58 N.E.2d 26 | Ill. | 1944
While this is a proceeding under "An Act in relation to oil and gas interests in land," (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 104, pars. 25 to 33,) the real issues involve questions of title to 20 acres of unimproved land in Clay county, Illinois, where oil has been discovered and is being marketed by the Pure Oil Company under leases from all interested parties. In this case the original complaint was filed by the Pure Oil Company holding oil leases from all the parties claiming an interest in the lands in controversy. It represented that there was a dispute as to the ownership of the one-eighth royalty. By an order of court the royalty has been impounded awaiting the outcome of the suit and all claimants thereto ordered to file claims. The circuit court found the entire title to the land, and consequently the right to the proceeds of the one-eighth reserved royalty of oil and gas, is vested in various proportions among seven certain parties to the suit, who, with the spouses of five that are married, will hereinafter be referred to as appellees. Accordingly, this appeal was taken by the remaining 17 parties to the suit, hereinafter referred to as appellants, who contend that they should be decreed a part of the fee title and their resulting proportionate share of the impounded monies arising from sales of oil already produced, and which may be produced in the future. Inasmuch as a freehold is thus involved, the appeal comes directly to this court.
The source of this dispute lies in a certain deed executed February 24, 1916. For the purpose of this suit, we may begin with the proposition that on that date Henry Gray owned the fee-simple title to the land in question which is described as: "The North half of the North East quarter South West quarter of Section Ten (10), Town two (2), Range Seven (7) East." Being of advanced years, in failing health and without children, he, together *334 with his wife, Annie F. Gray, then and there signed and acknowledged a printed form of statutory warranty deed, the material parts of which were as follows (the printed parts of the deed being in standard type while the italics represent the filled-in portions written with ink):
"The GRANTOR, Henry Gray and Annie F. Gray -------------------------------------------------------husband and wife ------------------------------------------------------- of the County of Clay and State of Illinois, for and in ------------------------------------------------------- support maintainance consideration of the sum of Making provisions for each ------------------------------------------------------- one DOLLARS, in hand paid, CONVEY and WARRANT to the -------------------------------------------------------survivor in Fee Simple forever survivor to dispose of -------------------------------------------------------they shall see fit to do the following described ------------------------------------------------------- Real Estate:" -------------------------------------------------------
After this, was a description of the 20 acres in question, together with other real estate not involved herein, the signatures of the grantors, and the acknowledgment by the notary public. Said deed was duly recorded on the day following its execution, and four days thereafter Henry Gray died intestate survived by his said wife and his two sisters, Essie G. Davis and Emma G. Bayler, as his only heirs-at-law. Up to this point the parties are in accord, but as to the legal effects of the above-quoted portions of the deed and subsequent events, there is a sharp conflict between counsel.
On behalf of appellees, it was proved that soon after the death of Henry Gray letters of administration were duly issued to his widow, and the inventory filed by her relative to the land in question contained the following statement: "All real estate owned by deceased reverted to Annie Gray at Henry Gray's death by deed of record." The estate was closed in March, 1917, and taxes on the land in question were paid by, or in the name of, Annie F. Gray, regularly, until her death, intestate, on October 5, *335 1921. The record further indicates that at least one incident of ownership over the land in question was exercised by Annie F. Gray from the period of 1916 to 1921 in that during that period she occasionally had, or permitted timber to be, removed therefrom.
Although the estate of Annie F. Gray was not probated, it does not appear to be disputed that her only heirs were her mother, Eliza J. Monroe, and a sister, Minnie A. Lee. The latter soon quitclaimed all her interests in the premises to said Eliza J. Monroe who, appellees claim, executed a deed in September, 1923, to one Alvin Stanford. For some reason, this alleged deed of 1923 was lost but the record contains evidence adduced by appellees to the effect that Alvin Stanford thereafter exercised some incidents of ownership over said land, such as occasionally cutting timber, making fence posts and removing firewood, building a small amount of fence, farming a few acres (the remainder of the land being covered by woods,) and payment of taxes down to the time of his death, in 1936. Upon discovering that the deed of 1923 had been lost or destroyed, he secured a new deed from Eliza J. Monroe and her husband, which was dated April 23, 1932, but was not recorded until discovered among his papers in December, 1941. In the meantime, on, to-wit, April 14, 1936, Alvin Stanford executed an oil and gas lease to one R.Z. McGowan, covering the entire 20 acres but reserving the usual one-eighth royalty. On March 18, 1937, McGowan assigned that lease to Pure Oil Company which subsequently discovered and marketed oil, as above stated.
Title to the 20 acres is then alleged by appellees to have passed from Alvin Stanford, by his duly executed and probated will, to Elias Stanford. The latter paid taxes for two years and on December 18, 1937, executed and delivered a deed to the premises to Roy Stanford and Amy Davis as equal tenants in common, who claimed to be the owners at the time of filing suit herein on December 1, *336 1941. In the same month that Roy Stanford and Amy Davis received title as aforesaid, they executed a mineral deed to one half of the oil and gas under the premises to Eugene D. Stanford, Mary Stanford Ehler, Andrew Stanford and Elias Stanford. In November, 1941, Amy Davis executed a further mineral deed conveying a one-eighth interest to R.S. Jones, but because of this litigation that mineral deed and payment therefor are now being held in escrow.
Through the foregoing chain of conveyances and transfers, appellees Roy Stanford and Amy Davis contend that they each own an undivided one-half interest in the fee to the 20 acres of land involved, and the trial court so found. For the same reasons, appellees contend, and the trial court found, that they own and are entitled to the proceeds of the one-eighth reserved royalty in the following proportions: Roy Stanford one fourth, Amy Davis one eighth, Eugene D. Stanford one eighth, Mary Stanford Ehler one eighth, Andrew Stanford one eighth, Elias Stanford one eighth, and R.S. Jones one eighth. The appellees also allege in their pleadings, and contend here, that if the foregoing deeds and transfers do not provide legal support for their claims, then they nevertheless own the same interests decreed by the trial court on the basis of open, continuous, adverse possession for 20 years, or possession under color of title and payment of taxes for 7 years as provided by sections 1 and 6, respectively, of our limitations statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 83, pars. 1 and 6.) (They likewise contend that by limitations and laches the appellants are estopped from asserting any interest in the premises.) The trial court did not pass upon these questions of limitations but based its decree on the theory that Annie F. Gray became vested with the fee-simple title as the survivor under the deed of February 24, 1916, after which title descended and was conveyed, as already explained. *337
Opposed to these contentions, appellants urge these alternate propositions: (1) that said deed of February 24, 1916, was entirely void and of no force and effect, whereby Henry Gray died seized of the whole title, and, in the absence of children, his wife inherited an undivided one-half interest (which descended and went to appellees by the same chain of title above set forth) but that certain of the appellants inherited the remaining undivided one-half by descent from Henry Gray; or (2) that if said deed of February 24, 1916, is not void, it, at most, conveyed an undivided one-half interest to Annie F. Gray as a tenant in common whereby the same appellants would be entitled to an undivided one-fourth interest by descent from said Henry Gray.
If either of the appellants' contentions is correct then there would be no dispute that they have certain interests as descendants of Henry Gray, because this is, of course, a simple matter of heirship, to-wit: It will be recalled that Henry Gray left no children but was survived by his wife, Annie F. Gray, and his two sisters, Essie G. Davis and Emma G. Bayler, as his only heirs-at-law. On appellants' side of the family tree, Essie G. Davis died intestate in 1937, leaving a daughter, Clemitena D. Delgar, who is still alive, and Harry D. Davis who died intestate in 1938. The latter was survived by a widow and six children who were likewise alive at the time this suit was instituted. The other sister, Emma G. Bayler, died intestate in 1928 and was survived by her husband and three children who are also alive so far as this record shows. Those twelve descendants and heirs-at-law of Essie G. Davis and Emma G. Bayler, and the spouses of four who are married, are the appellants in this case, together with the duly appointed guardian of three of the children of Harry D. Davis, who are minors. Apparently when discovery of oil became imminent, an examination of the abstract of title to the premises in question disclosed the possibility of the interests *338 of appellants, and, accordingly, the Pure Oil Company likewise obtained oil and gas leases from all of them in 1941 and 1942, under which the usual one-eighth royalty was reserved. Prior to that time there had been no suit or formal demands by any appellants claiming an interest in the land in question.
To sustain their first proposition, i.e., that the deed of February 24, 1916, was entirely void, appellants cite a host of cases, such as Herrick v. Lain,
In the light of these maxims, we believe it is apparent that the deed of February 24, 1916, in fact had a grantee. On that date Henry Gray and his wife were childless, he was ill and he died five days later. It cannot be supposed that he intended to do a useless thing by calling in a notary public and having the deed prepared. Although the manner of expressing a consideration was rather unusual, the purpose was as old as marriage itself — "Making provisions for support maintenance each one DOLLARS." When we remember the situation of the parties and the fact that theirs are the only names appearing in the body of the deed, it is obvious that they intended to make a transfer to no other person or persons. Thus, they conveyed and warranted "to the survivor in Fee Simple forever survivor to dispose of they shall see fit to do." The word "survivor" means "one who outlives another" and should receive its normal meaning with reference to the context of the instrument wherein used. So far as this phase of our discussion is concerned, it is as though the deed read "to Henry Gray and Annie F. Gray, the survivor to have title in fee simple" or "to Annie F. Gray *340
in fee simple if she survives Henry Gray," instead of as just above literally quoted. By so construing the deed, we are adding nothing of any legal significance but rather are arriving at the intention of the parties, which must be evident to any reasonable-minded person. Although Henry Gray could not convey to himself that which he already owned, his literal attempt to do so would not vitiate the deed where there was a grantee capable of taking title, — his wife, — and certainly it cannot be disputed that one spouse may convey to the other just as strangers. SeeBrown v. Brown,
The entire validity of this deed is further attacked by appellants on the theory that no title passes where it is the intention of the parties that the deed shall not become effective unless the grantor shall die before the grantee. In support thereof, they cite Benner v. Bailey,
Aside from such a presumption of delivery, that factor is normally one of intention, and, from the facts already related, we believe it is apparent that immediate and unqualified delivery was intended, as it was not made conditional either by wording of the instrument or acts of the parties. It follows, therefore, that the well-established rule of such cases as Hathaway v. Cook,
The second contention of appellants, i.e., that the deed of February 24, 1916, at most conveyed an undivided one-half interest to Annie F. Gray as a tenant in common, is based upon our decision in Deslauriers v. Senesac,
That case was recently approved in Porter v. Porter,
381 Ill. 322 , and, of course, stands as the rule of construction in Illinois when comparable facts are involved. However, substantially different facts are here presented, and when we apply the guiding rules of intention already stated *343 it becomes apparent that another result must follow. The key to the distinction lies in this sentence of the Deslauriers opinion: "It is manifest from the deed that she did not intend to convey the whole and entire interest to her husband, for she retained an equal share or interest." Exactly the opposite is true with the Henry Gray deed, for, by its very language, all of the land in question was conveyed "in fee simple forever." An estate in joint tenancy was not attempted, nor could it be so construed, for the very reasons pointed out in the Deslauriers case, and there was obviously no intention to create a tenancy in common. If the intention of the parties could have been recognized in theDeslauriers case, each would have had an undivided interest which he could have conveyed at will. No such intention is anywhere expressed in the Gray deed. The result of that case is purely an artificial creature of the law and should not be extended if the true intention of the parties can be permitted under the law, which we believe can be done here, as will next be pointed out. For similar reasons, the authorities from other States, cited by appellants, are inapplicable here.
Expressed in the simplest terms, it is our considered conclusion that Henry Gray intended to convey the fee title to his wife, subject, however, to a condition of defeasance if she should predecease him. Insofar as this land was concerned, his support and maintenance were already provided for by his ownership and there would have been no point in simply making a deed to himself. Furthermore, he must be considered as having known how title would have descended in the absence of such a conveyance. Thus, it was most natural, in view of his advanced years, ill-health and lack of children, to make a deed which would provide for his widow but without entirely relinquishing the possibility that he might still survive her (which appeared unlikely at that time and which did not occur.) At least he obviously intended that she should *344
have an interest for life, concurrently with him, and that the survivor of them should have the entire fee-simple title. Annie F. Gray's joining in the deed, even though she was the only real grantee, is readily explained either upon the basis that the parties knew it was the usual and customary procedure, or to make the deed a form of an agreement under which there would be no question that her interest was to terminate if she did not survive Henry Gray. True, the language chosen to accomplish those intentions was not the most apt, but, as said in Phillips v.Gannon,
It being unnecessary to here determine the exact quantum of estates held by the Grays from February 24 to February 29, 1916, but only to permit the accomplishment of their ultimate intention, if not contrary to fixed rules of law or decision, we believe it is apparent that the following cases, among many, readily sustain the conclusion of the trial court. Thus, inMittel v. Karl,
In Phillips v. Gannon,
Wording of similar import was also involved in the case ofBowler v. Bowler,
Annie F. Gray having survived Henry Gray, the title which she received likewise became one in fee simple upon his death. The record chain of title being thereafter unbroken down to appellees Roy Stanford and Amy Davis, it follows that the decree of the court below must be affirmed in all particulars.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. JUSTICE SMITH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. *347