88 Ala. 1 | Ala. | 1889
Dying declarations are received as evidence only in trials for homicide. They are limited in their scope to the act which causes the death, and the attendant circumstances, or res gestee. It is essential to their admissibility that, at the time when they were made, the declarant should have been in actual danger of death, that he should then have had a full apprehension of his danger, and that death has ensued. — 1 Taylor Ev. § 718. “It is the impression of impending death, and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, which renders the testimony admissible.” — Ib.; Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502; Whar. Cir. Ev. §§ 282-3-4; 3 Brick. Dig. 226, §§ 663 et seq.; Clark’s Manual, §§ 538 et seq.; Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 121.
The proof of previous threats made by the accused was clearly admissible.— Walker v. State, 85 Ala. 7.
The court rightly refused to give the charges asked, even if, in a proper case, they assert correct legal principles. The record fails to show any testimony to which those charges were properly applicable; and for all we can know, they may have been refused because they were abstract. We will not consider their sufficiency. — 3 Brick. Digest, 113, §§ 106, et seq.
Affirmed.