1 Denio 128 | Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors | 1845
It is insisted by the plaintiff below that the exemption law of 1842 applies to executions for debts which were contracted before the law was passed. This is denied by the defendant. But if the plaintiff prevails upon that point, the defendant then insists that the statute is unconstitutional, on the ground that it is a “ law impairing the obligation óf contracts.”
Under the old law, many enumerated articles of property, when owned by a householder, were exempt from sale on execution, and from distress for rent. (2 R. S. 367, § 22, and p. 501, § 10.) Then came the law of 1842, which provides, that “ in addition to the articles now exempt by law from distress for rent, or levy and sale under execution, there shall be exempted from such distress, and levy and sale, necessary household furniture, and working tools, and team, owned by any person being a householder, or having a family for which he provides,' to the value of not exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars.” (Stat. 1842, p. 193, § 1.) There is a proviso to the section; but it has no bearing upon the present inquiry.
The plaintiff had no property which was not exempt by the
Whatever may be thought of the expediency of pass ing exemption laws, if they are wholly prospective in their operation, no wrong is done to the creditor. - He has the law before him when he parts with his money or his property ; and it will not be -the fault of the government if the debt is lost. But when such laws are made to act upon past transactions, they cannot fail to work injustice.. They take the property which in honesty and fair dealing belongs to the creditor, and, without his consent, transfer it to the debtor. The least that can be said of such laws is, that they prove the existence of a bad state of public morals. There is nothing in the statute under consideration which, either in terms or by necessary implication, makes it applicable to the case in hand; and we ought in decency to conclude that the legislature did not intend it should have the retrospective and unjust effect which is claimed for it by the plaintiff. I will not deny that the general words in rvhich the law is framed are broad enough to include contracts already in existence, as well as those which should afterwards be made. But it is a well established rule that a statute shall not be so construed as to give it a retrospect beyond the time of its commencement; and there are many cases in the books where general words, as comprehensive as those under consideration, have been restricted in their,influence so as not to reach past transactions. This is but a branch of that great principle which requires that every law should, if possible, be so interpreted and carried into effect that no wrong
Granting that this statute is broad enough to cover the plaintiff’s case, the question then arises whether it is not a “ law impairing the obligation of contracts.” Imprisonment as a means of enforcing the payment of debts no longer exists. The creditor can look to nothing but the property of the debtor. If the legislature can deprive him of the right to reach the property— a right which existéd at the time the contract was made—it is evident that nothing will then remain of the obligation of the contract beyond an empty name. It may be the moral, but it is no longer the legal duty of the debtor to pay. For all honest and practical purposes, the legislature might just as well say that the debt shall be blotted out, as to deny to the creditor all means of enforcing payment. I have not overlooked the distinction which often exists between the obligation of the contract, and the remedy to enforce performance. In many cases this distinction is of a substantial nature, and must have a controlling influence. But experience has proved, that laws which in form go only to the remedy, may have the practical effect of nullifying the contract. This has been seen by the federal courts, and they have recently laid down some very important qualifications to the general doctrine that the states have unlimited power over the remedy. I shall not enter at large into the discussion of this question, f&r the reason that I think it virtually settled by the late decisions of the supreme court of the
We are referred to a dictum of Chief Justice Taney in Bronson v. Kinzie which favors the opinion that “ the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture” may, “like wearing apparel,” be exempted from sale on execution. This is not going far enough to include the plaintiff’s horse and harness : but I shall lay no stress upon that consideration. If the question turns on what is “ necessary” for the debtor and his family, the learned chief justice will find it impossible to stop with the articles he has mentioned. The husbandman stands in as much need of a farm, as he does of the “ implements of agriculture and “ household furniture” is not more essential to the head of a family, than a house to live in. The mechanic wants & workshop, as well as the “tools” of his trade: the lawyer must have a library; and to all classes, money or property with which to purchase food and raiment, is as needful as any thing else. And besides, what would be sufficient for one man, would be little better than nothing to another. The “ necessity” of
In relation to the dictum which has been mentioned, I will only add, that it was virtually overruled by the decision in McCracken v. Hayward. So long as that case stands, the exemption law of 1842) when applied to past transactions, cannot be supported.
Judgment reversed.