164 Mich. 342 | Mich. | 1911
Defendant maintains a double-track street railway on Michigan avenue, in the city of Detroit. That street runs practically east and west. The northerly
Giving to plaintiff’s evidence its greatest probative force, as we are bound to do where a verdict is directed against him, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, that he was guilty of contributory negligence. Ryan v. Street-Railway Co., 123 Mich. 597 (82 N. W. 278); Chauvin v. Railway Co., 135 Mich. 85 (97 N. W. 160); Gaffka v. Railway, 143 Mich. 456 (106 N. W. 1121); Hebblethwaite v. Railway, 145 Mich. 13 (108 N. W. 433); La Londe v.
Plaintiff offered in evidence an ordinance of the city of Detroit regulating the speed of street cars. The ordinance was not pleaded and was excluded. At the time of offering it, plaintiff’s counsel explained that it was offered, among other reasons, for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff had a right to anticipate that the speed of the car that was approaching would not exceed a certain maximum rate. It is urged in this court that it was offered, not for the purpose of showing negligence on the part of the defendant, but to acquit the plaintiff of contributory negligence.
An examination of the record in the case of Moran v. Railway, 124 Mich. 582 (83 N. W. 606), relied upon by plaintiff, shows that the ordinance was in that case duly pleaded. An ordinance may not be introduced for the purpose of showing the negligence of the defendant unless pleaded. Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich. 221 (54 N. W. 768); Gardner v. Railway Co., 99 Mich. 182 (58 N. W. 49). We think, however, an ordinance may be admitted in evidence without pleading, where the sole purpose of its admission is to acquit the plaintiff of contributory negligence. The ordinance should have been admitted under proper instructions from the court as to the purpose of its admission.
The other errors assigned require no discussion. The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.