Puchert v. AgsaludPuchert v. Agsalud
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- Before:
- Wakatsuki
OPINION
This is an appeal of the first circuit court’s affirmance of the director of labor and. industrial relations’ dismissal of Appellant’s complaint of unlawful discharge from employment pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-32(2). The complaint was dismissed for untimely filing under
The primary issue involves the construction of a statute,
The parties involved in this action are (1) Appellant Puchert, the employee who filed the complaint of unlawful discharge; (2) Appellee Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), the employer against whom the complaint was filed; and (3) Appellee Agsalud, Director of the State Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (Director) who dismissed Puchert’s complaint.
At the time of his alleged unlawful discharge, Puchert had been employed for several years as a port steward by Pan Am. On several occasions, Puchert had suffered back injuries at work, the last of which occurred on December 30, 1978. Due to this December 30th injury, Puchert did not return to work until January 6, 1979, at which time he was allowed to do only light duty work upon the instructions of his chiropractor. By letter of January 9, 1979, Puchert was discharged by Pan Am. The basis for this discharge was Puchert’s physical limitations in performing his work.
On January 14, 1979, Puchert, through his union (Transport Workers Union of America), filed a grievance with Pan Am as to his discharge pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Pan Am and the Transport Workers Union. The grievance was brought before the Board of Adjustment for arbitration on
February 7, 1979. The Board’s decision modified Puchert’s dismissal to a medical leave of absence not to exceed six months, and further, required that Puchert, during that six-month period, obtain a medical report from a physician approved by Travelers Insurance Company and a permanent disability
On June 1, 1979, Puchert filed a complaint, pursuant to
Five days prior to the expiration of Puchert’s medical leave of absence, as granted by the Board of Adjustment, Pan Am asked Puchert to advise the company of his intention to return to work.
On August 1, 1979, Puchert’s chiropractor submitted a letter to the department stating that Puchert was still only available for light duty work. However, on August 6,1979, Puchert was able to obtain a letter from the same chiropractor releasing him for regular duty “on a trial basis.”
The facts are not clear whether Puchert reported for duty on August 7, 1979, and was then discharged, or whether he received notification of his termination in some other manner. Nonetheless, Pan Am contends that on August 7,1979, Puchert had not complied with the terms of the Board of Adjustment’s decision, and therefore he had no right to return to work.
Neither on August 7, 1979, nor at any time thereafter did Puchert file another complaint with the department for unlawful discharge.
In June, 1980, a year after Puchert filed his complaint for unlawful discharge with the department, and ten months from the date he was allegedly able to return to work as a port steward, the department held hearings on Puchert’s complaint of June 1, 1979. Thereafter, the hearing officer recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of the
complaint. The hearing officer concluded that under
. I.
Before proceeding to an analysis of
The doctrine of labor law pre-emption concerns the extent to which congress has placed implicit limits on the permissible scope of state regulation of activity touching upon labor management relations. New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 527 (1979).
The Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151
et seq.,
which applies in this case, provides for compulsory arbitration to settle “minor disputes”.
Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville RR Co.,
406 U.S. 320 (1972);
International Assn. of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Air
lines,372 U.S. 682 (1963);
Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
702 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1983). A “minor dispute” exists where a collective bargaining agreement
Cases holding that state law claims are pre-empted by the RLA are clearly distinguishable. The complaints filed in those cases constituted state law claims that were non-existent but for the collective bargaining agreement which provided remedies for such claims, or the state law claims were identical to the contractual claims provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. E.g., Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville RR Co., supra, (state law claim of unlawful discharge depended solely on contract right not to be discharged); Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra (complaint of unlawful business practices in violation of California statutes was actually a complaint of wrongful demotion under the collective bargaining contract); Beers v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 703 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (complaints alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress referred to rights covered or substantially related to the collective bargaining agreement); Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) (emotional distress incident of discharge from employment rather than result of alleged conspiracy); Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F. 2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983) (state claim raised identical to claim employee would have made had he pursued his grievance through channels specified in the collective bargaining ageement).
Puchert’s complaint, however, does not constitute a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA. The resolution of the dispute in question does not hinge on the application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between Pan Am and. Puchert’s union. Puchert complains of a violation of his right not to be discharged from his employment solely because he suffered from a work injury compensable under the state’s workers’ compensation law. This right finds its source not in the collective bargaining agreement between Pan Am and Puchert’s union, but in the statute. See Air Line Pilots Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
If Puchert were not permitted to pursue his claim of wrongful discharge under
Other employment relations cases brought under federal statutes have held that where the right upon which the complaint is based is statutory, courts are not denied jurisdiction merely because a collective bargaining agreement exists which provides for grievance and arbitration procedures. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra; Harris v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 616 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (race discrimination suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (wage dispute under Fair Labor Standards Act); Airline Pilots Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, supra (violation of ERISA fiduciary standards in managing collectively bargained pension plan ); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
State court jurisdiction has similarly been upheld where it was clear that the source of the right alleged to have been violated was state statute rather than the
Inasmuch as Puchert’s claim of unlawful discharge has its source in state statute and his claim is not identical to any claim he may make under, the collective bargaining agreement, we hold that Puchert is not limited to pursuing remedies in the grievance and arbitration procedures established under the collective bargaining agreement.
Although we find that Puchert’s state law claim does not interfere with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, we must also consider whether application of state law in this case interferes with the scheme of the RLA.
This Court recently reviewed the question of pre-emption in the area of labor law in Gouveia v. Napili Kai, Ltd., 65 Haw. 189, 649 P.2d 1119 (1982). There we concluded that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) bestowed exclusive jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board on certain matters, id. at 193-194, quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Yet congress did not wholly pre-empt state regulation. Id. at 194, quoting Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). States retained the “power to regulate where the activity regulated was merely a peripheral concern of the [NLRA],” and “where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that in the absence of compelling congressional direction,. .. [it] could not infer that congress had deprived the states of power to act.” Id. at 195, quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra.
Gouveia and the cases cited therein examined the conflict between state law and the NLRA. This case, on the other hand, involves federal-state relations under the RLA, but the problems and considerations are analogous, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), and courts have applied standards adopted in NLRA pre-emption cases to RLA cases. E.g., Beers v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, supra; Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra; Majors v. U.S. Air Inc., 525 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1981); Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., supra.
The precise issue of whether state statutes prohibiting unlawful discharges for injuries compensable under workers’ compensation laws withstands federal pre-emption was presented in Peabody Galion v. Dollar, supra, and Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Co., supra.
The Oklahoma statute examined in
Peabody Galion
and the Oregon statute in
Vaughn
are substantially similar to
II.
We now turn to an analysis ofHRS § 378-33(b) , which reads: No complaint shall be filed after the expiration of thirty days after the alleged act of unlawful suspension or discharge, except that an alleged act of unlawful discharge under subsection 378-32(2) occurring while the aggrieved employee is still physically or mentally incapacitated and unable to work shall be considered to have occurred on the date the aggrieved employee is able to return to work.
Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, and the language is clearly consistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, judicial construction is inappropriate and it is our duty to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning. State v. Palama, 62 Haw. 159, 612 P.2d 1168 (1980).
However, where the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intention. In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 61 Haw. 572, 608 P.2d 383 (1980).
We find the statute here to be capable of more than one interpretation. Appellees construe
Appellant argues that
Finding both interpretations of
A.
The substance of
The purpose of this statute is to preserve the integrity of the workers’compensation law by protecting employees from retaliatory discharges. If an employer could, with impunity, coerce an employee into foregoing his rights, the employer would be able to destroy the function of the law and circumvent an obligation imposed upon him by the legislature. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 68.36(a).
Prior to 1974,
Furthermore, this court has long recognized the remedial character of the workers’ compensation statutes and has construed them liberally to effectuate their beneficient purposes. Evanson v. University of Hawaii, 52 Haw. 595, 483 P.2d 187 (1971); Re Ichijiro Ikoma, 23 Haw. 291 (1916).
Since the legislative intent of
B.
In analogous situations where employment discrimination suits were brought under the Federal Civil Rights and Age Discrimination Acts, federal courts have refused to dismiss suits prematurely filed. E.g., Hoover v. Opportunities Indus. Ctr. of Roanoke Valley, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Va. 1972); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1972); Budreck v. Crocker National Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Anisgard v. Exxon Corp., supra. Recognizing the remedial and humanitarian nature of the respective statutes, Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., supra; Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975), the federal courts have generously construed the law to afford claimants hearings on the merits and to prevent the loss of valuable rights. See, also, Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975); Black Musicians of Pittsburgh v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO, 375 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
C.
Appellee Agsalud urges affirmance of the circuit court’s decision on the grounds that a liberal interpretation of
By construing
We also note that the department sits in an adjudicatory capacity in hearing complaints of unlawful discharge,
Based on the foregoing, we hold that an employee, pursuant to
III.
Lastly, Pan Am argues that Appellant’s claim for relief should be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude that Pan Am’s assertion of laches is without merit. See Adair v. Hustace, 64 Haw. 314, 640 P.2d 294 (1982).
CONCLUSION
We hold that the circuit court erred in affirming the director’s decision dismissing Puchert’s complaint for untimely filing. Further, we hold that Puchert’s statutory claim is not pre-empted by the collective bargaining agreement or federal labor
Notes
Peabody Galion came before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as a diversity action.
(2) Solely because the employee has suffered a work injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the employer and which is compensable under chapter 386 unless the employee is no longer capable of performing his work as a result of the work injury and the employer has no other available work which the employee is capable of performing. Any employee who is discharged because of the work injury shall be given first preference of reemployment by the employer in any position which the employee is capable of performing and which becomes available after the discharge and during the period thereafter until the employee secures new employment. This paragraph shall not apply to any employer in whose employment there are less than three employees at the time of the work injury or who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement which prevents the continued employment or re-employment of the injured employee.
Originally designated as § 97-135; later redesignated as § 386-141.
The underscored language was added in 1974:
No complaint shall be filed after the expiration of thirty days after the alleged act of unlawful suspension or discharge, except that an alleged act of unlawful discharge under subsection 378-32(2) occurring while the aggrieved employee is still physically or mentally incapacitated and unable to work shall be considered to have occurred on the date the aggrieved employee is able to return to work.
Continuing a hearing, rather than dismissing a complaint, avoids the problem of having to re-file and re-process the same paperwork. When the claimant moves on for hearing after the continuance, he is, in essence, re-filing the complaint. Such “refiling” must be done within the time limits imposed by