191 A. 222 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1937
Argued March 1, 1937. On December 24, 1932, claimant was injured while in the course of his employment. He was squeezed by a derailed car, resulting in internal chest injury, shock, two fractured ribs on the left side, concussion of the left lung, which was followed by traumatic pneumonia, and laceration of the chest wall.
On December 31, 1932, claimant and defendant entered into a compensation agreement, which was approved, providing for compensation for total disability.
On June 22, 1934, defendant filed a petition to terminate the agreement, alleging therein that claimant was recovered on May 31, 1934, from the effects of his injury of December 24, 1932, and was able to return to work on June 1, 1934.
Claimant filed his answer denying recovery and averring continued total disability.
After hearing, the referee found that the claimant did not recover from the injuries sustained in the accident of December 24, 1932; that he was never in physical condition to work thereafter; and that he was still totally disabled on May 31, 1934, as a result of the injuries which he had sustained. The referee thereupon dismissed defendant's petition to terminate the agreement. On appeal by defendant to the board, the findings and conclusions of the referee were sustained. Defendant appealed to the court of common pleas which affirmed the board. Defendant has appealed to this court.
The sole question on this appeal is whether there is legally competent testimony to support the findings of the compensation authorities. "It is not within our province to weigh the evidence, as the findings of fact by the compensation authorities, if based upon sufficient competent evidence, are conclusive. Kuca v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
Appellant called four medical witnesses. One testified that claimant was still totally disabled, but that the cause of such total disability was advanced anthracosis, high blood pressure, and arteriosclerosis; another testified that claimant had fully recovered from the effects of his injuries and was able to go back to work in so far as the effects of those injuries were concerned; the third testified that claimant had, in his opinion, fully recovered from the injuries by June 1, 1934, and was able to do some very light work, and that the disabling condition from which claimant suffered was not traceable to his injuries; the fourth expert testified that claimant's reduced ability to work was the result of the arteriosclerotic condition plus the condition of his lungs, and that the accidental injury received on December 24, 1932, did not aggravate or accelerate this condition. This witness also testified that a normal lung may have adhesions following pneumonia, and that in a person having anthracosis there might be a tendency for pneumonia to produce adhesions more readily than in a normal lung following pneumonia.
Several witnesses testified for claimant, including one medical expert. The testimony showed that claimant was apparently a strong, vigorous man, and a steady worker before the accident, and that at the time of the hearing he was confined to his bed. Claimant's medical expert testified that he had examined claimant, and in answer to a hypothetical question said that claimant's present inability to work was due to the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident on December 24, 1932. The testimony of the witness was competent. See McMinis v.Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,
The opinions of the medical experts were conflicting. *492
It is the function of the compensation authorities to determine which shall be adopted and in whom credence shall be placed. The credibility and weight of testimony of one who qualifies as an expert is not reviewable as a matter of law. See Barton v.Pittsburgh Coal Co.,
Judgment of the court below is affirmed.
