*1 weight you evidence in the case and to be decide it given have. should charge adequately charged

We find this the law as determined Gates, at trial. presented from the evidence See 269 S.C. at 561, required at 681 trial court (finding charge S.E.2d trial). presented the law as determined from the evidence at charge given proper because the provided jury given presented, law for the consider the evidence trial court not err in failing give requested charge. did

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing For the the trial courts order is AFFIRMED. THOMAS, JJ.,

ANDERSON and concur.

665 S.E.2d 194 QUAIL HILL, LLC, Appellant, RICHLAND, Carolina, Respondent. COUNTY OF South

No. 4407. Appeals Court of of South Carolina. April

Heard 2008. Decided June 2008. Rehearing Aug. Denied 2008. *3 Koon, Jr., Holczer, Columbia, Clifford Paul D. de O. Appellant. for Davidson, II, Wren, Columbia,

William H. and Michael Respondent. for

HEARN, C.J. Hill,

Quail (Buyer) brought against this action Rich- LLC of a acre tract in purchase land result of its 72.5 reliance upon representations by County officers and staff summary The court regarding zoning. granted its circuit judgment equitable estoppel, claims for *4 negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and inverse condem- fact genuine nation. We believe issues of material exist as part, some of claims and therefore affirm in in reverse part, and remand.

FACTS In a licensed real estate broker and Buyer contacted him and agent locating purchasing authorized to act as its a manufactured-home sub- suitable for of parcel parcel potential Broker identified a as a division. 72.5-acre Buyer’s development. site for time, Department, Planning At this the Richland public: advised the “Since 1997 Development Services’ website the and land department performed planning, zoning the has county .The management government... use staff functions key point public is the Development Services Counter County. contact for the and functions of the planning primaiy It the resource oumers information knoiv can professionals and land use ivho need to ‘What often ” piece property.’ (emphasis and can not be done with a supplied). January Broker met the Richland with (Staff) the County Planning Department staff to obtain County’s and uses for the permitted parcel. classification coordinator, Gosline, the parcel subdivision Carl told Broker (rural), a classification that a manufac- permits zoned RU was tax list- Additionally, County tured-home subdivision. records the parcel’s zoning ed RU. 13, 2003, Buyer March the and then purchased parcel

On and it for In surveyed, platted, prepared development. Sep- tember, Buyer an application County Planning filed with plan proposed for site for his subdivi- approval Commission plan subdividing parcel site into requested sion. twenty Report lots for manufactured homes. The Staff to the Planning approval Buyer’s Commission recommended sub- (1) following findings: and included the plan division (2) RU, proposed project’s impact was zoned road, traffic for the access design capacity was well within adjacent develop- the proposed project compatible with ment, objectives of the North project implemented Plan, low-density varied and devel- including Central Subarea Planning initiatives. October Commis- opment On unanimously approve Buyer’s appli- sion voted subdivision Thereafter, Buyer began marketing cation and site plan. selling Brockington lots for Acres. later, year after the first manufactured homes were

Over installed, already community county members contacted their him representative neighborhood council and asked to attend Brockington at a church Acres. meeting adjoining *5 Price, administrator, accompanied zoning current Geonard inquired meeting, neighbors council member to the where to the expressed opposition restrictions and about thereafter, on Shortly Acres. Brockington development 14, 2004, inter- Buyer notified that Price had November Staff parcel and found the was zoned zoning map the official preted RS-1, manufactured homes.1 prohibits a classification later, Buyer an order to days requiring Three Price issued of the subdivision. development cease 17, 2004, stopping issued its order November On however, plan final site development; receiving further since Planning from the Commission October approval lots. twenty of the subdivision’s Buyer already had sold five authorizing County permits had obtained purchasers Two and, fact, homes to install manufactured homes two them Another had purchaser installed on the lots. already were lots, had manufactured homes on three but to install permits to them issued its order yet not installed when development. cease to cease about order Buyer contacted Staff

When Acres, him to apply told to Brockington at Staff him and assured zoning map council for a amendment county However, just approval request. it recommend of his would later, Planning recommended the Report the Staff two weeks zoning map for a deny Buyer’s application Commission Planning At a on December meeting amendment. Report and recommended accepted Staff Commission amend- request zoning map for a county deny Buyer’s council Thereafter, unanimously deny county council voted ment. zoning map. application to amend injunc- an requesting in circuit court complaint filed a Buyer for against County equitable causes of action alleging tion and and inverse negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, negligence, requiring County an order Buyer sought condemnation. Alternatively, of his from RS-1 RU. change zoning for fees. moved attorney’s sought damages County's administrator Price was not the 1. The Record indicates Buyer's Planning approved subdivision Commission in 2003 when the plan. summary the circuit court judgment, granted. which This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW When the of a reviewing grant summary judgment, this court the same standard that the trial applies governed court; summary judgment genuine is when there is no proper any issue as to material fact and the is moving party entitled Rose, 488, a matter judgment Fleming of law. v. 350 S.C. 493, 857, (2002); 56(c), 567 S.E.2d 860 see also Rule SCRCP. appeal “On from an order granting summary judgment, the conclusions, appellate court will all ambiguities, review inferences in and from the in a arising light evidence most to the appellant, non-moving party favorable the below.” Wil Wu, 146, (2004). 151, 63, v. 362 lis S.C. 607 S.E.2d 65

LAW/ANALYSIS Validity Zoning I. of Ordinances

Initially Buyer there contends is material issue of fact as to County validly whether enacted its 1978 zoning ordinances. agree Buyer We with the circuit court that is statutorily barred from challenging validity the of the zoning ordinance at juncture. this

It took County thirteen months to the provide minutes from the county council meetings 1978 wherein on the subject property purportedly granted. While Buyer as- serts certain in connection irregularities approval with the of ordinances, the circuit court correctly held that Buyer may not now be heard to challenge validity of the 6-29-760(D) enactment of the ordinances. Section South Carolina provides: Code No to the of challenge adequacy challenge notice or to the it, of validity regulation map, or or amendment to whether section, enacted before or after the effective date of this may sixty days be made after the governing decision if body there has been compliance substantial with the notice requirement proce- this section or with established

321 governing authority planning dures of the or the commis- sion. find Buyer’s argument we without merit.

II. Inverse Condemnation alleges granting next the circuit court erred in

summary judgment in on his claim for favor inverse condemnation. disagree.

An may gov inverse condemnation result physical private ernment’s or it appropriation property, may result from limitations on the use of government-imposed Hartsville, private property. Byrd City S.C. (2005). in an prevail S.E.2d To action for condemnation, affirmative, inverse “a must an plaintiff prove act aggressive, positive government entity that alleged damage plaintiffs property.” caused the to the WRB *7 County Ltd. P’ship Lexington, S.C. 630 S.E.2d (2006). The circuit court “no the found there was evidence that zoning designation Buyer’s parcel] changed, was and at [of most, any representation zoning designation of the of the Mr. or contained in the Tax Assessor’s property by Gosline records a mistake.” This is in line finding was with complaint, represented [Buyer] own which stated “the staff to erroneously [Buyer] subject that it had advised that the property was zoned ‘RU’ and that records and Tax office differed from the official staff offices Assessor’s zoning map.” appeal, Buyer puts arguments

On forth two alternative of its assertion that the circuit court erred in support granting motion for on the inverse con- County’s summary judgment First, there been Buyer demnation claim. contends has never valid, therefore, enforceable and it was zoning map it as desired without ability develop property denied above, subject restrictions. As discussed being zoning 6-29-760(D) this con- Buyer’s challenge, because Section bars Next, contends that Buyer tention is merit. without informing property action in it the of the was RU affirmative, aggressive, a sufficient of an showing constituted act to establish inverse condemnation. positive and However, in the indicates that only evidence record for the Buyer zoning designation County’s informing mistake, incorrect primarily by caused merely in the tax office. have found no keeping record assessor’s We none, case, holds that a Buyer and has cited which reported affirmative, an and may aggressive, rise to the level of mistake condemnation. Ac- act sufficient to constitute inverse positive grant summary judgment the court’s cordingly, on this cause of action is affirmed. Misrepresentation Negligence Negligent and

III. circuit court erred in granting also contends the negli in favor of on its claims of summary judgment negligent misrepresentation. agree. and gence Tort judge, relying The circuit court on the South Carolina Act, against County held that tort claims were Claims § Ann. by sovereign immunity. barred S.C.Code 15-78-40 State, subdivision, agency, political states: “The an their torts in the same governmental entity and a are liable for extent as a under private manner and to same individual circumstances, subject liability to the limitations and upon like liability damages, con- damages, exemptions 15-78-50(b) Moreover, § tained herein.” Ann. S.C.Code governmental entity “In no case is a liable for provides: if a employee employee, private a tort of an where that of this person, would not be liable under the laws State.” Thus, reasoned, circuit court is liable for the ordi- negligent administration and enforcement its only private person nances if a could also be held liable for duty breach of that same under South Carolina law. *8 authority supports We that there is Federal which recognize the circuit court’s resolution of this issue. States See United Olson, L.Ed.2d 546 U.S. 126 S.Ct. 163 306 of the Federal Tort (holding provision under similar Act, only sovereign immunity Claims the United States waives local make a private under circumstances where law would tort). Moreover, in the circuit court also relied person liable summary from this court in upon granting recent decision action; however, to on these causes of judgment recently supreme relied reversed our court. upon case Inc., Co., 368 S.C. Grassing, Inc. v. Southco Constr. See Sloan 108, 659 rev’d 377 S.C. (Ct.App.2006), 629 S.E.2d would private person that because a (holding S.E.2d mandated require the failure to bonds be liable for never Act,” found had no this court Sloan the “Little Miller under Act’s Tort Claims under South Carolina right sue Thus, no South Car- sovereign immunity). limited waiver determina- the circuit court’s support exists to precedent olina for order necessary private analogue to have a tion that it is under the South entity liability against governmental to exist Therefore, stage at this premature Act. Tort Claims Carolina not Buyer may pursue to hold that we decline litigation, misrepresentation and negligence negligent its claims for Tort of the South Carolina Claims provisions on these based Act. sum grant also based its decision

The circuit court 15-78-60(4) (2005), §Ann. which mary on S.C.Code judgment resulting is not liable for a loss entity a governmental states enforcement, any or compliance or with law “adoption, from: invalid, law, valid or any or enforce whether adopt failure to ordinance, to, charter, provision, any but not limited including, resolution, rule, or We view regulation, policies----” written negligent misrepresentation for Buyer’s negligence claims mistakenly advising Buyer actions in from arising parcel, on the 72.5 acre zoning restrictions applicable on the or enforcement Coun- adoption from the emanating not as therefore, circuit ordinances; with the disagree we ty’s zoning Buyer’s act bars of the tort claims provision that this court grant circuit court’s reverse the claims. we for negligence causes of action summary judgment misrepresentation. negligent Equitable Estoppel IV. erred the circuit court Buyer contends

Finally, for equita on its claim summary judgment granting inquiry further Buyer argues Specifically, estoppel. ble estopped be County should to determine whether needed years almost two zoning determination enforcing the RS-1 RU and a was zoned determined the same after agree. plan. it site year approved after *9 324 doctrine, is an

“[EJstoppel equitable essentially flexible, and therefore to applied be or denied as equities parties may between the preponderate.” Pitts v. N.Y. Life Co., 545, 552, (1966). 369, Ins. 247 S.C. 148 S.E.2d 372 To on a claim prevail a equitable estoppel, party must show: “(1) a lack of knowledge!,] and the means of knowledge!,] of truth as to in question; justifiable facts upon reliance conduct party estopped; prejudicial change position of the party claiming v. estoppel.” Evins Rich .the Comm’n, County 15, land 20, Historic Pres. 341 S.C. 532 (2000).2 876, S.E.2d 878

“The acts of a government agent are within the proper of his scope authority may give rise to estoppel against municipality.” Co., Charleston v. Nat’l Adver. 292 416, 418, 9, (1987); S.C. 357 S.E.2d 10 see also Landing Dev. Beach, Corp. City 216, 221, v. Myrtle 285 S.C. 329 S.E.2d (1985) (“To 423, 426 allow the city repudiate its former interpretation of permissible rentals and the statements of its director, based upon re-assessment of the meaning of ordinance!,] an undefined term in the would be unconsciona ble.”). Knowledge

1. Lack of In granting summary judgment on Buyer’s claim equitable estoppel, the circuit court found the admin- istrator’s interpretation of the official zoning map was conclu- sive because: “Richland County Zoning provide Ordinances that the official zoning map of Richland County constitutes the only official description of the location of zoning district boundaries, and that the zoning administrator is the only representative behalf of Richland that can interpret However, the official zoning map.” this finding ignores the import clear of the County’s website which directs the public to the Development Services Counter as “the primary infor- appears 2. We note divergence there to be a in our state's case law as to however, required prove equitable number of elements estoppel; purposes appeal, analyze for the of this we this claim under the three element e.g. McCrowey Zoning Adjustment rubric. See City Bd. of Hill, 617, Rock 360 S.C. 599 S.E.2d (Ct.App.2004) (quoting County, Oswald v. Aiken 281 S.C. 315 S.E.2d (Ct.App.1984)). mation resource of and land use professionals owners can who often need to know ‘What can and not be done with ” Moreover, *10 Ques- of the Asked piece property.’ Frequently tions the to check the portion public website advises by of a to its zoning parcel prior development consulting with Services, the of that it Department Development suggests your “to meet the to discuss Planning advisable with Staff on the website is it stated that upcoming project.” Nowhere the official must be consulted to determine a zoning map correct property’s zoning designation. genuine we believe issue of material fact Buyer possessed knowledge

exists as whether the or the acquire knowledge concerning means to the true Abbeville, property. City this See Abbeville Arms v. (1979); Landing S.C. 257 S.E.2d 716 Dev. 285 S.C. Corp., trial, parties at 329 S.E.2d at 425. At both will have the opportunity develop evidence on the issue of whether or not zoning map County the official in Richland is the exclusive means for information. acquiring zoning

2. Justifiable Reliance question contends there is a of material fact whether staff, representations its reliance on the officers and justified. acting proper scope authority, within their was agree. We zoning hearing,

At the Price asked about Staff’s deter- was RU, Buyer’s Planning mination that was zoned and the parcel plan subdivision subsequent approval Commission’s predicated upon for manufactured was RU housing which thought approvable Price admitted: “It was to be zoning. asked.” Price also conceded subdivision coordi- when we were nator told him the zoned Price then parcel Gosline was RU. tax from the office showing reviewed cards assessor’s RU; however, no parcel’s zoning as Price could offer reason for the contradictions of these statements and his later deter- mination the had a classification of RS-1.

Broker testified he met coordinator Gosline with subdivision Broker Buyer purchased parcel. about two months before practice stated it was the common for brokers to consult Staff to determine a classification. He also acknowl- parcel’s that, 17, 2004, to November he unaware edged prior was County kept zoning map an official and had never heard of it. developers demanding Additionally, to see Broker testified determined the zoned parcel looking that Gosline was RU a tax up computer. it on his Broker confirmed he later saw bill that zoned Broker Finally, showed was RU. to November all documents prior stated referring parcel, including Buyer’s to the recorded subdivision zoned plat, showed was RU. assertions, on all of these Buyer purchased

Based surveyed, then it for parcel, platted prepared develop- ment. hold issue of genuine this evidence created fact represen- material as whether reliance on the justified. officers and staff tations of Prejudicial Change 3. in Position *11 Buyer contends there is a of fact question material whether justifiable harm caused his reliance on the by was representations. Specifically, argues he there was evidence (1) County’s Planning that: after Staff determined the parcel RU, zoned a home permitted was which manufactured subdivi- sion, Buyer and it for purchased parcel prepared develop- ment; after the Planning unanimously ap- Commission Acres, the subdivision for proved plan Brockington Buyer plat, recorded the marketed the and sold lots for property, objection; County twelve months without after grant- permits purchasers ed for installation of their manufactured homes, it notified Buyer zoned RS-1 and was must cease.3 that, reliance, contends a

Buyer as result of his detrimental the value of his diminished. Broker greatly mobile homes predominate community testified encom- Acres and lots for passing Brockington “stick-built homes” do quickly not sell as lots for manufactured-homes. After County told he could not install on manufactured-homes he six property, twenty-percent his sold lots at a discount to the church had opposed develop- members who earlier his ment, losing a substantial amount of interest Buyer would permits placed 3. Purchasers who had received and had mobile homes required on their lots were to remove them. original lots to the those six self-financing received have demonstrate clearly these facts believe purchasers. change position. Buyer’s prejudicial of question we summary judgment, for of review the standard Under of the elements on each material fact exist find questions estoppel. equitable of action for cause Buyer’s this on summary judgment granting court’s order cause of action is reversed.

CONCLUSION in favor summary judgment court’s grant The circuit existence of valid claims of the on The grant are affirmed. condemnation and inverse ordinance claims of in favor of summary judgment estop- equitable misrepresentation, negligent negligence, are reversed. pel PART, and RE- PART, IN IN REVERSED

AFFIRMED MANDED. PIEPER, J., in a dissents

CURETON, A.J., concurs. opinion. separate

PIEPER, J., dissenting. I troubling, the case are the facts of recognize IWhile dissent. respectfully remedy Act provides the Tort Claims

I do not believe not employee a governmental or mistake of any negligence for from a to deviate or ordinance statute by authorized or negligence The county. duly passed ordinance *12 discretionary of a the exercise did not involve at issue mistake instead, administrator; zoning duly authorized by act even misinterpretation mistake at issue was act or negligent than an official other classification zoning the official indication Moreover, is no simply there administrator. zoning authority else had anyone or administrator that the duly classification absent the official deviate authorized variance. interpreted bemay opinion that the concerned

I am also re- state of this jurisprudence long-standing modifying garding the application of estoppel against governmental entity by recharacterizing claim, a possible estoppel if any, into one for negligence or negligent misrepresentation. Unit- ed Supreme States Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted that “men must turn square corners they when deal Island, with the Government.” Rock A. & L.R. v.Co. United States, U.S. 41 S.Ct. 55, (1920). 65 L.Ed. This case indeed presents such a situation and the majority opinion very compelling as to the estoppel issue and the issue of summary judgment.

However, based upon my interpretation of the law on this issue, I would affirm the decision the circuit court.

665 S.E.2d 201 Carolina, Respondent, STATE of South LYLES, Appellant. Lance No. 4406. Appeals Court of of South Carolina.

Heard June 2008. Decided June 2008. Rehearing Aug. Denied 2008.