55 Tex. 304 | Tex. | 1881
In order to avoid a multiplicity of suits involving the same questions, the original parties entered into the agreement, the effect of which was to waive the misjoinder of causes of action by the plaintiffs. The
We conclude that the agreement was valid and binding as between the parties thereto. It seems to have been recognized, and acted on, by the parties for several years. Purchasers pending suit are not regarded with favor by the courts. Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex., 326; Burford v. Rosenfield, 37 Tex., 42. Such a purchaser can only acquire such rights in the subject matter of the suit as was in his vendor. And when he becomes a party defendant by reason of such purchase, he can occupy no better or more advantageous position than did the original defendant. He buys the suit as it is, and simply takes the place of his vendor, and assumes the burdens that were resting upon him. In short, he is strictly in privity with his vendor, and can no more ignore his agreements with reference to the suit, and which are on file among the papers of the cause, than could the administrator ignore the agreements of his testator, made with reference to a pending suit.
We are of the opinion that said agreement is as bind
The other error complained of is not such as will likely occur upon another trial, and need not be considered.
It is our conclusion that a proper disposition of this appeal is to reverse the judgment and remand the case.
Reversed and remanded.
[Opinion delivered May 31, 1881.]
Ch. J. Moore did not sit in this case.