197 P. 346 | Cal. | 1921
The plaintiff brought seven separate suits for the purpose of recovering from the treasurer of the state of California taxes paid by it under protest. The taxes were levied at the rate of either three or four per cent upon the gross receipts from the business of the plaintiff transacted in the state of California. The rate is fixed and the tax authorized by section
Intrastate Interstate Total
Year Business Business Business Rate
1912.. $ 938,786.80 $ 966,516.17 $1,905,302.97 3% 1913.. 1,000,963.16 953,036.44 1,953,999.60 3% 1914.. 1,124,877.77 956,213.61 2,081,091.38 4% 1915.. 1,196,719.76 1,004,681.57 2,201,401.33 4% 1916.. 998,330.30 855,072.22 1,853,402.52 4% 1917.. 1,053,141.34 1,025,743.33 2,078,884.67 4% 1918.. 1,214,463.33 1,182,424.90 2,396,888.23 4%
Amount Plaintiff Total Seeks to Year Tax Recover
1912.. $57,159.08 $28,995.48 1913.. 58,619.98 28,591.09 1914.. 83,243.66 38,248.55 1915.. 88,056.06 40,187.26 1916.. 73,209.40 33,811.67 1917.. 82,115.94 40,516.86 1918.. 94,677.08 46,705.78 In considering the effect of this method of apportionment of the passenger fares derived from interstate business, it should be observed in passing that, if the rates of the plaintiff corporation for long interstate hauls are less proportionately per mile than for shorter hauls in intrastate business, it follows that if two passengers proceed from San Francisco to the state line at Yuma, one going to New York or Boston by the way of New Orleans and the other stopping at the state line, the amount of fare apportioned to the state of California would be less in the case of the traveler who is going to Boston or New York than in the case of the one who stops at the state line. If the state is entitled to levy a tax in the manner adopted, this would seem to be the fairest method of apportioning the receipts of an interstate common carrier. If the same system was adopted in all the states traversed by the carrier, the sum of the amounts thus apportioned to the several states would be equal to the gross receipts of the carrier derived from such interstate commerce.
Appellant's contention is that a tax upon the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce is in violation of the federal constitution giving Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and for that reason seeks to recover the proportion of the tax which is based upon the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce.
[1] It is apparently conceded by the appellant that the gross receipts of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce can be considered as a basis in a bona fide effort to determine the value of the carrier's property within the state, and that if the value so derived from the consideration of these gross receipts from interstate commerce and from intrastate commerce is the fair valuation of the property within the state subject to taxation, that the tax is valid. *487
If not so conceded, it is clear that such a tax is valid. (Wisconsin Mickigan Ry. Co. v. Powers,
The section of the California constitution authorizing and levying the tax declares that it is a property tax in lieu of all other taxes, state, county and municipal, and if this declaration is a true statement of the fact, it is undoubtedly true that the method is unobjectionable. The constitution, after enumerating the various companies which are required to pay the tax levied under its provision, requires that they "(a) . . . shall annually pay to the state a tax upon their franchises, roadways, roadbeds, rails, rolling stock, poles, wires, pipes, canals, conduits, rights of way, and other property, or any part thereof, used exclusively in the operation of their business in this state, computed as follows: Said tax shall be equal to the percentages hereinafter fixed upon the gross receipts from operation of such companies and each thereof within this state. . . . Such taxes shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county and municipal, upon the property above enumerated of such companies except as otherwise in this section provided. . . . All property enumerated in subdivision a [supra], b and d of this section shall be subject to taxation, in the manner provided by law to pay the principal and interest of any bonded indebtedness created and outstanding by any city, city and county, county, town, township or district, before the adoption of this section. The taxes so paid for principal and interest on such bonded indebtedness shall be deducted from the total amount paid in taxes for state purposes. . . ."
[2] The question as to whether or not the taxes levied by section 14, article XIII of the constitution are taxes upon property rather than upon receipts or income has several times been considered by this court and in each instance it has been declared to be essentially a property tax.
The opinion in City and County of San Francisco v. PacificTel. Tel. Co.,
"The appellant's contention, briefly stated, is that the constitutional provision relieves the companies named from no burden except that of taxes upon the property theretofore enumerated, and that the charge imposed by the ordinance is a business or occupation tax, and not a tax upon property at all, and therefore not covered by the so-called exemption. The respondent, on the other hand, claims that under a fair reading of the constitutional amendment, the liability of a telephone company to pay a percentage of its gross receipts was designed to exclude the power of the state, or of any county or municipality, to exact from it any further revenue (except as stated in the proviso above quoted) whether by way of a direct tax upon its property or in the guise of a license fee upon its business. . . .
"The percentages enumerated in the amendment are declared to be 'in lieu of all other taxes,' etc., and such percentages were, doubtless, fixed at higher rates than would have been adopted in the absence of a restriction on other taxation. These considerations are of weight in determining the rule of interpretation by which the provision regarding freedom from other taxation is to be read. . . .
"For these reasons we agree with the conclusion of the learned trial judge that the taxes imposed by the amendment supersede, not only other taxes upon property, but also license fees like those exacted by the ordinance of the city and county. This result, it seems to us, not only accords with the language of the part of the amendment defining the tax, but is in harmony with the apparent purpose and scope of the new system of taxation created by the amendment."
In the opinion in the case of Lake Tahoe Ry. etc. Co. v.Roberts,
In the opinion in Pacific Gas Electric Co. v. Roberts,
"Without pausing here to review the decisions of the supreme court bearing upon the question, but contenting ourselves with a subsequent reference to some of them, it may be said that the conclusions of the supreme court were that property used in the public service frequently acquired a value in the use, which value was something greater than the value of the property not engaged in such use; that by the systemization and unification of such properties in use they in the aggregate acquired a special value by virtue of this unity of use; that this special value was in the nature of property; that a fair tax upon gross earnings bore such a relation to the values of these properties under their unity of use as to justify such a tax upon revenue as being a legal and commutated or substituted tax for other taxes which were or might have been levied. (Maine v. GrandTrunk Ry.,
"So much for the justness and reasonableness and legality of the new method. . . ."
While we have not heretofore considered the proposition from the standpoint of its relation to interstate commerce, it is clear from the foregoing that this court has always considered the tax to be in fact what it purports to be, namely, a tax upon the property of the company as it is described in the constitution and with more particularity in the assessment by the state board of equalization.
The validity of such a tax from the standpoint of the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution, as interpreted by the supreme court of the United States, received careful consideration from the commissioners, who were appointed to formulate and report upon the proposed system of *490
taxation. Before the appointment of these commissioners, in pursuance of an an of the legislature authorizing such a body to be formed, the supreme court of the United States in a number of cases had considered whether or not certain forms of state legislation authorizing the taxation of inter-state commerce transportation companies was a valid exercise of the power of the state. The reports of the commission show that these cases were considered by them in formulating their plan of taxation and that an effort was made to conform to the then latest expression of the supreme court of the United States upon the subject. A quotation from Wisconsin Michigan Ry. Co.
v. Powers,
The court in disposing of the contention that the statute was an invalid interference with interstate commerce said: "We need say but a word in answer to the suggestion that the tax is an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. In form the tax is a tax on 'the property and business of such railroad corporation operated within the state,' computed upon certain percentages of gross income. The prima facie measure of the plaintiff's gross income is substantially that which was approved in Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
A decision (Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas,
Of course, the fact that the constitutional provision assailed by the appellant purports to levy a tax upon the property and to consider the gross receipts solely as a basis for the valuation thereof is not necessarily determinative of the question, however persuasive and definite such a declaration may be.
[3] The question as to whether or not a particular taxing law violates the federal constitution depends upon the practical operation and the effect of the tax imposed and not upon the definitions or declarations of the state authorities. The rule is thus stated in the recent case of Shaffer v. Carter,
To the same effect is the case of American Mfg. Co. v. St.Louis, supra, where it is said: "As a matter of construction, this, upon familiar principles, is conclusive upon us. But, as has been held very often, the question whether a state law or a tax imposed thereunder deprives a party of rights secured by the federal constitution depends not upon the form of the act, nor upon how it is construed or characterized by the state court, but upon its practical operation and effect. (St. LouisSouthwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas,
Before considering the effect of our new constitutional scheme of taxation upon interstate commerce, we cite some of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States on the subject, rendered since the system was adopted by this state. The decision of that court in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright,
"A state may not tax property belonging to a foreign corporation which has never come within its borders — to do so under any formula would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so far, however, as movables are regularly and habitually used and employed therein, they may be taxed by the state according to their fair value along with other property subject to its jurisdiction, although devoted to interstate commerce. While the valuation must be just it need not be limited to mere worth of the articles considered separately but may include as well *493
'the intangible value due to what we have called the organic relation of the property in the state to the whole system.' How to appraise them fairly when the tangibles constitute part of a going concern operating in many states often presents grave difficulties; and absolute accuracy is generally impossible. We have accordingly sustained methods of appraisement producing results approximately correct — for example, the mileage basis in case of a telegraph company (Western Union Tel. Co. v.Massachusetts), and the average amount of property habitually brought in and carried out by a car company (AmericanRefrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall). But if the plan pursued is arbitrary and the consequent valuation grossly excessive it must be condemned because of conflict with the commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment or both. (Western Union Tel. Co. v.Massachusetts,
"In the present case the comptroller-general made no effort to assess according to real value or otherwise than upon the ratio which miles of railroad in Georgia over which the cars moved bore to total mileage so traversed in all states. Real values — the essential aim — of property within a state cannot be ascertained with even approximate accuracy by such process; the rule adopted has no necessary relation thereto.During a year two or three cars might pass over every mile ofrailroad in one state while hundreds constantly employed inanother moved over lines of less total length. Fifty-seven was the average number of cars within Georgia during 1913 and each had a 'true' value of $830. Thus the total there subject to taxation amounted to $47,310 — the challenged assessment specified $291,196. . . . *494
"Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, relied on by defendant in error, contains the following passage which seems to uphold the Georgia rule: 'The mode which the state of Pennsylvania adopted, to ascertain the proportion of the company's property upon which it should be taxed in that state, was by taking as a basis of assessment such proportion of the capital stock of the company as the number of miles over which it ran cars within the state bore to the whole number of miles, in that and other states, over which its cars were run. This was a just and equitable method of assessment; and, if it were adopted by all the states through which these cars ran, the company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock, and no more.' But the point therein spoken of was unnecessary to determination of the cause; and so far as the quoted passage sanctions the specified rule for ascertaining values as generally appropriate, just, unobjectionable and productive of conclusive results, it must be regarded as obiterdictum, and we cannot now approve or follow it." (Italics ours.)
It is worthy of note that three members of the supreme court considered that even this method of assessment was a valid exercise of the state taxing power as theretofore determined by the supreme court. The opinion of the minority is thus stated by Mr. Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke concurring:
"The supreme court of Georgia sustained the tax on the authority of numerous decisions of this court, cited for the purpose. (
"In my opinion the Georgia system of taxing movable property of this character when habitually employed in the state, and the decision of the state supreme court sustaining the particular taxes in question, are based upon a correct view of the powers of the state under the federal constitution, and are in entire harmony with principles laid down in authoritative decisions of this court which have remained unchallenged for more than a quarter of a century. (Western Union Tel. Co. v.Massachusetts,
The appellant relies very strongly upon a recent decision of that court, Galveston etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas,
"Since the commercial value of property consists in the expectation of income from it, and since taxes ultimately, at least in the long run, come out of income, obviously taxes called taxes on property and those called taxes on income or receipts tend to run into each other somewhat as fair value and anticipated profits run into each other in the law of damages. The difficulty of distinguishing them became greater when it was decided, not without much debate and difference of opinion, that interstate carriers' property might be taxed as a going concern. In Wisconsin Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, supra, the measure of property by income purported only to be prima facie
valid. But the extreme case came earlier. In Maine v. GrandTrunk Ry. Co.,
" 'By whatever name the exaction may be called, if it amounts to no more than the ordinary tax upon property or a just equivalent therefor, ascertained by reference thereto, it is not open to attack as inconsistent with the constitution.' (Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams,
That the Texas case just quoted is not decisive of the case at bar is made apparent by a later decision of the supreme court of the United States much relied upon by respondent, wherein a law of Minnesota is sustained, requiring car-loaning companies to pay a tax upon their gross earnings within the state, in lieu of other taxes on the property. The matter is discussed as follows in the opinion (Cudahy Packing Co. v.Minnesota,
"As construed and applied by the state court, the Minnesota law requires a freight line company, meaning a company furnishing or leasing cars to railroads for freight transportation, to report annually its gross earnings from the operation of its car line within the state and to pay, in lieu of other taxes on the property so employed, a tax fixed at a stated per cent of such earnings. That court holds that this law is an exertion of the power of the state to tax the property within its limits from which the earnings are derived and is intended to embody a practical method of reaching and valuing that property, tangible and intangible, for taxing purposes.
"In so far as the property constituting this car line is regularly or habitually used or employed in Minnesota it is within the taxing power of the state, although chiefly devoted or applied to interstate transportation. (Pullman's Palace CarCo. v. Pennsylvania,
"As before stated, the state court regards the tax as imposed in respect of the property rather than the earnings, and the same view seems to be taken by the legislature, for the act of 1909 speaks of the tax as 'a tax upon its [the campany's] property' and the act of 1911 says 'the value of such property [that used within the state] for purposes *500 of taxation is to be determined' by reference to the gross earnings from the mileage within the state. True, this local view is not conclusive on this court, but it cannot be rejected unless it can be said to be ill founded. . . .
"The other case [United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223, U.S. 335, [
"The law imposing the present tax is closely patterned after the one exacting the tax upheld in United States Express Co. v.Minnesota, and contains the same declaration that the tax shall be in lieu of other taxes on the property. The statutes differ only in minor details and are both parts of a general system which the state applies to railroads, telephone lines and the like. So, unless this tax be otherwise distinguishable, it must, under the decision in that case, be regarded, as a property tax and not as laid on the gross earnings."
The decision in this case is clear authority for the system of taxation incorporated in our constitution, and "the local *501 view" concerning the same embodied in that constitution and the statutes and court decisions defining its purpose and scope.
In a still later case the system adopted by California was apparently applied by the state authorities of Nevada, and sustained by the supreme court of the United States. (State v. Wells Fargo Co.,
"Looking only at that entry there is strong ground for saying that the tax was laid on the privilege or act of doing an express business which was principally interstate. On the other hand, the action of the state board, on which the assessment concededly was predicated, indicates that what was taxed was the company's property in Humboldt County. The difference is vital, for, consistently with the commerce *502
clause of the federal constitution, the state could not tax the privilege or act of engaging in interstate commerce, but could tax the company's property within the state, although chiefly employed in such commerce. (Adams Express Co. v. Ohio StateAuditor,
"The company insists that the state is concluded by the entry on the assessment-roll. But the state court, as shown in its opinion, rejects that view and holds, in effect, that the entry must be construed in the light of the statute and the action of the state board, and that when this is done it is apparent that the tax was not laid on the privilege or act of engaging in interstate commerce, but on the company's property within the county. We perceive no ground for disturbing that ruling. In so far as it turns on the authority of the state board and the assessor under the statute and the relative effect to be given to their acts it is not reviewable here, and in so far as it relates to what really was the subject of the tax we think it was right. (See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, supra, p. 454.) Evidently the company at one time took this view of the tax, for in an amendment to its answer we find an allegation that the state board 'valued the property used by this defendant at the rate or sum of three hundred dollars for every mile of railroad over which this defendant transacted business, and apportioned said assessment or tax to the various counties of the state in accordance with the number of miles of such railroads, so situated within said county, and that the tax herein sued for was not otherwise levied or assessed.' . . .
"It also is asserted that the state board in valuing the property acted on inaccurate data and applied erroneous standards which resulted in a valuation so excessive as to make the tax a burden on interstate commerce. It is true that some inaccurate data and some computations following erroneous standards were presented to the board by a state officer in support of a suggestion that the property be valued at five hundred dollars or more per mile of line. But the *503 suggestion was not adopted, and it is not shown that the board's valuation was based on the data and computations so presented. Besides, if the valuation was excessive, the company was entitled in the present suit to show the true value and to have the tax reduced accordingly. (Rev. Laws 1912, sec. 3664.) An attempt at such a showing was made, but the state court concluded therefrom that a valuation of three hundred dollars per mile, as fixed by the board, was not excessive. It may be that the showing was not complete, but, even if so, it was the company's showing and was all that was before the court. After examining it we think it discloses no ground for condemning the tax as a burden on interstate commerce.
[4] It follows from the foregoing decisions that it is proper to consider, as a basis on which to establish the value of plaintiff's property in this state, the earnings derived from its property, tangible and intangible, within the state; and that it is proper to consider the proportion of its receipts derived from its interstate business, earned within the state as an element of that basis. [5] It is also clear that the system adopted by our state constitution for such apportionment of interstate earnings is the fairest possible method of such apportionment, and that by such method the state does not assert jurisdiction over any earnings from the interstate business, not actually derived from that portion of such business actually conducted within the state, and does not draw to itself earnings derived from capital or property elsewhere situated. In short, that the method adopted for the ascertainment of local values is wholly unobjectionable.
The appellant advances one other argument in support of its contention that the constitutional system of taxation is in reality a tax upon the gross revenues derived in part from interstate commerce and not a tax upon the appellant's property. The contention may best be stated in the words of the appellant: "The facts regarding what was done refute completely the claim set up by the defendant in his answer and found by the court that the property was taxed at all. It was thegross receipts and gross receipts only." The claim is that the reports of the state board of equalization and assessment by them of appellant's property make manifest that the tax in question is not a property tax. For the *504 purpose of considering appellant's contention it will be necessary to consider the method of fixing the rate or percentage of gross receipts (three per cent and later four per cent) used in determining the tax.
Before the new scheme was recommended hearings were had before this commission and all transportation companies, including plaintiff, doing business in this state were given an opportunity to present their views and their data upon the subject. It is, perhaps, worthy of note that the report of the commission shows that the plaintiff then stated that it was unable to comply with the request of the commission for information as to the proportion of its interstate business conducted in California and contented itself with a protest against any form of taxation which operated to place a burden upon its interstate commerce.
The tax commission in its report of 1906 to the legislature furnished the proper rate of taxation based on the gross receipts in order to properly tax the property of the various corporations involved in the amendment, as follows, to wit:
"In view of the strength of the popular feeling that taxes should be 'equal,' and of the obvious and essential justice of such a demand, it is highly important to discover a practical method for determining whether the burden of a tax which it is proposed to impose upon the gross earnings of a given class of corporations is the equivalent or not of a tax which might be levied under an ad valorem plan. Such a method has been devised by this commission. By the application of this method we can ascertain what rate of tax on the gross earnings is the equivalent of a given tax rate on the property, and vice versa. This will make it possible to compare any proposed gross earnings tax with an assumed 'fair' rate on property.
"Briefly stated that method is: To determine what tax rate on gross earnings is the equivalent of a given rate on the property, for a given class of public-service corporations, (1) ascertain what percentage of the gross earnings is net, (2) ascertain what rate of interest would constitute a fair return to investors in the securities of the class of public-service corporations under consideration, then (3) divide the percentage of net earnings by the rate of interest and multiply *505 the result by the given tax rate on property.* This method isnot as rigid or as infallible as the mathematical statement ofit might seem to imply. There is still room for difference ofopinion. But it has been found of great practical value in testing the probable effect of different rates on any set of assumptions. . . .
"In order to compute what rate of taxation on gross earnings is the equivalent of a given rate of taxation on the property, we have simply to divide the percentage of net earnings by the assumed rate of capitalization and multiply the result by whatever tax rate on the property we wish to compare the gross earnings rate with. Thus, for example, if we wish to impose, in the form of a gross earnings tax, a burden which shall be the equivalent of a tax of 1 1/2 per cent on the property, then in the case of a railroad, taking the figures assessed above, we divide 36 by 6 or 8, whichever shall be determined upon as a fair rate at which to capitalize railroad earnings, and multiply the result by 1 1/2, obtaining, at 6 per cent, 9 per cent as an equivalent rate on gross earnings, or at 8 per cent as a basis of capitalization, 6 3/4 per cent. If the tax rate on property or capital were fixed at 1 per cent, the above rates would become six per cent and 4 1/2 per cent."
The commission of 1906 also shows in its report the close approximation between the value of railroad property as theretofore assessed by the state board of equalization for taxation purposes, and the value to be ascertained by the proposed system. That portion of the report is as follows:
"The question of the equity of the gross earnings tax as between different roads can be tested somewhat roughly by comparing the taxes now paid on the ad valorem plan with the taxes that would be paid on the gross earnings plan. This is done in the following table for the more important railroad systems of the state. It is not argued that the present system is equitable as between the different roads, but it *506 affords the easiest and most readily available basis of comparison:
Tax on Per Cent Tax on Per Cent Column 3
Property. of all Gross of all Reduced
Present Taxes on Earnings Taxes on to Same
System Railroads. at 4 Railroads. Total as
1904. Per Cent Column 1.
Proposed
System.
Southern Pacific System ......... $1,349,425 75.85 $1,508,958 74.17 $1,319,484.30 Santa Fe System .......... 306,372 17.22 375,109 18.44 328,047.60 California Northwestern and North Shore ...... 62,612 3.52 82,027 4.03 71,693.70 Nevada — California Oregon and Sierra Valleys ........... 4,666 .262 7,661 .87 6,582.30 Salt Lake Road .... 27,237 1.530 24,423 1.205 21,486.95 Nevada County Narrow Gauge ...... 3,897 .191 5,125 .252 4,483.08 Pacific Coast ..... 6,959 .391 5,806 .285 5,070.15 Pajaro Valley Consolidated ...... 2,881 .161 2,535 .124 2,205.96 Sierra Railway ..... 8,424 .472 14,657 .721 12,826.59 Boca and Loyalton ........... 5,501 .308 6,936 .341 6,066.39 Lake Tahoe ......... 1,700 .095 1,265 .062 1,102.98 ---------- -------- ---------- -------- ------------- *$1,779,174 100.00 $2,084,502 100.00 $1,779,000.00
The similarity of values derived by the assessment of individual items of property, and by adding such items and thus ascertaining the total value, and the system inaugurated by the constitution, can be determined by a comparison of the assessment of plaintiff's properties by the two methods for the same years. The use of the two methods of valuation resulted from the adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1910 requiring a tax to be levied upon all the property of the state for the Panama-Pacific Exposition.
While the discrepancies between these two valuations is pointed out by the plaintiff as an evidence of the inequality and excess of the percentage tax, the analysis of the figures by the attorney-general shows that the valuations of the plaintiff's property, ascertained by the two methods, were practically identical. In considering these figures, however, it is important to bear in mind that while the law directs that all property shall be assessed at its full cash value, as *507 a matter of fact experience has shown that the assessed value is less than 50 per cent of the actual value, or, to be more accurate, and use the figures of the state board of equalization in 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, the assessed value was 45.1 per cent of the actual value; in 1915, 41.991 per cent; 1916, 42.755 per cent.
If the state board of equalization had certified to the county assessors the true valuation of plaintiff's property instead of the percentage of its value based upon the system of assessment adopted by the county assessors, the plaintiff's property would have home an excessive proportion of the tax. As stated by the supreme court of the United States in Sunday LakeIron Co. v. Township of Wakefield,
In making the comparisons of values another fact must also be considered, namely, that the gross revenue method includes all operative property (Const., art. XIII, sec. 14), while the property valuation, by the state board of equalization, for taxation purposes according to the former plan excludes certain operative properties, which are separately assessed by the various local assessors.
For the purpose of comparison we will use the figures furnished by the attorney-general in his brief for plaintiff's property:
Assessed Percentage Actual Value Undervaluation
Value. of Actual Value Ascertained by Latter
Value. from Per- Method.
centage
Gross
Year. Receipts.
1911 .....$2,995,760 45.1 $6,642,438 $5,020,112 $1,620,000.00 1912 ..... 3,070,654 45.1 6,808,500 5,148,426.13 660,073.87 1913 ..... 3,270,246 45.1 7,251,000 7,238,579.13 12,421.13 1914 ..... 3,459,920 45.1 7,671,600 7,227,781.25 353,819.25 1915 ..... 2,913,253 42. 6,936,300 6,009,143.88 927,156.22 1916 ..... 3,548,032 42.75 8,300,000 6,792,000 1,508,000.00 *508 To such item of undervaluation must be added the operative properties locally assessed. Expressed in terms of tax the comparison is compiled by the attorney-general from the reports of the state board of equalization, and is shown in the next table.
State Average Ad Valorem Gross
Board Tax Rate. Tax Would Receipts
Year. Assessment. Have Been. Tax Was.
1911 ...........$2,995,760 1 $2.53 $75.798 $57,159.08 1912 ........... 3,070,654 2 2.53 77.687 58,619.98 1913 ........... 3,270,246 3 2.55 83.391 83,243.66 1914 ........... 3,459,920 4 2.90 100.338 88,056.06 1915 ........... 2,913,253 5 2.91 84.778 73,209.40 1916 ........... 3,548,023 6 2.824 100.196 82,115.94
In view of our conclusion on this branch of the case it will be unnecessary to consider or determine the extent to *509 which the taxing power of the state may be exercised in the event that the burden upon the property of interstate Commerce carriers is out of all reasonable proportion to that imposed upon the property of others within the state.
[6] We cannot see that the validity of that portion of the act (Stats. 1911, pp. 530, 548, sec. 24), declaring a forfeiture of the right of a foreign corporation to do business in the state if taxes are not paid, is involved in this action to recover taxes already paid.
Judgment affirmed.
Olney, J., Sloane, J., Shaw, J., Angellotti, C. J., Lennon, J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.
n t = -- x r. . . . i