86 Va. 475 | Va. | 1890
dcdivered the opinion of the court.
■ The defendant claims title to the premises in controversy through Bowen, and at the trial, to maintain the issue on his part, he offered in evidence the deed from Whitehhad to Bowen, wherein most of the foregoing facts are recited. The plaintiff, who claimed through Rodes, objected to the introduction of the deed, on the ground that when the decree was entered directing the deed to be executed Rodes loas dead; but the circuit court overruled the objection, and admitted the deed, not as a conveyance of the legal title, nor as evidence of color of title in Bowen, but as evidence of a claim of title by Bowen; and this ruling, which was excepted to by the plaintiff, is the subject of the first assignment of error.
It is insisted that, so far as Rodes’ interest was concerned, the deed from Whitehead and the decree directing it were void for the reason just mentioned. But can this position be maintained? We think not. The provision in the decree directing the deed to be made tó “ the said purchasers,” of whom Rodes was one, or to their vendees, imports that Rodes was then living, and as the record discloses nothing to the contrary, the decree cannot be collaterally assailed. Nothing is better
It is true the record in the chancery suit wherein the decree in question Avas rendered, was not produced at the trial, but enough appears from the-recitals in the deed from Whitehead to Bowen for the purposes of the present case. If those recitals are inconsistent with the record, the plaintiff could have shown it by the introduction of the record. It is clear, therefore, that the deed was not only admissible in evidence, but that in this collateral action it must be regarded as an unassailable conveyance of the legal title. And as this view of the subject is decisive of the case, no other question need be considered. The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.