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Puerto Rico v. Branstad
483 U.S. 219
SCOTUS
1987
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*1 BRANSTAD, GOVERNOR RICO PUERTO IOWA, OF et al. 1987 Decided June Argued March

No. 85-2116. *2 J., Marshall, opinion Court, delivered the of the in which Rehnquist, J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, JJ., C. Stevens, joined, and in I, II-A, II-C, O’Connor, JJ., Parts and III which Powell joined, J., in Scalia, joined part. O’Connor, J., and which in opinion filed an part concurring concurring in judgment, in the in J., which Powell, joined, p. J., post, Scalia, opinion part an concurring filed in concurring judgment, in the post, p. 231. Lino Saldana J. the cause for argued With petitioner. Cruz, were Hector Rivera him on the brief Secretary Jus- Carrion, tice of Ortiz Rico, Puerto Solicitor General, Rafael and Susan Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan.

Brent R. Appel argued the cause for With respondents. Miller, Thomas him J. on the brief were Attorney General of Iowa, Roxann Ryan Dahl, and Pamela Greenman Assistant Attorneys General, and William L. Kutmus. delivered the opinion Court.

Justice Marshall This case requires that we reconsider the of Ken- holding tucky Dennison, How. 66 that federal courts to fulfill the of State no order Governor

have obligation of the Con- under the Extradition Clause State’s justice. up fugitives § to IV, 2, Art. deliver stitution, I respondent January then a ci- Calder, Ronald 25, 1981, On employed Aviation the Federal air traffic controller vilian people two Juan, Rico, Puerto struck San Administration Antonio de Jesus victims, One of the with his automobile. Army injured; was killed. wife, Villalba, his Gonzalez, was eight pregnant; not her unborn child did months Villalba was parking App. occurred lot 3a. The incident survive. Aguadilla, grocery Rico, what was Puerto after of a store *3 apparently and De Jesus Gon- an altercation between Calder by police, According statements taken to two sworn zalez. a and one from witness to from De Jesus Gonzalez one striking couple his car two Calder backed incident, after prostrate body App. to of Villalba. or three times over the A34-A41. Pet for Cert. statements, arrested, of these Calder was basis

On municipal judge, arraigned charged a homicide, before with February 4, 1981, Calder $5,000 bail. On released on arraigned District Court of Commonwealth before a was first-degree charged murder and at- Rico, of Puerto appear preliminary tempted at to a murder. Calder failed hearing'on $50,000. was increased to March and bail by appear Despite representations that Calder would counsel hearing April preliminary he not do so. 13, 1981, on did at a justice, fugitive from was declared At that time Calder police, Puerto Rican $300,000. to The was increased bail having left Puerto Rico and believe that Calder had reason to family’s authori- Iowa, notified local his home returned to fugitive in Puerto Rico was a wanted in Iowa that Calder ties April charges. surrendered 24, 1981, Calder on murder On County, posted to local authorities in Polk Iowa, the $20,000 by Magistrate, bond set an Iowa and was Id., released. at A18-A19. May 15, 1981,

On the Governor of Puerto Rico submitted request to the Governor of Iowa a for Calder’s extradition. requesting papers fugi- included the arrest warrant, the charging tive resolution, the documents, and three sworn including statements of witnesses, one in which the affiant photograph depicting identified of Calder as the driver of requested the car. Counsel for Calder that the Governor of hearing, Iowa hold an extradition which was conducted the Governor’s counsel on June 17, 1981. at Id., A19. This hearing only partially was transcribed, but the record does permitted testify show that one of Calder’s counsel was his belief that “a white American man . . . could not receive a App. fair trial in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,” 32a, understanding while Calder himself testified to his that “on numerous occasions” witnesses Puerto Rican courts had “bought.” been Id., at 47a. hearing

After the extradition in Iowa, discussions between among Calder’s counsel, the Governors of Iowa and prosecutorial Rico, Puerto and authorities Puerto Rico apparently were negotiating held, with a view to a reduction charges lodged against Calder. These discussions *4 unavailing, were and on 28, December 1981, Iowa’s Gover- Ray, formally nor, Robert notified the Governor of Puerto “change Rico that in the absence of a to a more realistic charge,” request App. the for extradition was denied. to subsequent Pet. for request Cert. A44. A extradition made Ray’s respondent to Terry Governor successor in office, Branstad, was also denied. Id., at A21. February petitioner

On 15, Commonwealth of Puerto complaint Rico filed a in the United States District Court for against respondents the Southern District of Iowa Governor

223 declaration that a Iowa,1 seeking of Branstad and State extradi- of proper upon presentation failure to deliver Calder and the Extradi- Extradition Clause violated the tion papers (Act).2 further §3182 The complaint 18 U. S. C. Act, tion re- directing a writ of mandamus the issuance of requested of ex- duty” the “ministerial Branstad to perform spondent before the Respondents stipulated 7a-8a. App. tradition. with fully complied papers that the extradition District Court A20. Pet. for Cert. the Act. to App. of requirements with the complaint, agreeing dismissed The District Court v. Denni holding Kentucky this Court’s respondents to in any attempt 24 barred (1861), absolutely How. 66 son, with compliance authority compel federal judicial voke (SD Iowa, May No. 84-126-E or the Act. Civil Clause of Appeals A10. Court to Pet. for Cert. 1985), App. 1986). (CA8 2d 423, affirmed. 787 F. “[r]eluctantly” Court, complaint in this sought file a bill of previously had Petitioner file the bill was denied. jurisdiction. Motion for leave to original our under Iowa, 464 U. S. 1034 Puerto Rico v. provides: Section 3182 Territory authority any or demands State “Whenever the executive authority any justice, of the executive any person fugitive as a from fled, produces Territory person has State, to which such District or magistrate an affidavit made before copy indictment found or of an having person com- Territory, charging the demanded or State crime, gover- authentic treason, felony, other certified as or mitted person Territory whence the so the State or from magistrate or chief nor State, Territory fled, authority District or executive charged has secured, cause him to be arrested person has fled shall to which such demand, agent of authority making such or the notify the executive fugi- cause the authority fugitive, receive the and shall appointed to such agent If appear. no such agent such when he shall tive to be delivered to arrest, prisoner may be days the time of the thirty appears within discharged.” substantially original enact- unchanged since its has remained

The statute 1793, 1 also 18 U. S. C. Act of Stat. 302. See ment the Extradition (1940 ed.); § § Rev. Stat. 5278. *5 granted We certiorari, U. S. 811 to consider propositions concerning whether the the limitation of federal judicial power Kentucky in stated v. Dennison in 1861retain validity today. their We reverse.

II Kentucky v. brought Dennison an action under this was A original jurisdiction compel by Court’s writ of mandamus fugitive grand jury the extradition of a fejon. The of Wood- County, Kentucky, ford returned an in indictment October charging Lago, Willis a “free man color,” with the assisting escape’ crime of of a slave. 24 How., at 67. papers The defendant requesting was a resident Ohio, and pf upon his extradition were served William Dennison, the Gov ernor opinion of that State. Dennipon secured an Attorney Ohio’s General, who took the view that the Extra only dition Clause3 covered those acts which were crimes asylum “regarded under the law of the State, or which were by judgment as malum in se the general and conscience of civilized nations.” Id., at On this basis Dennison 69.4 brought refused extradition, and its mandamus ac Kentucky . in tion this Court The case was in heard 1861, and decided on February March 14. On that date was a fact, and civil war a secession threatening possibility. Representatives of the States 3“A charged Treason, Person Felony, State with Crime, or other Justice, who shall flee from State, and be in another shall on Demand foupd Authority of the executive fled, of the from which he up, be delivered State to be having removed to the State IV, of the Crime.” Art. Jurisdiction § 2, cl. 2. interpretation This of the Clause frequently was invoked Extradjtion period by the antebellum requested free States to extra Governors dite escape those who had assisted the initially of slaves. It was stated Governor Seward of New York 2See Works of William H. Sew (G. 1853); ard 502-509 generally Swisher, Baker ed. see History 5 C. Supreme Court of Taney the United States: The Period 677-685 *6 Deep Congress.

of the South had withdrawn from the Jus- Campbell reputedly engaged tice was in mediation efforts be- seceding tween the States and the Lincoln administration, resignation departure but his from the Court and from Wash- ington resigned April were imminent; he on 30, 1861. See 5 History Supreme Swisher, C. of the Court of the United Taney States: The Period 688-689 It was these practical power circumstances, with the of the Federal Gov- adoption ernment at its lowest ebb since the of the Constitu- Taney opinion tion, that Chief Justice delivered the Court. firmly rejected position by

The Court the taken Dennison and the Governors of other free States that the Extradition required only delivery fugitives charged Clause by asylum acts which would be criminal the law of the State. vague “Under such a and indefinite construction,” the Court peace said, “the article would not be a bond of union, and but controversy irritating a constant source of discussion.” Interpreting language How., at 102. for the first time the Clause, the Court looked to the fundamental role of the right request binding to extradition the individual States into a nation:

“Looking, therefore, to the words of the Constitu- policy necessity provi- tion—to the obvious of this preserve harmony sion to between States, and order and respective law within their borders . . . —the conclusion compact engrafted is irresistible, that this in the Con- every stitution included, and was intended include, to of- punishable by fence made the law of the State which it gives right was committed, and that it to the Execu- authority fugitive tive of the State to demand the authority the Executive of the State in which he is found; right given implies that the to ‘demand’ that it is an abso- right; lute it and followsthat there must be a correlative

obligation to deliver, without reference to the char- charged, policy acter of the crime or to the or laws of the fugitive State to which the has fled.” at 103. Id., Act Extradition The Court then turned procedures regulation of extradi- In the for the Stat. 302. the same abso- Act, that the Court found tion established obligation right demand and correlative to deliver. lute asylum the Act, under As to the State Governor of perform duty “[t]he is which he is to Court determined party merely ar- is, . ministerial —that to cause the to be . . authority agent or rested, delivered to the the State *7 24 at But How., was where the crime committed.” duty’ that words ‘it shall be the the Court concluded “the mandatory compulsory, not as but as declara- were tory used and duty” Id., of created the Constitution. the moral necessary, in was at 107. a construction the Court’s Such infirmity. view, to avoid constitutional any compel provide not the exe- “The act does means duty, any punishment neglect cution of this nor for inflict part the State; or of Executive of nor refusal on provision clause in the which is there or Constitution of the United States with this arms the Government place every power. power a Indeed, such would State under the control and of the General Govern- dominion in the its internal concerns ment, even administration rights. clear, we it and reserved And think that no Government, Constitution, Federal under the has any duty impose such, a as officer, on State perform compel and him to it.” Ibid. whatever, B years, Kentucky 125 v. Dennison has stood Thus, for over propositions: two that the Extradition Clause cre- first, for duty up upon mandatory fugitives proper de- ates a to deliver authority second, the federal have no mand; and that courts compelperformance of this ministe- under the Constitution to delivery. duty conclusions, first rial As to of these passage The lan- has revealed no occasionfor doubt. of time Michigan explicit.” guage v. Clause is “clear (1978). mandatory language Doran, 439 U. S. Its purposes: bring furthers its intended “to enable each state to swiftly possible offenders to trial as as in the state where the alleged preclude any offense committed,” was and “to state becoming sanctuary fugitives justice from for of an- Biddinger other state.” at Id., 287; see v. Commissioner of (1917);Appleyard Police, 245 U. S. 128, 132-133 v. Massa chusetts, 203 U. S. The Framers of the perceived objec- Constitution that the frustration of these impediment unity, tives would create a serious to national responds perception. and the Extradition Clause to that “It altogether, would have been far better to omit it and to have comity left it to the of the States, and their own sense of their respective conferring interests, than to have inserted it as right, yet defining right loosely so as to make it a never-failing subject dispute Kentucky and ill-will.” v. Dennison, at How., 102. We reaffirm the conclusionthat mandatory, the commands of the Extradition Clause are afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum Superior State. See Court California of Califor *8 (1987). 482 nia, 400, U. S. 405-406 dispositive, holding Kentucky

The second, and of v. Denni- upon son rests a foundation with which time and the currents change favorably. of constitutional have dealt much less If it facing looming seemed clear to in the Court 1861, the shadow of a Civil War, that “the Federal Government, under the impose Constitution, has no to on a State officer, any duty compel perform such, as whatever, and him to it,” principles 24 point How., 107, at basic constitutional now clearly way. years as the other Within 15 of the decision plain in Dennison duty, it was said that “when a official requiring performed, no exercise of is discretion, to be performance any person personal refused, is who will sustain injury by may compel such refusal have a mandamus to its performance,” objection and it was no that such an order might sought against be in the federal courts a state officer. Liquidation (1876). Board v. McComb, 92 531, U. S. 541 of 228 long principle may been

It has a settled that federal courts enjoin by unconstitutional action state See Ex officials. (1908). parte Young, 209 U. S. 155-156 It be su- would perfluous to restate all the occasions on which this has Court upon imposed duty obey requirements a state officials the compelled performance of the of Constitution, or the such may refer duties; it suffice to to Brown v. Board Edu- Cooper cation, 349 U. S. 294 Aaron, (1958). premise holding U. S. The fundamental in the Dennison—“that the States and the Federal Government coequal sovereigns all circumstances must be viewed as —is representative today.” Mississippi, not law of the FERC v. U. S. respect Yet, with law extradition, the has remained as century ago. it than was more novo, Considered de there justification distinguishing duty fugi- is no for the to deliver many species duty tives the other of constitutional en- forceable the federal courts. Indeed nature of the obligation many problems here is such toas avoid cope which federal courts must other circumstances. That duty precludes essentially this is a ministerial conflict with discretionary governance, elements state and eliminates continuing supervision for need federal of state furictions. explicit long-settled nature of the command, con- provision substantially tained in a constitutional and statute unchanged years, possibility for 200 eliminates the that state subjected officers will be to inconsistent direction. Because duty directly upon imposed is the States the Constitu- weigh performance tion there itself, can be no need to obligation against powers the federal reserved to the States under Tenth Amendment.

Respondents contend, an however, “executive com- *9 developed through mon law” has extradition the efforts employ Governors discretion accorded them under provides superior and that Dennison, this “common law” duty” provided alternative to the “ministerial to extradite Arg. for Tr. Constitution. of Oral assum- Even ing law,” this tradition of “executive common the existence of Long weight can accorded it. continuation of no be io practice incompatible or administrative decisional law requirements our of the Constitution cannot overcome g., requirements. responsibility e. See, to enforce thos'e (1954); v. Education, Brown v. Board 347 U. S. Green County Kent 391 U. Board, New School S. argu Though respondents’ terms, not articulated theise request we reconsider our construc ment is essence a thkt establish as a matter of con tion of the Extradition Clause to interpretation a has hitherto been stitutional discretion which solely explicit exercised because the Constitution’s command gone previously This, has unenforced. for the reasons decline to do. stated, we

C holding Respondents contend that even if the further contemporary Kentucky Dennison cannot Withstand scru v. tiny, petitioner prbfit would not from its demise because right no to demand rendi State, Puerto Rico is not a has fugitives It is true tion of under the Extradition Clause. only apply and we “States,” that the words of the Clause of Puerto Rico is en have never held that the Commonwealth confer]'ed upon the States under the titled to all the benefits today applicability need not decide what Constitution. We may to the Commonwealth of the Extradition Clause have clearly ap for the Extradition Act Rico, however, Puerto fugitives request plies. requires Act rendition of at the The demanding “Territory,” as It was decided of a as 'well State. long ago Territory Rico, that Puerto ais a United jus fugitives its States, could invoke the Act to'reclaim Bingham, Kopel ex rel. S. 468 tice, see New York U. challenge respondents do nob the correctness of change holding. subsequent to Commonwealth sta §§ through legislation, tus see 64 48 U. S. C. Stat. 731b-731d, did not remove from the Government of the Common pos power to demand extradition which it had wealth Territory, legislation sessed as a for the intention of that *10 230 degree autonomy and to Puerto Rico

was “to accord normally independence associated with States of the Union.” Surveyors Examining Engineers, Architects Board 594 Since the Act Otero, de 426 U. S. Flores applies may invoke the Rico, the Commonwealth to Puerto against rights to enforce state officers of federal courts including equitable relief to com- statutes, created federal statutory pel performance Maine v. of federal duties. See (1980). Accordingly, Rico Puerto Thiboutot, U. S. may predicate Act, its mandamus action on the without re- gard applicability of the Extradition Clause.5 to the direct

Ill Kentucky product of another time. v. Dennison is the conception and the of the relation between States fundamentally is in- there announced Federal Government compatible century more than a of constitutional de- velopment. decision has stood while the world of Yet this passed away. part conclude that it it has We which was longer. Appeals may is no The decision of Court stand

Reversed. Justice Powell O’Connor, joins, with whom Justice concurring judgment. concurring part opinion. join III II-A, II-C, I of the Court’s I, Parts ultimately this case under the the Court resolves Because to force the states to honor Respondents contend: “Puerto Rico seeks representatives though Congressional requests even its rendition opportunity the admission of Puerto not had an to consider states have argument. . . serves to into the Union.... Puerto Rico’s Rico as a state process.” Brief for significance of the statehood admissions eviscerate the legisla Congress enacted the Respondents Leaving aside the fact Commonwealth, Territory Rico first a and then tion which made Puerto required is not to extradite logic suggest would that Iowa this curious Massachusetts, presence in States, whose New York and felons to such as Congress. cast in is not attributable to votes Union I § 3182, II-B, do not find Part 18 U. S. C. Act, Extradition concerning the Extradition Clause of statements and its *11 necessary this case. Accord to the decision of Constitution, part opinion. ingly, to that Court’s I do not subscribe (1985); g., Kolender 472 U. S. Nelson, e. Jean v. See, (1983);Ashwander n. 10 v. 352, 361, 461 U. S. Lawson, v. (1936)(Brandeis, concurring). J., TVA, U. S. Scalia, concurring concurring part Justice judgment. portions of the Court’s result,

I concur in the § overruling Kentucky applying opinion 3182 and 18 U. S. C. interpreted Dennison, 24 insofar as it How. party predecessor I that statute. note that no before us Congress require lack of extradi- has asserted the Territory. tion from a State to a

Case Details

Case Name: Puerto Rico v. Branstad
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Jun 23, 1987
Citation: 483 U.S. 219
Docket Number: 85-2116
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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