128 F.2d 34 | D.C. Cir. | 1942
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court which authorized registration of appellee’s trademark.
We need not consider appellant’s ownership, priority, etc., for we agree with the trial court and the interference examiner that there is no likelihood of confusion. Appellant’s marks and appellee’s are similar only in that they use the word “Pep.” That word is descriptive and therefore not capable of exclusive appropriation.
Affirmed.
R.S. § 4915; 35 U.S.C.A. § 63.
15 U.S.C.A. § 85.
Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Krause Bottling Co. et al., 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 272, 273.
Reo Motor Car Co. v. Traffic Motor Truck Corp., 55 App.D.C. 227, 4 F.2d 303; Patton Paint Co. v. Sunset Paint Co., 53 App.D.C. 348, 290 F. 323; Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Theopold-Reid Co., 50 App.D.C. 200, 269 F. 716. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Independent Oil Men of America, 58 App.D.C. 372, 30 F.2d 996.
Appellee’s mark may even be understood as attributing “pep” to the “Boys—
Cf. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 73 App.D.C. 131, 134, 117 F.2d 293.