Pultz v. EconomakisPultz v. Economakis
Borah Goldstein Altschuler Nahins & Goidel, P.C., New York City (Jeffrey R. Metz of counsel), for Community Housing Improvement Program, Inc. and another, amici curiae.
Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP, New York City (Sherwin Belkin and Magda L. Cruz of counsel), for Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc., amicus curiae.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JONES, J.
Defendants are a married couple who own a five-story, 15-unit apartment building in Manhattan. Six of these units are rent stabilized and each plaintiff is a tenant of a rent-stabilized apartment within the building.
In June and September 2004, defendants served two plaintiffs with notices of “non-renewal of lease,” stating their intention to recover possession of all of the remaining rent-stabilized apartments on the ground of owner-occupancy pursuant to
In October 2004, plaintiffs commenced the instant action, seeking: (1) a declaration that defendants’ plan violated the Rent Stabilization Law and Rent Stabilization Code; (2) an injunction tolling the notices and enjoining defendants from instituting any holdover proceedings in Civil Court based on the notices during the pendency of this action; and (3) attorneys’ fees based on defendants’ breach of the residential leases with two of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that, consistent with the legislative intent to preserve rent-stabilized housing for persons and families that occupy such housing (see
Subsequently, defendants, relying on
By order entered April 14, 2006, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ cross motion solely to the extent of entering a judgment that defendants violated the Rent Stabilization Law and Code by failing to obtain DHCR approval before attempting to regain possession of the entire building. The court determined that because defendants sought to recover all of the building units,
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that defendants’ plan to recover rent-stabilized apartment units was governed by
“It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. The starting point is always to look to the language itself and where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning” (State of New York v Patricia II., 6 NY3d 160, 162 [2006] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see also Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]).
Plaintiffs maintain that
Section 2524.5 (a) (1), by its plain terms, is triggered only when there is an attempt to withdraw any or all housing accommodations from the rental market and where the owner requires the units for use in connection with a business he or she owns or operates, or because the cost of removing violations filed by government agencies is equal to or exceeds the value of the property. Where, as here, withdrawal from the rental market is not for one of the above-stated purposes, section 2524.5 (a) (1) does not apply.
Plaintiffs’ legislative intent argument presumes an ambiguity in the Rent Stabilization Code‘s owner-occupancy provisions with respect to defendants’ actions. Of course the Legislature intended to make more rental housing available, but it also intended to allow owners to live in their own buildings if they choose to do so. The unambiguous language of
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Division correctly granted summary judgment to, and vacated the permanent injunction against, defendants. In so ruling, we underscore that defendants may not recover the stabilized apartment units unless and until they establish in Civil Court (at holdover proceedings against plaintiffs) their good faith intention to recover possession of the subject apartments for the husband owner‘s personal use as the primary residence.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Order affirmed, with costs.