plaintiffs’ acceptance of a franchise contract, remedy, any, if is in not under the purchase requirements package included antitrust laws.16 contractual consistent with restrictions reasons, competitive agree in these the dis- existence For we valued, pleaded have part, accord trict court which franchises are valid relevant market.17 ing to terms of acted in a North 16. The dissent contends Domino's has 12. See Co. Mozart Mercedes-Benz of America, Inc., (9th "predatory way.” plaintiffs may Cir. 833 1349-50 But have a Meese, 1987); Balancing J. Antitrust in a Alan right to sue for breach of contract. (Near) The Franchise Coasean World: Case of L.Rev, 111, Contracts, Tying 95 Mich. 117-119 adopted by reasoning 17. The district court Grimes, (1996); When Warren S. Do Franchisors recently by case has criticized two been Power?, Antitrust 105 145-47 Have Market 65 L.J. other district court decisions. See Wilson v. Mo- Saft, (1996); Benjamin The Klein Lester F. (E.D.La.1996); Corp., F.Supp. 944 bil Oil 940 Tying Con- Law and Economics Franchise Queen, Inc., Dairy Collins International tracts, (1985). 28 J.L. & Econ. 346-48 Wilson, (M.D.Ga.1996). F.Supp. interpre- disagreed court with the district court’s Grimes, Warren S. When Do Franchisors Have Kodak, arguing Power?, that under Kodak infor- tation n.l Market 65 Antitrust L.J. alone, switching (1996). mation and costs absent service, may unique product create a relevant Arnold, Co., 14. See United States v. Schwinn & above, purposes. market for As noted 365, 387, 1856, 1869, 18 U.S. 87 S.Ct. interpretation, disagree for the Su- we with this (1967) J., (Stewart, concurring in L.Ed.2d 1249 specifically copier preme found Court ("Indiscriminate dissenting part) part and in- unique. The parts the case were involved in franchising arrangements validation of of the dis- basis of the Collins court’s criticism competi- eliminate creative contributions clear, though is less trict court's decision here franchising suppliers tion and force to abandon appears the believed that the district court integrate to the of small forward detriment holding expansive. The Collins court's was too words, inadvertently we business. In other judgment apparently wished reserve by misguided compel ness.”) (internal zealous- concentration tying arrangements whether some franchise omitted). quotations major- The anti-competitive might future. be deemed in the opinion ity’s See Arnold was later overturned. approach in this taken the district court The T.V., Sylvania Continental Inc. v. GTE scholarly support has received recent case (1977). 53 L.Ed.2d 568 Meese, See J. Balanc- literature. Alan Antitrust (Near) ing Case in a World: The Coasean noted, As one there are thousands scholar Contracts, Ill, Tying 95 Mich. L.Rev. Franchise opportunities of franchise available to investors (1996) ("economic theory suggests ... help them and disclosure laws to make informed riding actually tying free contracts that reduce Hay, George A. choices about alternatives. these power”); exercise of market are unrelated Half-Empty or the Glass Is Reflec- Half-Full?: Silberman, Case, Myths Franchise H. Alan on the L.J. tions Kodak Antitrust Power”, (1996). Antitrust L.J. 181 "Market *12 442 in among restraint of or commerce the

C. trade nations, states, several foreign or with attempt claim for Plaintiffs’ § illegal.” declared to be 15 1. U.S.C. same monopolize fails for the reasons. To monopolization prevail attempted claim on an a 1 To establish section violation Act, plaintiff § under 2 of the “a Sherman trade, plaintiff of unreasonable restraint (1) engaged prove must that the in defendant (1) prove by must de concerted action the (2) predatory anticompetitive conduct with fendants; (2) produced anti-competitive (3) specific monopolize intent to and with product effects within relevant geo dangerous achieving of probability monopoly (3) markets; graphic ac that the concerted McQuil Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. power.” (4) illegal; plaintiff tion was was lan, 447, 456, 113 884, 890,122 506 U.S. S.Ct. injured proximate as a result of the concert Farms, Dairy L.Ed.2d 247 Ideal v. ed action. Mathews Lancaster General Ltd., Labatt, v. Inc. John 90 F.3d 750 (3d Cir.1996); Hospital, 87 639 F.3d (3d Cir.1996); Advo, Inc. Philadelphia Corp., Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film 79 F.3d (3d Inc., Newspapers, 51 F.3d 1197 (3d 1358,1366 Cir.1996); Petruzzi’s Su IGA Cir.1995). In to determine order whether Co., permarkets, Darling-Delaware Inc. v. dangerous probability monopoli there (3d Cir.1993). 1224, 1229 998 F.2d zation, inquire a court “into must the rele allege Plaintiffs defendant’s actions caused product vant geographic market and the anticompetitive effects within the in that power defendant’s economic market.” supplies by used Domino’s McQuillan, Spectrum Sports, 506 Inc. pizza Again, stores. this claim fails because 447, 459, 884, 892, 122 113 247 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d products proposed within (1993); 750; Dairy at Ideal Farms Pastore products interchangeable with outside Telephone Pennsylvania, v. Bell 24 Co. of proposed market.18 Cir.1994). (3d F.3d 512 attempted monopoly Plaintiffs’ claim is E. predicated proposed on the identical Pizza, allege Plaintiffs Domino’s monopoly market underlying its claim: a imposed tying arrangement an unlawful ingredients, supplies, market in the and ma- by requiring buy ingredients franchisees to by pizza terials used Domino’s stores. Be- from them as a condition products proposed cause the within mar- obtaining Pizza dough, fresh in vio interchangeable products ket are with other Act, § lation of 1 of Sherman 15 U.S.C. market, outside of the the claim § arrangement, 1. “In a tying the seller sells properly dismissed. item, tying product, one known on the buyer purchases condition that an D. item, product.” known as the Al- tied lertr-Myland, allege dealing exclusive ar Inc. v. International Business (3d rangements into Corp., entered Machines F.3d Cir. 33 200 1994). unreasonably Inc. have restrained trade in tying “[T]he antitrust concern over Act, § violation of 1 arrangements of the Sherman is limited to those situations § U.S.C. 1. 1 of the which exploit Section Sherman Act the seller can its contract, provides: “Every combination in market tying buyers for the to force otherwise, the form conspiracy, purchase of trust or when tied oth- Monopoly power requires § consistently under “some- and lower courts have held that rele- thing greater” § than market under vant both markets under sections are defined 504 U.S. at at interchangea- 2089 This same two factors: reasonable however, imply, analyses bility does not that the em- of use and cross-elasticities of demand. See, ployed types e.g., Allen-Myland, the two cases to define rele- 201 and n. past, vant (applying markets differ. we intimated Brown Shoe test analysis required interchangeability cross-elasticity the relevant market under reasonable case). § case, § tying Sherman Act was “instructive” we demand in In this cases, though perhaps analyses not identical. See see no the relevant Tunis difference in Bros., Supreme required provisions. 952 F.2d at 724 3. The n. Court under the two not, buy thereby restraining compe- requiring franchisees to erwise would supplies “as a product market.” Id. “Even condition their continued in the tied tition enjoyment rights monopoly and services under their has obtained if a seller *13 (as in obtaining Agreement,” a Standard Franchise violation product legitimately tying Act, § expansion of of 1 of the Sherman 15 U.S.C. have seen the patent), courts plaintiffs This Though claim is meritless. power product markets ille- to other that complain illegal arrangement, of an tie-in competition suppressing.” gitimate they point any particular Tops, Inc. v. have failed to to and Custom Town Sound (3d tying product or service which Domi- Chrysler Corp., 959 F.2d over Motors Pizza, Inc, Cir.1992). power. any § 1 no’s has market Domino’s inquiry ty- “The in first plaintiffs’ control has suffi- Pizza’s over “continued en- ing case is whether the defendant product, joyment rights of power tying and services under their cient market over separate Agreement” is a finding a that Standard Franchise not requires which two Rather, it is a function of and a “market.” Domi- product markets exist determination products powers no’s precisely tying tied contractual under what the agreement Allen-Myland, participation F.3d at to terminate the are.” markets system they in if franchisees the franchise 200-201. agreement. plaintiffs violate the Because Here, plaintiffs allege Piz Domino’s market, plead any tying failed to za, purported in Inc. used its properly claim was dismissed. Domino’s-approved dough for to plaintiffs buy to force unwanted G. claim supplies from them. This fails tying proposed market—the because appeal, plaintiffs advance a On Domino’s-approved dough—is market in not new claim based on a different relevant mar purposes. antitrust a relevant market for theory—that monopoly ket Domino’s has a reasonably dough interchangea Domino’s comprised pizza a relevant market fran pizza dough, ble with other brands opportunities type chise that Domino’s a relevant mar does not therefore constitute Pizza, raise this Inc. offers. Plaintiffs new distinguishes ket of its own. All that this theory, which the district court did not ad dough from other brands that a Domino’s dress, a hopes obtaining in the remand. a suit must use it or face for franchisee argument that Domino’s Pizza Plaintiffs’ above, breach of contract. As we have noted monopolized has a relevant com- particular restraints assumed contractual particu- prised opportunities of a of franchise plaintiff by a are not sufficient themselves lar not raised or sort was mentioned interchangeable to render commodities non complaint, complaint, first amended memo- purposes interchangeable of relevant support randum of law in of their motion for If had market definition. complaint, leave to file second amended pizza dough market for the overall pro- relief’ the “claims for section purchase plaintiffs to other un and forced posed complaint. When the second amended dough, plaintiffs wanted to obtain plaintiffs to district court denied leave file might possess tying claim. But valid complaint, grounds of amended on second “power” where the defendant’s to “force” plaintiffs no futility, it had idea intended prod purchase alleged tying “This to raise such claim. court desired market, uct not but stems from consistently that it held will consider agreement purchase contractual first that are raised for the time issues tying product, claim will lie. For that no appeal.” City Philadelphia, 35 Harris v. reason, plaintiffs’ properly claim dis (3d Cir.1994). missed. Nonetheless, plaintiffs this argue F. raised court. claim was before district contention, support they this note that allege might support claim imposed arrangement by facts such a an unlawful tie-in which lies, problem all, pleaded paragraphs 60 65 of their if at under contract complaint. say second amended law. The did not as a matter Though pleadings liberally, construe availability we of law the of common law reme- duty make have a the district prohibits recovery dies an under antitrust rely on a court aware intend theory. no We see error.

particular theory. This is particularly complex true in a case like this I. one, plaintiffs bring multiple where district court declined to exer on multiple claims alternative rele based jurisdiction supplemental plain cise over the vant market theories. See Pastare v. Bell *14 remaining tiffs’ state law contract claims. 508, Telephone Pennsylvania, 24 F.3d Co. of This is decision committed to sound dis (3d Cir.1994) (plaintiff 513 bound relevant Stehney cretion of district court. v. Per court); theory market raised before district (3d Cir.1996); ry, 101 939 F.3d Growth TV Communications Network. Inc. v. Tur Horizons, Pa., County, Inc. Delaware 983 Television, Inc., ner Network F.2d (3d Cir.1993). F.2d 1284-85 (10th Cir.1992) Because (same); Edward J. all correctly federal claims were Sons, Texaco, dismissed Inc., Sweeney & Inc. v. (3d remaining and dismissal of the Cir.1980) (same). contract F.2d We do litigants claims not be unfair to fleeting proposed not believe a in a reference judicial resources, result in waste we see complaint second amended facts that no abuse of discretion. might support relevant market is sufficient, own, preserve on its that rele theory

vant appellate for review. IY. Industries, See Frank v. Colt 910 F.2d reasons, foregoing For the we will affirm 90, 100 (3d Cir.1990) (issues not raised before the judgment of the district court. appeal; district court are fleeting waived on reference issue before district court insuf LAY, Judge, dissenting. Circuit review). preserve appellate ficient to it for “Particularly important complex where and I respectfully dissent. presented, issues of law are a far more de court, The pleading stage, district at the exposition argument required tailed is plaintiffs’ complaint alleging dismissed viola preserve an issue.” Id. 100. Because this § tions under of the Sherman properly claim not was raised before the holding Antitrust Act that failed to us, district properly court and is not before allege a relevant market. The issue is com we decline to it. generally address See Sal plex. Judge opinion logically Scirica’s rea Army Department vation Community soned. interpreta Our differences lie in the (3d of N.J., 183, 196 State Affairs of application Supreme tion and Court’s Cir.1990) (“The questions matter of what opinion recent in Eastman Co. v. Kodak Im up be taken resolved the first Servs., Inc., age Technical appeal time on primarily one left to the 119 L.Ed.2d 265 I re appeals, discretion of courts of to be submit, spectfully follow, for the reasons that case.”). exercised on the facts of each opinion the district court’s in this case rests on hypotheses. several incorrect To H. majority adopts the extent the dis contend the district court rationale, trict court’s I dissent. availability held that the of contract remedies prohibited rejected The recovery district as a under antitrust laws. matter of But plaintiffs’ alleged market, law the misstates the district court’s hold- ing. The that of district court for ingre- held derivative aftermarket ability to pur- supplies Pizza’s block franchisees dients among from (“DPI”)’s chasing ingredients from other sources franchisees. The district court stemmed its from exercise contractual pos- found that economic DPI “[t]he powers, power, not market remedy and the sesses results from the nature of interchangeability analyzing its market is to find com- or from share business, from peting products but fast food franchise which are reasonable substi- agreement.”1 thereby prevent power.2 tutes and Kodak, question was whether the cross- DPI plaintiffs allege that has harmed The elasticity equipment of demand between the by “foreclos[ing] in- competitive process market and the derivative aftermarkets for for dis- competition in the market terbrand parts deprive was and service sufficient to Supplies approved Ingredients tributing power. Kodak of market Our question is ar- to Domino’s franchisees.” of, interchangeability whether the or cross- coopera- gue prevented DPI a franchise between, elasticity DPI-approved of demand tive other distributors supplies ingredi- supplies By that market. entering supplies ents and is sufficient to make the competition for in- stopping interbrand issue, franchisees, alleged invalid. The DPI gredients and DPI, whether according pleadings, to the has exclud- under framework of market distributors, potential thereby ed other as market here, preempted disciplining forces from competition definition as is whether *15 ingredients supplies. providers the sale of and ingredients sup- from other of and plies pizzas power for will restrain the of Interchangeability ingredients supplies DPI over and it sells to Kodak, adopting approach In the district court’s to franchisees. 504 at 469 n. See U.S. definition, majority plaintiffs allege only they the rea- The not that ingredients supplies, buying ingredients sup- all and wheth- are limited and sons that to DPI, interchangea- DPI, approved by plies from information er or not but also that and pizzas generally switching prevented them making ble for and therefore costs from antici- respond pating being within the and able to to must be included relevant market. DPI’s substantially price argument. power As in Ko- to raise for Kodak made a similar the dak, ingredients supplies. They allege ignores reality the that there are no and that this competition independent providers ingredients supplies and sold from of substitutes only by majority’s approach supplies DPI. to not The and does restrain ingredi- interchangeability power faithful DPI’s in the concept is not aftermarket purpose interchangeability analysis supplies, ents and and therefore of supplies approved by and DPI need Supreme understanding of mar- not not Court’s power. purpose The in the relevant ket and of included market.3 definition existing ers that become ‘locked-in’ to their Ko- 1.The district court relied on "two influential Klein, commentators,” equipment.” Benjamin Benjamin Lester dak See Market Klein and F. Saft, Analysis Economic Ko- Tying Power Antitrust: The Law and Economics Franchise After of dak, 43, (1993). 345, Sup.Ct. Contracts, (1985) 48 3 Econ. Rev. 28 & J.L. Econ. 356 cases, pre-Kodak Co. v. Mercedes- two Mozart power is 2. The basic definition of market "the America, Inc., (9th 833 F.3d 1342 North Benz of power prices competitive levels raise above Cir.1987), Tominaga Shepherd, many price losing that without so sales in- (C.D.Cal.1988). F.Supp. 1489 The district court unprofitable.” Hovenkamp, is Herbert crease analysis adopted the Circuit's from Ninth Mozart Policy: Competition Law Federal Antitrust The of alleged irrelevant that an economic-lock-in is 3.1, (1994) (footnote and its at 79 Practice pow- defendant’s market determination omitted). Tominaga, F.Supp. (quoting at 1494 er. See Mozart, 1346-47). reasoning at This 442, majority, ante states 3. The in footnote simply Supreme with the Court’s irreconcilable approach "received that the district court’s analysis switching costs in information literature,” scholarly citing support in recent Kodak, 473-77, Kodak. See 504 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. Meese, (Near) Balancing in a Alan J. Antitrust at 2085-87. Tying World: The Case Franchise Con Coasean tracts, recog- It should be noted Professor Klein also Howev 95 Mich. L.Rev. nized, thesis, er, contrary original that argue ap to his Kodak not that Professor Meese does permits recognition proach in a taken is correct under current fact, "despite page absence that the derivative aftermarket law. 126 he concedes market, by equipment of rela tak- Kodak decision "found that existence advantage tionship-specific can confer ing imperfectly consum- investments 'market informed Switching copiers Costs bought nesses from the result Information would have Repair been different.4 PSI See problem with closely A related the district Servs., Honeywell, Inc., Inc. v. 104 F.3d opinion court’s is its scant treatment of infor- (6th Cir.1997) (“We agree likewise that switching mation costs their rele- change policy in Kodak was the crucial defining a vance to valid market. By factor in changing the Court’s decision. plaintiffs argue experi- have policy in,’ its its after customers were ‘locked switching enced information and costs which advantage Kodak took fact its prevented anticipating them from have customers lacked the price information antici responding ingredi- to the increases for — denied, pate change.”), supplies They cert. argue ents from DPI. -, 195; switching these information and costs 138 L.Ed.2d see create Digital Equip. Corp. Uniq “lock-in” which makes the Digital aftermarket for Techs., (7th DPI-approved ingredients Cir.1996); 73 F.3d Specifically, imperfect relevant market. America, Lee v. Ins. Co. North Life they proffer (1st Cir.1994). information the franchi- F.3d Several commen sees not foresee that Domino’s “could analysis tators have described how the from policy represented follow the its Offer- Kodak could mean that franchisors’ deriva instead, would, ing Circular commence tive aftermarkets be relevant antitrust suppliers in excluding potential order to fore- Meese, markets. 95 Mich. L.Rev. at 152 competition They close in the (“Under aftermarket.” law, [post-contract current suggest switching costs arise sunk costs power] can arise once the to the cost franchi franchise, in the limits on franchisees’s abili- switching see of to a different franchise is *16 franchise, ty noncompetition to sell their and significant____”); Grimes, Warren S. When the Agree- covenants in Standard Franchise Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Anti ment. trust For Opportun Remedies Franchisor ism, (1996) (“A 65 Antitrust L.J. part Supreme

An important Court’s can, power franchisor has market if with Kodak plaintiffs present- decision in that the sales, out losing price substantial raise the ed a claim was “there ques- triable that is a good or service sold to a franchisee tion of whether information above fact costs and the level at which an simple equivalent good switching assumption costs foil the service suppliers.”); that is available from equipment the and service markets other act Lande, see pure complements Chicago as H. to one another.” Robert Takes Ko- It dak, Imperfect On The at at Chin: 2087. In Could Information fact, Play circuit A other courts have held that Crucial Role the In The Posi-Kodak presence World, (“An imperfections (1993) 193, 195 of these was Antitrust L.J. Kodak, the factor in important crucial and that had lesson of is that Kodak im policy perfect Kodak’s been known at the time busi- information can be a crucial factor ”, power’ at 152-55 he that states "under even clear that Professor Meese find the may power current law" franchisors have market plaintiffs' allegations insufficient as a matter of over derivative aftermarkets due "lock-in" of they allege law charged supra- because that DPI franchisees, proposes the this he because of competitive prices sup- for the analyzing a new framework for such claims. He plies. See id. at 155. argues "the focus on market and less alternatives, though perfectly restrictive natural quite This conclusion seems If sensible. Kodak given partial equilibrium framework that do- subsequent about parts- customers knew Kodak’s premises minates antitrust law and the that un- policy they bought copiers, and-service when jurisprudence,” tying derlie properly does not economically or were not restricted from switch- apply tying to the franchise context. Id. at ing dissent, copiers, to other then Justice Scalia’s argues tying Professor Meese contracts that perfect competition/perfect which assumes in- riding, opportunistic reduce free a form of be- world, right. formation should be Kodak is expense havior taken at of the franchise merely a concession to fact system, that markets do not prima legal. be should facie Whatever sometimes, always perfectly, argument, work pre- but not value of Professor Meese’s he supposes always, imperfections that “under current law” from the these can create Su- sufficient preme justify possible Court the district court in this case antitrust liabili- addition, have ty- erred. Id. at 152. In it is not markets.”). important to be unique But Alan 465.5The term seems see defining relevant describing Silberman, purposes only antitrust Myths Franchise “Market The Power”, L.J. which has no reasonable substitutes.6 65 Antitrust parts unique The fact that were was Kodak Uniqueness important only it limited the because choices equipment available to Kodak owners seek theory plaintiffs’ that the rejecting the In ing replace parts. out The Court worn switching they face costs information “The stated: alleged market under justify the relevant purposes is determined the choices avail majority does not states: “Kodak equipment able to Kodak owners.” 504 U.S. the existence of information hold Here, 481-82. choices at are alone, switching those faced costs such sup DPI-approved ingredients limited to franchisees, an other- renders mar plies, alleged therefore the Ante invalid relevant market valid.” wise is in kind that involved in ket identical omitted). (footnotes Both district Kodak. majority make a more difficult court and the necessary factor Kodak argument, that Corp., F.Supp. v. Mobil Oil Wilson repair “unique.” parts (E.D.La.1996), analyzed the district court uniqueness gave is what They that this state opinion of the Kodak to the the relevance power, the lack of and that Kodak argued The franchise context. defendants rejecting the factor herein warrants apply that Kodak does not to the franchi- The ba- plaintiffs’ alleged relevant market. relationship and cited the dis- sor/franchisee this case lies applying sis for not Kodak opinion support. case for trict court from this (1) arguments: ingredi- aftermarket two Wilson, The re- F.Supp. at 951. (2) unique, ents and jected argument that the lack of policy knew of because it was franchisees parts, Kodak products, like Kodak makes agreement. in the franchise contained relationship: inapplicable to the franchise matter law. argument first fails as a princi- that a This not convinced Court unique was not the Whether the as a matter *17 pled distinction can drawn opinion. component of Kodak Even key the of law between the franchise context and preoccupied if was somehow with the Court in equipment the durable market involved replacement “uniqueness” of the Kodak the No facts have been adduced to Kodak. parts, opinion the as economic itself well that a business format franchise indicate theory suggest uniqueness that aftermarket for cannot create a derivative of qua finding a triable claim sine non products purchase sale of that the power. Justice Blackmun describes market operation by used in the franchise must be allegations regarding mar- the the Nor have facts the franchise network. realities, that including the facts Kodak ket that such an aftermarket been adduced independent parts distributors excluded had subject to same economic could not be the competition then boosted and service power permitted market this dislocations that prices prior above After discus- levels. possible in Kodak. The Kodak court sion, to be Blackmun “Under our Justice states: power its market purport suf- did not to base prior precedents, this evidence would be analysis solely the fact that Kodak’s on on respondents to entitle to trial ficient unique, did it limit the power.” at machines were nor claim of 504 U.S. market example, patented if a new mate- For someone 5. Power in Antitrust Poli- 6. In Market Aftermarkets: Case, drinks, cy certainly the 40 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1447 bottling Kodak soft it rial (1993), Hovenkamp argues that wheth- Professor just like true that there were no other materials replacement requires “unique” er a But, plastic provided glass were still it. absolutely parts to whether man- is irrelevant the substitutes, "unique” description the reasonable power. He of that has market ufacturer analysis. meaningful for antitrust would not be portion opinion of Kodak states that the the parts wrong, unique that the evi- about is but prices was to dence cited of increased relevant question power. at the of market Id. 1454-55. ever, facts; reasoning application prod- of its to durable this the Prime’s misstates If equipment anything, markets. Kodak fact, unique. plaintiffs uct was not In the against making assump- economic cautions products Virtual Maintenance made a blank factual Ko- tions on record. See reasonably interchangeable were with that of 466-67, dak, U.S. at S.Ct. at 2081- Thus, analysis slights signifi- Prime. the cance of Prime’s distribution license from requirement suppliers analysis Ford Ford’s compelling Id. at 951-52. This incorporates it the understanding product. because use the latest of Prime’s version unique product does not itself confer analyzed Sixth The Circuit market reali- the analyzes work- and then ties, manipulation including price of evidence ings in question.7 of the market lock-in, an economic and concluded that alleged Kodak under relevant majority distinguishes Virtual was valid. Maintenance, Computer, Inc. v. Prime (6th Cir.1993), F.3d 660 the basis importance product. of a In Virtual Agreement The Franchise Maintenance, Circuit Sixth was directed Supreme Court, opinion light its argument, alleged The second that the rel- Kodak, reconsider Sixth Circuits’ evant market fails because franchisees knew rejection earlier policy, fails as a matter of fact. Upon light claims. reconsideration Ko- Adopting position, the district court’s dak, upheld the alleged majority states that franchisees knew the for “the sale software revisions potential costs and economic risks of DPI necessary support software to do busi- forcing buy ingredients them Company.” ness Ford Motor at Id. 664 only from supraeompetitive prices DPI at (citation omitted). upholding deriva- agreement gave because the franchise DPI market, tive aftermarket as a relevant so. Ante do This court held: “Like Prime is able to illusory First, statement for two reasons. exercise control over the sale of software ignores Offering the information in the support because of its exclusive distribution supposed Circulars: the are to have Ford, Ford’s requirement license anticipated despite these actions the fact that design suppliers that its automotive use the they directly contrary DPI to what told most current version Prime’s software plaintiffs argue them. The that the Offering support.” majority Id. at 666. The in the DPI presented Circulars when present rejects application case of Virtual considering a DPI franchise stated there “But Maintenance this case: Prime had a *18 suppliers would be ingre- alternative for the possessed monopoly unique because it Second, supplies. dients and it would be no one else sold. Since the illogical for expect the franchisees to that the unique, interchangeable not right franchisor’s sell ingredients sup- to any products, other it constituted its plies coupled approval with its power own purposes. relevant market for antitrust contrast, By agreement, not sell very does included for the product or service.” Ante at 440-41. How- legitimate purpose quality of franchise con- majority However, 7. The Agents proceeded cities United Farmers 236-7. the court to ex- (5th Exchange, pressly Farmers Ins. 89 F.3d 233 Cir. address whether there were sufficient in- 1996), denied,-U.S.-, cert. switching justify 117 S.Ct. invoking formation and costs to (1997), argument upholding 136 L.Ed.2d 846 for the plaintiffs’ alleged that a Kodak and rele- by derivative aftermarket defined contractual re vant market. The district court in Wilson ad- However, rejected. be importance straints must this case dressed the of the United Farmers proposition does stand opinion not for the for anything, which is and concluded: "If this deci- Farmers, suggests parties cited. In United the 5th Circuit does sion that when seek invoke cite the statement from Professors Klein and switching issues of information costs and Saft, power economic tying derived from con must be costs addressed before claims can agreements Wilson, nothing rejected tractual to do with mar F.Supp. be out of hand.” purposes ket for of antitrust. 89 F.3d at forth, I set trol, For the reasons would reverse applied in such an odd would be 12(b)(6) plain- court’s dismissal district DPI way.8 seems hard for predatory It complaint. tiffs’ justifies agreement the franchise argue that doing buying is when all it’s its actions up the supplies, marking

ingredients and fran- reselling then them to the

prices, and

chisees.9

Conclusion possible expressed about the Concern AND EXCHANGE SECURITIES adopt- industry impact on the franchise COMMISSION theory defi- ing plaintiffs’ of relevant market However, prove nition. still have present alleged for arguments they CORPORATION; HUGHES CAPITAL Securities, Inc.; market, discovery in and seek more F.D. Roberts Howard Ackerman; Beall; Dominick defenses, Gilbert many There are order to do so. Fiorese; Galiardo; Frederick Sheldon may argued, not which be which have been Kanoff; Knoblauch; G. John Susan La ease other applicable franchisor/ chance; Lieb; Mascolo; Alan Frederic disputes. My main con- franchisee antitrust Perfetti; Reifler; Lionel Ira John Vic opin- affirming the court’s cern with district tor, rejection ion is broad basis by against franchisees fran- antitrust claims Reifler, Lachance, Lionel Susan aftermarkets. See chisors in derivative Ackerman, Appellants. Howard (describ- Grimes, L.J. at 125-26 65 Antitrust No. 96-5401. types post-contract franchisor ing several opportunism may which lead to antitrust Appeals, Court of United States power). claims if the franchisor has market Third Circuit. problems, which There Rule Under Third Circuit Submitted court, plaintiffs’ allega- with the before 34.1(a) LAR monopolization illegal tying tions of 13,1997. June franchisor, by a aftermarkets the derivative July Decided Supreme clear but the Court’s direction switching costs Kodak that information and determination of

are relevant the ultimate honored the district reality of only in breach. The

aftermarket according to plaintiffs,

faced these *19 suppliers

pleadings, is alternative do not ability price,

restrain DPI’s increase switching costs lock-in the

information and preventing competi- thereby

franchisees price response

tive to the increases

DPI. Moreover, analysis, repre- majority’s that what the Offering alleged It the DPI’s Circular prospective franchisees that DPI would sented to approve entered the franchise knew when suppliers factor, en- sufficient number important distinguishing agreement is an competitive sure a aftermarket imperfect ais crucial information concedes only supplies, it would utilize its determining definition. factor quality approval power to maintain control.

Case Details

Case Name: Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Aug 27, 1997
Citation: 124 F.3d 430
Docket Number: 96-1638
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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