167 A.D. 433 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1916
The complaint in this action alleges, we believe, the purchase from the defendant by the plaintiff’s assignor of a model T touring car, and the subsequent injury of such car to the extent of $250, by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to equip such car with proper brakes, and in negligently assembling such car, with the result that it could not be controlled and it ran over an embankment, with the result stated. The defendant demurred to the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The demurrer has been overruled and the motion for judgment on the pleadings denied, and the defendant appeals to this court.
There is only one question involved, and that is whether the complaint states a cause of action; whether the defendant, under the facts alleged, owes the plaintiff for the damages sustained by the car in running over the embankment. The respondent puts the proposition, “is the manufacturer of an automobile liable for injuries received by the purchaser thereof owing to the fact that a brake-band, constructed of inferior material, gave out or collapsed under ordinary use, also owing to the fact that said car was improperly assembled by said manufacturer, although the vehicle was not purchased directly from the manufacturer, but from an agent to whom it was sold ? ” The learned court at Special Term has in effect answered this question in the affirmative, and the defendant urges that this is erroneous, and asks for a reversal of the order and the granting of the motion for judgment. The case, notwithstanding the allegation in effect that the plaintiff’s assignor purchased the car of the defendant through its agent, is presented here upon the theory that the purchase was made from the defendant’s agent, who had purchased the same from the defendant, so that there was no contractual relation
This question concedes the proposition that a manufacturer in sending out an inherently dangerous machine, one inimical to the life and limb of human beings, would be liable to one suffering personal injury from negligent construction of such machine, but seems to draw a distinction between the duties of the manufacturer in reference to injuries to the machine itself. We think there is no well-founded ground for such a distinction. A modern automobile, properly equipped with brakes, and assembled in harmony with the plans underlying the construction, is not inherently a dangerous machine. In the hands of a reasonably intelligent and careful operator, it involves no greater hazards to the public than a team of horses attached to a wagon. But this theoretically safe machine becomes inherently unsafe when it is improperly assembled, or when the brakes are constructed of materials which will not stand the necessary strain upon them; such an automobile, designed for use upon the highways (and this court may take judicial notice of the use to which such vehicles are commonly put), is a menace to the safety of the public, and it devolves the duty upon the manufacturer to use proper materials and to use due care in the assembling of such materials in the completed machine, and the character of the injuries resulting from defective materials
The suggestion that this doctrine enlarges the liability of
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Order affirmed, with costs.