PYTLINSKI, APPELLANT, v. BROCAR PRODUCTS, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 00-1756
Supreme Court of Ohio
January 16, 2002
94 Ohio St.3d 77 | 2002-Ohio-66
Submitted October 17, 2001, at the Greene County Session. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-000032.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
- Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted.
- A common-law cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee in violation of public policy favoring workplace safety is subject to the four-year limitations period set forth in
R.C. 2305.09(D) .
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 1} In 1997, Larry J. Pytlinski, appellant, was hired by appellee John Helmsderfer, the president of appellee Brocar Products, Inc. (“Brocar“).1 While
{¶ 2} In February 1999, approximately one year after his termination from Brocar, Pytlinski filed a complaint against appellees alleging that he was terminаted in violation of the public policy of Ohio, which prohibits the termination of employees for lodging complaints pertaining to violations of the law, including OSHA regulations.
{¶ 3} Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellees argued that Pytlinski‘s complaint was time-barred by the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in
{¶ 4} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court of appeals found that a complaint for damages for wrongful discharge from employment, where the discharge was retaliatory and violative of Ohio public policy, is limited to the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in
{¶ 5} This case is now before us upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 6} Pytlinski presents a single issue for our consideration. We are called upon to determine whether the court of appeals erred in applying the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in
{¶ 7} In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, paragraph two of the syllabus, wе created an exception to the traditional common-law doctrine of employment-at-will where a discharge is in violation of a statute and thereby contravenes public policy. The Greeley holding was later expanded to recognize a cause of action in tort when the wrongful discharge violated the “Constitutions of Ohiо and the United States, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law.” Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 8} Pytlinski claims that he was discharged in violation of Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety because the discharge was predicated upon his complaints regarding workplace safety. Pytlinski asserts that he has a valid common-law cause of аction based upon Greeley and Painter and that his cause of action is governed by the four-year limitations period set forth in
{¶ 9} Subsequent to our decision in Contreras, we held that an at-will employee who is discharged for filing a complaint with OSHA alleging concerns with workplace safety is entitled to maintain a common-law tort action based upon Greeley. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 308, paragraph one of the syllabus. In Kulch, the plaintiff was discharged after he
{¶ 10} In Kulch, we recognized the abundance of Ohio statutory and constitutional provisions that support workplace safety and form the basis for Ohio‘s public policy, which is “clearly in keeping with the laudable objectives of the federal Ocсupational Safety and Health Act.”2 Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152, 677 N.E.2d at 322. We concluded that retaliation against employees who file complaints regarding workplace safety clearly contravenes the public policy of Ohio. Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152-153, 677 N.E.2d at 322.
{¶ 11} Specifically, we held:
“[A]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined for filing a complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace is entitled to maintain a common-law tort action against the employer for wrongful discharge/discipline in violation of public policy pursuant to Greeley, 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny. Thus, appellant is entitled to maintain a Greeley claim against appellees whether or not he complied with the dictates of
R.C. 4113.52 in reporting his employer to OSHA.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 162, 677 N.E.2d at 328-329.
{¶ 12} We disagree with any contention on appellees’ behalf that Pytlinski‘s claim fails because his complaints were not filed with OSHA. As
{¶ 13} We find the holding in Kulch controlling in this cаse. Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted. Therefore, Pytlinski is not bound by the statute of limitations set forth in
{¶ 14} Having determined that the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in
{¶ 15} Based upon the foregoing, a common-law cause of action against an
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in judgment only.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents.
COOK, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 16} Today‘s majority correctly frames the sole issue this case presents as “whether the court of appeals erred in applying the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period set forth in
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{¶ 17} In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 308, a majority of this court decided that “[a]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in
{¶ 18} If the issue of whether a common-law whistleblower cause of action exists were before this court for the first time today, I would decide this case in accordance with my dissenting view in Kulch. But in deference to the doctrine of stare decisis, I begin my analysis of today‘s case recognizing the holding of Kulch that a limited common-law whistleblower cause of action exists based on the public policy evinced by
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{¶ 19} Given the existence of such a cause of action, I find that Kulch dictates the result reached by today‘s majority. I take issue, however, with the majority‘s reasoning hеre that recasts Kulch to depart from the actual holding of that case.
{¶ 20} The majority characterizes the rationale in Kulch as follows:
” ‘[A]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined for filing a complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace is entitled to maintain a common-law tort action against the employer for wrongful discharge/discipline in violation of public policy pursuant to Greeley, 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny. Thus, apрellant is entitled to maintain a Greeley claim against appellees whether or not he complied with the dictates of
R.C. 4113.52 in reporting his employer to OSHA.’ (Emphasis added.) [Kulch], 78 Ohio St.3d at 162, 677 N.E.2d at 328-329.”
{¶ 21} Based on this language, and without mentioning that other portions of the Kulch opinion state that the appellant had complied with
“We find the holding in Kulch controlling in this case. Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted. Therefore,
Pytlinski is not bound by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 4113.52 because his cause of action is not based upon that statute, but is, instead, based in common law for violation of public policy.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 22} Today‘s majority thus asserts, as Pytlinski urges, that Kulch recognizes a common-law cause of action based on a general public policy and not based on satisfaction of requirements embodied in
{¶ 23} Instead, the only parts of Kulch that garnered the support of four members of this court were the five syllabus paragraphs and the judgment. I therefore confine my decisionmaking to the law set forth by a majority of this court and not to the dicta of three justices.
{¶ 24} I find that Kulch‘s third syllabus paragraph disposes of the issue before us:
“An at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in
R.C. 4113.52 may maintain a common-law cause of action against the employer pursuant to [Greeley] and its progeny, so long as that employee had fully complied with the statute and was subsequently discharged or disciplined.”
{¶ 25} The conjunctive phrasing and tense of this syllabus language suggest a progressive, two-pronged scheme: (1) the employee must have satisfied all
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} Thus, pursuant to Kulch, Ohio recognizes a common-law cause of action based on
{¶ 30} I therefore join today‘s majority only in its judgment that Pytlinski is not time-barred frоm asserting such a cause of action. In so doing, I do not opine on whether Pytlinski has asserted a valid claim (i.e., whether he has fully complied with the applicable
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 31} I agree with Justice Cook‘s concurrence in judgment only to the extent that she would decide the issue of the existence of a common-law whistleblower cause of action in accordance with her opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 164-171, 677 N.E.2d 308, 330-335. Like Justice Cook, I will defer to the doctrine of stare decisis and adhere to this court‘s syllabus law in Kulch. However, because I believe that the one-hundred-eighty-day limitation period set forth in
{¶ 32} I believe that Kulch applies here because the substance of the complaint alleges a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying the Whistleblower Act,
{¶ 33} Paragraph three of the syllabus in Kulch states that “[a]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in
{¶ 34} Likewise, in Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244, 652 N.E.2d 940, the court held that an employee must “strictly comply with the dictates of
{¶ 35} Because I believe that the one-hundred-eighty-day limitations period in
Mark J. Byrne, for appellant.
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Jerry S. Sallee, for appellees.