Frances R. PURDIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, the Department of Educational Psychology of the University of Utah, Claude W. Grant, Joseph C. Bentley, Robert E. Finley, Adelaide Fuhriman, Reed M. Merrill, Ralph E. Packard, James P. Pappas, Michael J. Patton, and John Does I through VII, Defеndants and Respondents.
No. 15209.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 23, 1978.
584 P.2d 831
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
WILKINS, Justice (concurring with comments).
I concur, adding these comments.
Though there is tension between the first answer of the medical panel, noted in the main opinion, and its other answers, the Commission was certainly at liberty to believe one answer where the panel stated that the claimant sustаined physical impairment “attributable to the injuries sustained by claimant as a result of the work activities of July 13, 1976” (emphasis added of “75%“, particularly when this last answer received strength from the ones immediately preceding and following it.
v. U. S. Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749, a case of similar fаcts where the court said that, due to the employee‘s appearance of weakness and pain immediatеly after exertion and his asking for medical help, there was sufficient evidence to make an issue of fact as to whether he suffered an accident; See also Nuzum v. Roosendahl Const. & Mining Corp., Utah, 565 P.2d 1144 (1977).
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Brinton R. Burbidge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
WILKINS, Justice:
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court of Salt Lake County, dismissing her complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could bе granted. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs awarded.
The District Court‘s order states in relevant part:
. . . the parties have stipulated for the purposes of this motion only that all of the facts as set forth in the Plaintiff‘s Complaint were true . . .
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the use оf age as a criterion for evaluation of applicants to educational programs is not in violation of the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution or any other statutory or Constitutional prohibition and is a reasonable practice in light of the limited resources available for educating persons in the field of educationаl psychology at the University of Utah . . .
The complaint in pertinent part alleges that: in the academic year 1975 plaintiff applied for admission to the University of Utah‘s Department of Educational Psychology (the named individual defendants being members of the admissions committee of the Department of Educational Psychology) to pursue a post-graduate degree in that department; she has been a resident and taxpayer of the State of Utah in excess of thirty-four years; plaintiff‘s credеntials, educational background, experience, academic record, scores on the admissions test, and all оther factors exceed the normal requirements for admission to the department; at the time of the application, plaintiff was fifty-one years of age (she re-applied for admission in 1977 also); the department and admissions committee rеjected plaintiff‘s application on the sole ground of her age; and the department gives preference to younger persons over older persons. The demand of the complaint then seeks a) a declaration that the рolicy and practice of discriminating against one on the sole basis of age violates equal protection of the law and b) a permanent injunction against defendants from applying this policy and practice.
The parties do nоt dispute that the establishment of the University of Utah was confirmed by the
The position of defendants, sustained by the District Court‘s ruling, noted ante, is infirm and offends the equal protection provisions of the
The District Court‘s order prevented any evidentiary hearing to consider the relevance, inter alia, of whether the age of 51,
Defendants cite Beard v. Board of Education North Summit School District, et al., 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932) for the proposition that the “. . . presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule or regulation duly made.” At 16 P.2d 903 quoting from 24 R.C.L. 575. Of course, this Court‘s prior statement is not hostile to what we write today because this presumption can be rebutted and certainly does not require judicial abdication.
Plaintiff has also urged us to declare that age is an inherеntly suspect classification and that post-graduate education at a university is a fundamental right, requiring application оf the strict scrutiny test.1 We decline to do so, as the authorities cited are unpersuasive, but base our reasons and opiniоn on the rational relationship test, noted ante.
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, and HALL, JJ., concur.
ELLETT, Chief Justice (concurring).
I concur except that I do not think the Federal Constitution is involved in this cаse.