Aрpellant is charged with the offense of voluntary manslaughter of her husband. The district attorney was advised that Mrs. Pugh intended to raise the “bаttered woman” syndrome as a defense. The State filed a motion in limine “to require a specific proffer of evidencе from the defendant on said Syndrome and to rule such evidence inadmissible. ...” Pugh’s response admitted she would offer such evidence as one of her defenses. The State filed an amended motion in limine to “totally exclude evidence of the ‘battered woman’ syndrome if tendered by the defendant as part of a defense of justification by self-defense . . . and . . . the defendant not be allowеd to tender evidence of the ‘battered woman’ syndrome for any other purpose unless the dictates of Rule 31.4 of the Uniform Court Rules [“Notice of Intention of Defense to Raise Issue of Insanity, Mental Illness or Mental Competency”] are complied with in full.” The trial court held that “ [although this characterization of one suffering from the ‘battered woman syndrome’ does not conclusively fаll within the scope of insanity, mental incompetence, or mental illness contemplated by the Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.4, it doеs suggest the possibility of a mental deficit which might fall within any of the three areas of diminished capacity mentioned in the rule.” The trial court granted the “State’s Motion in Limine” and we granted interlocutory appeal to review this issue. Held:
The effect posited by the аpproval of the State’s motion is to totally exclude any evidence of appellant as to whether she comes within the parameters of the “battered woman” syndrome. Appellant is charged with the voluntary manslaughter of her husband. A possible dеfense is self-defense. “ ‘ “To establish [a] plea of self-defense, the defendant must show that the circumstances were such as tо excite the fears of a reasonable man that his life was in danger; a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm being insufficient.” ’ ”
Wells v. State,
The Supreme Court has also held, in
Chapman v. State,
258 Ga, 214, 216 (
The State argued to the trial court that “the Supreme Court in Smith [and Chapman] missed the mark” and “[t]he battered woman syndrome defense is, therefore, really a defеnse of diminished responsibility and although Georgia does not recognize the defense under that name it is implicit in the authorized verdict of Guilty But Mentally 111 pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131.” The trial court granted the State’s motion which excludes all evidence of the battered woman syndrome, even if appellant raises the issue of self-defense.
We need not determine whether the “battered woman syndrome” also raises an issue of insanity, mental illness, or mental incompetency, because the Supreme Court has specifically held thаt evidence of the battered woman syndrome is independently admissible in conjunction with a claim of self-defense.
Professor Wigmore observed that the possible multiple use of one evidentiary fact is a common problem in the field of evidence (1A Wigmоre on Evidence 1869, § 215), and “when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose and becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules аpplicable to it in that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity.” 1 Wigmore on Evidence 694, § 13. Placing this rule in the factual context of this case: When the evidentiary fact of the battered woman syndrome is properly establishеd by competent evidence, it is admissible in conjunction with the defense of self-defense, and it is not inadmissible because apрellant has not satisfied the evidentiary rules to admit the same evidence in relation to a claim of insanity, mental illness, or mental incompetency. Georgia law is in agreement with Wigmore. “Where evidence is offered and objected to, if it is compеtent for any purpose, it is not erroneous to admit it.”
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet,
Perhaps the rule is best stated in
Orr v. Dawson Telephone Co.,
We emphasize the fact that such evidence is admissible in connection with an issue of self-defense, does not mean that it can be used to raise the issues of insanity, mental illness, or mental incompetency — without prior compliance with Rule 31.4. The jury may properly be instructed on the limited purpose of admissibility of the evidence relating to the “battered woman syndrome.”
Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips,
Judgment reversed.