117 Mo. App. 469 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1903
This action is for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the defendant failing to construct a farm crossing for plaintiff over its railway. There was a demurrer to plaintiff’s petition which was sustained by the trial court, and he refusing to plead further, judgment was entered for defendant.
The, statute (section 1105, Revised Statutes 1899) is: ^Every railroad corporation formed or to be formed in this State, or any. railroad corporation running or operating any railroad in this State, shall erect and maintain lawful fences on the sides of the road where the same passes through, along or adjoining inclosed or cultivated fields or uninclosed lands, with openings and gates therein, to be hung and have latches or hooks, so that they may be easily opened and shut, at-all necessary farm crossings of the road, for the use of the proprietors or owners of the land adjoining such railroad. ... If any corporation aforesaid shall, after three months from the time of the completion of its road through or along the lands, fields or inclosures hereinbefore named, fail, neglect or refuse to erect or maintain in good condition any fence, opening or farm
It is with a great deal of hesitation that we conclude to reject the construction which the distinguished judge writing the opinion in that case placed upon the' statute just set out. It seems to us that if the operation of the statute is confined to crossings on farms bisected by the original construction of the road, and is prevented from application to instances where one becomes the owner on both sides subsequent to the building of the road, a great part of the object of the Legislature is thwarted. Railroad corporations are granted many privileges by the State, and on the other hand, they have imposed upon them, restrictions as well as duties to the. public and to individuals with whom they may interfere. The State is interested in the free and untrammeled development of the country consisting largely in the opening up of farms. The individual citizen ought to be permitted to buy lands where he will, untrammeled by anything but the most necessary obstruction; and where obstruction, on account of other interests, necessarily comes about, it should be alleviated as much as possible, to the end that the least inconvenience may follow. In the sense here considered, railroads, fenced on either side for safety of operation, are an obstruction to the free use of the lands through which they run when owned by the same man, but on account of their great general benefit such obstruction and inconvenience is not allowed to prevent their building and operation. The Legislature, by the statute quoted, has endeavored to lessen that inconvenience by requiring openings in the fences, and crossings on the tracks, so that the obstruction may be alleviated as much as possible. This lessening of inconvenience was not intended to be confined to tracts of land owned by the owner and divided by the railroad in its original construction. It was intended
If the status of affairs at the time the road is constructed is to determine the land upon which farm crossings can be had, then no such crossing ought to be required where open bodies of land are made into farms after the road is built. But undoubtedly the roads could be made to malee them, since both the owners of the road and the Legislature must have contemplated that new'' farms would be made. And so each must have understood that ownership of land on the sides of the road would change, as has happened in this case.
Nor do we believe the statute should be so construed as to restrict the right to a farm crossing to those instances in which the railroad divides the farm. It is not so worded. It reads that openings for crossings are to be made in fences which run “through, along, or adjoining the land.” The road may run along the side of a farm and cut it off from a highway. Undoubtedly, in such case, the statute requires that a crossing should be constructed. [Buffalo Stone Co. v. Railway, 130 N.
There may be instances in which to require crossings Avould be an abuse of the laAv, and we cannot in any one case lay down a rule Avhich would apply to any condition or situation Avhich might arise.
The case of Smith v. Railway, 94 Mo. App. 398, is cited by defendant as supporting the judgment. We think it has no application. The same question was urged in that case that has been in the present one, but we found, on the facts of the case, a proper way to dispose of it without touching the present question and for that reason did not affirm or deny the rule in the Stumpe case.
The ruling herein being contrary to the view of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the cause is transferred to the Supreme Court for final determination.