9 Ga. App. 397 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1911
Pye sued Mr. and Mrs. Gillis for malicious prosecution. The petition alleged, that for an improper purpose, set forth, Mr. Gillis procured his wife to go before a magistrate and, without probable cause and maliciously, to swear out a warrant charging the plaintiff with the offense of being drunk at her (Mrs. Gillis’) residence, and that a warrant was issued charging him with this, as a misdemeanor, and that he was arrested; that no commitment.trial took place, but that shortly after the arrest Mrs. Gillis, ac
The affidavit in the present case did name a constituent element of the offense set forth in the Penal Code (1910), § 442, and described that offense in language by which it is commonly known. That section of the Penal Code provides that “if any person shall be and appear in an intoxicated condition on any public street or highway, or within the curtilage of any private residence not in the exclusive possession of the person or persons so intoxicated,” etc., he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It is true that this -section provides also that the drunkenness must be made manifest by boisterousness, or by indecent conduct, or by vulgar language, or by loud and violent discourse; but these things are made evidentiary characteristics of the offense, rather than constituent elements of it, within the meaning of that term as it is employed in the case of Satilla Mfg. Co. v. Cason, supra. Considering the fact that it is alleged in the petition that the plaintiff in the present case had been charged in the affidavit and in the warrant with one of the constituent elements by which the offense is commonly known, and that the defendants followed this up by going before the grand jury of the county and preferring an indictment which fully complied with the law as to specificness and definiteness, we think that a criminal prosecution was abundantly shown; and as malice and lack of probable cause are asserted, as well as the fact that the prosecution had terminated by the return of a “no bill” by the grand jury, we have no hesitancy in holding that the petition set forth a valid cause of action.