PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., Pеtitioner, vs. JONIDA GOGA, et al., Respondents.
No. SC2024-0669
Supreme Court of Florida
July 9, 2026
This case requires us to clarify the standard of appellate review to be applied when a trial court dismisses an action for fraud on the court. In the decision below, the Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed a trial court‘s dismissal order, applying “a more stringent abuse of discretion standard.” Goga v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 383 So. 3d 490, 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (quoting Beseler v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 291 So. 3d 137, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). District courts across Florida have reached conflicting results in applying this unique abuse of discretion
The First District Court of Appeal recently considered this issue as well. See Pro Choice Remediation, Inc. v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 400 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Applying traditional standards of review to eаch aspect of the trial court‘s ruling, the First District reviewed the trial court‘s factual findings for competent, substantial evidence; its legal conclusions de novo; and its choice of sanction for abuse of discretion. Id. Notably, the First District did not employ a specialized or “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard in the fraud on the court context. See id.
For the reasons that follow, the framework of review outlined in Pro Choice is correct. Applying those standards here, we quash the Fourth District‘s decision in Goga and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
Jonida Goga was shopping at a Publix supermarket in Pompano Beach, Florida, when she slipped on spilled dish soap and fell. Security footage from the store showed that after her fall, Goga continued shopping. After perusing the wine section, a customer service manager helped her find a bottle of champagne, which she ultimately purchased.
Nevertheless, citing her slip-and-fall incident, Goga sued Publix for premises liability. She alleged that she sustained injuries to her neck, back, pelvis, and hip area and claimed to have received seven months of medical treatment for her spine. She sought damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages.
More than two years after the incident, Goga answered interrogatories from Publix addressing the extent of her injuries. According to her answers, she was unable to “lift anything heavy” or “do [physical] activities” such as playing in the pool. Nor could she “walk or stand for long periods” or “go places with both [of her] children alone.” In sum, she claimed that she would never be able to do many of the activities she did before the slip and fall.
Unbeknownst to Goga, Publix hired a private investigator to surveil Goga while discovery was ongoing. The investigator videoed Goga doing many, if not all, of the things she allegedly was unable to do. These includеd picking up and carrying her children, bending at the waist as she loaded and unloaded her vehicle, walking with groceries in hand, and even playing in the pool—all without restriction or apparent discomfort.
Given the discrepancy between these video recordings and Goga‘s interrogatory answers and deposition testimony, Publix moved to dismiss her complaint for fraud on the court. In support of dismissing the entire action, Publix cited the Third District Court of Appeal‘s decision in Willie-Koonce as “extremely analogous.”
Goga appealed. In reviewing the trial court‘s rulings, the Fourth District applied a “more stringent abuse of discretion standard,” reasoning that a “trial court‘s discretion is narrowed where dismissal is imposed as a sanction for fraudulent conduct.” Goga, 383 So. 3d at 493 (quoting Beseler, 291 So. 3d at 139).3
Asserting that the decision below expressly аnd directly conflicts with the Third District‘s factually analogous decision in Willie-Koonce, Publix sought our review. See
In Willie-Koonce, a woman fractured her femur when she was struck by a vehicle. 233 So. 3d at 1272. She later sued the owner and driver of the vehicle. Id. at 1273. In answering interrogatories and while testifying at her deposition, the woman claimed that, as a result of the accident, she had a permanent limp, which necessitated the use of a cane. Id. She also said she had difficulty carrying large items. Id.
As in Goga, an investigаtor for the defense had covertly surveilled the woman. Id. Videos recorded by the investigator showed that the woman was lying—she had no limp, did not use a cane, and was able to carry bulky items without assistance. Id. Following an evidentiary hearing, during which she testified and the investigator‘s videos were played, the trial court granted the defense‘s motion to dismiss her entire complaint with prejudice for fraud on the court. Id.
To resolve the conflict between Goga and Willie-Koonce, we granted review.
II
The central issue underlying the conflict here is the proper scope and standard of appellate review when a trial court dismisses an action for fraud on the court. Whether the Fourth District applied the correct standard of review is itself a question of law, so our review is de novo. See Alahad v. State, 362 So. 3d 190, 197 (Fla. 2023) (citing Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 252 (Fla. 2013)).
We begin by discussing fraud on the court and the origins of the “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard applied in Goga,
A
We have long recognized that cases may be dismissed for fraud on the court. See Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 194 (Fla. 1934) (noting that “a court has authority by summary means to prevent an abuse of its processes, and to peremptorily dispose of a cause of action that is frivolous or wholly vexatious,” including by “dismiss[ing] the cause“).
Three decades ago, the Fifth District Court of Appeal became the first district court to incorporate a definition of fraud drawn from a federal court of appeals decision:
The requisite fraud on the court occurs where “it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system‘s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party‘s claim or defense.”
The Fifth District concluded that trial courts must “carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system.” Id. (citing Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1117-18). The district court emphasized that dismissal, which the trial court in Cox had ordered, is the “most severe” sanction and thus “should be employed only in extreme circumstances.” Id. (citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).
Even so, the Fifth District opined that “where a party lies about matters pertinent tо his own claim, or a portion of it, and perpetrates a fraud that permeates the entire proceeding, dismissal of the whole case is proper.” Id. at 47 (citing Savino v. Fla. Drive In Theatre Mgmt., Inc., 697 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). “The integrity of the civil litigation process,” it explained, “depends on truthful disclosure of facts.” Id. Ultimately, the district court concluded that although it “might have imposed a lesser sanction” than dismissal, the question was “close enough” such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
Three things are noteworthy about Jacob. First, although the Second District did not clarify how “stringent” this standard was, its review was more rigorous than it would have been under the traditional abuse of discretion standard. The latter is “highly deferential,” Williams v. State, 415 So. 3d 168, 173 (Fla.) (quoting Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 994 (2025), for it asks whether “no reasonable person would
Second, the court in Jacob justified its imposition of a more stringent standard on the grounds that dismissal is an “extreme” sanction and that trial courts have “narrowed” discretion in the fraud context. Id. at 1169. Drawing on the latter consideration, some district courts, such as the Third District in Willie-Koonce, have referred to this standard as narrowed abuse of discretion. 233 So. 3d at 1273 (quoting Empire World, 89 So. 3d at 1038); see also, e.g., Ramey v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 993 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applying “an abuse of discretion standard that is somewhat narrowed” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Howard v. Risch, 959 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))).
Third, and finally, the Second District in Jacob applied this more stringent standard to the trial court‘s dismissal order as a whole—including its findings оf fact and conclusions of law—rather than to its choice of sanction in particular. A number of decisions have followed suit, effectively treating the trial court‘s fraud-based
B
“A standard of review is ‘a limiting mechanism which defines an appellate court‘s scope of review,’ and hence its power.” Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) (quoting Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 379 (1984)). The standard of review identifies the degree of deference, if any, afforded
For example, determinations of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. See Pinellas County v. Joiner, 389 So. 3d 1267, 1269 n.2 (Fla. 2024) (citing Knight v. State, 286 So. 3d 147, 151 (Fla. 2019)). Thus, any legal conclusion made by the trial court receives no deferencе from the appellate court on review. See D‘Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003).
Factual findings, by contrast, are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence. See Cartenuto v. Just. Admin. Comm‘n, 260 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Dep‘t of Fin. Servs. v. Freeman, 921 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 2006)). This standard of review is appropriate considering that “the trial court is in a superior position ‘to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based
Finally, matters committed to a trial court‘s discretion are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Rivera v. State, 260 So. 3d 920, 925 (Fla. 2018) (citing Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 817 (Fla. 2005)). This standard of review is a means of ensuring that trial courts make reasonable decisions even when exercising the discretion they possess. See Coney, 845 So. 2d at 137 (quoting White, 817 So. 2d at 806).
With these background principles in mind, we examine the nature of the trial court‘s decision here—dismissal as a sanction for fraud on the court—and the role of the appellate court on review.
C
Whether a party perpetrated a fraud on the court that
Factual findings in this context primarily consist of the nature and extent of a party‘s deception in filing the complaint, answering interrogatories, testifying during a deposition or at a hearing in court, and making other factual assertions during litigation. Of course, mere mistakes of fact do not constitute intentional deceit. See Cox, 706 So. 2d at 45, 47 (explaining that plaintiff inadvertently providing wrong social security number in her interrogatories was not fraudulent). And on appeal, a trial court‘s findings of fact may not be disturbed if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Cartenuto, 260 So. 3d at 910 (citing Freeman, 921 So. 2d at 601).
By contrast, the trial court‘s legal conclusions consist of its application of the law to its factual findings. See Alahad, 362 So. 3d at 198 n.4 (citing Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 606 (Fla. 2001)). If the trial court concludes, based on its factual findings, that a party committed a fraud on the court that permeated the entire proceeding, it has discretion to impose a sanction. See Savino, 697 So. 2d at 1012 (affirming dismissal when the plaintiff repeatedly “lied about matters which went to the heart of his claim on damages” and “undermined the integrity of his entire action“); Hogan v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same); Cox, 706 So. 2d at 47 (“[W]here a party lies about matters pertinent to his own claim, or a portion of it, and perpetrates a fraud that permeates the entire proceeding, dismissal of the whole case is proper.” (emphasis added) (citing Savino, 697 So. 2d 1011)). Applying de novo review, the appellate court should ask whether the individual‘s deceit was so egregious and pervasive that it amounted to an intentional scheme to undermine the impartial adjudication of the cаse. See Cox, 706 So. 2d at 46.
This leads us to the trial court‘s choice of sanction (or its decision not to impose one), which should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In applying this standard of review, an appellate court must determine whether the sanction, if any, imposed by the
As discussed earlier, the First District recently applied these traditional standards of review in the fraud context rather than the “more stringent abuse of discretion standard” used by other district courts. Pro Choice, 400 So. 3d at 791 (quoting Beseler, 291 So. 3d at 139). We agree that this approach is sound and consistent with established methods of appellate review.
D
By contrast, applying a “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard in the fraud on the court context is inconsistent with established principles of appellate review. As Judge Winokur observed, “link[ing] a standard of review to a
Courts have offered two related justifications for their use of this special standard: (1) trial courts are afforded less discretion in the fraud on the court context, and (2) dismissal is a severe sanction. Neither justification is sound.
Begin with the premise that a trial court has narrow discretion in deciding whether tо dismiss a complaint for fraud on the court. This simply means dismissal should be imposed cautiously given the extreme nature of the sanction. However, whether the trial court can employ its discretion in this context depends on its conclusion that sanctionable fraud has been committed on the court—that determination is not one of discretion, but of fact (what happened) and law (whether that amounts to fraud). See, e.g., Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (Fla. 2015) (observing that a trial court‘s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but its interpretation of “the evidence code and applicable case law” is reviewed de novo (quoting Pantoja v. State, 59 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2011))).
This unique standard of review also cannot be defended on the
The unpredictable and inconsistent application of this standard across the district courts only magnifies its flaws. As we have explained, some appеllate courts have applied the standard to the entirety of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss for fraud on the court—including its findings of fact and conclusions of law. See, e.g., 940 Ocean Drive, 403 So. 3d at 1054. Other courts have applied this standard only to discrete aspects of the trial court‘s ruling. For example, the district court in Goga emphasized the necessity of reviewing the trial court‘s sanction, 383 So. 3d at 496-97, whereas the court in Willie-Koonce focused its analysis almost entirely on a sufficient finding of fraud, 233 So. 3d at 1274.
For these reasons, we reject the “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard applied in Goga, Willie-Koonce, and other district court cases.
III
Applying the proper standards of review here, we conclude that the Fourth District erred in partially reversing the trial court‘s dismissal order.
First, the trial court‘s factual findings regarding the nature and extent of Goga‘s fraudulent conduct are supported by competent, substantial evidence. As revealed by the videos taken by Publix‘s private investigator, Goga repeatedly lied in her
Furthermore, applying de novo review, we conclude that the trial court properly reasoned that Goga had committed fraud on the court based on its factual findings. Goga‘s pervasive lying about the extent of her physical limitations was an intentional “scheme calculated to interfere with the [trial court]‘s ability impartially to adjudicate” her premises liability claims “by improperly influencing the trier of fact.” Cox, 706 So. 2d at 46 (quoting Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118). Likewise, Goga‘s fraud permeated the entire case—in the trial cоurt‘s words, her actions “comprehensively infect[ed] the integrity of th[e] action.” To the extent the Fourth District held to the contrary, it erred.
Lastly, we disagree with the Fourth District‘s determination, echoed by the dissent, that the trial court‘s dismissal of Goga‘s
IV
For the reasons set out above, we quash the Fourth District‘s decision in Goga and remand for reinstatement of the trial court‘s order dismissing Goga‘s entire complaint with prejudice.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., Petitioner, vs. JONIDA GOGA, et al., Respondents.
No. SC2024-0669
Supreme Court of Florida
July 9, 2026
The plaintiff in this slip and fall case testified during her deposition that she could not lift her young children and had not lifted them at all since her fall. She also testified that she could not bend at the waist. Goga v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 383 So. 3d 490, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). A private investigator hired by the defendant conducted several video surveillances that depicted the plaintiff picking up and carrying her children across parking lots, loading and unloading her vehicle with multiple bags of purchases, walking, and bending at the waist without any visible difficulty. Id.
Based on the information depicted in the various video surveillances, the trial court, after an evidentiary hearing where the plaintiff testified regarding the apparent discrepancies between her sworn discovery statements and what was depicted in the videos, entered an order granting the defendant‘s motion to dismiss the entire action with prejudice. Id. at 493.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed the trial court‘s order, relying on its decision in Beseler v. Avatar Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 291 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), where it held that “[a] trial court‘s dismissal of a claim for fraud upon the
Today, however, the majority rejects the “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard applied by the Fourth District and remands the cаse with instructions that the trial court‘s order dismissing Goga‘s entire complaint with prejudice be reinstated. Majority op. at 22, 24. I disagree.
Trial courts inherently possess the requisite authority, in the exercise of their sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court. Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). However, because the Florida Constitution guarantees every person open access to the judicial system to redress injuries,6 courts must
As the Fourth District specified in Goga, “[w]hen reviewing a case for fraud, the court should ‘consider the proper mix of factors’ and carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system.” Goga, 383 So. 3d at 495 (quoting Arzuman, 843 So. 2d at 952). The Fourth District added:
In balancing the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, trial courts must keep in mind that misconduct that falls short of the rigors of the fraud on the court test, including inconsistency, nondisclosure, poor recollection, dissemblance and even lying, is insufficient to suppоrt a dismissal for fraud, and, in many cases, may be well-managed and best resolved by bringing the issue to the jury‘s attention. In other words, allegations of inconsistency, nondisclosure, and even falseness, are best resolved by allowing the parties to bring them to the jury‘s attention through cross examination or impeachment, rather than by dismissal of the entire action.
Id. at 494-95 (second emphasis added) (citation modified).
Ultimately, the Fourth District agreed the trial court properly dismissed the portion of the plaintiff‘s claims associated with
Unfortunately, by excising the more stringent abuse of discretion standard, the majority in effect enlarges the scope of the discretion of trial courts. Consequently, trial courts are now empowered to subordinate the policy of favoring adjudication on the merits—an aspiration enshrined in the Florida Constitution—to competing interests aimed at safeguarding judicial integrity.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2023-0011
(Broward County)
Edward G. Guedes and Blayne J. Yudis of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida,
for Petitioner
Annabel C. Majewski of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, Florida,
for Respondents
Tiffany Roddenberry and Kathryn Isted of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida; and William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute
Bryan S. Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association