PV v. District Court in and for the Tenth Judicial District
609 P.2d 110
Colo.
1980
Check Treatment

*1 Judgment affirmed. does GROVES not participate.

No. 79SA145 P.V. v. The District Court in for the Tenth Judicial District of the Colorado, State of Abram, and the Honorable Donald F. one of the Judges thereof

(609 110) Decided March 1980. *2 Jacobson, Defender, K. Walta, Steven State Public Gregory

J. Yukawa, for Deputy, petitioner. H. Stephanie Deputy, Jones, Jr., Gary A. Losavio, Deputy, Attorney, Stephen E. District J. Stork, for respondents. R. Deputy,

En Banc. of the Court. delivered the opinion ERICKSON child, P.V., a writ of prohibition seeks a minor The petitioner, charge a court to dismiss respondent pending directing mandamus trial with the speedy provisions failure to comply juvenile delinquency (now in 1978 C.R.S. 18-1-405(1), and section 48(b)(1) of Crim. P. cause, that rule ab- and now make issued a rule to show 8). Vol. We Repl. solute. 8, 1978, was filed charging petition a delinquency

On May of less committing the crime theft child for being P.V. with a delinquent 18-4-401, 8). Vol. The (now $50. 1978 Repl. Section C.R.S. than on June to the charge and a of not plea guilty entered a denial petitioner an alternate on October was for trial as and the case set original conflict, vacated the court respondent Due to a docket 1978. docket conflict 1979. When a January it for date and rescheduled trial trial to 18, 1979, rescheduled the again the trial court on January arose June 1979. 8, 1979, a with the respon- filed motion February petitioner

On for failure to accord charge petitioner the theft court to dismiss dent and sec- 48(b)(1) Crim. P. the six month period required trial within holding motion The court denied the C.R.S. 1973. trial 18-1-405(1), tion to juvenile were not applicable provisions that the (No. S.E. decision, to follow People the court declined its reaching J9179, District, F, Tenth Judicial 1979) Division announced January which held that the was fundamental and must be juvenile proceedings. 18-1-405, Section C.R.S. 1973 the General Assem expresses that, bly’s conviction absent specified exceptions, charged all with persons a criminal offense brought must trial within six months the time a is entered. guilty plea provision parallels guarantees to trial afforded both the Colorado and States United Constitu tions, and, effect, it a reasonable provides guideline the implementa Schechtel, tion of that constitutional In Re right. 103 Colo.

762 (1938); Henwood v. People, 143 P. 373 In deed, the right to a trial has always considered “one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” v. North Klopfer Carolina, 386 U.S. See People ex rel. Coca v. 530 P.2d 958 (1975) (the *3 to right a trial is of one the most cherished of our constitutional rights). considering

In the rationale underlying right the to a speedy trial, the United States Court in Supreme stated Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 89 S.Ct. 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969): constitutional guarantee has to at universally thought protect “[T]his least three basic demands of criminal justice Anglo-American legal system: ‘(1) trial, to undue and prevent oppressive incarceration prior (2) to minimize and concern anxiety accusation and accompanying public (3) to limit the long will the of an possibilities delay impair ability ac- cused to (Citations defend himself.’” omitted.) This Court has found an “to similarly intent foster more effective prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by eliminating, as as expeditiously possible, the uncertainties surrounding criminal to be inher- outstanding charges” Court, ent in the a right to trial. Simakis v.

436, 577 3 (1978). recognized We have also that it is in the in- public made, an early terest “that determination of be so guilt that the innocent be exonerated and the may guilty Jarmillo v. District punished.” 174 Colo. 484 P.2d 1219 to be addressed in this case is the question constitu trial, adult, right

tional is which mandated for must also every be juvenile made available to a who is a juvenile tried in In proceeding. C.B., in the Interest 585 People (1978), P.2d 281 in the Interest P.2d 46 we People (1978), Colo. held judicially that certain created rules and enactments which legislative must, are on fundamental constitutional a premised as matter rights fairness, fundamental be to juveniles. Those cases re required, that a receive the spectively, juvenile same a proof beyond reasonable he doubt where is with the commission of a criminal charged same to chal- and the proceeding,

offense a revocation probation ac- that would be cause a trial juror proceeding, for lenge potential nei- Although under circumstances. adult defendant similar corded an Rules of Juvenile the Colorado by was provided ther specifically of a Procedure, guarantees minimal due we held both cases that no less. we explained fair As fundamentally procedure required R.A.D.: in the Interest of ‘civil,’the as juvenile the technical classification of

“Despite proceeding juvenile characteristics of a criminal A many prosecution. has proceeding crime if done an by be with acts which would constitute a may charged adult, held, and child be coun- may may represented by the adult .... who is as a like an juvenile adjudicated delinquent, sel A criminal, the involuntary Though pur- incarceration .... subject rehabilitative, is nonethe- juvenile of incarceration punitive, pose deprived liberty.” less now courts are bound and constitu- by statutory

We hold that trial as well as adult requirements tional See v. Pennsylvania, McKeiver no Fundamental fairness less. In re Winship, S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); U.S. Gault, re and In 25 L.Ed.2d 368 U.S. decision, rea reaching our we are forceful persuaded v. Furey, in United States Court of soning by the employed Appeals 1974): F.2d 338 Cir. (2d

“The the enactment of rules providing same which policies precipitated criminal whether the are prompt disposition applicable Thus, juvenile. is an adult or the deterrence afforded charged person defense from de- prejudice any arising prompt disposition, potential *4 and created are charge, as well as the a criminal lay disruption anxiety (Citations the be a or an omit- juvenile accused adult.” present ted.) Services, 489, County

See also v. Clark Juvenile Court Piland 85 Nev. State v. 78 N.M. Henry, (1967). 457 523 692 juvenile brings is our that resolution of proceedings It view the speedy to than about more benefits child and are accrued significant society of trial rules in through Certainly adult application speedy proceedings. during to the far more vulnerable harm average juvenile psychological addition, the adult be. In it can average the than be would pretrial period juvenile delay not be denied that a suffers with an adult when the equally en his defense. we ability Finally, of his to proceedings impairs present to 7.1 at 125 commentary (Priori dorse the concerns raised in the section of the Juvenile Justice Cases) Juvenile Court Scheduling ties to Relating Standards Pretrial Court Proceedings 1979): (approved

361 a ‘built-in sense based on the of juveniles “Because have time urgency needs,’ instinctual and emotional . . . attention must be their special to . . given speedy decision in the court. Juveniles are less . making juvenile than Thus, able adults to and the future with un- anticipate delays. cope due in the of court cases rise to of delays juvenile give feelings processing and frustration which can harmful to the psychologically impatience young person.

“Stigmatization juvenile long of the can also result from before the delay not, A adjudication. juvenile, whether innocent or who has out- charges standing can be anxiety negative suffer reactions expected concerning school, the and at home. and community, perhaps Prompt of (Citations omitted.) cases can alleviate this strain.” processing Interest As we stated in the goal supra, of our rehabilitate, juvenile system “is to reform and the merely punish child.” Any the limits of delay juvenile proceedings, particularly beyond rule, and statute if not inimical to the injurious purposes Pennsylvania, McKeiver v. underlying system. very U.S. Cf. 91 S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d the rule is Accordingly, made absolute.

JUSTICE and ROVIRA JUSTICE LOHR dissent.

JUSTICE GROVES does not participate. dissenting: LOHR

I respectfully dissent.

The right to a trial is guaranteed to adult defendants in crimi- nal in state courts Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments Carolina, v. to the Constitution Klopfer North United States. U.S. L.Ed.2d 1 Although issue has never court, to this little presented I have doubt that due process of law also requires to be juvenile delin- Gault, In re 87 S.Ct. quency U.S. Cf. L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (due process charges, law notice requires counsel, self-incrimination, and privilege against confrontation re in juvenile cross-examination delinquency proceedings); Winship, 397 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 368 (1970) (due L.Ed.2d of law process proof reasonable doubt delin- beyond but McKeiver Pennsylvania, quency adjudications); cf. (due of law does not (1971) require trial in juvenile delinquency adjudications). *5 In order to determine right constitutional to a speedy violated, has been an ad hoc it is to make judgment based necessary on the facts of each case. Barker Wingo, Court, 1, 525 P.2d 186 Colo. v. District Potter the reason delay, length include to be considered Factors to the and right, any prejudice of the assertion defendant’s delay, Court, supra; v. Potter supra; Barker v. Wingo, defendant. this Necessarily, 260 (1973). 512 P.2d 182 Colo. v. Spencer,

People mathematical lacking preci- and is difficult ad hoc balancing process 586 P.2d 1331 v. People, sion. See Gelfand constitutional reflected in the of the same values In service in criminal pro- defendants trial, has required the legislature date of the entry months from the to trial within six brought be ceedings in 1978 (now C.R.S. 1973 18-1-405(1), Section guilty. of a plea 48(b)(1). P. contained in Crim. 8). requirement Vol. This same Repl. to trial brought pursuant must be within which a defendant The time as the time for the same necessarily is not constitutional requirement case. Each of the and the rule in a particular the statute by trial mandated v. District Potter is to be applied independently. sets of requirements two supra. v. People, supra; Gelfand similar to sec- chosen to adopt requirement has not legislature The 8), Vol. in 1978 (now Repl. C.R.S. 1973 18-1-405(1), tion such containing require- a rule has this court adopted nor proceedings, us; we is not the issue before of such a requirement ment. The desirability an adjudication constitution mandates that whether the can consider only within six months case take place in a juvenile delinquency proceeding allegations delinquency. of the petition denial refuse to fundamental that to involving rights so in situations Only of law would contravene due process to juvenile proceedings them apply criminal to adult that a statute applicable has it been required in the Interest People juvenile delinquency proceedings. be applied C.B., (right proof beyond P.2d 281 (1978) require Colo. a crim- violation which constitutes doubt to establish probation reasonable in the Interest offense); inal juror employed by for cause a (right challenge potential (1978) fairness In the case before us fundamental agency).1 law enforcement trial. the constitutional would be assured fully applying 18-1-405(1), of law that section that due agree I cannot Crim. P. 8), 48(b)(1) Vol. (now Repl. C.R.S. 1973 in juvenile delinquency proceedings. in this dissent. joins ROVIRA granted adjudication proceedings certain circum delinquency trial in 19-1-106(4), C.R.S. 1973. Colorado statute. Section

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