*1 619 Co., 734, Isaacs Hobbs Tie & Timber 282 U.S. Compare v. Co., 738-9; Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. 258 377, extraordinary 382.11 It U.S. is sufficient that ' remedy denied, mandamus should be because injunction pre common may remedy Trustees jurisdiction vent interference with the of the bank Ex ruptcy Compare parte Square court. Park Automo Station, Riddle, 244 412, 414; parte bile U.S. Ex 255 U.S. 450; parte Co., Ex Last Hinge Krentler-Arnold Moreover, 533. exer bankruptcy might, court cise its discretion, conclude that it desirable to have the litigation proceed the state court.12 discharged.
Rule PUGET & SOUND POWER LIGHT CO. v. SEATTLE. Argued 15, January 12, No. 344. 19, 1934. Decided 1934. March 11Compare Zehner, In re 787; 193 Fed. First Baylor, Trust Co. (2d) 24, F. 27. See note infra. 12McHenry v. La Société Francaise, Johnson, 58; In re Zehner, re 618; In Fed. First Trust 787; Fed. Baylor, Co. In re Schulte-United, (2d) 24, 27; F.1 (2d) 243; 50 F. In re Gas Co., Products (2d) 342; compare 57 F. In re Schermerhorn, 145 Fed. 341; In re Locust Bldg., 272 Fed. Field City Refining v. Kansas Co., 296 Fed. (2d) 9 F. *2 Innis,
Mr. Clarence R. with whom Messrs. Elmer E. Todd, Holman, E. Frank and William M. Allen were on * brief, appellant. for Baumgartner
Messrs. Walter L. and A. C. Van Soelen appellee. Mr. the opinion delivered of the Court. Justice Stone This is appeal § under of the Judicial Code from a judgment Supreme Court of Washington, 172 (2d) P. 727, Wash. sustaining a municipal tax, license or excise assailed by appellant as infringing the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.
An ordinance of the City of Seattle of May 23, 1932, an annual imposes license tax upon privilege carry- ing of selling the business or furnishing electric to consumers. The tax is of the 3% ” n income the business in the during the fiscal year next preceding year the tax for which the license is required. The suit, brought to recover an installment of already to enjoin the collection of future installments, was heard and upon decided demurrer appellant’s complaint.
Both appellant,. Massachusetts corporation, acting under municipal franchise, and appellee, City Seattle, acting by state authority, are engaged and actively compete in the business of furnishing electric light and power to consumers for hire. By state law the city is given plenary fix power to rates for the electric current distributes, and its rates are not subject to regu- lation- and control Public Commission, Service are those of appellant. Remington’s Rev. Stat. *3 of Washington. city of Revenues the from its electric light required are the by city charter, VIII, Art. “ 9, to in a deposited city light fund,” be special § separate from city, the funds general of the and transfer from one other, the by fund to direction of except city the council, by city is forbidden the Art. IX, charter. 17. Section 6 §. terms, ordinance, same imposes the tax on the “ law,” city permitted by so far as as that on levied ap- it city, that pellant. appears acting But the under a state statute, 9491, Remington’s Rev. Stat. of § Washington, ordinance, the has taxing bonds, enacted before issued the which, interest, both is payment principal secured by light the revenue of its electric business. Appellant statute, by ordinance, contends that municipal the and the bonds~themselves, terms of this to pledge superior the is charges all other revenue that the upon city the lawfully that in fact appears the tax. It the pay cannot not for city has tax or made paid provision paying court, in The state this said: passing question, it. on allo- probably cannot allocated, The has not power the revenues of its any cate, a tax. have of such Bonds been issued $30,000,000 against revenues from that excess prior lien on the and those bonds are entire business; taking operating even over precedence income from it— city’s light rev- that charges. Conceding machinery no set tax, subjected be enues could to Fur- to such end. accomplish in the ordinance up for no up budget provision thermore, making its. to cover the excise levy general taxes was made problem So must the ordinance. for in provided ordinance; been omitted though 6 had met as - (cid:127)” [p. . 671] the court intended decide statement
Whether this tax, assumed lawfully pay could that un- decision, purpose be the case for the that to determine, further for appellant insists necessary it would by the to itself were though tax even burden. actual no impose is imposed, with respect that no effective tax
Asserting city, argues carried the business business is denial competing of its the taxation it of without property deprives equal protection measure because the is also assailed due process. because, by imposing and uncertain and vague of it doing business, upon privilege a license tax contract franchise impairs appellant’s the ordinance the business. conduct right it the gave *4 constitutionality tax, of the state sustaining In unnecessary whether, to ascertain it under found court law, ordinances, and. state the tax city charter city from city paid light must be its fund by if or what general fund, to extent from than its rathér hereafter be transferred from one may now or moneys far general fund or how other, fund raised by may otherwise, directly taxation be used either or to indirectly, city’s lighting aid electric business. We questions resolve here. Decision attempt do these existing law its by not authorized is aid fund by taxation, disposing without the consti- en- question court, tutional decided state would arising tail the decision of other under questions, or equal protection clauses, and contract not raised con- appellant sidered the case. Moreover the insists that case of the tax would neither relieve burden nor a burden appellant impose comparable city, pay on the since same hand would both tax, receive the there is no constitutional limitation to use the tax when collected power on the Standard Oil for the maintenance business. Lincoln, Neb. N.W. City Co. v. All curiam, questions per aff’d
id. met suggested disposed thus are decision of the state court question which decided the constitutional here. and which we decide franchise or appellant’s
1. There is no contention that
duty
from
generally
paying
relieves it
any contract
or municipality,
It
not contended that
state
taxes.
is
tax its
merely
property
it
or is unable to
own
because
fails
taxing
property
like
business,
prohibited
here
lim-
business. The contention
is that constitutional
the tax
transgressed
itations are
because
affects
taxing sovereign
actively
business with which the
com-
in-
argued
For that reason
that the taxation
peting.
a forbidden
deprives
volves
discrimination and
property
process
of- its
without due
since the combined
tax and
compete may
be used to
destroy appellant’s business. As appellant asserts that
impose
the tax can
no
city,
effective burden on the
*5
virtue of
city, by
effect,
that
is,
contention
for-
entering
Amendment, upon
Fourteenth
competitor.
any
to tax
feited
authority the
by state
the business
conducting
In
state
sovereign power
a
exercising
part
The decisions
not curtailed.
has
Constitution
which the
may,
a
in the
state
leave no doubt
Court
of this
in a business com
constitutionally engage
interest,
public
a tax to
enterprise, levy
sup
by private
monly carried
Portland,
Frazier,
Jones v.
it, Green v.
port
engaged
with
interests
private
compete
245 U.S.
Lincoln,
Oil
supra;
Co. v.
activity. Standard
in a like
Madera,
228 U.S.
Helena
Water Works v.
Madera
Helena,
Co.
Water Works
equal protec-
inquire
to
whether
stop
need not
We
protect
from ad-
designed to
citizen
was
tion clause
sovereign,
to
out the
point
vantages retained
implications
appellant’s argument when
extraordinary
activities which have
government
expansions
to
applied
for
enough
commonplace.
present purposes
It
become
clause does not forbid discrim-
equal protection
that are
things
to
different. The dis-
respect
ination with
taxing sovereign
and its taxpayers
between
tinctions
private
The
obvious.
what-
many
corporation,
are
private
carries on its business for
public duties,
ever its
subject
obligation,
to the
common
profit
all,
government
expense
paying
contribute
taxes.
which is
enabled
function
municipality,
be-
gatherer, may acquire
it is
property
cause
a tax
or con-
public
in the interest of the
a business
welfare,
duct
if
used
public
must be
gains
ends.
Hence
require
does not
equal protection
abstain from
corporation organized
of a
taxing
for profit
merely
public
because
interest
the municipality
like
acquired
has
property
conducts
like business.
are
These differences
not lessened
nor
constitutional
uniformity
exaction of
increased because the city com
with a
petes
business which it taxes. Compare Spring
*6
Kutz,
Gas
66;
Co. v.
257 U.S.
Springfield,
Hollis v.
field
452;
255
Union,
U.S.
v.
Emergency
Corp.
Fleet
Western
275
415. The
may
U.S.
state
different
types
tax
payers .differently
though they compete.
even
State
Tax
Jackson,
Board
Commissioners
283
v.
U.S.
Salting
Alaska Fish
By-Products
Smith,
&
Co. v.
255 U.S.
44; Hammond Packing
Montana,
Co. v.
233
U.S.
Quong Wing
Kirkendall,
v.
U.S.
German Alliance
Kansas,
Ins. Co. v.
389, 418;
U.S.
Citizens Telephone
Fuller,
Co. v.
229 U.S.
A
322.
business which in private hands
ex
might be
empted from taxation because not conducted for private
is
profit
privileged
no less
because
capital
is supplied
by
government
which controls
init
the public inter
est. These considerations are in
way
no
affected by call
“
”
ing the city’s activity
proprietary
instead
govern
Compare
mental.”
South Carolina
States,
v. United
437,
U.S.
with Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.
151 and
& Eddy Mitchell,
v.
stitution The Four- Henson, Vicksburg supra; property protect purport does not Amendment teenth state, Mem- action every injurious oppressive from 398, 400; St. County, Shelby Gas Co. v. phis 276, nor can Co., 210 U.S. Railways United Louis v. Water Madera congenital defects, property it relieve com- Madera, preclude It does supra, 456. Works drastic, private enterprises between however petition, differ- axe who competitors taxation unequal prevent en- it took when risks which appellant Those were ent: call- suggested principle field. No articulate tered subject is not ing for the conclusion competing risks because the same exercise of a state carried reserved) constitutionally been which has beginning. *7 the in Such was decision Madera Water Works v. Madera, in supra, pointed where this Court out that the absence of contract restriction the Fourteenth Amend- ment prevent city does not a' conducting public in water competition works with private pre- taxation clude of the rival private business to to help Springfield succeed. See also Springfield, Gas Co. supra. v. Such must be our decision now.
2. The definition of
2
by
of
income
the ordi
nance,
is
vague
indefinite,
assailed as
and
is that
Seattle,
Telephone &
considered
Telegraph Co. v.
Pacific
ante,
By
p.
§§10
300.
and 20 the
comptroller
required
to make
regulations, having
rules and
the force
law,
of
carrying
effect,
for
the ordinance into
pro
ho
vide
forms
upon
blank
of return
taxpayer
which the
is to
such information
may
enter
as the comptroller
require to
him to compute
alleges
enable
the tax. As appellant
that
it has received its license
of
first installment
tax,
appears that a
has
practical
construction
been
an
officer
by
to the ordinance
administrative
com
given
it,
It
petent
give
which the state court
upheld.
has
construed,
that
apparent
ordinance,
thus
suffi
ciently
comply
to enable
with it
appellant
definite
and as
taxation
appellant’s return for
and the
of
method
computing
tax are
no
not disclosed
record
con
infirmity
stitutional
ordinance
is revealed. See
n
Inc.,
Boeing
Transport,
Edelma v.
Air
Affirmed. Mr. Justice Van specially concurring. Devanter, I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but not principal part opinion. court’s
The appellant, power company, assails ordi- imposing nance the tax on the following grounds: equal protection contravenes 1. The ordinance the Constitution Amendment of the Fourteenth clause lays appel- the tax on the United that it of the States business but on lant’s electric and city. like competing process due clause of that The ordinance offends the and lia- penalties Amendment severe prescribes that yet defines nonpayment bilities for computed, vaguely the tax is to be so income,” that amount of the tax cannot be ascertained with certainty. reasonable impairs
3. The ordinance the franchise en- contract titling conduct its business within the fifty for a years, thereby infringes term Constitution, contract it makes the clause enjoyment of the franchise depend continued on the payment of the tax.
The assault is taxing confined to this ordinance. Other ordinances, provisions some charter, and enactments, still other have a real bearing on the matter,- but validity their under the Constitution of the United question. States not called in I agree that the grounds second third of the assault must be held untenable the reasons stated in opin- ground I ion; agree further that the first must fail— essentially but for reasons different from those which the opinion announces. ground
The first proceeds on the theory free to equal accord treatment to the two competitive businesses, but its ordinance unreasonably and arbi- trarily against discriminates the business of the appellant and in own favor of its subjecting the former omitting to the tax and refusing to subject the latter a like burden. It therefore is of first importance to provides what the ordinance ascertain what are the *9 in adoption which surrounded its and which circumstances applied. is to be May 25, approved by Mayor The ordinance was and July year. was to become effective of that “ ” It in in provides that the word the several person § sections shall be taken include a unless corporation (c) plainly otherwise; the context shows in subdivision “ every 5 that the tax shall be applied person § ” engaged or carrying selling the business of furnishing and and light power city; electric within the “ 6 that (c) subdivision as far as shall, per- § by law, City Seattle, mitted to the applicable except be said shall City not, taxpayer, required conform to ”—the provisions the other ordinance this ” require other provisions obviously being those which sv/orn returns, application for license, etc.
The power electric and business of the and like highly have been and are business competitive, and are the ones the field. Both had in ordinances one inception adopted their 1902—the a' being under which the entered the field little than the one granting older the franchise under which proceeded: Both businesses have been plaintiff has and in relative greatly enlarged keeping extended with city. growth of conducted, required by The is' as is charter as an statutory provisions, and unit independent from all other activities gov- distinct whether city, proprietary; accounts, revenues, and the ernmental pertaining business are expenses kept, funds similarly as is adjusted, required, separate- handled revenues, expenses other and funds ly accounts, city. independence separation merely This persistent. formal, gov- but real its' a customer of its proprietary light capacity ernmental .630 therefrom electric cur- obtains municipal pur-
rent
lighting
needed
and other
street
poses.
governmental
For
current
in its
city,
this
capacity
is determined after'
pays
year
each
sum which
*10
given
are
public
a
all who are interested
hearing which
effected
opportunity
to
The
is
participate.
gen-
by
from the
transferring money
city’s tax-supported
eral
fund,
governmental
which
devoted to
uses,
is
fund
of
separate
proprietary
into which the revenues
the
The
required
paid.
be
light
power business are
to
given
amount to
in 1932 was
be
for such current'
$438,750.
budget as
The
Court
the State leave
Supreme
decisions
In
just
as
stated.
Uhler v.
no doubt
the situation is
Olympia,
1;
998,
151 Pac.
which
117,
Wash.
id.
city-owned
system designed'
relates to a
water
proposed
private
municipal needs,
for hire both
supply
“
4):
says
court
The revenues to be received under
(p.
plan
partake
...
do not
character
proposed
if
general
they
nor
fund be invaded
general funds,
can
“The
sufficient”;
again (p. 14):
city,
are not
taking
functions that are called
meeting
governmental,
capacity;
from
city
proprietary
...
[water]
charged
fund of
be
general
city may
therefore the
fund
a reasonable
special
charge
and the
credited with
[by
city]
provided
for the water used
where it
sois
The
a
city,
governmental entity,
in the ordinance.
as
system
private
the same relation to the
stands
it.” And that
further
patronizing
citizen who
court
admissible
that, while it is
under the laws of the
holds'
”
make
from
temporary
for a
loans
the tax-
state
special
fund to a
utility fund
supported general
or vice
special utility
from one
fund
if
versa,
another,
is solvent and has
borrowing fund
an assured income from
may
made,
repayment
which
is not admissible to
funds to another
from one of these
make loans
permanent diver
contributions or
insolvent, or to make
infrac
attempted
and that
another;
from one
sions
injunction.
prevented
bemay
tions of these restrictions
679-680; 206 Pac.
Seattle,
674,
Wash.
Asia
Tacoma,
529; 95 Pac.
524,
49 Wash.
Griffin
id.
Pac.
1, 7; 151
87 Wash.
Olympia,
Uhler v.
Seattle,
141, 147, 150-151;
157 Wash.
998; Von Herberg v.
Since issu- power light electric velopment submitting without bonds, selling revenue ing creating an indebtedness matter to the electorate outstanding of such bonds city. total part By $32,000,000. approximately of 1931 was at end are payable bonds by their own terms these law and from revenues derived fund created specially from bond business. its electric by the *11 gross alleges that complaint in its appellant ordi- law, underlying revenues of the business are pay- bonds, pledged to terms of the nances, and the “ interest; such bonds, and and that principal ment of the prior revenues gross such charge upon constitutes a pledge including charges whatsoever, and to all other superior for the Counsel operation.” maintenance and charges for re- other allegation questioning while not city, pledge law the applicable insist that under the spects, what only of at most revenues, but gross operation, maintenance and costs of after paying remains city’s business if laid on the question the tax in and that gross may from the ordinance pursuant operation. and of maintenance other costs revenues like of Wash- Revised Statutes Remington’s Section is- bonds were alleges the under which ington, into a paying and aside provision setting makes for sued, “ ” “ special any proportion any bond fund fixed or fixed ” “ ” amount revenues the business issued, aid of making which bonds and for are bonds “ payable special fund.” out such These pro- visions followed another are the same section declaring:
“ In creating or special such fund funds the com- mon council or corporate other authorities of such or town to the cost regard shall have due of operation and maintenance of plant system or. as constructed added and to, to any proportion or part revenue previously pledged bonds, as a fund for payment warrants or indebtedness, other shall and not set aside into such a special greater fund amount or proportion the revenue proceeds and than judgment their will be available over above such cost of maintenance and. operation and the amount or if proportion, any, of the revenue so previously pledged.”
The charter
also contains a
provision, §
(Fifteenth),
enabling
establish,
operate and
maintain
system
a
for
plant
furnishing electric power
light
industrial,
individual and municipal uses,
to provide
secure
therefor in whole
part by
earnings
or in
net
therefrom.”
Section
under which the appellant alleges the
issued,
revenue bonds were
is not confined to enabling
an
supply
light
power service,
cities
electric
but
them
enabling
also directed to
through the issue of
supply
like bonds to
street railroad service or a water
service.
In 1919 the
appellant,
then
owned street
system Seattle as well
railroad
electric
*12
system,
power
sys-
sold
transferred its street railroad
tem to
in payment
the
and received
million
fifteen
a supporting pledge
dollars of revenue bonds with
like
in
complaint
forth in
appellant
that which the
sets
633
arose as to whether
Controversy soon
case.1
present
the
street
gross
entire
revenue
the
includes the
pledge
after
system
paying
what remains
only
railroad
litigation
much
and operation;
of maintenance
cost
to es-
sought
persistently
in which the appellant
ensued
The liti-
pledge.2
the broader construction
tablish
sustaining
recognizing
in decisions
gation resulted
undetermined
leaving
but
respects,3
in several
pledge
revenue or
all of the
it includes
question whether
opera-
of maintenance and
left after the cost
what is
Seattle, 157
Herberg
The case of Von
v.
paid.
tion is
have been the last
1930, appears
Wash.
decided
up
and set
party
was a
of the series.
In concluding the
in the other cases.
contention
deci-
accordingly express
opinion
no
“We
court said:
sion
wages,and operating
of whether or not
question
upon
before
railway
must be
the street
expenses
railway
fund
the street
any money
application
evidencing
purchase price
bonds
system.”
controversy
undetermined
acute and
view of that
In
pledge given
support
bearing
obvious
and its
electric light
pertaining
bonds
the revenue
business,
easy
why
it is
perceive
6
providing
of 1932 and
the ordinance
adopting
city’s business,
applicable
should
the tax
Evi-
by law.”
permitted
as far as
words
inserted
1
32;
127;
Colony
Pac.
Wash.
179
106
Seattle,
Old
v.
Twichell
Seattle, v.
U.S.
Trust Co.
659;
Seattle, Co. v.
Fed.
Von
2 Puget
Power &
Sound
(2d) 457;
Puget
Light
Seattle, 27 F.
Power
&
Co.
Herberg v.
Sound
644; Puget
v.
Light
278 Herberg,
Sound Power &
Co.
v. Von
(2d) 254;
F.
Seattle,
32;
127;
Seattle,
106 Wash.
Pac.
Asia v.
Seattle,
Twichell 157 Wash.
Herberg
206 Pac.
Seattle,
119 Wash.
Von
141;
.634
dently understood that, if the entire gross revenue from the business was pledged, it might be for that reason unable pay out part of the revenue for another purpose. It also is easy to perceive that the appellant, by reason of its interest in the street railroad revenue bonds, may have regarded the present suit as a suitable vehicle for its getting contention such respecting a pledge before a court possibly establishing indirectly what it had been unable to establish its through earlier and direct efforts. Certainly the appellant could not reason- ably have expected to enhance its chances of in success the present suit by introducing such a respect- contention ing the pledge in given support light the electric power revenue bonds.
Of the circumstances which the ordinance was adopted and of the provision in 6 declaring the tax ap- § plicable the city’s business, state court said present suit: “ The city, in proprietary its capacity, is in competition with appellant in the power and light business.' The pos- sible consequences to appellant, subjected if it is to an excise of per three cent on revenues, while competitor escapes burden, are too obvious for dis- Evidently cussion. having consequences such in mind, city council, virtue 6 of the ordinance, has subject undertaken to light imposed to the tax upon persons and corporations engag- in that ing business. This is merely a more or less friendly gesture. The city allocated, has not and prob- ably allocate, any cannot of the revenues of its power and to the payment of such a tax. Bonds have been $30,000,000 issued excess of against the revenues business; from that and those bonds are a prior lien on the entire income from taking precedence even over it— operating charges.” [p. 671.]
Counsel widely differ so respecting much of this excerpt as speaks of. existing pledge an obstacle to applying the city’s businéss. city say Counsel this statement rests allegation the appellant’s complaint and was presenta- made full absence *14 tion of the matter and without intention to render a de- thereon; cision they present arguments and citations giving color to hand, their On other assertion. the counsel for appellant the insist the statement decisive point as to its letter justifying in It them so is ob- insisting. vious that statement, the considered, when separately strongly makes for in view; the latter when but it read connection decisions', mention, with prior which it not does and with and statutory provisions, not which are charter noticed, there real arises a doubt whether it as was made utterance as alleged decisive recital of what was only to assumed be true.4 This is a matter on only the state court can with speak authority; ultimate as as will solution, appear later on, not essential for present it purposes, properly may put be to one side. done, When this is the appellant’s charge of unreasonable amounting discrimination of equal to a denial protection needs be examined with three suggested views of the existing mind —one pledge it as treating including the city’s business, the net revenues from as as- serts; another it treating including as the entire gross revenues, subject but payment any therefrom lawfully imposed city’s business; on the still another treating including entire as gross revenues and pre- venting, by reason of the contract clause of the Consti- tution, therefrom the tax named ordinance, as the appellant insists. 4 Inaccurate statements counsel sometimes lead to erroneous
assumptions by Langford Monteith, 145, courts. “ shall, as the tax that ordinance, 6, provides ” city’s law, applicable be permitted far way in the pledge business. Unless proprietary this carrying plain legal it is that there is no obstacle to suggest not The state court does into effect.5 provision for the and counsel presence any other obstacle; other any. On the do there is appellant not show im- the ordinance hand, for concede that counsel city’s and assert city’s- the tax on the poses revenues willingness tax out of the pay that business.
True, alleges complaint the revenues allocate budget for did not al- But this payment. from the such city point significance. As counsel-for legation is of no the tax- out, late while budget adopted was May. 25, 1932, adopted was until ing ordinance July year. Ap- 1 of that until did not become effective after shortly the ordinance complaint pellant’s was filed *15 making up fixed the time effective before became budget. another settling ordinance, city’s of In of of the the view the terms if counsel, that, is manifest attitude declared revenues, of the net tax falls on be the pledge the 5 Ky. 295; 62 Commonwealth, v. Commonwealth Ma v. Louisville 384; 372; Ky. 14 Co., S.W. v. Louisville kibben, Clark Water 90 1); Newport Ky. (affirmed 143 515; 14 502 U.S. 90 S.W. v. Com Ky. 845, 433; 434; 106 50 S.W. 51 v. monwealth, Covington id. (affirmed 231); Ky. 680; 39 836 173 Commonwealth, S.W. U.S. 183; 175, v. Saving Society Pa. St. Philadelphia, Fund Western 117; 94 Pa. St. Maginnes, County v. Erie v. Commission Chadwick 138; 368; 345, v. Manila, 220 U.S. 113 Pa. St. Atl. ers, Vilas 474; v. 75 N.C. And Commissioners, see Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. 437; States, Angeles Carolina v. United v. Los Los South Corp., Angeles Bank & United Gas Electric States of 904, Curran 15 How. Bank, Arkansas, 9 Wheat. Planters 309, just the other, as on the and that the unreasonable charge.of discrimination is without any basis.
If the of pledge subject revenues but of therefrom lawfully laid on the city’s business, thereby leaving free pay the tax imposed by the out revenues, ordinance of such it still is manifest treats ordinance both businesses alike, and therefore that there is no discrimination.'
If' the of pledge be the entire gross and, revenues contract Constitution, reason clause prevents application of the part revenues the payment tax, very of the it is plain that such discrimination as part results is neither on the arbitrary nor equal within the condemnation of the protection clause. equal The contract clause and the protection clause are parts Constitution; both and of course action taken omitted obedience to the contract clause cannot be a violation regarded equal protection clause. require Nor does clause right that a latter exemp which under other tion clause must be accorded.to particular business be also to a accorded similar business not otherwise entitled to it.6 in none
It follows of the suggested views can pledge appellant’s charge of unreasonable dis- crimination be sustained. this And, being so, there is no for now considering need which of suggested views pledge right. MgReynolds, Mr. Justice Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concur in opinion. this *16 6 Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, U.S. Corporation Packer 105, 109; 285 U.S. Utah, Des Moines National Bank v. Fair 103, 116-117; weather, Union Bank & Trust Co. Phelps,