Appellant Theodore Pund’s (father) petition for a change of child custody was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal Pund contends that the trial court’s decision was in error.
■ Pund sought to modify a dissolution of marriage decree under which his former wife, respondent-appellee Virginia Kay Pund, (mother) obtained custody of their two daughters. The decree was entered by Spencer Circuit Court on July 18, 1974. The father filed his petition, requesting full time custody of the children, on January 2, 1976, in Dubois Circuit Court. Both parties apparently had moved and were at this time residents of Dubois County.
The record discloses that the mother filed two motions to dismiss. Her first motion, filed on January 28, 1976, asserted lack of jurisdiction over the person. The trial court initially sustained the motion but later, in response to the father’s Motion to Correct Errors, concluded that it had personal jurisdiction. Thereafter, on April 23, 1976, the mother filed another motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This motion was sustained and the father’s appeal followed.
The trial court treated the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as raising the' following issue: whether Dubois Circuit Court had jurisdiction to modify a child custody order entered by Spencer Circuit Court. The trial court found that the 1973 Dissolution of Marriage Act, IC 31-1-11.5-1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1976), did not change prior Indiana law under which the original divorce court retained continuing jurisdiction to later change or modify a custody award. The father argues that the continuing jurisdiction of Spencer Circuit Court is not exclusive *349 and that IC 31-1-11.5-20 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1976) establishes an alternative procedure by which the appropriate court in the county where one of the parties resides can exercise concurrent jurisdiction in such proceedings.
We are compelled to hold, however, that the trial court’s ruling on this question as one of subject-matter jurisdiction is in error. The proper forum for modifying a child custody order relates to venue, not subject-matter jurisdiction.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as jurisdiction of the general class of actions to which the particular case belongs.
Farley
v.
Farley
(1973),
With respect to the general class of actions of child custody proceedings, Dubois Circuit Court most assuredly has the power to act under IC 1971, 33-4-4-3 (Bums Code Ed.). The trial court therefore did not lack jurisdiction over the subj ect-matter of this cause.
The cases under our prior divorce statute which emphasized the divorce court’s
continuing jurisdiction
used the term specifically in connection with venue or jurisdiction over the particular case.
See: State ex rel. Beineke
v.
Littell
(1966),
If an action is commenced in the wrong court or in a county without preferred venue, the injured party may raise the issue by answer or motion pursuant to TR. 12. See: TR. 75(A). The remedy is an order transferring the case to the proper court as prescribed by TR. 75(B). Where a timely and specific objection is not made, the issue is waived and the court in which the action is filed hears and determines the case. State ex rel. Knowles v. Elkhart Circuit Court, supra.
Accordingly, Dubois Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this petition in the absence of an objection to improper venue.
We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Lowdermilk and Lybrook, JJ., concur.
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