77 F. 754 | 5th Cir. | 1896
Lead Opinion
The Elfrida was in ballast bound for the port of Velasco, Tex. This was on the 5th of October, 1895. The Elfrida is a British steamship of 1,454 tons net register, 290 feet long, 38 feet beam, and 20 feet 1 inch in depth. Velasco is a Texas port, a few miles from the mouth of the Brazos river. In order to increase the depth of water at the mouth of the Brazos, with the consent of the government of the United States, a corporation has constructed jetties extending from either bank of the river about a mile out into the waters of the Gulf, and the outer ends of the jetties, for a distance of about 2,000 feet, are submerged. In the afternoon of the date above mentioned the Elfrida was pursuing her way
Definition and analysis of the law controlling the amount of the award in a case of salvage has been frequently made.' In addition to its paramount definition, much eminent authority upon this topic is cited by the supreme court of the United States in the case of Cope v. Dock Co., 119 U. S. 628, 7 Sup. Ct. 336; but perhaps the statement which is the most comprehensive is that given by Sir William 11. Kennedy, one of the judges of the queen’s bench division, in his recent work “The Law of Civil Salvage.” Some circumstances are always material for consideration, and these have been ascertained by experience, and the court has for its guidance a long
“Where all or many of these elements are found to exist, or some of them are found to exist in a high degree, a large reward is given. Where few of them are found, or where they are present in a low degree, the salvage remuneration, is comparatively small.” Kenn. Civ. Salv. 119.
It is to be observed in this enumeration that the ingredient of first importance, both as regards the thing salved and as regards the salvor, is the degree of danger to human life. This was also announced by Lord Sto’well, of whom a biographer has stated that: “The illustrious civilian must have possessed such a practical knowledge of shipping affairs as was probably never before attained by an advocate in the courts which he frequented.” . He had been born and bred in a seaboard town, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which it is interesting to observe is the town of the appellants here; and his father, like them, had been actively engaged in its shipping interests, and he himself, after Ms father’s death, carried these on. “What enhances,” he declared, “the pretensions of the salvors most, is the actual danger which they have incurred. The value of human life is that which is and ought to be principally considered in the preservation of other men’s property; and, if this is shown to have been hazarded, it is most highly estimated.” The William Beckford, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 355-358. See, also, the opinion of Sir John Nichol in The Clifton, 3 Hagg. Adm. 117-121. The most recent expression in the high court of appeal by Lord Justice Lindsley, in the case of The City of Chester, 9 Prob. Div. 182-202, in no degree* departs from the opinion of Lord Stowell above quoted. Said Lord Lindsley:
“The first matter of. consideration is the nature of the service rendered, the dangers from which the one ship has been saved, and the danger to which the other ship has been exposed. Under this head have to be considered the skiff and courage of the salvors, and the risk of life and death, as well to the saved as to the rescuers. A salvage service which, hardly, exceeds ordinary towage is*757 naturally remunera ted on a very different scale from a heroic rescue from imminent destruction.”
Critical scrutiny of the record of this cause will fail, we think, to discoter any danger to the lives of the officers and crew of the Elfrida, or of persons engaged in floating her. The weather while the ship was stranded was moderate, and most of the time fine. There was always communication with the shore by means of a small boat. Indeed, it is not suggested that there waft any danger to the life of anybody concerned, Said Dr. Lushington, in the case of The Thomas Fielden, 32 Law J. Adm. 61, 62:
“However grout may ho the (lunger to the property itself,'if it is wholly unattended with the risk to human life, it assumes much less value than when under circumstances where human life is put in peril.”
It follows, therefore, that the first and most important element which might otherwise “enhance the pretensions” of the salvors was wholly absent.
We will next inquire: First, what was the present, and, secondly, what the probable future, danger of the Elfrida herself? Most important, perhaps, in this connection was the state of the weather. We have stated, and it may be seen from the testimony of the master and many witnesses, the weather was moderate, and often fine, during the entire period that the Elfrida was aground. Great importance, in this connection, should be attached to the official weather report, which was in evidence. From this record, kept under the authority of law, it appears that the wind was blowing off shore during the time the vessel was on the beach, except on the afternoon of the 9th of October, and on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 15th, Kith, and 17th. The maximum velocity of the wind while the vessel was on the beach was 28 miles on the 8th of October, but, since the direction of the wind at that time was from the north, it was off shore, and could not; affect her. While blowing on shore, (he maximum velocity was 14 miles an hour, and the minimum 3 miles. It was clear all the while. An important feature is the testimony of Hutchins, a, witness for libelants, who had been superintendent; of the life-saving station on the Gulf of Mexico for 13 years. He testifies that the shore where the vessel stranded is very fiat, sloping out. gradually. A depth of 9 feet of water would not be reached inside of 1,200 feet from the shore, and a depth of 14 or 15 feet could not be attained at less than three-quarters of a mile. The1 breakers, he testifies, are in 1.2 or 16 feet of waier, bui only the spent force of the waves flows from that point upon the beach. Since the steamship was in 9 feet of water at high fide, it is plain that she was well inside the line where the force of the waves in the usual weather of that period of the year could have affected her with serious results. She was directly head on to the shore. She was erect, and lay easily in the bed she had made for herself in the quicksand which on that coast, unlike the sands of the Atlantic seaboard, had a tough, clay foundation. The tides could not have produced any material effect on her condition. We have the valuable assistance of the tide record, produced
Again, the amount of skill exerted by the salvors .was nothing’ uncommon or extraordinary. A small schooner in tow of a tugboat conveyed the salvage equipment from Galveston to Velasco. In quiet waters, at Velasco, the anchors were transferred from the schooner to a barge, and from the barge were planted on the steamer’s starboard quarter. The anchors of the Elfrida were planted on the port quarter, and the fifth anchor on the starboard side. Ropes and cables were attached to the chain cables and carried aboard the Elfrida, and each cable was attached to the drum of two winches,.
“When there had been a definite and distinct agreement, with ample time for the parties to consider what they are doing, the court would be reluctant to interfere with it.”
This principle is otherwise expressed by the supreme court of the United States in Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150:
“Courts of admiralty will enforce a contract made for salvage service and salvage compensation where the salvor has not taken advantage of his power to make an unreasonable bargain.”
While this is true, there is abundant authority for courts of admiralty to exercise the power of setting aside agreements for excessive compensation on account of salvage services. This principle was ascertained and clearly expressed very early in the evolution of the law. The small island of Oleron, off the west coast of Prance, the “Uliaras Insula” of Pliny, gave its name to the medieval code of sea laws described in the Black Book of the Admiralty as the “La!ws of Oleron.” The earliest text extant is in the handwriting of the fourteenth century, and is contained in the Liber Memorandorum of the Corporation of the City of London, and is preserved in the archives of their Guildhall. Judicial historians have stated that Richard Cceur de Lion, on his return from the Holy Land, remained some time in the Island of Oleron, and is entitled to the honor of producing these laws while there. It is, however, stated, by Mr. Benedict, in a note to his valuable work on Admiralty, that Pardessus has clearly shown that the Laws of Oleron were not the production of Richard I. It seems to be accepted now that Eleanor, duchess of Aquitaine and Guienne, consort of Louis VH. of Prance, but subsequently divorced from him, and married to Henry II. of England, and who became the mother of the Lion Heart, having observed, during her visit to the Holy Land in company with Louis, that a similar collection of maritime customs and ordinances in the Catalan language, called “Lo Libre de Consulat,” was generally respected in the Levant, directed that the judgments of the maritime court of the island of Oleron — at that time a peculiar court of the duchy of Guienne — should Ibe made, that they might serve as law for the mariners of the neighboring seas. It is also accepted that Richard I. brought to England a roll of these judgments, which he published, and ordained to be observed as law. Enc. Brit. art. “Sea Laws.” This interesting medieval compilation of maritime judgments announces this rule:
“And yf it were so, that tbe mayster and the marchauntes have promised to folke, that should helpe them to save the shyp and the said goodes, the thyrde parte or half of the said goodes which shuld be saved for the peryll that they be in, the justice of the country ought well to regarde what payne and what labour they have done in saving them, and after that payne, notwithstanding that promise which the mayster and the marchauntes shall have made, rewarde them. This is the judgment.”
The principle of this sententious deliverance is universally accepted by the courts and announced by the text writers upon this
“The court will also refuse to recognize an agreement where the master improperly or recklessly contraéis to pay the salvors an exorbitant amount. * * * If, on the other hand, the agreement should be unjust, or inequitable towards tbe salvors, the court will refuse to recognize it,” and allow them adequate compensation.
In The Phantom, L. R. 1. Adm. & Ecc. 58, Dr. Lushington (page OJ) said:
“However much it has been agreed upon by both parties, the court is in the habit of overruling such an agreement, if it is unjust and inequitable.”
In his well-known work on Wreck and Salvage (section 119), Judge Marvin, who for many years presided in the district court of the United States at Key West, where numerous salvage cases were fried, uses this language:
“And such an agreement will not bo binding upon the master, or owner of the properly unless the court can clearly see that no advantage has been taken of the parly's situation, and that the rate of compensation agreed upon is just and reasonable.”
And the illustrious Story, in The Emulous, 3 Sumn. 207 (at pages 230, 213), Fed. Cas. No. 4,480, declares that:
“No system of jurisprudence founded upon moral or religious, or even rational, principles, could tolerate for a moment the doctrine that a salvor might avail himself of the calamities of others to force upon them a contract unjust, oppressive, and exorbitant; that he might turn the price of safety into the price of ruin; that he might turn an act, demanded by Christian and public duty, into a traffic of profit, which would outrage human feelings, and disgrace human justice.”
The principle is also adopted by the imperial government of Germany:
“When, (luring the danger, an agreement has been made as to the amount of the salvage or payment for assistance, such agreement may nevertheless be disputed on the plea that the amount agreed upon was excessive; and the reduction of the same to an amount more in accordance with the circumstances of the case may be demanded.” German Commercial Code, art 748; translated in Wendt, Mar. Leg. (3d Ed.) London, 1888, p. 751.
Kee, also, The Ellen Holgate, 8 Fed. Cas. 509; The Rialto [1891] Prob. 175; Post v. Jones, 39 How. 150. In the case last quoted, the supreme court observes:
“Courts of admiralty will enforce contracts made for salvage service and salvage compensation where the salvor has not taken advantage of Ills power to make an unreasonable bargain; but they will not tolerate the doctrine that a salvor can lake advantage of his situation, and avail himself of the calamities of others, to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit. The general Interests of commerce will be much better promoted by requiring the salvor to trust for compensation to the liberal recompense usually awarded by courts for such services.”
“It is not, however, it is submitted, only where it is proved- that there has been unfair dealing in the shape of fraud or misrepresentation, or practical compulsion, that the court will interfere with an agreement which fixes a grossly excessive remuneration. Evidence of any such unfair dealing greatly strengthens, of course, the ease against the agreement; but, even without such evidence, if it finds the exorbitancy to exist, however that exorbitancy originated, the court will, alike on principle and authority, be justified in setting aside the agreement.”
Indeed, the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty to set aside an excessive salvage contract was exercised, as we have seen, in the time of Richard I., and it does not appear that contracts and other instruments were canceled by the courts of chancery before the reign of Henry VI., 2£ centuries later. 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. (Philadelphia, 1846) p. 624. We conclude, therefore, that the learned district judge was in error when he became of the opinion that he could not set aside the agreement for salvage except upon such evidence as would justify a court of equity in relieving a party from the obligation of a contract.
There remains to be determined whether the award of the circuit court should be reduced because the amount stipulated as compensation for salvage in' the contract and allowed by the final decree is unreasonable, excessive, and oppressive. We have seen that the salvage services were neither onerous, arduous, responsible, dangerous, or unusually skillful, or long of duration. Nor was the master, when he agreed to pay the enormous sum of $22,000 for the relief of his vessel, on an equal footing with the experienced salvor, Clarke, who made the contract. Clarke was perfectly familiar with the coast. , He knew the dangers and opportunities of success. His experience was great. He had never failed to float a ship on that coast. The master was a young and inexperienced man, only 28 years of age.. The locality was unknown to him; and how his excitement, anxiety, and inexperience would enhance to him the dangers of the situation may be readily understood. He was informed by Clarke that sand would bank around his ship, and this did not appear to be true. It was made to appear to the master that Clarke and he only had the equipment for hauling the ship off. The danger of the Elfrida was' greatly exaggerated. It is true that Clarke had originally offered to perform the service for what a court of admiralty would allow him, but we can well understand how alarming this proposition would be to the young master of the ship. The mention of litigation is terrible to a seaman, and the proposition was declined. But Clarke afterwards positively refused to render any assistance to the ship except upon a contract to pay $22,000 for the service, and Brock, who it seems owned the barge, gave the same refusal. The G-alveston Lighterage Company was asked by the ship’s agent if they would send tugs and appliances to Velasco to assist the ship, and, after consultation, they refused. To the
For the reasons stated, a majority of the court are of the opinion that the decree of the district court should be reversed, and set
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I do not discover that the nature and origin of the admiralty jurisdiction in salvage cases, or the general principles upon which admiralty courts make salvage awards, are involved in this cause. The question is in regard to the enforcement of an admitted salvage contract, and, as declared by the supreme court in Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 160, the law in that behalf undoubtedly is:
“Courts of admiralty will enforce contracts made for salvage service and salvage compensation, where the salvor has not taken advantage of liis power to make an unreasonable bargain; but they will not tolerate the doctrino that a salvor can take the advantage of his situation, and avail himself of the calamities of others to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit.”
Our inquiry should be, to wit: As the circumstances were at the time the contract was entered into between the owners and salvors of the Elfrida, did the salvors take advantage of their power to make an unreasonable bargain, or, in other words, was the amount of salvage contracted for excessive, in proportion to the value of the property salved, to such an extent as to be unreasonable? The Agnes I. Grace, 2 U. S. App. 317, 2 C. C. A. 581, 51 Fed. 958. The Elfrida was aground within the limits of the port of Galveston and off the harbor of Velasco, upon a sandy beach, in water from 6 to 8 feet in depth, according to the tides, 1,000 feet distant from water of sufficient depth to float her, imbedded in sand about 2 feet, with a draft of 11 feet 10 inches, which could not be reduced by discharge of ballast or otherwise so as to get her off. The master has ineffectually attempted to pull the ship off with the aid of her own anchors, cable, gear, and a tugboat, but had lost an anchor and a cable, and had strained the ship’s appliances; and the ship was practically helpless for 10 days before the contract for salvage was entered into. From the time the ship went ashore, the master was in communication with the agents of the ship and Lloyd’s agent in the interest of the underwriters in Galveston, — all practically on the ground, — and by cable with the ship’s owners. Before the contract for salvage was entered into, the master had opportunities to acquaint himself with the nature of the shore upon which he was stranded, and the surroundings find conditions, as well as the likelihood of the ship’s being damaged or lost; and, besides the agents and owners above mentioned, the master had information and advices from pilots and masters of other vessels at Velasco in no wise concerned with or for the contracting salvors. During this time the libelants in the court below and thé appellees in this court offered to the captain to undertake the floating of the Elfrida for such salvage compensation as the United States court would award if
“Please tender for to float and place in a place of safety, say Galveston, where her bottom can be examined; furnishing diver and his apparatus; also to furnish all the material and labor In floating said S. S. Elfrida; also time required. Reply at your earliest convenience, under seal, t'o .Tames Horley, IJoyd’s agent, or myself. No cure, no pay.
“Yours, truly, B. Burgess, Master.
“P. S. A convenient, time to be allowed to get the ship off, and if, at the expiration of ihe time, the vessel is still aground, all claims of this contract to cease, and to be null & void. B. Burgess, Master.”
How many of these tenders were sent out does not appear, but the master, in response, received two propositions; one for the sum ot $24,000, and one for $22,000. He cabled the lower proposition to his owners, and received instructions as follows:
“To Burgess, Steamer Blfrida, Velasco: Accept tender forty-five eighty if lower impossible. No cure, no pay. Try include in agreement, if steamer, after coming off, not worth amount salvage, steamer in damaged state to be taken in payment salvage. Pyman.”
Under this instruction he entered into a contract with the appellees by which they bound themselves to float and place in a safe anchorage, — Quintana or Galveston, — as directed, the steamship Elfrida, furnish all labor and material at their own cost, furnish diver and necessary apparatus to survey and examine the bottom of said steamship,' and complete the same within 21 days; otherwise no compensation for work performed, labor, tools, or appliances furnished. The master agreed to. pay for such services the sum of $22,000, but reserved the right to abandon the ship in favor of the salvors in lieu of the said $22,000. At. that time, according to the evidence, all parties thought the matter of floating the Elfrida would be a difficult aud tedious work, necessarily taking time, and accompanied with great risk of success. That the master and owners so believed is shown by the fact, that they required the salvors to do the work in 21 days, aud stipulated for the option to abandon jhe ship in. lieu of paying the salvage agreed upon; and that the contractors so believed is shown by the extensive preparation made to carry out their contract. The contracting salvors prepared a month’s supply for their force, procured cables, gear, chains, anchors, two tugboats, two lighters, and two schooners, fully manned and equipped, aud hired a, large force of men. Some of the anchors and chains and the tugboats were the property of the contractors, but the schooners and lighters and other anchors and chains were hired. As to one lighter, at least, the contractors specially assumed the responsibility of all loss. The property thus prepared was worth about $50,000, was exposed to risk of loss or damage in the Gulf and by contact with the jetties and with and near the Elfrida among the breakers. About 5% days were consumed in preparations and actual work. By means of the skill aud experience of the salvors, with favoring weather, the Elfrida was floated. When afloat, she was worth, according to the evidence, from ninety to one hundred and ten thousand dollars. The only possible ground upon which
How the discretion vested in ¡he courts in matters of salvage contracts has heretofore been exercised by distinguished admiralty judges appears from the following extracts:
Mr. Justice Story, in Bearse v. Pigs of Copper, 1 Story, 323, Fed. Cas. No. 1,193, says:
“The situation of the parties, the nature of the service, and the absence of all controlling necessities, requiring immediate relief, on one side, at any expense and hazard, in order to escape from impending perils and calamities; and, on the other side, the absence of any duty to lend the required assistance, or any motive to take advantage of the necessities and urgencies of those perils and calamities, to drive a hard and unconscionable bargain, — these circumstances make it a case where the.court not only looks with indulgence upon such a contract, but endeavors to fortify itself against the exercise of mere discretion by adopting and enforcing such a contract as equally just, moral, and conscientious.”
Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, in The Alert, 56 Fed. 721, 724, says:
“In such contracts, so far as the element of a reward enters into the compensation allowed, — that is, an allowance wholly beyond the mere quantum meruit for the work and labor performed, as a reward given as a premium, on grounds of public policy, to encourage the maintenance of salvage equipments, and to induce speedy and heroic efforts for the safety of life and property, — this element cannot logically become a subject of barter, or of any irreviewable contract between the parties: since that would permit the parties to usurp pro tanto the functions of the court, but these considerations are applicable but slightly, if at all, to contracts which,*767 like the present, are made upon land, between parties dealing upon equal terms, with full opportunity for deliberation, with equal knowledge to the facts, and under the ordinary conditions of nonmaritime contracts. Such contracts should be treated like other voluntary, deliberate contracts for specific service. Bondies v. Sherwood, 22 How. 214; The Agnes I. Grace, 2 C. C. A. 581, 51 Fed. 959, and 2 U. S. App. 317.”
Judge Longyear, oí the district of Michigan, in The Silver Spray, 1 Brown, Adm. 354, Fed. Cas. No. 12,857, says:
“As the matter turned out, it was no doubt a hard bargain for the libelants. But I do not understand that a court of admiralty will set aside a contract for that canse alone, where it is' free from all fraud, deception, mistake, or circumstances of controlling necessity. McArthur had ample time for consideration, and there is no pretense of any fraud or deception on the part of Moore or his agent, Reilly, or that McArtirar did not know all about the situation, and the difficulties in the way of getting the boilers out; and there was no controlling neeossity, of duty or otherwise, to undertake the job. The contract appears to have been entered into openly and fairly in all respects, and there is no principle or authority upon which the court can disregard it, or make a new contract for the parties.”
Judge Hughes of the Eastern district of Virginia, in The Sir William Armstrong, 53 Fed. 150, says:
“It is well settled text-book law that the master of a vessel in distress may bind the owner by a salvage agreement in the absence of the owner; that it is competent for salvors, instead of leaving the amount of their remuneration to be determined by a court, to agree with the master of a vessel in distress to render the required assistance for a specific sum; and that, if a salvage agreement be prove;d, the court will enforce it, unless it be clearly inequitable; it being no answer to an agreement to say, on one hand, that it is too hard upon the salvors, or, on the oilier, that the salvage sendees were attended by less difficulty than was anticipated.”
Judge Wells, of the district court of Missouri, in The H. D. Bacon, 1 Newb. Adm. 280, Fed. Cas. No. 4,232, says:
“The true principle by which such cases should be governed would appear to this court, with great respect for others, to be that established in like cases in courts of equity; that is, that a contract should be presumed prima facie to be fair, but, if proven to be unconscionable, tbe court of admiralty, like the court of equity, would refuse to enforce it.”
Judge Speer, of the Southern district of Georgia, in The Agnes I. Grace, 49 Fed. 664 (where five-twelfths of the salved property was awarded as salvage), says:
“It is true, as insisted by the respondent’s counsel, that a contract of this character is not binding upon the court, and that in all cases of salvage it is competent for the court to adjudge and assess the amount of the recovery in accordance with the equities of the case; and, if it should appear that a contract of this character was an inequitable one, the court would, of course, disregard it. But whenever a contract has been entered into after due deliberation by the parties, and has not been shown to be in any respect an inequitable one, it is exceedingly valuable as evidence to enable the court to arrive at a just determination. The court regards this contract as evidence in that light, and not as a conclusive contract; but it is a most significant and valuable indication of wbat should be the true amount of recovery.”
In Jones,. Salv. p. 99, the English rule is declared as follows:
“If a salvage agreement be proved, the court will uphold it, unless it be clearly inequitable; and it is no answer to the agreement to say that the bargain is a hard one upon the salvors, or that greater difficulties than were anticipated, in consequence of the change of weather, attended its performance; or that the weather became tempestuous; or the vessel was longer in arriving in port than*768 might have reasonably been expected. Nor, on the other hand, can the owner of the vessel receiving assistance refuse to pay the amount stipulated for on the ground that the salvage services were attended with less difficulty than had been anticipated, unless, indeed, the sum happen to be so grossly exorbitant as to amount to evidence of bad faith or fraud, which of themselves would induce the court to set aside the agreement.”
In The Agnes I. Grace, supra, this court held that:
‘‘Courts of admiralty will enforce contracts for salvage services and salvage compensation where there has been a definite, distinct agreement, with ample time for the parties to consider what they were doing, where the contract was considered by all at the time it was made to be fair and reasonable, and where the salvor did not take advantage of his power to make an unreasonable bargain.”
If the rule unanimously declared by tliis court in tbe last-cited case is applied to the case in hand, the decree appealed from must be affirmed. A reversal of that decree, and a reduction of the amount of salvage stipulated in the contract, necessarily stamp the salvors with fraud and bad faith, and this, in my opinion, is wholly unwarranted by the evidence and circumstances of the case.
I have examined the adjudged cases cited in the opinion of the court as supporting the doctrine that a salvage contract may be disregarded under any and all circumstances when the court is inclined to think the amount of compensation agreed upon is too much or too little, to wit, The Phantom, L. R. 1 Adm. & Ecc. 58; The Emulous, 1 Sumn. 207, Fed. Cas. No. 4,480; The Ellen Holgate, 8 Fed. Cas. 509; The Rialto [1891] Prob. 175; Post v. Jones, supra, — and I find that, while detached expressions in the opinions rendered may apparently support the contention of my brethren, not one of the cases referred to warrants the abrogation of the salvage contract in the instant case unless had faith and undue advantage are imputed to the contracting salvors; and in Post v. Jones, supra, the supreme court of the United States, whose decisions ought to be of controlling influence in tbis court, expressly declared that “courts of admiralty will enforce contracts made for salvage service and salvage compensation where the salvor has not taken advantage of his power to make an unreasonable bargain.” In the present case it is undisputed that the contracting salvors offered to do the work, leaving the compensation to be settled by a court of admiralty, and that the master on shore, surrounded by Ms friends, and in full “communication with the world by rail and telegraph, in consultation with owners, and having every opportunity to inform himself as to the circumstances, called for competing bids, received more than one, and accepted the lowest in a contract which fully protected the owners, and threw all the risks on the salvors, with a time limit. It is an overdraft on my credulity to ask me to take the evidence in the record, and conclude that when the contract of salvage was entered into there was either undue advantage taken of power, collusion, or bad faith on the part of the salvor, or that the bargain made was unreasonable.