OPINION OF THE COURT
In Nоvember 1979, plaintiff, while a customer at a gas station in Brewster, New York, was struck by a speeding car that crashed into the gas station and seriously injured him. The car was owned and operated by Emily Shаw, 1 who on the date of the accident, was a 73-year-old voluntary resident of the defendant Bethel Methodist Home with a medical condition that left her susceptible to fainting spells and blaсkouts. The issue presented on this appeal is whether defendants Bethel and the facility’s admitting physician, Dr. Argenziano, owed to plaintiff — an unidentified member of the public — a duty either to prevеnt Shaw from driving or to warn her of the dangers of driving given her medical condition. We hold that in the circumstances presented, defendants were under no duty to prevent Shaw from operating a motоr vehicle off the premises, or to warn her of any danger of her so doing.
I.
Defendant, Bethel Methodist Home (Bethel), operates as a health-related facility, required by statute to prоvide its residents with "lodging, board and physical care including, but not limited to, the recording of health information, dietary supervision and supervised hygienic services” (Public Health Law §2801 [4] [b]; 10 NYCRR 414.1 [a] [1]); health-related facilities afford to residents some degree of institutional care and services, but not the degree required of a hospital or a skilled nursing facility (see, Public Health Law § 2801 [2], [4] [a], [b]; 10 NYCRR 414.1 [c] [8]). Shortly before her admission *7 to Bethel on October 10, 1979, Shaw had been hospitalized for a stroke which left her susceptible to fainting spells and blackouts. Indeed, it is not now disputed that the accident was a consequеnce of her having blacked out at the wheel of her automobile. Pursuant to her contract with Bethel, Shaw became a voluntary resident of the facility and consented to routine mediсal treatment and inoculations and restraints as ordered by the facility’s physician. She further agreed to allow Bethel "to act in any emergency, in any way it deems necessary for the benеfit of the resident”, but insofar as she was a voluntary resident, she did not relinquish general autonomy.
Upon admission to Bethel, Shaw was examined by defendant, Dr. Elio Argenziano, Bethel’s medical director and thе physician responsible for overseeing the health care of all the residents. Pursuant to regulations, Dr. Argenziano took Shaw’s medical history and conducted the admission examination (see, 10 NYCRR 741.1 [k]). Dr. Argenziаno thereafter issued an order authorizing Shaw to leave Bethel unaccompanied. He did not question her as to whether she owned a car, whether she knew how to drive, or whether she intеnded to drive while a resident at Bethel.
Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injury against Shaw, Bethel and Dr. Argenziano. The crux of plaintiff’s claim against defеndants Bethel and Dr. Argenziano is that both were negligent in failing to prohibit Shaw from operating a motor vehicle when they knew or had reason to know that Shaw might, because of her medical condition, blackout at the wheel. Plaintiff also claimed that defendants, and particularly Dr. Argenziano as Shaw’s attending physician, were negligent in failing to warn her of the danger of her driving in her condition. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor and apportioned liability in the amount of 10% to the estate of Shaw, 30% to Bethel and 60% to Dr. Argenziano. With respect to defendants Bethel and Dr. Argenziano, the Triаl Judge set aside the verdict and directed judgment in their favor, concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish that the breach of any duty owed was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained. The Aрpellate Division affirmed, holding that neither defendant owed a duty to plaintiff —a member of the public — either to prevent a resident from, or to warn her against, operating a motor vehicle off the facility’s premises. The appeal is here by leave of this court, and we now affirm.
*8 II.
The question of whether a member or group of society owes a duty of care to reasonably avoid injury to another is of course a question of law for the courts
(Eiseman v State of New York,
Of course, there exist spеcial circumstances in which there is sufficient authority and ability to control the conduct of third persons that we have identified a duty to do so. Thus, we have imposed a duty to control the cоnduct of others where there is a special relationship: a relationship between defendant and a third person whose actions expose plaintiff to harm such as would require thе defendant to attempt to control the third person’s conduct; or a relationship between the defendant and plaintiff requiring defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct оf others
(see, Pulka v Edelman,
Here, plaintiff concedes the lack of any relationship between himself and defendants. Thus, the imposition of a duty on defendants would have to arise out of some special relationship between defendants and Shaw such as would require them to control Shaw’s conduct for the benefit of plaintiff. We conclude, however, that neither Bethel nor Dr. Argenziano had the necessary authority or ability to exercise such control over Shaw’s conduct so as to give rise tо a duty
*9
on their part to protect plaintiff — a member of the general public
(see generally, Eiseman v State of New York,
Shaw was a voluntary resident at Bethel with no medical reason — as is implicit in Dr. Argenziano’s order — impeding her ability tо leave Bethel unaccompanied; Shaw could come and go as she pleased. Plaintiff points to no provision of the Public Health Law or regulation governing health-related fаcilities that either authorizes or requires defendants to prevent Shaw — in nonemergency situations — from leaving the premises or to control her conduct while she is off the premises. Indeed, the statute and regulations provide for just the opposite — the right of the voluntary resident to make independent personal decisions (10 NYCRR 414.14 [a] [19]), the right to exercise civil and religious liberties (Public Hеalth Law § 2803-c [3] [a]), and the right to be free from physical restraint, except where emergency dictates otherwise (Public Health Law § 2803-c [3] [h];
see, e.g., Cartier v Long Is. Coll. Hosp.,
Plaintiff’s alternative theory of liability — that defendants owed plaintiff a duty to warn Shaw that her medical condition impaired her ability to operate a motor vehicle safely — is also unavailing. A physician’s duty of care is ordinarily one owed to his or her patient. With respect to the physician-patient relationship giving rise to a duty owing to members of an indeterminate class оf persons, we have only recently stated in the context of a physician reporting to a college admissions office the results of a physical examination of an applicant to the college that "the physician plainly owed a duty of care to his patient and to persons he knew or reasonably should have known were relying on him for this service to his patient”, but that the physician did not "undertake a duty to the community at large”
(Eiseman v State of New York,
Insofar as plaintiff failed to demonstrate what is essential to the maintenance of this action against these defendants — that defendants owed a duty to plaintiff to prevent Shaw from driving off the premises of their facility — the Appellate Division correctly affirmed the trial court’s setting aside the jury verdict and directing entry of judgment in defendants’ favor.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Notes
. Shaw has since died of causes unrelated to the automobile accident, and her estate is represented by defendant Public Administrator.
. For these reasons, the third-party complaint brought by the Public Administrator against Dr. Argenziano was also properly dismissed.